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Abstract
This thesis considers representations of time in cinema in the work of Michelangelo 
Antonioni and American and European experimental filmmakers of the 1960s and 
1970s. In particular, it considers the role of the technology of cinema itself, and its 
relation to photography and sound recording, in the “representability” and 
embodiment of time. Chapter One considers the prominence of “the cut,” and how 
this relates to notions of time, subjectivity and their discontinuity. Drawing on Hollis 
Frampton, Antonioni and Alain Resnais, I discuss how these notions are differently 
articulated in their work. Chapter Two focuses on the period’s intensive reflection on 
the stillness of the photographic at the root of cinema, and on the ways in which 
Antonioni, Frampton, Michael Snow, Andy Warhol and Marguerite Duras amongst 
others “remediate” photography within cinema. In particular, I discuss this in 
relation to the contemporary problem of boredom. Chapter Three considers sound 
and, more specifically, how the conditions of aurality were changed by the 
development of magnetic tape technology in the course of the 1960s. Here I discuss 
Antonioni development of “soundscapes” in his films, indebted to the ideas of the 
French musique concrete movement and John Cage. In addition, I look at the 
representation of sound recording technology within Antonioni’s films themselves, 
and the ways in which this also temporalizes the cinematic image. Chapter 4 
concludes the thesis by discussing the thematic of “The End” that pervades the 
period. I consider how film itself could function as an emblem of temporal 
irreversibility and entropic decay. Entropy is further considered through a discussion 
of “the desert” in Antonioni, Robert Smithson, and Nancy Holt.
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8Introduction: Apprehending Time
Time is what we know about it.
Gaston Bachelard1
In a short piece entitled “La ruota” (“The Wheel”), Michelangelo Antonioni 
describes an emergency landing in which he was involved in Death Valley, whilst 
making Zabriskie Point (1970). He and his crew were shooting the scene in which 
the aeroplane piloted by Mark, the male protagonist, descends to within metres of the 
ground, nearly touching the roof of the car where Daria, whom he is yet to meet, is 
driving across the desert. With his cameraman, Antonioni was filming from a plane 
behind the first. At one point, they accidentally hit the car’s roof: though the impact 
was almost imperceptible, both actress and driver were injured. “I looked down,” 
Antonioni recalls,
and I saw a wheel rolling next to the car, and I immediately asked Jim, the 
pilot, how it could be that, having touched the roof of the car, it was a wheel 
that had come off.
-  It’s not the car’s wheel -  Jim replied -  It’s ours. The front one.
Faced with an emergency landing in the desert, Antonioni’s reaction was, apparently, 
calm and serene. To facilitate the operation and make the plane lighter, he started to 
throw things off-board -  except, he points out, the movie camera. As he did this, he 
contemplated the surrounding landscape:
9I knew it well: I saw it every day and there was nothing different in it now. I 
thought that, since the landscape was the same as always, there was no reason 
why we, instead, should change and go from being alive to being dead. This 
-  so very human -  incredulity of mine made me smile. There were indeed all 
the same things as always in that landscape, except one: the tiny wheel that 
only a minute ago was still attached under our plane.2
In this contingency, then, the tiny wheel stands out in the vastness of the desert -  a 
setting in whose apparent homogeneity Antonioni, after days of shooting, has 
suddenly learnt to see “difference.” Within an unchanged landscape, this wheel alerts 
Antonioni to the difference between before and after; indeed, it marks this temporal 
difference. For the wheel is here the only indicator that time has passed and thus, in a 
way, functions as a sign, or a token of time itself.
Jean Epstein expressed a similar concern with time and its manifestation 
when he wrote that “time in itself does not exist.” Rather, he continued:
it is from events as such that the consciousness of what has been, of what is 
present, and of what will be derives; no one, it must be admitted, has a sense 
of time in itself, considered outside of the movement of things and their 
stasis.3
1 Gaston Bachelard, The D ialectic o f  Duration  [1936], trans. Mary McAllester Jones (Manchester: 
Clinamen Press, 2000), 49.
2A11 o f the above from: Michelangelo Antonioni, Quel bowling sul Tevere (Torino: Einaudi, 1983), 
184-85; published in English as That Bowling Alley on the Tiber: Tales o f  a D irector , trans. William  
Arrowsmith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Here and henceforth, unless otherwise 
stated, all translations from Italian are mine.
3 Jean Epstein, “Realisation de detail” [1922], in Ecrits sur le cinema 1921-1953, ed. Pierre Leprohon,
2 vols., vol. 1 : 1921-1947  (Paris: Seghers, 1974), 106 (my translation).
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Time, Epstein argues, can solely be grasped through “things” and their motion, or 
lack of it Our only experience and understanding of time, in short, is necessarily 
through a vehicle, a medium. And for Antonioni too, in the incident in the desert he 
reports, the wheel on the ground was indeed one such “thing” -  a medium of time.
Taken together, then, both Antonioni’s story and Epstein’s remark (the latter 
more explicitly and the former almost allegorically) bring into relief what one might 
call the “mediatedness” of time and, even, its ultimate inextricability from the things 
and events through which it is known. In addition, since both seemingly suggest that 
time may have as many “media” as there are things or events -  including, indeed, the 
small wheel in the immensity of the desert -  they also point us, more specifically, to 
the medium of cinema. For Antonioni’s reluctance to part with his camera, as well 
as, more implicitly, Epstein’s emphasis on “the movement of things and their stasis,” 
are informed by the appeal of cinema as a medium of time. At some level, that is, 
they both evoke the opportunity afforded by cinema to record and contemplate 
events and things; an opportunity, indeed, which makes possible a kind of 
observation of events and things not available when one is otherwise immersed in 
them. In this respect, cinema’s relation to time hinges on the fact that, if time is only 
apprehended through things and events, then cinema is a technology which, in its 
turn, apprehends things and events and grants us a special purchase on them. Three 
main aspects of this “special purchase” and, therefore, of how cinema relates to time, 
can be delineated.
A first aspect is the kind of link existing between cinema and what it 
represents. For the most part, cinema is a technology that represents by recording, or 
registration. This therefore means that, unlike paintings, cinematic images have an 
indexical relation to the objects they represent -  as well as, generally (unless, for
11
example, the picture is blurred) one of resemblance.4 Like photographs or sound 
recordings, cinematic images (with the arguable exception, in each case, of computer 
generated ones) presuppose and are the product of a direct connection with their 
referents. Indeed, the referent leaves an “impression” of itself on the very material of 
representation. Andre Bazin famously grounded his claim on this connection when 
he argued that “[pjhotography and the cinema [...] are discoveries that satisfy, once 
and for all and in its very essence, our obsession with realism.”5 Since these media, 
as he put it, “share a common being” with their objects -  “after the fashion of a 
fingerprint” -  they both present us, so to speak, with a bit of reality as such, or a 
physical trace of it.6 But where photography lacks movement, and can only give us 
the object “enshrouded [...] in an instant, as the bodies of insects are preserved [...] 
in amber,” cinema has the ability to reproduce objects in their movement. Unlike 
photography, which can only isolate discrete moments of an event, cinema can 
capture an event as it happens and in its very unfolding, thus offering us an “image
4 The classic definition of the indexical sign is Peirce’s, in Charles Sanders Peirce, The Collected  
Papers o f  Charles Sanders Pierce, 8 vols., vol. 2: Elements o f  Logic, ed. Charles Hartshome and Paul 
W eiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), esp. chapter 3. Peirce defines “index” as a 
type o f sign “we may think o f [ .. .]  as a fragment torn away from the Object” (137) “denot[ing] what 
it does owing to a real connection with its object,” thus “mark[ing] the junction between two portions 
o f experience” (160-61). Even though an index may also  be iconic, it doesn’t denote by resemblance 
but by physical connection. This is the case o f the photographic image, in which similarity, as Peirce 
points out, is just a by-product o f the photographs “having been produced under such circumstances 
that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to nature” (159). Peirce’s semiotic, and 
its application to film analysis, was pioneered by Peter Wollen, Signs and Meaning in the Cinema 
(London: Seeker and Warburg, 1969), chapter 3. See also: Rosalind Krauss, “Notes on the Index: Part 
1” [ 1 9 7 7 ]; jn 77je Originality o f  the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1985). On the basis o f Peirce’s definition, Krauss concisely summarizes “indexes” as “the 
marks or traces o f a particular cause, and that cause is the thing to which they refer, the object they 
signify” (198).
5 Andre Bazin, “The Ontology o f  the Photographic Image” [1945], in What Is Cinema? trans. Hugh 
Gray, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1967), 12.
6 Ibid., 15. A s I mention in Chapter 3, though Bazin’s argument is hinged on technologies o f  
recording (technologies predicated on some form o f “inscription” o f a referent in the “real” world), 
his bias is obviously for visual media. Thus, he appreciates the use o f sound technology in the cinema, 
since it restores to reality one o f the “elements” o f which silent cinema had “deprived” it. Andre 
Bazin, “The Evolution o f the Language o f Cinema” [1950-55], in What Is Cinema? trans. Hugh Gray, 
2 vols., vol. 1 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1967), 28. However, when he considers 
sound recording p e r  se, he brings it into relief as a means for storing not so much the real as the 
“aesthetic” world o f music. Andre Bazin, “Death Every Afternoon” [1949], trans. Mark A. Cohen, in
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of things” and “of their duration”: “change mummified, as it were.”7 Following 
Bazin’s argument, the time of which the moving image enables an apprehension is 
that of, or in, things and events; the time, that is, which may become manifest 
through them. And, given cinema’s indexical properties, this apprehension is, at 
some level, material. Thus, in documenting change, cinema paradoxically also seizes 
and “embalms time” in its passing.8 It can function, that is, as a sort of archive of 
time.
Immediately connected with this, a second aspect of the relation between 
cinema and time emerges. This, one might call a cognitive aspect. For Bazin, cinema 
“reveals” reality, it opens a window on things we may not otherwise be able to see, 
or to see properly -  not only because of our temporal and spatial distance from the 
event “transferred] to the screen,” but also, indeed, because of lack of it.9 
Furthermore, it can grant us a repeated view of things.10 So, by making possible the 
registration and archiving “of things” and “their duration,” and thus giving us a kind 
of access to them not otherwise available, cinema contributes to the “thinkability” of 
time. Besides, since events in the cinema are, so to speak, manipulable pieces of 
celluloid, the opportunity arises to organize them in new and possibly revealing 
ways. Cinema’s “material” apprehension of time, in other words, in turn supports our 
mental apprehension of it.
Ivone Margulies, ed., Rites o f  Realism: Essays on Corporeal Cinema (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003), 30.
7 Bazin, “The Ontology o f the Photographic Image,” 14-15. The relation between indexicality, time 
and death in Bazin’s essay is explored by Laura Mulvey, “The Index and the Uncanny,” in Carolyn 
Bailey Gill, ed., Time and the Image (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). For a study of  
Bazin’s insistence on the cinematic image as a form of preservation of the past in relation to modern 
historiographic discourse and historicity, see: Philip Rosen, Change Mummified: Cinema, Historicity, 
Theory (Minneapolis:-University o f Minnesota Press, 2001), chapter 1.
8 Bazin, “The Ontology o f the Photographic Image,” 14.
9 Bazin, “The Evolution o f the Language o f Cinema,” 28 and 37.
10 Bazin discusses cinematic repetition -  and, in the case o f the representation of death, its 
“obscenity,” in “Death Every Afternoon.”
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Finally, a third aspect of cinema’s purchase on time is that cinema itself cm  
be a vehicle of it. Just as a sunrise or a withering flower or, indeed, a wheel in the 
desert, may be among the things through which we get a “sense of time” (to use 
Epstein’s expression), so cinema as such may count as one of these things. This is to 
say that cinema may embody time directly, in its very materiality as a technology 
and a culture, as well as vicariously -  through the objects and events it may happen 
to represent. What counts in this respect, then, is not so much what cinema 
represents, as how it does so -  its physical and formal properties -  and the ways in 
which this signifies culturally. For, of course, its technology enables the 
manipulation and reconfiguration of things and events captured by the camera, both 
during and after filming. And the very way in which cinema technology does so -  
framing, cutting, editing, slow and fast motion, multiple exposure, repetition, freeze 
frame and so on -may itself come to function as a “carrier” of time.
Indeed, there are reasons to believe that cinema has been (whether 
consciously or unconsciously) seen to perform this role since its incipience, as Mary 
Ann Doane has argued in The Emergence of Cinematic Time.11 In fact, cinema has 
done more than simply mediate time. For, as Doane maintains, together with the 
other representational technologies (photography, sound recording, television, etc.) 
produced during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, cinema has actually been 
crucial to the “reconceptualization” of time which is essential to modernity.12 The 
scientific, technological, economical, social and cultural changes characterizing 
modernity, that is, both produce and depend on a rethinking of time in which
11 Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence o f  Cinematic: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
12 Ibid., 4.
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cinema’s role is pivotal in all of the ways I outlined above.13 And whilst one may be 
able to think of them separately, in practice they work together and are deeply bound 
up with each other. Indeed, even Bazin’s notion that the cinematic image should be 
valued “not for what it adds to reality but what it reveals of it,” also depends on how 
the cinematic image reveals what it does (i.e., in his view, long take, depth of focus, 
medium shot).14 Cultural theorists like Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer 
placed great emphasis on the ways in which the representational, indexical and 
technological aspects of cinema worked together to enable a cognitive grasp -  
Benjamin called it “a complex kind of training” of “the human sensorium” by 
technology 15 -  of time in modernity. For them, “the cut” in particular, as Doane 
points out, “was the incarnation of temporality in film, and it constituted the formal 
response to the restructuring of time in modernity.”16 As a marker of discontinuity 
and heterogeneity, the cut could designate both the experience of time in modernity 
and the related transformation of its conception. For -  also in the wake, of course, of 
Einstein’s general theory of relativity -  time came to be understood as relative to, 
and embedded in, subjects, objects, events; and therefore as very much unlike the 
homogeneous, continuous, absolute time of Newtonian physics. But, where the 
cinematic cut may function as a demonstration of time -  the very emblem of 
“modem” time -  it has also made this time. More than just embodying it, that is,
13 For Doane modernity is characterized by mechanization, rationalization, standardization and 
commodification; all o f which she considers in so far as they relate to time. For other studies of 
cinema and modernity see the anthology: Leo Charney and Vanessa Schwarts, eds., Cinema and the 
Invention o f  Modern Life (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1995). For further discussions of 
“modernity” itself, see e.g.: David Frisby, Fragments o f  Modernity: Theories o f  M odernity in the 
Work ofSim mel, Kracauer and Benjamin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985); Marshall Berman, All That 
Is Solid M elts into Air: The Experience o f  M odernity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982); Matei 
Calinescu, Five Faces o f  M odernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernsim  
[1977], (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987).
14 See for example: Bazin, “The Evolution o f the Language o f Cinema.”
15 Walter Benjamin, “Some Motifs in Baudelaire” [1939], in Illuminations, trans. Harry Zorn 
(London: Pimlico, 1999), 171.
16 Doane, The Emergence o f  Cinematic Time, 184. Emphasis in original.
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cinema as a whole has also actively shaped time; it has played a fundamental role not 
only in making manifest our notion of time but also in forming it. And in this 
respect, the way in which cinema depends on, “incorporates” and re-appropriates 
other representational technologies, as well as working alongside them, is also 
crucial.
Time and Cinema in the 1960s and 1970s
Hollis Frampton adumbrated much, if not all, of what I have outlined above when, in 
an interview in London in 1972, he said that “time is simply as plastic as the 
cinematic substance itself.”17 For Frampton, that is, the plasticity of time seemed to 
find an ideal medium in the plasticity of cinema. Why was Frampton, too, interested 
in time and cinema at this point? And why, in particular, was he interested in cinema 
as a medium of time? The answers to both these questions lie in Frampton’s remark 
itself, because it was indeed the “plasticity” of both time and cinema that, with 
renewed intensity, became prominent during the 1960s and 1970s.
Obviously, as I have mentioned, modernity as such is fundamentally defined 
by a concern with time: the question of its rationalization, management and 
commodification in production, labour and leisure; of its scientific and philosophical 
reconceptualization; of its role, as in psychoanalysis and phenomenology, in the 
constitution of subjectivity. Yet, this multifaceted concern with time became much 
more acute duringlhe 1960s and 1970s. In Pamela Lee’s view, this preoccupation
17 Simon Field, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” Afterimage 4  (Autumn 1972), 4 4 -77 .73  cited.
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acquired such intensity and pressure that, in her recent book on visual culture in the 
1960s, she actually proposes “chronophobia” as a signature of the period.18 Time, 
that is, became a source of almost obsessive anxiety. But, as with phobias in general, 
that which is feared is also, perversely, sought and played out -  for it fascinates and, 
even, enraptures.
In the wake of the postwar boom and the increased diffusion of mass- 
consumerism, time came to be felt, more and more pressingly, as a problem of 
repetition, standardization and routine. In this respect, even as it offers a recuperative 
reading of repetition, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (1968) indicts the 
incremental pace at which “our daily life appears standardised, stereotyped and 
subject to an accelerated reproduction of objects of consumption.”19 Along these 
lines, in his essay “Free Time” (1969), Theodor W. Adorno noted that, whilst having 
“expanded enormously in our day and age,” “free time” is in effect a travesty of 
itself, since it is as structured, routinized and repetitive as its assumed opposite, the 
time of work.20 For some, as for E. M. Cioran in ‘The Fall out of Time” (1964), this 
increased regimentation and standardization of everyday life actually meant a loss of 
time, a sense of having fallen into a “wrong eternity” from which time is “sealed o ff’ 
and hopelessly “out of reach.”21 For others, on the contrary, the consequence of the 
expansion of “spare” time and of its related commodification as “leisure” time, was a 
sense that there was just too much of time itself. Andy Warhol once seemingly 
suggested that he had turned to filmmaking as a way of dealing with this excess.
18 Pamela M. Lee, Chronophobia: On Time in the Art o f  the 1960s (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2004), xiv.
19 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition  [1968], trans. Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2001), 
293.
20 Theodor W. Adorno, “Free Time” [1969], trans. Thomas Y. Levin, in The Culture Industry:
Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. J.M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1993), 163.
21 E. M. Cioran, “The Fall out o f Time,” in The Fall Into Time [1964], trans. Richard Howard 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 174.
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“My films,” he said, “are just a way of taking up time.”22 Yet his films (such as, 
indeed, the notoriously long Empire [1964]), rather than overcoming this excess of 
time, quite literally, incarnate it: they take it up and play it out. And Warhol, of 
course, is also famous for actually cultivating boredom -  a disposition which is the 
very emblem of time as excess and “weight,” and whose currency, visibility and 
representation grew exponentially during this period.
But, as there were preoccupations about time’s monotony and endlessness, so 
there were anxieties about its end. Indeed, for Cioran, the “burial in blind repetition” 
to which modem life amounted already denoted the end of time -  or at least, as he 
put it, of a time that flew and knew “denouement.”23 Besides, industrialization started 
to generate concern not only for how it affected people’s social and psychic lives, 
but also for its devastating effects on the planet as a whole. Unlike earlier complaints 
with the sights, noises and smells of modernization, the 1960s saw the emergence of 
“ecological” discourse, and pollution and waste production started to be assessed in 
terms of the permanent and irreparable damage they caused to people and the 
environment. In this context, a reconstituted notion of thermodynamic entropy as 
corrosion and universal depletion also became popular.24 But the climate of the Cold 
War -  with its corollary of nuclear proliferation and of conflicts, coups and terrorism 
across the globe -  fed more specific and urgent fears of “The End” as such. Events 
such as the protracted and disastrous Vietnam War (1957-1975), the US-Soviet 
stand-off of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), when the threat of nuclear war 
suddenly felt very tangible, and John Kennedy’s assassination (1963), contributed to
22 Quoted in Peter Gidal, Andy Warhol: Films and Paintings [1971] (New York: Da Capo, 1991), 84.
23 Cioran, “The Fall out o f Time,” 178.
24 See, for instance, the work o f J.G. Ballard (e.g. The D rowned World [London: Victor Gollancz, 
1962], The Voices o f  Time [1963] [London: Phoenix, 1992], The Drought [London: Cape, 1965]) and 
Italo Calvino (“Smog” [1958], in The Watcher and Other Stories, trans. William Weaver [New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971], La speculazione edilizia  [Torino: I Coralli, 1963]).
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create an apocalyptic mood. Yet, the sense of apocalypse could cut the other way 
too, and be seen as an exhilarating moment of destruction or rupture that might, 
even, hold the promise of radical rejuvenation. And indeed, the period has become 
particularly “iconic” for its mass protests, and their international range and spread -  
not only the student revolts of the late 1960s and early 1970s but also, among others, 
the race riots and the peaceful campaigns of Martin Luther King’s Civil Rights 
Movement.
Space exploration, which the landing on the moon has made another 
symbolic aspect of the period, has a similarly ambivalent connotation with regard to 
time. For if “the sense of an ending” could tip over into an idea of beginning, then 
the buoyancy of the “conquest” of space could belie anxiety and pessimism. The idea 
of time was both further opened up and relativized by it. Some may have seen it as 
an enticing promise that our “earth-bound” condition, essentially constitutive of 
human time in Hannah Arendt’s view, could finally be superseded and expanded.25 
For others, though, it may have exposed the precariousness and insignificance of 
human life itself in the context of the universe as a whole. Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A 
Space Odyssey (1968), for example, seems hinged on this very ambiguity: does 
space travel bring evolution or involution? Is it a beginning or an end -  civilization 
coming full circle?
It is against the panorama of this multifarious concern with time, and of an 
understanding of time itself as multiple, malleable and elusive, that the period’s 
interest in cinema and its “plastic” qualities is situated. The 1960s inaugurated a 
period of inquiry and experimentation of unprecedented scope into all aspects of
25 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1958), esp. 2 
and 17-19. Arendt does indeed start her book by referring to the Sputnik satellite launched into space 
in 1957, and an anecdote about a news reporter presenting it as “the first step toward escape from 
men’s imprisonment to earth” (1).
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cinema, in which experimental filmmakers (as I shall for the most part refer to them 
here, in preference to “avant-garde” or “independent”26), feature-film directors, 
artists, critics and scholars were differently involved. Indeed, the constitution of film 
studies as an academic discipline in its own right in the 1970s was also in part a 
result of this moment.27
A number of technical factors were crucial to this phase of investigations and 
“experiments.” New equipment for both professional and amateur use was developed 
-  at once more practical and more affordable than any other to that date. In the late 
1950s, lightweight 16 mm synch-sound camera systems were launched, as well as 
portable 35 mm cameras, whilst the 1960s saw the commercial diffusion of Super-8 
film format (whose sprocket holes, smaller than in the standard 8 mm, allowed for a 
larger image). Meanwhile, emerging in the late 1950s, magnetic tape audio and 
video technology hit the mass market in the course of the 1960s -  and in portable 
formats (the Philips compact audio cassette was introduced in 1963, and Sony’s 
small video camera, the Portapak, in 1970).28 Together, as well as facilitating 
commercial film production, these developments contributed to the diffusion of 
filmmaking as an independent or personal activity. So, for example, magnetic tape 
(though not part of the technology of cinema in the strict sense), being cheaper and 
easier to handle, edit and mix than optical soundtrack, encouraged the diffusion of
26 In view, also, of the specific artists I will be considering, “experimental” seems the most 
appropriate term, preferable to “independent” (which creates ambiguity with non-Hollywood feature 
films of the time, such as John Cassavetes’s for example), “underground” and “avant-garde” -  this 
latter, however, I may employ at times. I mean “experimental” in the best possible sense -  a term 
which should convey an openness to the exploration o f the possibilities o f cinema, rather than a 
closure onto some (assumed) defining characteristics.
27 For discussions of this development, see e.g. D.N. Rodowick, The Crisis o f  Political Modernism: 
Criticism and Ideology in Contemporary Film Theory [1988] (Berkeley: University o f California 
Press, 1994) and Patrice Petro, Aftershocks o f  the New: Feminism and Film History (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 2002).
28 On the development o f cinema technology see e.g. James Monaco, H ow to Read a Film: The Art, 
Technology, Language, History and Theory o f  Film and M edia  [1957], rev. edition (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1981).
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sound recording on set or location. Meanwhile, the very emergence of magnetic tape 
technology -  and, in this context, of video in particular -  is also one of the factors 
behind the investigation of cinema that characterizes the period.
Yet this process of inquiry into the cinematic need not be framed as simply a 
defensive and essentially “negative” reaction to the perceived threat of the new 
media (though of course this might also have been -  and indeed has been seen as -  
part of the equation).29 After all, the “death” of cinema had been wrongly foretold 
often enough to have become an unconvincing cliche -  announced not only with the 
diffusion of television and, before that, with the advent of sound but also, famously, 
by the Lumiere Brothers at the very birth of cinema.30 Certainly, the emergence of 
these new technologies promoted a wide-ranging analysis of the structure, culture 
and history of cinema -  also, perhaps, pushing cinema into “self-reflexive” mode. 
But at the same time it also stimulated and contributed to the transformation of 
cinema itself. These technologies, that is, often constituted not so much something 
against which cinema was defined, as something in relation to, or even with which 
cinema was reconsidered, redefined, reviewed.
These series of innovations in camera and recording devices boosted 
enormously the sector of independent, “art film” production, as well as contributing 
to an explosion in the category of the “home movie.” The setting up of support 
groups and associations is, partly, a consequence of this increased production, as
29 For an acute discussion o f this in relation to experimental filmmaking, see: Rosalind E Krauss, A 
Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the Age o f  the Post-Medium Condition (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1999).
30 As many others, the Lumi&re Brothers saw the cinematograph as just another in a line of 
“novelties,” o f which people would soon tire. See e.g. Michael Chanan, The Dream that Kicks: The 
Prehistory and Early Years o f  Cinema in Britain [1980], second edition (London: Routledge, 1996), 
for an account of the development o f cinema in the context o f competing forms o f popular 
entertainment, as well as o f the various patenting processes and lawsuits through which the industry 
itself took shape. Hollis Frampton, “The Invention Without a Future” [lecture delivered at the 
Whitney Museum of American Art, New York, 17 November 1979], in O ctober 109 (Summer 2004),
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filmmakers tried to find ways of enabling the distribution and screening of their 
work. Organizations on the model of the New York Film-makers Co-operative 
(founded in 1962) and Anthology Film Archive (1970) emerged across Europe 
throughout the decade -  including the London Film-makers Film Co-operative and 
Filmstudio in Rome, a showcase for international and Italian experimental cinema.31
Experimental filmmakers, in particular, took the materials and mechanics of 
cinema as the object of intensive self-reflexive attention -  with the aim, often, of 
thus also “educating” those who watched their films. P. Adams Sitney sensed this 
tendency in the body of films he therefore labelled “structural” (by artists including 
Tony Conrad, Michael Snow, Paul Sharits, George Landow32, Joyce Wieland and, 
indeed, Hollis Frampton), which he saw as “insist[ing]” on their own “shape”33
Peter Gidal later (re)defined this trend more explicitly, by saying that in 
works of this kind “the process of making the film is the film,” “the film is a record 
of its own making.” From the perspective of the more vocally political cinema avant- 
garde in London, of which he himself was part, he also added “materialist” -  where 
this term designates both Althusserian Marxism and the technical “matter” of film as 
such -  to “structural.”34 In fact, this concern with the apparatus of film in cinematic
64-75, assesses the words often attributed to Louis Lumiere precisely in the context o f the 
development of video and computer technology in the 1970s.
31 See, among others: David E. James, ed., To Free the Cinema: Jonas Mekas and the New York 
Underground (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Alan Leonard Rees, A H istory o f  
Experimental Film and Video: From Canonical Avant-Garde to Contemporary British Practice 
(London: BFI, 1999); Bruno di Marino, Sguardo inconscio azione: cinema sperimentale e 
underground a Roma, 1965-1975  (Roma: Lithos, 1999).
32 George Landow is currently known as Owen Land. However, I have thought it more practical to 
refer to him using his previous name, since it is this that most often appears in the sources I cite.
33 P. Adams Sitney, “Structural Film” [1969], in Film Culture Reader [1970] (New York: Cooper 
Square Press, 2000), 327 (emphasis in original).
34 Here and above, Peter Gidal, “Definition and Theory o f the Current Avant-Garde: 
Materialist/Structural Film,” Studio International 187 (1974), 53-56. 55 cited. See also: Peter Gidal, 
M aterialist Film  (London: Routledge, 1989). Peter Wollen, “ ‘Ontology’ and ‘Materialism’ in Film,” 
in Screen 17 (Spring 1976), 7-23, constitutes a representative discussion o f concerns around the 
nature and significance o f “modernist formalism” in independent filmmaking; here “tautological ” 
formalism (i.e. “film as film ”) is opposed to a politically materialist (“post-Brechtian”) formalism. 
See: Peter Wollen, “The Two Avant-Gardes,” Studio International 190 (November/December 1975),
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practice was paralleled by a similarly analytical concern in theoretical discourse. For 
the main objective of what are now known as “apparatus theories” was indeed, 
through a coupling of Marx and Freud, the study of the ways in which the actual 
“machines” and processes of cinema (the movie camera, the projector, editing, 
printing) functioned to produce “ideological effects.”35
Undoubtedly, and whether the ultimate motivation was overtly “political” or 
not, the film movement Sitney and Gidal helped defined was primarily (though not 
exclusively) focused on staging and promoting reflection on the constitutive 
elements and principles of the cinematic. So, Wieland’s and Frampton’s A and B in 
Ontario (1967/84) hinges on the filming 0/ filming, as Wieland and Frampton film -  
or indeed, “shoot” -  each other in a playful “duel” of movie cameras. Landow’s Film 
in Which There Appear Sprocket Holes, Edge Lettering, Dirt Particles, etc. 
(1965/66), re-presents the filmstrip, whereas Snow’s Wavelength (1967) and Back 
and Forth (1969) concentrate our attention to the work of the camera: the former 
through a forward zoom, the latter with a persistent left-right, right-left pan. 
Similarly, Conrad’s The Flicker (1965) and Sharits’ Ray Gun Virus (1966) raise 
awareness of the intermittence of projection and the mechanism of the shutter.
In addition to its concerns with the material basis of cinema, this 
investigation also extended to its origin.36 Films such as Ken Jacobs’s Tom Tom the
171-75, for a contemporary discussion o f the perceived differences between American and European 
experimental filmmaking. In W ollen’s view , in Europe there are two avant-gardes: one is that of 
experimental filmmakers, the other is that o f “directors” such as Jean-Luc Godard -  this latter, 
because o f H ollywood’s hegemony over feature film production, is not found in the US. Finally, see 
(again) Peter Wollen, “The Avant-Gardes: Europe and America,” Framework 14 (Spring 1981), 9-10, 
for a problematization o f the then predominant reading o f the American avant-garde as a “film as 
film ” approach. He suggests that a more subversive “Duchampian” force may be at work.
35 See e.g. Jean-Louis Baudry, “Ideological Effects o f the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus” [1970], 
trans. Alan Williams, in Philip Rosen, ed., N arrative/ Apparatus/Ideology: A Film Theory Reader 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), as well as the anthology as a whole; and: Teresa de 
Lauretis and Stephen Heath, eds., The Cinematic Apparatus (London: Macmillan, 1980).
36 On this see e.g.: Bart Testa, Back and Forth: Early Cinema and the Avant-Garde (Toronto: Art 
Gallery o f Ontario, 1992).
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Piper's Son (1969), which “recycles” a short 1905 film and “transforms” it through a 
variety of techniques (slow motion, freeze frame, etc.), and Malcolm Le Grice’s 
After Lumiere (1974), a remake of Lumiere’s UArroseur arrose (1895), wear their 
interest in cinema’s early history on their sleeve. The pre-history of cinema, too -  the 
analytic photography of Eadweard Muybridge and Etienne-Jules Marey, the series of 
optical toys produced throughout the nineteenth century, such as the praxinoscope 
and the zoetrope, magic lantern shows, and so on37 -  became an object of attention 
as well as inspiration. A fascinating example in this respect is the amazing array of 
toys and pre-cinematic devices collected since the late 1960s by the Austrian 
experimental filmmaker Werner Nekes, part of which was recently exhibited at the 
Hayward Gallery.38 Both the circular movement and the kind of imagery (animals, 
acrobats, etc.) characteristic of these devices is evoked, amongst others, by Le 
Grice’s film Berlin Horse (1970), with its relentlessly repeated footage of a horse 
going round in a circle. In his essays, Frampton was very vocal in advocating what 
he called a “meta-history of cinema” -  a history, in fact, that would trace the 
genealogy of cinema not only in the visual culture pre-dating its official birth, but 
also in other types of cultural events.39
But the self-reflexive exploration of cinema and the interest in its history and 
prehistory were not exclusively an “avant-garde” affair. For, in many ways, it is also 
manifested in narrative films, at both the “commercial” and the “art” end of the 
spectrum. So, where Landow’s Film in Which There Appear displays the filmstrip
37 For a study o f nineteenth-century pre-cinematic devices and photographic motion studies, see e.g. 
Jonathan Crary, Suspension o f  Perception: Attention, Spectacle and Modern Culture (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1999).
38 The exhibition, entitled Eyes, Lies and Illusions, was at the Hayward Gallery, in London, from 7  
October 2004 to 3 January 2005. See the exhibition catalogue: Laurent Mannoni, ed., Eyes, Lies and  
Illusions: The Art o f  Deception  (Aldershot: Lund Humphries, 2004).
39 See in particular: Hollis Frampton, “For a Metahistory o f Film: Commonplace and Hypotheses,” 
Artforum  10 (September 1971), 32-35.
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for its whole duration, Ingmar Bergman’s Persona (1966) makes its display a 
Brechtian “distantiation effect” that interrupts and disrupts the flow of narrative. 
Michael Powell’s Peeping Tom (1960), whose stoiy is about cinema, its technology 
and its processes, ends with a sequence that returns us to, as it were, cinema’s 
“origin” in still photography. For, here, the scene is that of Muybridge’s motion 
studies: the protagonist (whose obsessive pursuit throughout has been the filming of 
the very moment of death) captures his suicide on a series of still cameras set off by 
trip wires, as he runs towards his death (a knife mounted on his movie camera).40 
Still photography as the historical root of the moving image is also evoked in the 
stereoscopic devices unearthed under a tree by Sissy Spacek’s character in Terrence 
Malick’s Badlands (1973), and in the sepia-tinted freeze frames, reminiscent of 
nineteenth-century photographs, of George Roy Hill’s Butch Cassidy and the 
Sundance Kid (1969). And while they allude to cinema’s genealogy in photography 
through an emphasis on obsolete instances of the medium, these films also bring into 
view the stillness of the photographic which is at the physical basis of cinema itself. 
Photographic stillness, as well as an analysis -  if not even, indeed, a “dissection” -  
of the photographic that has provoked debates ever since the film’s release, is also, 
of course, central to Antonioni’s Blow-up (1966). Meanwhile, Francis Ford 
Coppola’s The Conversation (1974) may been seen to unpack and reflect upon 
recorded sound in ways comparable to those adopted in Blow-up for the photograph.
The radical challenges to the confines of both the art object and the space of 
the gallery occurring during the 1960s are also fundamentally related to the period’s 
close investigation of, and experimentation with, the cinema. As Chrissie lies has
40 Cf.: Laura Mulvey, “Death 24 Times a Second: The Tension Between Stillness and Movement in 
the Cinema,” Coil 9/10 (2000), unpaginated. Muybridge’s experiments, as is well known, analyzed 
motion by photographing moving bodies with a battery o f cameras, each set o ff by the very 
movements o f the subjects being studied.
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noted, the “projected image” played a pivotal role “in creating a new language of 
representation” for art -  one very much alive today.41 Whilst several filmmakers, 
though coming to cinema via other routes (e.g. painting for Snow, Sharits and Le 
Grice, photography for Frampton), are now mainly identified with their cinematic 
output, many visual artists also took up the camera -  as one of their media -  during 
these years. Bruce Nauman, Richard Serra, Joan Jonas, Robert Morris, Mel Bochner, 
Vito Acconci, Robert Smithson and many others all made films. As what constituted 
the “object” of art was being drastically rethought and reconfigured, artists such as 
Nauman and Acconci might use the movie camera (and indeed the video camera, as 
it became available) to record an activity that -  as a film -  will itself become the 
artwork. Film and video were likewise used to document performances or, as in the 
case of land art, work in remote locations. Meanwhile, to accommodate this new 
type of work, the space of the gallery changed -  often taking the form of that “hybrid 
of white cube and black box” so ubiquitous today 42 And indeed, filmmakers 
themselves (including Sharits, Snow, Anthony McCall, Malcolm Le Grice, William 
Raban, Gill Eatherly, Marina Pirelli) also made work specifically for the gallery. 
Sharits, for example, created a number of multi-screen projections, which he called 
“locational” films. In this context, then, the projector -  in many cases more than one, 
as in Shutter Interface (1975) -  and the movement of film through it were literally 
exhibited, made a central part, when not the very subject, of the work.43
My specific interest, in this thesis, is with the ways in which the period’s 
concern about time and its inquiry into the cinematic intertwine. For many
41 Chrissie lies, Into the Light: The Projected Image in American Art 1964-1977  (New York: The 
Whitney Museum of American Art, 2001), 33.
42 Ibid.
43 On Shutter Interface, see Paul Sharits, “Locational Film Pieces,” Film Culture 65/66 (1978), 122. 
On Sharits’s films and installations see also: Annette Michelson, “Paul Sharits and the Critique of 
Illusionism: An Introduction,” in A A .V V ., Projected Images. Minneapolis: Walker Art Centre, 1974.
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experimental filmmakers, cinema was a way of experimenting with time itself. For, 
as Frampton’s claim about a shared plasticity of the two highlights, in and with the 
cinema, time became concrete and manipulable. In many respects, cinema made 
time, quite literally, a type of matter -  namely, celluloid: as Frampton added to his 
comments on “plasticity,” time can be “measured by counting the number of 
frames.”44 Gidal expressed a similar interest in the way in which cinema “captured” 
time in film frames, and thus opened it to manipulation. Talking about the fact that 
many of Warhol’s films, though shot at twenty-four frames per second, were meant 
to be projected at the lower speed of sixteen or eighteen, he enthused that “one click 
of the switch” allowed “the sense of time” to be changed.45
Of course, here the “sense” of time also calls into play the spectator’s 
experience of watching the films. It refers to how the unfolding of the film’s time 
may, in turn, produce an awareness of the viewer’s own time, bring forth, so to 
speak, his or her sense of time as embodied, lived duration. The philosophical 
discourse of phenomenology was an important theoretical framework for many 
filmmakers, artists, and critics at this time. With its emphasis on an equation 
between temporality and consciousness (of time, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty put it, as 
that which “arises from my relation to things”46), phenomenology helped rethink the 
aesthetic encounter in terms of a bodily experience unfolding in time. So, when 
Snow said that he saw his Wavelength as a “time monument,” the meaning of this
44 Field, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” 73. Cf. Lee, Chronophobia. Lee discusses the intertwining 
of art and technology in the 1960s, and the ways time is manifested through this relation. For 
instance, she discusses kinetic sculpture as a “mattering” of time (128).
45 Gidal, Andy Warhol: Films and Paintings, 80.
46 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology o f  Perception  [1945], trans. Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 478 (emphasis in original). In fact, Merleau-Ponty also wrote about the relation 
between film and phenomenology. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Film and the New Psychology” 
[1945], in Sense and Non-Sense, trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964).
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expression is twofold.47 At one level, it designates the time assembled and, indeed, 
constructed by the camera, of which the film is the repository (the zoom “moves” 
forward not in “real time” but with cuts; film stocks vary, some footage is possibly 
re-exposed, day changes to night, etc.). At another, a second “monument” of time 
emerges in the very experience of watching. For the film itself -  for its whole 
duration of about forty-five minutes -  is accompanied by an electronic sine wave 
sound of growing intensity. As the film unfolds, this loud unpleasant noise makes for 
some very uncomfortable viewing, one in which the “sense of time” is heightened -  
if not even, more strongly, created -  precisely by how time may be felt not to pass 
soon enough in an unpleasant situation.
As these examples indicate, experimental filmmakers talked often, keenly 
and explicitly about cinema and time, as well as producing work which drew on, and 
emphasized the perceived affinity between the two. And where Frampton had an 
unusually strong sense of its “total historical function [...] not as an art medium, but 
as this great kind of time capsule,” most saw it as something that turned time into an 
object of experiment, play and display.48 Overall, cinema seemed to offer an ideal 
medium through which time could be captured, produced and reproduced. And to the 
extent that cinema was seen to do so, it was also, explicitly or implicitly, a way of 
dealing with time as a problem -  be this the problem of its loss or the problem of its 
excess, of its fleetingness or of its slowness. Indeed, perhaps the “solution” offered 
by cinema might even simply amount to finding something to do with time: as 
Nauman’s films of his “exercises” in the studio and, as we have seen, Warhol’s 
statements seemingly suggest.
47 Snow quoted in Annette Michelson, “Toward Snow,” Artforum  9 (June 1971), 29-34. 31 cited.
48 Peter Gidal, “Interview with Hollis Frampton”[London, 24 May 1972], O ctober 32 (Spring 1985), 
93-117. 98 cited.
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Many of the preoccupations with time thus far outlined, as well as the pursuit 
of time through cinema in the work of artists and experimental filmmakers, also 
inform the feature films of Antonioni. The centrality of time in Antonioni’s cinema 
has been noted, amongst others, by Deleuze, for whom the director is exemplary of 
the new “cinema of time” that emerges in the postwar period.49 Antonioni features 
prominently in the opening chapter of Cinema II, where Deleuze’s notion of a 
“modem” cinema of “the time-image” is outlined.50 This is a cinema in which time, 
no longer a representational by-product of the movement of images (as in “classical” 
cinema), is embodied in the images, a core objective of representation. Indeed, it is 
this very centrality -  if not “visibility” -  of time that makes films such as 
Antonioni’s at once symptomatic and diagnostic of a moment of crisis and 
transformation in which time itself is a primary concern.
Yet, by contrast with the prominence of the word “time” in the public 
utterances of contemporary artists and filmmakers such as Warhol, Frampton and 
Snow, Antonioni is more reticent about it. Reading the extensive collection of 
Antonioni’s own writings and interviews, one scarcely finds anything comparable to 
Frampton’s quips about “time as the universal solvent” pitted against “time as an 
elastic fluid.”51 However, there is a sense that time is everywhere at issue in these
49 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-image [1985], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(London: Athlone Press, 1989), 22.
50 Ibid., chapter 1. See also, in particular, D eleuze’s discussion, inspired by Red D esert ( 1964), of 
Antonioni’s representation o f modernity as a dichotomy between a “tired, worn out, neurotic body,” 
and a “modem [...]  brain-colour with all its future potentialities,” 204ff. See also: Cinema I: The 
Movement Image [1983], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: The Athlone 
Press, 1992), esp. 119-120.
51 Gidal, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” 101. The most extensive anthology o f Antonioni’s 
writings and interviews on his films is: Michelangelo Antonioni, Fare un film  e p er  me vivere: Scritti 
sul cinema, ed. Carlo di Carlo and Giorgio Tinazzi (Venezia: Marsilio, 1994). English edition 
published under the title: The Architecture o f  Vision: Writings and Interviews on Cinema, ed. Carlo di 
Carlo and Giorgio Tinazzi (New York: Marsilio, 1996). A collection o f Antonioni’s writings as a film  
critic (mainly dating from the 1940s, prior to his debut in directing) has recently been published: 
Michelangelo Antonioni, Sul cinema, ed. Carlo di Carlo and Giorgio Tinazzi (Venice: Marsilio,
2004). In addition to the aforementioned Antonioni, Quel bowling sul Tevere, similar collections of 
stories, sketches and ideas for unrealized film s are: Michelangelo Antonioni, Tecnicamente dolce
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pieces -  if not, indeed, the issue. As the anecdote on “the wheel” I cited at the start 
of this introduction highlights, time is addressed through things, for it is only there -  
in objects, people, events -  that, according to Antonioni, time can be found and 
understood. Thus, for instance, in another piece, “Report About Myself,” Antonioni 
evokes the passing of time in a similar manner. Here, two arbitrary dates -1882 and 
2006 -  are used to designate “past” and “future.” But, Antonioni writes, it is only by 
connecting them to specific events in his experience that he comes to feel “trapped” 
between them as “indexes of time.”52 Thus, a notice for a reunion for the class of 
1882 that Antonioni happens to read on a shop window triggers his memory of a 
conversation with Roland Barthes about a young colleague whose retirement age 
would be reached in 2006. It is the concreteness of these events (even if only 
tangentially related to him) that makes the passing of time, and Antonioni’s sense of 
his own passing through time, palpable.
As this example further throws into relief then, whilst perhaps less vocal 
about time than his contemporaries in the avant-garde, Antonioni undoubtedly shares 
with them not only a concern about time but, more specifically, an understanding of 
time as plastic and mediated. More crucially still, he shares with them an interest in 
the plasticity of cinema as the ideal medium for revealing the plasticity of time itself 
-  as a medium, that is, where the very elusiveness of the latter can find some form of 
embodiment and thus, paradoxically, be “fixed.” For Antonioni, too, cinema plays a 
fundamental role in the articulation of time, not only to the extent that events are 
recorded, but also because its own technology makes time. And the type of time 
Antonioni constructs in his films, may ultimately not be so different from, for
(Turin: Einaudi, 1976) and /  film  nel cassetto , ed. Carlo di Carlo and Giorgio Tinazzi (Venice: 
Marsilio, 1995).
52 Antonioni, Quel bowling sul Tevere, 110. The title, “Report About M yself,” is in English in the 
original.
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example, the “time monument” Snow created with Wavelength, or “the cut[s] in 
duration,” Frampton wove in Zorns Lemma (1970).53 For, just as cinema is used as a 
means for moulding and creating time (hence, for example, his confessed dislike for 
“real time” because of all its “useless moments”54), it is also exploited for its ability 
to reproduce time and turn it, so to speak, on to the spectator.
But this is not the only way Antonioni’s and experimental cinema relate to 
each other. For where experimental filmmakers found Antonioni’s work stimulating, 
he was, in his turn, stimulated by their work. Keenly interested in the arts in general, 
Antonioni not only (as is often reported) admired Mark Rothko and Jackson Pollock, 
but also liked artists such as Claes Oldenburg and Warhol and followed the 
developments of the “underground” cinema.55 Thus, interrogated in 1969 about the 
“abstract tendency” of his films, he immediately replied by drawing on a 
conversation with Jonas Mekas where they had discussed how “narrative” was re- 
emerging in the “abstract” or “non-narrative” cinema too: even Warhol, Antonioni 
argued, was reintroducing “some sort of scheming,” of story.56 Conversely, 
experimental filmmakers were interested in, and admired Antonioni’s films. In his 
“Movie Journal” columns for The Village Voice, Mekas always wrote 
enthusiastically about Antonioni’s films, even defending Antonioni’s biggest flop, 
Zabriskie Point (1970), which, despite being much despised by critics and public, he
53 Gidal, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” 101.
54 Michelangelo Antonioni, “A proposito di erotismo” [1967], in Fare un film  e p er  me vivere, 145.
55 On his interest in Pop Art, see e.g. Jean-Luc Godard, “La notte, U eclisse, l ’aurora” [interview with 
Antonioni, 1964], in Antonioni, Fare un film , 259. For a discussion of Antonioni’s relation to Pollock 
and Rothko see e.g. Sam Rohdie, Antonioni, (London: BFI, 1990), esp. 65ff, and Seymour Chatman, 
Antonioni, or The Surface o f  the World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), esp. 54ff.
56 Giorgio Tinazzi, “L’esperienza americana” [1969], in Antonioni, Fare un film  e p er  me vivere, 315. 
On Antonioni’s views o f American experimental cinema see also: Alberto Moravia, “II deserto 
America” [interview with Antonioni, 1968] and Michele Mancini and Alessandro Coppabianca, “II 
mondo e fuori dalla fmestra [interview with Antonioni, 1975], in Antonioni, Fare un film  e p er  me 
vivere.
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had to watch standing in a sold out auditorium.57 Moreover, films such as 
Frampton’s nostalgia (1971) and Smithson’s Spiral Jetty (1970) clearly invoke 
Antonioni’s films: where the former calls into play the enlarged photographs of 
Blow-up, the latter is informed by the imagery of Red Desert (1964).
Though producing films for commercial distribution, Antonioni is in 
fundamental respects an “experimental” director. Asked what he thought of his 
films, he once answered that he saw them as “experiments -  both at the technical 
level and in terms of content.”58 His work is certainly characterized by an 
exploration, and testing, of the possibilities of the cinematic medium, as well as by a 
fairly “hands-on” approach to filmmaking as such. Antonioni has been fond of 
drawing attention to his close involvement in all phases of production, and to remark 
on the inevitable controversies and disagreements with producers this caused.59 His 
passion for experimenting with the technology of cinema, “inventing” new solutions 
(such as the bravura tracking shot at the end of The Passenger), and trying the latest 
developments, emerges strikingly from his interviews.60 In fact, as his keenness to 
work with video demonstrates, cinema is thought of “expansively,” as a medium in 
continuous transformation.61
57 Jonas Mekas, Movie Journal: The Rise o f  the New American Cinema 1959-1971 (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1972), esp. 372 for this episode.
58 Antonioni interviewed by Lino Micciche in the documentary by Luciano Tovoli, Antonioni visto da  
Antonioni (1978).
59 See e.g.: Aldo Tassone, “Conversazione” [with Antonioni, 1985], in Antonioni, Fare un film  e per  
me vivere.
“ The making of the last sequence o f The Passenger (1975), and its technicalities, are enthusiastically 
explained by Antonioni himself in a short documentary by Andre S. Labarthe, La Derniere Sequence 
de Profession Reporter (1974). For more general examples o f  Antonioni’s interest in “experimenting” 
see amongst others: Gianluigi Rondi, “Sono stanco del cinema com ’e oggi” [interview with 
Antonioni, 1975], in Antonioni, Fare un film , 152-155.
61 Antonioni made orie feature-length film on video, The M ystery ofO berw ald  (1981), for RAI 
television. He also directed a music video for the pop singer Gianna Nannini’s song Fotoromanza 
(1984). For Antonioni’s famous enthusiasm for video technology, see e.g. Anna Maria Mori, “II 
regista e l ’elettronica: credetemi, e il nostro futuro” [interview with Antonioni, 1983], in Antonioni, 
Fare un film , 312-15.
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Some Notes on “Method”
Thus, as outlined above, Antonioni and experimental cinema relate to one another in 
a variety of ways. It is with how one cinematic practice can illuminate the other, and 
viceversa, that this thesis is concerned. As I bring into focus a number of affinities 
between Antonioni and experimental cinema, my aim is to explore what they reveal 
about time, the engagement with time, and the role of cinema technology in this 
engagement, during the 1960s and 1970s. Obviously, while the shared interest in 
articulating time through cinema brings these practices together, the specific ways in 
which they do this may vary. For the purpose of my discussion, the aesthetic 
differences are as interesting and revealing as the affinities, since they help to 
highlight the complexity and multiplcity of the question of time in those decades.
My intention is not simply to contextualize these practices within the period so as to 
read them as exemplary of its time and its “picture” of time. Rather, I aim to show 
how the works here considered at once partake o f  and make that “picture,” draw 
from and into it. For, as I also argue, given the ways in which cinema becomes 
incrementally diffused and embedded into the everyday, time itself comes to be 
crucially shaped by the cinematic. Hence, if we can speak of a “picture” of time at 
all, it surely is a “moving” one.
My strategy for discussing these practices’ contribution to the thinking and 
making of time in the 1960s and 1970s is twofold. On the one hand, looking at two 
kinds of cinema not usually examined in relation to each other is already a fruitful 
way of approaching the question -  more so, indeed, when these practices themselves 
are overtly interested in time itself. By dislodging Antonioni’s and experimental
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films from the straitjacket of the “category,” “genre” or “area-study” in which they 
are commonly placed (artist film versus European art cinema or national cinema, 
narrative versus non-narrative or abstract film, commercial versus underground, and 
so on), we can see more in them, or see them differently. Rather than merely an 
example of the categories they at once occupy and constitute, we can see them as 
part of a visual culture fundamentally formed through, and informed by, the joint 
pressure of representational technologies and the temporal itself. But to understand 
how filmic practices as apparently diverse are nevertheless connected by the crucial 
problem of temporality it is also important -  indeed, necessary -  to consider them in 
light of other cultural products pivotal to the period’s engagement and preoccupation 
with time and cinema.
Thus, the objects of analysis of my thesis are not only these films per se, but 
also the film-makers’ writings, as well as a variety of other materials that relate, in 
different -  and, sometimes, unexpected -  ways, to time and/or cinema. Among 
others, these “materials” include, in Chapter 1: Sigmund Freud’s “A Note Upon the 
‘Mystic Writing-Pad,”’ Alain Robbe-Grillet on time and narrative and Maria Torok 
on fantasy; in Chapter 2: Stanley Cavell on the “liveliness” of stillness in the cinema, 
and Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer on both photography and boredom; in 
Chapter 3: John Cage’s understanding of silence as sound, and the role of sound 
technologies in this understanding; in Chapter 4: the underlying presence of 
nineteenth-century thermodynamic entropy in Lawrence Wiener’s “cybernetic” re­
elaboration of the concept in the 1950s, and the way this relates to Robert 
Smithson’s interpretation of cinema and the desert as “analogous” spaces of 
temporal irreversibility. As this (non-exhaustive) list shows, what I consider and 
draw on in my thesis is certainly heterogeneous; the sheer range is itself revelatory of
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the cultural “reach” and yield of the imbrication of time and cinema at issue here.
The respective definitions of what constitutes an “object” and what a “theory” are 
deliberately blurred at the edges. In many ways, “objects” (films, mostly, but also 
other kinds of aural and visual works, such as music and sculpture, as mentioned 
above, as well as literary texts) and “theories” (a variety of psychoanalytical, 
philosophical, scientific and critical texts) have interdependent and interchangeable 
functions, exerting mutual pressure upon one another. Read and used with and 
against each other for what they might bring to bear upon the question of time, 
cinema and their intertwining, the “objects” may disclose or make a “theory,” while 
the “theory” may be treated as an “object” of analysis.
The blurring of the boundary between theory and object (or “practice”) and 
the interdisciplinarity at work in my project are both product and token of the 
historical moment with which they engage. Indebted to and “derived” from it in 
important respects, they are also commanded by the historical moment itself. For this 
was the moment when art became theory, idea, concept, as well as a time of great 
porosity between disciplines, in which categories proved to be remarkably malleable. 
Not only did artists, writers, filmmakers (including Antonioni himself, as his later 
forays into video, among other things, show) experiment with many different media, 
they also overtly drew on a broad spectrum of “theoretical” texts, such as, in fact, 
Freud’s essay on the “Mystic Writing-Pad” and Wiener’s cybernetics. And, more 
crucially for my specific purposes here, an interdisciplinary yet thematic approach is 
called for by the fact that, as we have seen, it is of time itself to be everywhere and 
nowhere, always mediated. To a certain extent, one is always, necessarily, looking 
for or dealing with time in things -  be one of these things, even, an essay on time. 
Conversely, it is precisely by drawing into the discussion a variety of “materials”
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that we can contemplate time’s mediatedness and plurality, and see how Antonioni 
and experimental cinema at once speak of time in the 1960s and contribute to its 
thinking and imaging. In this respect, the complementary claim is that throughout the 
twentieth century, and since the postwar decades in particular, it is of  cinema too to 
become as diffused and embedded in “things” as time. If cinema incarnates the 
world, then the world, in its turn, comes to incarnate cinema: the cinematic seeps 
into it.
The materials and critical sources I employ in my thesis are also 
chronologically heterogeneous, ranging between texts produced during the period 
and others produced before or after it. Psychoanalysis, philosophy and cinema have 
accustomed us to the fact that time is not necessarily, or not exclusively, 
chronological, linear and one-dimensional. The past is in some form preserved -  on 
reel, in memory, as trauma -  and brought into the future or, at least, the future of 
itself. Any given “now” may thus be seen as a palimpsest of different times: a 
present made of past while also, at some level, already inhabited by the future (in the 
form of possibility: the “virtuality” of what might be “actualized,” as Deleuze would 
put it62). So the work of Freud, Bergson, Bachelard, Benjamin, Kracauer, Heidegger 
and Bazin converged from the “past” into the “present” of the 1960s and 1970s, 
contributing in fundamental ways to shape -  sometimes in harness, sometimes 
antagonistically -  the understanding of temporality and representational technologies 
of those decades. As Laura Marcus, among others, has pointed out, Freud’s recurrent
description of the psyche as an “apparatus,” to give one example, played a crucial
£.'1
role in the development of “apparatus theories.’ In this respect, his “A Note Upon
62 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, esp. 207-221.
63 Laura Marcus, “Introduction: Histories, Representations, Autobiographies in The Interpretation o f  
Dreams,” in Laura Marcus, ed., Sigmund F reud’s The Interpretation o f  Dreams: New  
Interdisciplinary Essays (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
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the ‘Mystic Writing-Pad,’” is a “theory” that itself became the “object” of another 
“theory” in the 1970s. For Thierry Kuntzel and Jean-Louis Baudry, among others, 
the metaphorics of writing at the heart of Freud’s thought that this short essay 
exemplifies -  the psyche as a “site of inscription”-  proved a useful tool to reflect on 
cinema as a practice and an ideology.64 Through a slightly different lens, I draw 
attention to how the then apparently overlooked reflections on temporality in Freud’s 
text nevertheless informed and permeated the thinking of time during the period -  
and this precisely with the mediation of the cinematic. Similarly, John Van Dyke’s 
conception of the American desert, presented in his idiosyncratic 1901 memoirs of 
his two-year-long journey across it, percolated, more or less explicitly, into the re­
discovery of that space during the 1960s and 1970s on the part of land artists such as 
Smithson and Nancy Holt.65 In a compelling article, Alessandra Ponte has articulated 
the differences between Van Dyke’s and Smithson’s models of the desert.66 These 
notwithstanding, I suggest that there are, however, a number of affinities in the ways 
in which they both saw the desert as a space of time which, for Smithson, was also 
intrinsically “cinematic.”
Meanwhile, if the work of Benjamin and Kracauer (among others) informed 
the period’s debates, it can still be used today as a “theoretical” tool in the analysis
64 Jean-Louis Baudry, “Ideological Effects o f the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus” [1970], trans. 
Alan Williams, in Philip Rosen, ed., Narrative/ Apparatus/Ideology: A Film Theory Reader (New  
York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 287 cited; and Thierry Kuntzel, “A Note Upon the Filmic 
Apparatus,” Quarterly Review o f  Film Studies 1 (August 1976), 266-271. For further commentary on 
this see e.g. D.N. Rodowick, The Crisis o f  Political Modernism: Criticism and Ideology in 
Contemporary Film Theory [1988] (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), esp. 96-97. 
Jacques Derrida famously analysed Freud’s metaphorics of writing in “Freud and the Scene of 
Writing” [1966] first published in Tel Quel, and then reprinted in Jacques Derrida, Writing and  
Difference [1967], trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2003).
65 John C. Van Dyke, The Desert: Further Studies in Natural Appearances [1901] (Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1999).
66 Alessandra Ponte, “The House o f Light and Entropy: Inhabiting the American Desert,” Assemblage 
30 (August 1996), 12-31.
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of those debates themselves, and the “objects” they produced.67 Of course, alongside 
these “historical” sources, I have also referred to more contemporary criticism and 
scholarship. In their analysis of time, representational technologies and the relation 
between the two, books such as Deleuze’s Cinema I and Cinema 11, Lee’s 
Chronophobia and Doane’s The Emergence of Cinematic Time, even if from 
different angles and with different focus, have enabled and stimulated reflection on 
the specific material of my research.
Rather than adopting in toto, say, a Deleuzian or a psychoanalytic reading, I 
have, indeed, used theories as heuristic objects to have recourse to “as and when” for 
specific questions or problems. Hence, they are varied; but what pulls them together 
is their heuristic function for the purposes of my research. All in all, the materials 
discussed and used in this thesis are so included because they not only reflect but, 
more importantly, reflect upon the period’s concerns with time and/or the cinematic, 
or converge and percolate into the thinking of these questions. In different ways, 
they are symptomatic or diagnostic -  if not even, indeed, symptomatic and 
diagnostic on occasions -  of an apprehension about time which is both specific to the 
period and embedded within the idea of modernity at large.
Chapter Outlines
In Chapter 1 ,1 consider the prominence of “the cut” in the 1960s and 1970s and how 
this relates to notions of time, subjectivity and their discontinuity. Drawing on
67 Kracauer, still alive, could in fact “actively” participate in it. See for example: Siegfried Kracauer, 
Theory o f  Film: The Redemption o f  Physical Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).
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specific films and texts by Antonioni, Hollis Frampton and Alain Resnais, I discuss 
how these notions are differently articulated in their work.
In Chapter 2 ,1 consider the period’s intensive reflection on the stillness of 
the photographic at the root of cinema. The still photograph as such appears in many 
films of the period, among them Frampton’s nostalgia, Snow’s Wavelength, 
Antonioni’s L’eclisse (1962) and Blow-up. Meanwhile, many other films seem 
permeated by the idea of photographic stillness. I argue that in this “remediation” of 
photography within cinema, the “instant” of the photographic is made to endure. In 
particular, I discuss this in relation to boredom, a disposition that becomes strongly 
thematized, and pursued, in the art and cinema of the period.
In Chapter 3 ,1 consider sound and, more specifically, the ways in which the 
development of magnetic tape technology changed the conditions of aurality in the 
course of the 1960s. It is largely as a consequence of this, I argue, that there is what 
we may call an “acoustic turn” in Antonioni’s cinema of the period: a development 
of “soundscapes” indebted to the ideas of the French musique concrete movement 
and John Cage. In addition, this chapter considers the representation of magnetic 
tape technology within Antonioni’s films themselves, and the ways in which this 
also temporalizes the cinematic image.
Chapter 4 concludes the thesis by discussing the thematic of “The End” that 
pervades the period. I consider how film itself could function as an emblem of 
temporal irreversibility and entropic decay. Entropy is further considered through a 
discussion of “the desert” in Antonioni, Robert Smithson, and Nancy Holt.
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Chapter 1: The Cut
We can no longer really attribute uniform continuity to time when we have had such
a vivid premonition of the weakening and failing of being The decisive centres of
time are its discontinuities.
Gaston Bachelard1
... this human soul of ours, one of whose laws... is intermittence.
Marcel Proust2
When Antonioni said that, with Red Desert (II deserto rosso, 1964), he aimed to 
express “the reality of our time,”3 he certainly wanted to reiterate his continuing 
commitment to the portrayal of the “now” in which he was immersed, a present 
acutely felt as modern.4 His films, from the early post-war documentaries onwards, 
are all, at some levels, chronicles of contemporary reality, at once both diagnostic
1 Gaston Bachelard, The Dialectic o f  Duration [1936], trans. Mary McAllester Jones (Manchester: 
Clinamen Press, 2000), 51 and 54.
2 Marcel Proust, In Search o f  Lost Time [1913-1927], 6 vols., vol. 2: Within a Budding Grove, trans. 
C.K. Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (London: Vintage, 2002), 192.
3 Michelangelo Antonioni, “II deserto rosso” [1964], ed. Francois Maurin, in Michelangelo Antonioni, 
Fare un film  e per me vivere: Scritti sul cinema, ed. Carlo di Carlo and Giorgio Tinazzi (Venezia: 
Marsilio, 1994), 251.
4 For discussions o f Antonioni’s Red D esert and his other “Italian” films o f the 1960s in the context o f 
the country’s economic “boom” see P. Adams Sitney, Vital Crises in Italian Cinema (Austin: 
University o f Texas Press, 1995), in particular chapters 7 and 9; and Angelo Restivo, The Cinema o f  
Economic M iracles: Visuality and Modernization in the Italian Art Film (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2002), especially chapters 6 and 7.
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and symptomatic of the time of modernity, and of time as such in modernity.5 In 
addition to circumscribing a specific historical moment, the phrase used by 
Antonioni also indicates that the time in question is -  insistently -  ours: his focus is 
on the subject’s experience of time, if not, indeed, on the subject as himself or 
herself the seat of time. This use of the possessive pronoun “our” brings into relief 
how the heightened consciousness of time in modernity often takes the form of a 
reflection on consciousness as time, on subjectivity and temporality as thoroughly 
indissociable.
Only a few years earlier, Antonioni had tried to summarize this temporal 
reality, dwelling on his dedication to render it cinematically, to an audience of young 
filmmakers at the Centro Sperimentale di Cinematografia (CSC) in Rome:
The rhythm of life is not made up of one steady beat; it is, instead, a 
rhythm that is sometimes fast, sometimes slow; it remains 
motionless for a while, then at the next moment it starts spinning 
around. There are times when it appears almost static, there are 
other times when it moves with tremendous speed, and I believe all 
this should go into the making of a film.6
Neither absolute nor abstract, time is here an experiential category, the very “rhythm 
of life.” The word “rhythm,” in the singular, is not used to convey the idea of a
5 “Even fiction films are, in a way, documentaries,” Antonioni maintains: “Let’s say that when the 
subject matter of the film is contemporary, the camera documents it.” Michelangelo Antonioni, “D ied  
Domande” [1985], in Fare un film  e p e r  me vivere, 203.
6 Michelangelo Antonioni, “A Talk with Michelangelo Antonioni on His Work” [1961], in Harry M. 
Geduld, ed., Film Makers on Film Making: Statements on Their Art by Thirty D irectors 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), 202. This text is based on an open discussion at the 
Centro Sperimentale di Cinematografia in Rome, on 16 March 1961, originally published in the 
CSC’s monthly periodical Bianco e Nero.
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regular beat, a predictable pattern. Instead, it evokes intermittence or interruption: it 
is turned on its head and made to refer to irregularity, unpredictability, lack of 
pattern. The model of time charted by Antonioni is discontinuous (in turn 
“motionless” and “spinning”) and heterogeneous (“not made up of one steady beat,” 
but “sometimes fast, sometimes slow”). It is this very irregularity, discontinuity and 
heterogeneity that cinema, in Antonioni’s view, should be able to embody.
Antonioni’s resolve could seem to be animated by an enthusiasm for the 
medium not dissimilar from Benjamin’s and Kracauer’s, who saw cinema as offering 
precisely this opportunity. With film, as Benjamin put it, the “series of shocks and 
collisions” structuring experience in modernity are “established as a formal 
principle.”7 With “their constant, sudden change” of images, the movies could both 
represent and enact modernity’s kaleidoscopic and frenzied temporality.8 The 
cinematic cut, of course, is central to this effect; and in fact we could say that 
Benjamin’s and Kracauer’s own enthusiasm hinges for the greatest part on its 
operation.9 For them, it is chiefly the cut that, as Mary Ann Doane has put it, is “the 
incarnation of temporality in the film,” standing as a marker of “the restructuring of 
time in modernity.”10 Paradoxically, it is precisely by cutting up and reassembling 
duration -  understood as an ongoing stretch of time - , that the modern subject’s 
experience of time can be represented and embodied. The cut can convey both its
7 Walter Benjamin, “Some Motifs in Baudelaire” [1939], in Illuminations, trans. Harry Zorn (London: 
Pimlico, 1999), 171.
8 Walter Benjamin, “The Work o f Art in the A ge of Mechanical Reproduction” [1936], in 
Illuminations, 231.
9 As Benjamin often looks at cinema and modernity through the lens of the nineteenth century, he 
may stress the former’s “shock” aspect more than Kracauer, largely rooting his analysis directly in 
twentieth-century mass-culture. A neat distinction, however, is simplistic, and both Benjamin and 
Kracauer, as I discuss in chapter 2, consider the moment after the shock o f the new within modernity 
itself. For a discussion o f the differences between Benjamin’s and Kracauer’s thought, see the two 
essays by Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Benjamin, Cinema and Experience: ‘The Blue Flower in the Land 
of Technology,”’ New German Critique AO (Winter 1987), 179-224; “America, Paris, the Alps: 
Kracauer (and Benjamin) on Cinema and Modernity,” in Leo Charney and Vanessa Schwarts, eds., 
Cinema and the Invention o f  Modern Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
discontinuities (the interruptions, the jolts) and its heterogeneity, as it enables cinema 
“to stir up the elements of nature,” as Kracauer says, to recombine “disjointed” 
spatio-temporal segments.11 And this, according to Benjamin, constitutes a useful 
“kind of training.”12 As I discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the experience 
and cognition of time itself in the twentieth century comes to be formed, in a 
fundamental way, through the cinematic, if not even thought of in cinematic terms. 
Thus we could say that, to a certain extent, it is cinema itself that makes “the reality 
of our time” Antonioni talks of; what he wants to put “into the making of a film” is 
already somewhat cinematic.
In many respects, Antonioni seems to share Benjamin’s and Kracauer’s 
position on the cut, both in practice and theory. Only a few years after his talk at the 
CSC he claimed that he “couldn’t stand real time,” because “there are too many 
useless moments.”13 As the allusion is to a strategy of cutting, one of the implications 
is that it is through such a process of selection and re-assemblage of “real time” that 
cinema can stage “the reality of our time,” as a cipher of the intermittence and 
fragmentation lived by the subject in modernity. While noting that cutting -  or indeed 
cutting out -  already starts with filming, “as soon as we focus our camera on 
something,” “making a choice” of what, how and how long to shoot, Antonioni has 
often reiterated his passion for editing, his fascination with it as a “creative” 
process.14 “Unfortunately,” he confesses, “I don’t like my films when I’ve finished
10 Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence o f  Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 184. Emphasis in original.
11 Siegfried Kracauer, “Photography” [1927], in The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays [1963], trans. 
and ed. Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 62.
12 Benjamin, “Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 171.
13 Michelangelo Antonioni, “A proposito di erotismo” [1967], in Fare un film  e p e r  me vivere , 145.
14 Michela Mancini, et. al, “II mondo e fuori dalla finestra” [interview with Antonioni; 1975], in Fare 
un film  e p er  me vivere, 160 and 158-159. A s Sean Cubitt has more recently remarked, “the first cut in 
film is the power of the frame to differentiate what is visible from what is not.” See: Sean Cubitt, The 
Cinema Effect (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2004), 44. His argument, which he makes drawing on Jacques 
Aumont, also echoes Andre Bazin’s notion of the screen as a “mask which allows only a part o f the
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shooting them. [...] Then I start cutting: and I like this phase.”15 He has been very 
keen to stress his hands-on involvement with editing -  “from the first cut to the last 
of all my films” noting, for example, that even for bigger productions like Blow-up 
and The Passenger (both produced by MGM, and released in 1966 and 1975 
respectively), he did the cutting himself.16 Indeed, Antonioni’s fascination and 
involvement with cutting chimes with that of many contemporary experimental 
filmmakers, for whose “artisanal” approach the cut had a particular allure. Hollis 
Frampton, for example, was beguiled by how “film builds upon the straight cut.”17
Yet, the speed of the cinematic pace evoked by Benjamin and Kracauer seems 
far removed from what we are likely to find in any of Antonioni’s films. Despite his 
avowed dislike of “useless moments,” Antonioni is also famous for his temps morts, 
moments in which, from the point of view of narrative and of the “moving” image as 
such, the time seems dead, or inert. His camera may arrive on the scene just slightly 
too early, a few seconds before the actors enter it, or leave it slightly too late, once 
they have left.18 Or again, he might persist in filming his characters performing banal 
activities, in idleness, or just being “static,” as Adorno once put it.19 Antonioni 
referred to this when continuing his description of the “rhythm of life” at the CSC,
action to be seen.” Andre Bazin, “Theatre and Cinema -  Part II” [1951], in What Is Cinema? trans. 
Hugh Gray, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 105. Jacques Aumont, 
“The Variable Eye, or the Mobilization o f the Gaze,” in Dudley Andrew, ed., The Image in Dispute: 
Art and Cinema in the Age o f  Photography (Austin: University of Texas, 1997), discusses “the cutting 
force of the frame” (252) in the cinema, also relating cinema’s variable framing to the “mobile” 
subject o f modernity (244).
15 Betty Jeffries Demby and Larry Sturhahn “Professione: Reporter,” [interview with Antonioni,
1975], in Fare un film  e p er  me vivere, 300.
16 Aldo Tassone, “Conversazione” [with Antonioni, 1985], in Antonioni, Fare un film  e p er  me vivere, 
214. See also ibid.
17 Hollis Frampton, “The Withering Away o f the State o f the Art” [1974], Circles o f  Confusion: Film, 
Photography, Video (Rochester: Visual Studies Workshop Press, 1983), 166.
18 As Seymour Chatman has noted, whereas pre-diegetic lingering may even be seen to fit within 
conventional narrative dynamics, as a way o f setting the scene, post-diegetic lingering is more 
“provocative.” Seymour Chatman, Antonioni, or The Surface o f  the World (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985), 125.
19 Theodor W. Adorno, “Transparencies on Film” [1966], trans. Thomas Y. Levin, in The Culture 
Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. J.M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1993), 156.
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maintaining that it is precisely “through these pauses” that “there springs forth what 
today is more and more coming to be known as modern cinema.”20 Self-consciously 
presenting himself as a modern filmmaker, and not simply one committed to 
representing modern reality, Antonioni is arguing for an editing strategy that, 
somewhat paradoxically, makes film include the “pauses,” the cuts in our time. What 
seems to be at stake is not just cutting, as an operation of interruption, but -  however 
paradoxically -  the cut itself as a thing. It is this that can render “the reality of our 
time,” which has to do with time being cut but, also, with the reality of the cuts in 
time themselves.
The 1960s and 1970s marked a moment when the cut comes to be seen not as 
a negative but a positive operation. In other words, it comes to be considered an 
“insertion” rather than an “elision”; even if, indeed, that which is inserted is nothing 
less that the operation of eliding as such -  a “cutting in” of the cut as opposed to a 
“cutting out” of it. Like Antonioni, Alain Resnais, among others, discussed and used 
the cut very self-consciously as a crucial marker of “modern cinema,” even, 
provocatively, within the tracking shots he is famous for. The long tracking sequence 
along the corridor in Last Year at Marienbad (1961), for example, is not only 
interrupted by cuts but is actually a montage of three quite different corridors -  a 
heterogeneity which Resnais did not want to disguise.21 Frampton, who began his 
artistic career as a photographer, started to experiment with film in the early 1960s. 
During this period, he reflected on various articulations of the “cut-problem,” as he
20 Antonioni, “A Talk with Michelangelo Antonioni on His Work,” 202.
21 Jean-Louis Leutrat, L ’annee derniere a Marienbad, trans. Paul Hammond (London: BFI, 2000), 33. 
Leutrat reports an anecdote by Sylvie Baudrot, the film ’s script-supervisor: “In Marienbad, for 
example, there was a very long scene in which Delphine Seyrig and Albertazzi walk side by side 
down a corridor. We shot in three different corridors [ ...] . W e’d put potted plants so that the 
continuity between the potted plants might disguise the passage from one section of corridor to 
another, but Resnais didn’t want to hide the fact that three different corridors were involved.”
Baudrot’s statement appears in F ran cis Thomas, V A telier d ’Alain Resnais (Paris: Flammarion, 
1989), 157.
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once called it.22 He thought intensively about the relation between the cut, 
temporality and consciousness, as well as about the interrelation between a spatial 
and a temporal register of the cut in cinema -  between “photographic” framing (on 
which film too is also based) and “cinematic” editing.
In this chapter, through a focus on Red Desert, Last Year at Marienbad and 
Frampton’s Zorns Lemma (1970), I consider the visibility, the “inclusion,” of the cut 
in these filmmakers’ work. At one level, this is the cut as a feature of editing. 
Employed and brought into relief as an index of the discontinuities Benjamin and 
Kracauer discuss as being at the heart of the subject’s experience of temporality in 
modernity, it also grows to acquire, as Deleuze says, “an importance in itself.”23 This 
autonomy of the cut, for Deleuze, is a fundamental trait of “modern,” as opposed to 
“classical” cinema: “the cut no longer forms part of one or the other image,” 
“included as the end of the one or as the beginning of the other,” but “stands on its 
own.”24 So, at another level (largely dependent on and derived from the first), this is 
also a more abstract notion of the cut as a pause, a hole in the subject’s experience of 
time, to which cinema may offer some form of embodiment by turning it into a 
“thing.” As a temporal and a spatial register of the cut intertwine, so the cut expands 
to become, as Deleuze puts it, an “interstice,” a quite literal topos of modern 
cinema.25
Moving to Zorns Lemma via Freud’s famous essay “A Note Upon the Mystic 
Writing-Pad” (1925), I first consider how these two levels are articulated in 
Frampton’s film. Frampton, I will argue, is interested in the cut, paradoxically, as the
22 Hollis Frampton, “Letters from Framp -  1958-1968” [to Reno Odlin], in O ctober 32, Hollis 
Frampton: A Special Issue, ed. Annette Michelson (Spring 1985), 25-55. 50 cited, from a letter o f 22 
April 1964.
23 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time Image [1985], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1989), 213.
24 Ibid., 277.
interruption that keeps things moving. Cinema, consciousness and time “function” 
and “flow” because o/the cut I then turn to discuss Red Desert and Last Year at 
Marienbad, whose concerns, in different ways, tend to be with the disruptive force of 
the cut, and with attempting to embody, to give visibility to the “temporality” of the 
cut in time itself. In Red Desert, as the flipside of the subject’s experience of time, 
this is vividly rendered as a space, or rather, an “other place” in the film.
Interruptions: Time, Subjectivity and Cinema
In Isaac Newton’s definition, as Ronald Schleifer reminds us, “time exists as an 
‘absolute,’” it “‘flows equably without relation to anything external.’”26 Within this 
paradigm, in which “time is ‘objective’, self-same, simply a surrounding ‘ether’ to 
events,” “subjects and objects can be ‘abstracted’” from time itself.27 By contrast, in 
the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, time comes to be conceived as 
inextricable from both the events and subjects apparently “in” it. Within this “post- 
Enlightenment” model time, crucially, “has” a subject, and it is as the experience of 
a subject that time itself is conceived and apprehended. But, as time has a subject, so 
the subject is himself or herself temporal, and “temporalized’:28
25 Ibid.
26 Ronald Schleifer, Modernism and Time: The Logic o f  Abundance in Literature, Science and Culture 
1880-1930  (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 37. Schleifer quotes from Isaac 
Newton, The Mathematical Principles o f  Natural Philosophy [1687], (New York: The Citadel Press, 
1964), 17.
27 Ibid., 6 and 3.
28 Ibid., 7. Emphasis in original.
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the temporal situation of the subject of the experience -  situated within the 
contours of his or her own life and within the “events” of history more 
generally conceived -  is a constituent element in the nature of that 
experience.29
Time is o/the subject, dependent on his or her experience of it, and the subject, in 
turn, is temporally situated and temporalized on both a personal and collective plane. 
And it is this mutuality and indissociability between temporality and subjectivity 
that, for Schleifer, constitutes one of the salient traits of twentieth-century 
modernity.
Off and On Like a Light: Freud, Time and Consciousness
Perhaps the place where this inextricability between the subject as the seat of time 
and the temporality of the subject is most vividly and succinctly postulated is 
Freud’s “A Note Upon the Mystic Writing Pad.” In this brief, biologistic essay, he 
reports his “suspicion” that the faculties of perception and consciousness, in their 
very “method of functioning” may lie “at the bottom of the origin of the concept of 
time.”30 Innervations, or feelers, Freud explains, are rhythmically stretched out to 
sample the external world, and withdrawn. Consciousness in the process of 
perception is characterised as “flickering up and passing away,” opening and closing 
periodically to the reception of sensible impressions.31 The working of “the system 
Pcpt-Cs" (as he abbreviates perception and consciousness), is therefore described as
29 Ibid.
30 Sigmund Freud, “A Note Upon the ‘Mystic Writing-Pad’” [1925], The Penguin Freud Library, 18 
vols., trans. James Strachey, vol. 11: On M etapsychology: The Theory o f  Psychoanalysis (London: 
Penguin Books, 1991), 434.
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discontinuous, intermittent “Like a light ceaselessly turning off and on,”32 as Jean 
Laplanche has put it, consciousness, in Freud’s model, is interrupted by pauses, cuts. 
Since this is presented as the very “origin of the concept of time,” this means that 
time too is, in its turn, cut In sketching time’s dependence on a consciousness whose 
experience of the world is in samples, Freud is suggesting that time is cut because 
consciousness is, effectively making temporality a function of subjectivity.
Freud’s model here is rather primitive and archaic. The image of 
consciousness he conjures up is strongly reminiscent of a very elementary organism 
(with its “feelers,” “innervations,” and “protective shield”33), like the “living vesicle” 
he had used in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920).34 By harking back to the 
notions of periodicity of his very early writings, he presents the functioning of 
consciousness as fairly rudimentary. Though discontinuous, the perceptual and 
conscious processes he describes are somewhat regular, recurrent.35 For these 
reasons, as Laplanche has rightly pointed out, what Freud seems to be describing 
here are immediate biological consciousness and the temporality of the living being 
in general -  those which humans share with the protozoa, so to speak -  and not those 
specifically pertaining to the human subject.36 Yet, primitive as it is, this model, with 
its “black outs,” also contains, as if in a nutshell, the broader Freudian view of
31 Ibid., 433.
32 Jean Laplanche, “Psychoanalysis, Time and Translation” [1990], in Seduction, Translation and the 
Drives, ed. John Fletcher (London: ICA, 1992), 164.
33 Freud, “A Note Upon the Mystic Writing-Pad,” 432-433.
34 Sigmund Freud, “Beyond The Pleasure Principle” [1920], The Freud Penguin Library, vol. 11: On 
Metapsychology, 299.
35 See, for example, Freud’s letters to Fliess on memory and hysteria, such as those dated 6 December 
1896 and 3 October 1897, in Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, ed. and trans., The Complete Letters o f  
Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904  (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1985), 210-211 
and 268.
36 Ibid., 164-166. See also: Jean Laplanche, “Time and the Other” [1992], in Essays on Otherness, ed. 
John Fletcher (London: Routledge, 1999), esp. 237-241.
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human time as radically heterogeneous, irregularly discontinuous and riddled with 
holes because of the competing forces of memory, the unconscious and repression.37
Though ostensibly based on the metaphor of what was even then a slightly 
old-fashioned children’s toy, it has not gone unnoticed that Freud’s account is also 
strikingly evocative of the cinematic apparatus. The intermittent dynamics he 
outlines conjure not a manual movement but a “mechanism,” automatic and 
involuntary -  which could be that of the recurrent interruptions of the movie camera 
shutter. Though Freud was sceptical about the possibility of exploring 
psychoanalytical concepts -  and the “abstractions” of the psyche, as he called them 
when approached about G.W. Pabst’s film Secrets of a Soul (1926) -  through the 
figurative properties of film, cinema’s structure and mechanics may here have been 
his unacknowledged comparative model.38 Thierry Kuntzel, writing in 1976, drew 
attention to this -  assuming, in fact, that Freud himself might have been unaware of 
it. Kuntzel noted that Freud’s text suggests that “the underside of cinema,” “the 
functioning of the machine itself’ might have interested him and that, had the 
metaphor been applied thoroughly, it would have provided a model better suited to 
Freud’s own illustrative purposes than that of writing and erasure.39 In the 1960s and 
1970s, Freud’s essay was perhaps unavoidably bound to be read as cinematic, given 
the prominence of psychoanalysis as a tool in film studies, and the renewed attention
37 Cf: Freud’s crucial notion o f Nachtraglichkeit (which Strachey translates as “deferred action” and 
laplanche proposes to re-translate as “afterwardsness”) at work as condensation and displacement in 
screen memories, repression and trauma. Sigmund Freud, “Screen Memories” [1899] and 
“Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” [1914], Standard Edition o f  the Complete 
Psychological Works o f  Sigmund Freud, 24 vols., trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1953-1974), vol. 3 and vol. 12 respectively. See also Laplanche’s essays in Essays on 
Otherness, in particular “Note on Afterwardsness” [revised 1998].
38 Freud refused to sanction G.W. Pabst’s Secrets o f  the Soul (1926), objecting with Karl Abraham, 
who acted as a consultant for the film: “I don’t believe that satisfactory plastic representation o f our 
abstractions is at all possible”. Sigmund Freud, “Letter to Abraham, 9th June 1925,” in A 
Psychoanalytic Dialogue: The Letters o f  Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham 1907-1926, ed. Hilda C. 
Abraham and Ernst L. Freud (New York: Basic Books, 1964), 80.
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to the constitutive structures and principles of cinema itself.40 Like Freud’s insistence 
on characterizing the psyche as an “apparatus,” the model of the “Mystic Writing- 
Pad” -  whether explicitly or implicitly -  certainly, in its turn, had a decisive 
influence on the development of the “apparatus theories” of the 1970s, of which 
Kuntzel’s own essay is an instance.41
Frampton, with Freud: Cinema as Consciousness
Though he doesn’t refer to it directly, Frampton might have had Freud’s essay in 
mind when he wrote that the cinema had
discerned and enunciated for itself a task, namely, the founding of an art that 
is to be fully and radically isomorphic with the kineses and stases -  in short, 
with the dynamic “structure” (if one may still dare use that word) -  of 
consciousness itself.42
39 Thierry Kuntzel, “A Note Upon the Filmic Apparatus,” Quarterly Review o f  Film Studies 1 (August
1976), 266-271. 267 cited.
40 For a comprehensive study of 1960s and 1970s apparatus theories see: D.N. Rodowick, The Crisis 
o f  Political Modernism: Criticism and Ideology in Contemporary Film Theory [1988] (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994).
41 See for example Baudry’s notion of the camera and projector as “substitute secondary organs,” and 
Metz’s conception of the screen as “a veritable psychic substitute, a prosthesis.” Jean-Louis Baudry, 
“Ideological Effects o f the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus” [1970], trans. Alan Williams, in Philip 
Rosen, ed., Narrative/ Apparatus/Ideology: A Film Theory Reader (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986), 295; and Christian Metz, “The Imaginary Signifier,” Screen 16 (Summer 1975), 14-76; 
15 cited. Jean-Louis Comolli, in “Machines o f the V isible,” in Teresa de Lauretis and Stephen Heath, 
eds., The Cinematic Apparatus (London: Macmillan, 1980), likens the visible (i.e. shooting, 
projection, etc.) and invisible (i.e. chemical baths, editing etc.) processes o f the cinema to the 
conscious and unconscious activities o f the mind. For a discussion of Freud’s objection to cinema, 
and yet, o f how his recourse to the idea o f the “apparatus” influenced theorists in the 1970s, see:
Laura Marcus, “Introduction: Histories, Representations, Autobiographies in The Interpretation o f  
Dreams,” in Laura Marcus, ed., Sigmund Freud’s The Interpretation o f  Dreams: New  
Interdisciplinary Essays (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), esp. 33-43.
42 Hollis Frampton, “Incisions in History/Segments o f Eternity,” Artforum  13 (October 1974), 39-50. 
44 cited.
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Frampton is thinking here less of the simultaneous co-existence of stillness and 
movement in the cinema (in the antithesis between the intrinsic stillness of the 
individual film frames and their extrinsic motion through the projector) than of their 
alternation. It is the discontinuities between one frame and the other that he is 
referring to as “stases”: the interruptions of the shutter -  both in filming, and, again, 
in projection -  to which Freud’s essay would also seem to allude. What in “A Note 
Upon the Mystic Writing-Pad” can only be read between the lines is made explicit 
by Frampton. For him, as he plainly declared on several occasions, the very 
mechanics of cinema are “‘about’ consciousness” and its interrupted temporality: 
they both act on it and enact it.43
For Frampton, in fact, a perceptual and a metaphorical “mode” co-exist. 
When he describes the ambition of a (certain) cinema as “the bodying forth of the 
movement of consciousness itself,”44 he embraces an understanding of it as a 
perceptual activity which can be geared to produce, in the viewers, a self-reflexive 
awareness of their own consciousness “in action.” Like many other 
phenomenologically-informed works of the period, Frampton’s own films probe the 
relation between mind and cinema, by using the latter (its constitutive materials and 
basic principles) to attract attention to the viewer’s perceptual and mental 
processes 45 According to P. Adams Sitney, the structural film -  the category he 
coined to describe much of this body of work, and in which he includes Frampton’s 
films -  “evoke[d] states of consciousness without mediation, that is, with the sole 
mediation of the camera.”46 By dissecting the cinematic, in a vein both self-reflexive
43 Ibid.
44 Frampton, “The Withering Away of the State o f the Art,”164.
45 This is more pronounced in the early, more abstract films, such as Process Red  (1966) and 
Heterodyne (1967).
46 P. Adams Sitney, Visionary Film: The American Avant-Garde (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), 370. To Sitney’s own admission, Frampton’s films somewhat rendered the very
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and didactic, structural filmmakers dissected the relation between cinema and mind, 
opened it up for scrutiny and analysis at the perceptual level, presenting work, as 
Peter Gidal put it, during which “one watches oneself watching.”47 However, even 
Zorns Lemma, which Frampton himself described as “a very didactic work,”48 does 
not do it as directly and as exclusively as, for example, a flicker film does. When, 
interviewed by Simon Field in London in 1972, Frampton was asked: “Your films 
are about the consciousness of the people who are looking at them, aren’t they?” his 
quipping answer was: “I would like to believe that they’re about consciousness, 
period.”49 This terse reply encapsulates how, for him, an appreciation of cinema as 
an activity engaging the viewers’ consciousness, cohabits with the notion that 
cinema itself can function as a “mimesis,” an “incarnation” of consciousness.50 
Paradoxically perhaps, by deconstructing the mechanics of, and dynamics between, 
the cinema and the viewer’s psychic activity, certain works come, in many respects, 
to use cinema itself to construct an “analoguefs] of consciousness,” as Annette 
Michelson once put it.51 “Film, even in its physical attributes,” Frampton tells Field, 
“has become a kind of metaphor for consciousness for me.”52
category problematic: see his 1970 “Postscript” to his “Structural Film” [1969], in P. Adams Sitney, 
ed., Film Culture Reader [1970] (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), esp. 346-48 on Frampton.
47 Peter Gidal, “Theory and Definition of Structural/Materialist Film” [1978], in Peter Gidal, ed., 
Structural Film Anthology {London: BFI, 1978), 10.
48 Peter Gidal, “Interview with Hollis Frampton”[London, 24 May 1972], in Gidal, Structural Film 
Anthology, 64-72. Here and subsequently I refer to the reprint in October 32 (Spring 1985), 93-117. 
108 cited.
49 Simon Field, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” Afterimage 4  (Autumn 1972), 44-77. 53 cited.
50 Frampton, “The Withering Away o f the State of the Arts,” 164.
51 Annette Michelson, “Toward Snow,” in Artforum  9 (June 1971), 29-34.
52 Simon Field, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” 66 (my emphasis). Contemporary literature on 
experimental filmmaking certainly tended to highlight and lever on this metaphorics as opposed to 
other aspects. See, for example, the exhibition catalogue: Marilyn Singer, ed., A History o f  American 
Avant-Garde Cinema (New York: The American Federation of Arts, 1976). See also: Malcolm  
Turvey, Hal Foster, Chrissie lies, et. al, “Round Table: The Projected Image in Contemporary Art,” 
October 104 (Spring 2003), 71-96, in which Turvey suggests that Sitney’s and M ichelson’s reading of 
1960s and 1970s avant-garde cinema “in terms o f the use o f film as a metaphor for the mind” could, 
mutatis mutandis, apply to many artists working with the moving image at present, such as Douglas 
Gordon (84).
53
In fact, Frampton explains this by pitting film, and its “activation” as cinema, 
against video. It is the fundamental discontinuity, the infinitesimal, and recurrent, 
moment of pause, of stasis, at the heart of the cinematic that makes film, in his view, 
win over video as a model of the mind. The central property of film in this respect is 
precisely the “incremental frame,” “which video does not have, it’s frameless, it’s 
continuous.”53 As a cipher of the “the quantum, the chunk nature, of light itself,” the 
“incremental frame” is therefore at the core of the metaphor.54 Whether thought of as 
light or as cinema, or, aptly, as a play of the one in the other, consciousness, for 
Frampton, is always inherently interrupted, and hence fragmentary, partial. Further 
elaborating on the superiority of cinema as a model, in fact, he goes on to explain:
If you’re watching a film, you believe you’re watching a complete 
illusion of something real, but you’re actually watching an illusion 
of only half what took place. The camera’s shutter was closed the 
other half of the time. So that there is another cinema of equal 
length that could have been made precisely at the same time. And 
when you play that back, the shutter in the projector is also closed 
half the time, so that half the time you’re sitting in total darkness.55
These fractional black-outs, in a way, constitute a first, basic form of the “cut” in the 
cinema; a cut that the editing cut then reinstates at a different level. Playing on this, it 
is precisely through the editing cut that, in the central part of Zorns Lemma,
Frampton stages or, better, fictionalizes these intermittent dynamics he so
53 Field, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” 66.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
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enthusiastically sees as the cinematic “incarnation” of the interrupted temporality of 
consciousness. The fast and systemic montage Frampton concocted for this does 
indeed function as a sort of dramatization of the mechanic “cuts” of the shutter’s 
interruptions, consisting, as it does, of a sustained rhythm of short shots visibly 
interrupted -  and at the same time motored -  by editing cuts.
This silent middle part starts with a run through the letters of the Roman 
alphabet, as each letter, set against a dark background, is held for one second before 
the cut to the next.56 The sustained, regular cutting pace remains throughout the rest of 
the section, which, for over forty minutes, runs through alphabet cycles “told” through 
imagery. Initially, the images consist of one-second shots of “words” -  different at 
every cycle, apart from a few exceptions -  found in the urban environment 
(Manhattan), such as shop signs, graffiti, etc., so that the words’ initials denote the 
relevant alphabet letters (ills. 1 and 2, pp. 329-30). After a while, a second type of 
images is also introduced. These are constituted by shots, again of the duration of one 
second, of ongoing segments of human actions, natural phenomena or animals, used to 
replace, at the pace of one per cycle -  though not at every new cycle, and randomly 
rather than alphabetically -  the urban word-images (ills. 3 and 4, pp. 331-32). Given 
the uniform but brief “rhythm” of the shots, the overall effect is that of a sustained, 
heterogeneous pulsation of images recurrently interrupted by cuts, by fractional 
“stases.” It is, as Paul Arthur has recently described it, a “controlled riot of colour and 
shape and semantic meaning.”57 Disintegrating Manhattan into “an impossible
56 For an in-depth analysis and discussion o f the film as a whole, see, among others: Wanda Bershen, 
uZorns L em m a” in Artforum  10, Special Film Issue (September 1971), 41-45; Allen S. Weiss, 
“Frampton’s Lemma, Zorn’s Dilemma,” October 32 (Spring 1985), 118-128; David E. James, 
Allegories o f  Cinema: American Film o f  the Sixties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 
254-260; Scott Macdonald, Avant-Garde Film: Motion Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), chapter 6.
57 Paul Arthur, A Line o f  Sight: American Avant-Garde Film Since 1965  (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005), 52.
55
onslaught of rapid-fire signs,” which we then “gradually come to master conceptually, 
just like the inhabitants of actual cities learn to master their physical perambulations,” 
Zorns Lemma is very Benjaminesque.58 It evokes and demonstrates Benjamin’s 
conception of cinema as at once an incarnation of, and a training for, the “series of 
shocks and collisions” involved in the quintessentially modern experience of moving 
through a big city.59 Throughout, the cut is not elided, but “included,” made 
perceptible, visible; acquiring, in fact, more and more “presence” through its insistent, 
relentless reiteration as the alphabet cycles continue to unfold for about three-quarters 
of an hour.
In fact, Zorns Lemma includes and makes present both a temporal and a 
spatial register of the cut. Once described by Frampton as the outcome of his “being 
systematically forced into cinema by [his] work in still photography,” the film is also 
a meditation on the interrelation between the spatiality of the photographic cut, as 
framing, and the temporality of the cinematic cut, as act of interruption.60 Indeed, 
perhaps it even bears witness to having been Frampton’s possible solution to “the 
cut-problem,” “the problem of recognizing, setting up, locking in a cut,” formulated 
in relation to photography in the early 1960s, the same years in which he was 
beginning to experiment with the filmic medium.61 While Frampton talked of Zorns 
Lemma as “a way of handling stills,” no actual photographs are in it.62 What is there, 
though, in the one-second length shots, is the idea of the still: the photographic cut as
58 Ibid., 52 and 54.
59 Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 171.
60 Gidal, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” 93. As he tells Gidal, Frampton started experimenting 
with a movie camera in the autumn of 1962.
61 Frampton, “Letters from Framp -  1958-1968” [to Reno Odlin], 50.
62 Gidal, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” 93. Indeed, the embryonic idea for the film would seem to 
be Word Pictures, the black and white photographic series of environmental words Frampton 
produced between 1962-1963. For a discussion of Frampton’s relation to his photographic activity 
see: Christopher Phillips, “Word Pictures,” October 32 (Spring 1985), 63-76. For his often neglected 
photographic output, see: Bruce Jenkins and Susan Krane, eds., H ollis Frampton: Recollections/
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a segment of space (and, indeed, a spatialized “instant”63) locked within the frame. 
This is what Roland Barthes would call “the tableau,” “a pure cut-out segment with 
clearly defined edges, irreversible and incorruptible,” which, in Zorns Lemma -  and 
in the cinema more generally -  is “moving” and durational.64 One of Frampton’s 
preoccupations, during this period of reflection over the “the cut-problem,” seems to 
have been that the photograph wouldn’t enable the inclusion of the “dimensionless,” 
yet “in the mind, precisely as real” operation of interruption constitutive of the 
tableau, of the photographic segment itself.65 It is here that cinema apparently offered 
a solution, as what the still necessarily leaves off, or just at its edge -  something to be 
imagined rather than seen -  the moving image could incorporate and make visible. 
With the editing cut, cinema presented itself as the medium that could concretize this 
“dimensionless” temporal operation of interruption and elision. Through, in its turn, a 
hybridization with spatiality, film could extend and draw out this act of suspension 
and separation. It could give body and duration to this aspect of the cut (and, indeed, 
another of Frampton’s concerns was the idea of a “duration of cutting”66), so as to 
bring it above perceptibility, embodying it, in a way, as another kind of segment. At 
the end of each alphabet cycle, for example, the cut itself is punctuated and enhanced
Recreations, exhibition catalogue: Albright-Knox Art Gallery, Buffalo (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1984), which also brings into relief the continuous intertwining between his still and moving work.
63 Cf. Erwin Panofsky, “Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures” [1934], in Three Essays on Style, 
ed. Irving Lavin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). Panofsky sees the “spatialisation o f time,” and, 
even, the creation o f a space “doubly charged with time” as among the unique possibilities of the 
cinematic medium (96 and 104).
64 Roland Barthes, “Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein” [1973], in Roland Barthes, Image Music Text, trans. 
Stephen Heath (London: Fontana Press, 1977), 70.
65 Hollis Frampton, “Digressions on the Photographic Agony,” Artforum 11 (November 1972), 43-51. 
51 cited.
66 A friend of Carl Andre’s, Frampton developed his reflections on the cut, in both photography and 
cinema, also through thinking about sculpture. In one of twelve early-1960s “dialogues” between the 
two artists, edited in a collection by Benjamin Buchloh in the 1980s, Frampton explains: “I cut that 
timber in Ohio because I wanted to get some idea into my forearms of how a certain kind o f sculpture 
was done. I wanted a sense of the duration o f cutting.” Carl Andre and Hollis Frampton, 12 
Dialogues 1962-1963, ed. Benjamin Buchloh (Halifax: The Press of Nova Scotia College o f Art and 
Design, 1981), 15. Emphasis in original. The dialogue is entitled “On Sculpture and Consecutive 
Matters,” and dated October 14,1962.
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by a second of darkness, of blank screen. A spatialized temporal dimension, the cut 
appears as a visible “interval,” as Deleuze calls it, which is also an “interstice,” “an 
autonomous outside.”67
Frampton has remarked that he chose the system of the alphabet as 
“essentially [...] a chance operation,” so as to make the order of the images “as 
random as possible, that is, to avoid imposing my own taste,” meaning, and narrative 
on the film.68 Effectively a readymade system, the alphabet -  from Jasper Johns’ 
encaustic paintings to Martha Rosier’s Semiotics of the Kitchen (1975) -  was indeed 
popular with artists seeking to problematize the idea of art as lyrical, personal 
expression. In the use of the alphabet as a structure providing at once systematization 
and randomness to the film, Frampton’s montage differs, crucially, from that of 
Sergei Eisenstein, where cutting is the basic operation for the articulation and 
creation of meaning through the concatenation of images.69 In Frampton’s film, this 
meaningful concatenation is avoided in favour of a serial arrangement, in which no 
one term bears any logical relation to those on either side of it. In this respect, the 
alphabet is crucial, since this is itself precisely a series in which each term is 
conventionally and paratactically, rather than logically and hierarchically, arranged. 
For Deleuze, Eisenstein is exemplary of the “classical” cinematic model, in which 
the cut is subordinated to “the linkage of images.” This subordination, however, is 
abolished in “modern” cinema, where, as we have seen, according to Deleuze the cut 
gains “importance in itself,” not as part of the images, but on a par with them.70
67 Deleuze, Cinema II, 277-278.
68 Gidal, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” 94 and 96. Melissa Ragona discusses Frampton’s use of 
the alphabet and conceptual mathematics (Zorn’s Lemma is a term from set theory) in “Hidden 
Noise: Strategies o f Sound Montage in the Films o f Hollis Frampton,” O ctober 109 (Summer 2004), 
96-118; esp. 104-109.
69 See: Sergei Eisenstein, “Word and Image,” in The Film Sense [1943], trans. Jay Leida (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1986).
70 Deleuze, Cinema II, 213.
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And it is parity between cuts and images that Zorns Lemma's serialization obtains. 
This is not only when the cut is expanded to “last” one second at the end of each 
cycle but, also, within the individual cycles, where, rather than as a link, it functions 
as a separation between independent images.
Despite Frampton’s emphasis on chance, however, it is not incidental that 
Frampton has forced the normal twenty-six letter alphabet of the English language 
down to twenty-four, by counting I and J, and U and V as one letter. This, in fact, 
renders the pulsation, the intermittence of images and cuts, more obviously “about” 
cinema’s mechanics. Since the individual shots are uniformly one second long, each 
alphabet cycle takes twenty-four seconds to complete. Thus, the overall duration of a 
cycle echoes the number of frames (twenty-four for a second of film projected at 
standard sound speed) of which each of its shots is composed. In Noel Carroll’s 
view, this structure makes Zorns Lemma “the archetypal systemic film.”71 And, 
perhaps, it is even more so in view of the irregularities, a missing frame or a frame in 
excess, that Frampton deliberately inserted here and there as the inevitable “glitch” 
to any system.72 The twenty-four second cycles, with their cut at each second, are, in 
a way, a sort of twenty-four-times enlargement of one second of film. It is as if the 
number of film frames passing through the apparatus in any one second had been put 
under a time-magnifying lens, so as to allow the viewer to see each one, and the 
separations between one and the other, individually. The recurrent, regular editing 
cut between shots can be seen to function as a cipher of the fundamentally 
interrupted mechanics of both camera and projector; its time scale enlarged, 
expanded, so as to bring it above the threshold of visibility. It is as if the editing cut 
-  a sort of “second order” of the cut in the cinema -  were used to enact, to
71 Noel Carroll, Interpreting the Moving Image (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 306.
59
fictionalize, cinema’s basic intermittence -  the “first order” of the cut constituted by 
the shutter’s interruptions. By having one incarnate the other, both acquire a certain 
relief in time and space, a certain corpus.
But the syncopation embodied by Zorns Lemma’s fast montage is also, as we 
have seen, the pivot around which, for Frampton, the cinema-consciousness metaphor 
revolves. If cinema and the mind are “alike,” it is not simply because they are both 
“moving,” but because their movement is essentially discontinuous, and their 
temporality broken up. With its sustained intermittence, its visual bombardment 
punctuated by breaks, Zorns Lemma not only acts on (the viewer’s) consciousness, 
but also enacts consciousness itself; incarnates it, as Frampton would put it, offers 
itself as a model. By both addressing and demonstrating the very logic of 
discontinuous temporality upon which, in Frampton’s view, the metaphor operates, 
the film can therefore also be seen to crystallize his reflections on the relation 
between cinema and the mind. In this respect, as Melissa Ragona has recently noted, 
the film’s “systematic interruption is not necessarily about disruption”: instead it 
“sharpens the focus” on -  and demonstrates -  perception and consciousness as 
“nonlinear process[es].”73 Paradoxically, what interrupts cinema and consciousness, 
is also, for Frampton, what motors them, what enables and sustains their very 
mobility.
Though he seemingly presents their isomorphism as self-evident, even innate, 
Zorns Lemma’s very constructedness brings into relief how cinema offers Frampton 
not so much a medium through which to describe the psyche, as a structure through 
which to construct it. As in Freud’s “A Note Upon the Mystic Writing-Pad” (and, of 
course, his thought at large), or in Kuntzel’s text, the description of a model of the
72 Gidal, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” 97.
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mind is also always the constitution of a model for it. In this imaging, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, cinema is certainly a persistent instrument. Sometimes, as in 
Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory (1896), such a use may even almost pre-date, or 
narrowly coincide with cinema’s own actual birth.74 As we have seen, during the 
1960s and 1970s, bolstered by the increased popularity of phenomenology, 
psychoanalysis and structuralism, the notion of an analogy between cinema and the 
psyche became increasingly embedded and widespread (with “apparatus theories” 
indeed representing an apex). So, for example, in the early 1960s Alain Resnais 
explained his Last Year at Marienbad, with a language not entirely at odds with the 
one later to be used by Frampton, as “an attempt, still crude and primitive, to 
approach the complexity of thought and of its mechanisms.”75 A similar vocabulary is 
found applied to Antonioni’s films too. Writing in 1961, the critic Guido Aristarco 
characterized them as “a precise analysis of the psychic machinery itself.”76 It is to 
Antonioni’s and Resnais’s cinematic models of and for the psyche and its temporality 
that I now turn.
73 Ragona, “Hidden N oise,” 108.
74 Though Bergson does not explicitly mention the cinema in M atter and M emory, his account there is 
strikingly cinematic (and it is on this account that Deleuze levers his re-appropriation o f the 
philosopher’s thought for his own Cinema books), and he does indeed explain the mechanism of 
thought as cinematographic in his later Creative Evolution. Henri Bergson, M atter and Memory 
[1986], trans. N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991) and Creative Evolution 
[1907], trans. Arthur Mitchell (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1998), chapter IV. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, 
Cinema I: The Movement Image [1983], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: 
The Athlone Press, 1992), esp. chapter 1. Another early classical account o f cinema as an 
exteriorization of the operations of the mind is Hugo Mtinsterberg, The Photoplay: A Psychological 
Study (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1916). Deleuze is himself using -  and proposing -  the cinema 
as a model for thought and the mind. In addition to the Cinema books, see: Gilles Deleuze, “The 
Brain Is the Screen” [1986] trans. Marie Therese Guirgis, in Gregory Flaxman, ed., The Brain Is the 
Screen (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 2000), 365-373.
75 Alain Resnais, “Trying to Understand My Own Film” [1962], in Geduld, Film Makers on Film 
Making, 160.
76 Guido Aristarco, “Literary Cinema” [1961], in Pierre Leprohon, Michelangelo Antonioni: An 
Introduction [1961], trans. Scott Sullivan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), 162.
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Out of Gear: Red Desert and Last Year at Marienbad
Interviewed by Jean-Luc Godard following the release of Red Desert, Antonioni at 
one point excitedly tells him of his recent meetings with two cybernetics experts, 
who had been developing artificial brains. One of them had constructed a “true 
electronic brain,” he explains, while the other had “invented a chemical brain.” This 
latter had visited the director in Rome while en route to a conference in Naples 
where he was going to show his invention, “one of the most extraordinary 
discoveries in the world.”77 Antonioni goes on to describe the scientist’s invention:
It was a tiny box, mounted on some tubes: they are cells, whose composition 
contains gold together with other substances, immersed in a chemical liquid. 
They live an autonomous life and have reactions: if you enter the room 
they’ll assume a certain shape, while they’ll assume a different shape if I 
enter, and so on. In that tiny box there are only a few million cells, but 
starting from those it is possible to recreate the human brain.78
Antonioni is fascinated by this invention, by the possibility of “recreating” the 
human brain in a box, and seeing it function in the open, with the processes of 
perceiving and reacting all on the outside, visible and measurable. His excitement, in 
many respects, speaks of a certain affinity he perceives between the operations of
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cinema and the scientists’ artificial brains. In agreement with what Aristarco had 
suggested, in this period, Antonioni, like Frampton, seems to treat cinema as a means 
“to recreate the human brain” on a screen, to enact the psyche’s very structures and 
dynamics.
“The States of Mind Themselves”
But whereas Frampton’s concerns are, overall, more abstract and absolute (“about 
consciousness, period”),79 Antonioni is especially interested in situating this psyche 
historically, amidst the radical processes of social, economic and cultural 
transformation of the post-war period. It is also for this reason that, where 
Frampton’s focus lies mostly in addressing and (re)producing how consciousness 
functions, Antonioni’s also comes to be on how consciousness may malfunction in 
response to these dramatic changes. Indeed, the chief aim is to analyse the effects of 
“history” on the psyche, to see “what remained inside the individual,” as Antonioni 
put it at his talk at the Centro Sperimentale quoted above.80 “The reality of our time” 
Antonioni said he had striven to address in Red Desert is constituted by just this 
impact of the “outside” on the “inside,” by the operations of the social on the 
psychic. Thus, in what Deleuze, paraphrasing Antonioni himself, has called the 
director’s “bicycle-less neorealism,” a “quest involving movement” (as the quest for
77 Jean-Luc Godard, “La notte, L ’eclisse, l ’aurora: Intervista ad Antonioni” [1964] in Antonioni, Fare 
un film  e per me vivere, 258.
78 Ibid.
79 Though, for example, Frampton himself suggests that the fragmentation o f Zorns Lemma denotes a 
post-Renaissance subject, for whom “spatial representation” has lost “rectilinearity.” See: Gidal, 
“Inteview with Hollis Frampton,” 99.
80 Antonioni, “A Talk with Michelangelo Antonioni on His Work,” 199.
the bicycle in De Sica’s famous film81) is replaced by “a specific weight of time 
operating inside the characters and excavating them from within.”82
During his CSC lecture, Antonioni goes to some length to discuss the 
development of his cinematic strategies to this effect. Initially, he recounts, referring 
in particular to his early Cronaca di un amore (Story of a Love Affair, 1950):
I felt the best way to capture their [the characters’] thoughts, their states of 
mind, was to follow them around physically with the camera. Thus the long 
shots, the continuous panning, etc. Later, however, as I went along [...] I 
became aware that perhaps this was not the best method after all, that perhaps 
I was concentrating too much on the external aspects of the actors’ states of 
mind, and not enough on the states of mind themselves.83
Long shots and continuous panning proved to be inadequate to communicate “the 
states of mind themselves,” Antonioni explains. They end up being too much of an 
external description. Whereas, given the sense of their abstractedness and inherent 
resistance to “figuration,” what he seems to want is something functioning as almost 
an inscription -  or, even, like the concealment of a secret message within an apparent 
one, an encryption -  of this interiority in the very matter of the film. After all, how 
else to convey, cinematically speaking, what Freud, precisely objecting to their 
figuration in film, had called “our abstractions”?84 Slavoj Zizek would suggest that 
Antonioni is invoking that dimension which Michel Chion has termed “rendu,” 
whereby “the content [...] is ‘rendered’ by the very form of the film,” “the ‘message’
81 The Bicycle Thief, released in 1948.
82 Deleuze, Cinema II, 23.
83 Antonioni, “A Talk with Michelangelo Antonioni on His Work,” 221.
84 See above, footnote 38.
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is [...] the form itself.”85 And, indeed, Antonioni seems to corroborate this, talking of 
“form” in his films as an attempt “to fill the image with a greater suggestiveness,” 
“beyond the strictly figurative.”86
The Italian critic Lorenzo Cuccu has noted that La notte, released at the 
beginning of 1961, only a few months before the CSC talk, was the first of 
Antonioni’s films in which straight cuts completely replaced dissolves.87 Up to 
L’avventura (1960), in fact -  though less conspicuously there than in, say, II grido 
(1957), with its slow merging of fade-outs and fade-ins -  the director had tended to 
use dissolves to “soften” the spatio-temporal transitions between different sequences. 
Chiming with Deleuze’s later argument, Cuccu’s interpretation of this change is as a 
more widespread symptom of a self-consciously modern cinema.88 Antonioni’s 
change of tack, for example, coincides almost exactly with Resnais’s (and Alain 
Robbe-Grillet’s) decision to eliminate from Last Year at Marienbad a series of 
dissolves they had initially thought they would use. On realizing that these would 
have brought to the film’s temporality an unwanted smoothness and gradualness, 
they replaced them with straight cuts.89 For Cuccu, paradoxically, Antonioni’s turn 
from dissolve to cut makes La notte and the subsequent films appear like “one very 
long sequence.”90 In a way, he is right. As Antonioni, in his own words, decides to 
throw out of the window “all those connective links between sequences, where one 
sequence served as the springboard for the one that followed,” the very idea of
85 Slavoj Zizek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 43. Michel Chion outlines his notion of rendu in “Quiet 
Revolution...and Rigid Stagnation” [1987], trans. Ben Brewster, October 58 (Fall 1991), 69-80.
86 Antonioni, “A Talk with Michelangelo Antonioni on His Work,” 201.
87 Lorenzo Cuccu, La visione come problem a: Forme e svolgimento del cinema d i Antonioni (Rome: 
Bulzoni, 1973), 77.
88 Ibid. Cf. Chatman, Antonioni, or The Surface o f  the World, esp. 115-117 and 127-131.
89 Alain Resnais and Alain Robbe-Grillet, “Last Words on Last Year” [1962], in Geduld, Film Makers 
on Film Making, 171. The text is an adaptation of Andre Labarthe and Jacques Rivette, “Entretien 
avec Alain Resnais et Alain Robbe-Grillet,” Cahiers du Cinema 21 (September 1961), 1-22.
90 Cuccu, La visione come problem a, 77.
“transition” is eliminated.91 But, as gradualness and progression disappear, what is 
brought into relief is precisely the fact that the duration of these, in Cuccu’s view, 
“sequence-less” films is inherently disconnected, discontinuous, heterogeneous.92 
Like “the rhythm of life” Antonioni describes, the weft of these films is woven with 
the very discontinuities, which, according to Bachelard, are the “decisive centres of 
time.”93 Not only, pace Cuccu, between, but also within sequences, it is precisely the 
cut that becomes increasingly and emphatically present throughout Antonioni’s films 
of the 1960s -  breaking up scenes from within and eliminating “springboard[s]” 
between them.94 Some of the sudden reframings in L’avventura (as when Sandro and 
Claudia, in their search for Anna, arrive at the uncannily deserted village in inland 
Sicily), or the unsignposted temporal ellipses in L’eclisse (as when Vittoria goes 
“African”), are particularly memorable. And indeed they are probably all the more 
memorable precisely because unexpected; introducing a radical hiatus within the 
same sequence, the disorientation they initially engender is even greater. The effect 
achieved through these cuts is similar to that in Last Year at Marienbad, where, 
throughout, disorientation (both temporal and spatial) is central to the film. 
Coinciding with Antonioni’s renewed resolution to focus more directly on “the states 
of mind themselves,” the cut thus becomes, in terms reminiscent of Benjamin and 
Kracauer, Antonioni’s rendu (to use Chion’s term) of the subjective experience of 
the time of modernity, and of time in modernity. This, vividly encapsulated in Red 
Desert, finds a parallel in Last Year, which Resnais, as we have seen, had described
91 Antonioni, “A Talk with Michelangelo Antonioni on His Work,” 202.
92 Ibid.
93 Bachelard, The D ialectic o f  Duration, 54  and 65.
94 Antonioni, “A Talk with Michelangelo Antonioni on His Work,” 202.
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in terms similar to Antonioni’s as an attempt to get to “thought” and “its 
mechanisms.”95
Inside Out: “The Reality of Our Time”, On Screen
With its concentration on the neurotic Giuliana, Red Desert is undoubtedly the 
culmination of Antonioni’s effort to presents us with, as Aristarco had put it, “an 
analysis of the psychic machinery itself.”96 In Red Desert, where the world is 
stricken by modernity as if by a plague, and “transfigured” by progress “to the point 
of becoming monstrous,” “the reality of our time” is portrayed, Antonioni explains, 
through Giuliana’s eyes.97 By adopting what Pier Paolo Pasolini has termed the “free 
indirect point-of-view” (the character’s subjective view independent of his/her 
contingent, physical point-of-view), the film enacts her alienated subjectivity, 
exteriorising her psyche, unrolling it on the screen, so to speak.98 Indeed, the 
attempts to express “the reality of our time,” and to focus “on the states of mind 
themselves” are shown to coincide. As for Benjamin and Kracauer, so for Antonioni, 
modernity, and time as such within it, are indissociable from the subject, whose 
experience is at the same time constitutive of them, and (re)constituted by them. 
Giuliana’s neurosis, moreover, is presented not so much as an isolated pathology but 
as an acute manifestation of the impact of radically changing socio-historical 
conditions on the modern subject in general, a subject who, Antonioni feels, is often
95 Resnais, “Trying to Understand My Own Film,” 160.
96 Aristarco, “Literary Cinema,” 162.
97 Antonioni, “II deserto rosso,” 253 cited.
98 Pier Paolo Pasolini, “The ‘Cinema of Poetry’” [1965], in Heretical Empiricism, ed. Louise K. 
Barnett (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), esp. 178-79. Angela Dalle Vacche develops 
Pasolini’s position in her discussion of Antonioni’s strategy as “visual ventriloquism.” See Angela 
Dalle Vacche, “Michelangelo Antonioni’s R ed Desert. Painting as Ventriloquism and Colour as 
Movement,” in Cinema and Painting: How A r tis  Used in Film (London: Athlone Press, 1996).
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too slow to “adapt to the new ‘technique’ of life.”99 As a limit case -  at a peak in her 
crisis her lover consoles her by saying “we all have [your illness] a little” -  Giuliana 
becomes exemplary of the dramatic moment of reconfiguration of subjectivity 
Antonioni feels lies “behind industrial transformation,” and of which his cinema is 
both diagnosis and symptom.100
Red Desert was Antonioni’s first colour film. In line with the attempt to 
present Giuliana’s “view,” colour is used expressionistically rather than realistically, 
and Antonioni opted to give hues a predominantly faded, bleached-out look, apart 
from isolated, and occasional, surges of vivid reds, greens, yellows or blues.101 So, 
for example, the yellow smoke of the refinery, Giuliana’s dark green coat, or the 
bright-red wooden walls of the hut by the sea will stand out from the polluted 
muddiness and fog of the surrounding landscape (ill. 5, p. 333). But, as well as being 
his first colour film, it is also Antonioni’s choppiest. The cutting rhythm is faster and 
more fragmented than in his earlier works. Talking about the film after its release, 
Antonioni commented on the relation between colour and editing pace:
For Red Desert, I have chosen very short shots. Perhaps it was colour which 
demanded this, insinuating this deep need to treat it in blots, as if they were 
pulsations penetrating confusedly into the character.102
99 Antonioni, “II deserto rosso,” 252.
100 Antonioni, “II deserto rosso,” 252. See also the talk at the CSC, where Antonioni comments on our 
psychology and morality as lagging behind material change: Antonioni, “A Talk with Michelangelo 
Antonioni on His Work,” 209. Deleuze draws on this in his Cinema II, where he discusses 
Antonioni’s cinema as staging a dichotomy between a “tired, worn-out, neurotic body” and a “modern 
[artificial] brain,” 215.
101 In addition to using special filters, Antonioni famously also resorted to altering objects and, even, 
landscapes to be filmed by applying paint on them directly. Most notorious is perhaps his having a 
whole wood outside Ravenna painted white, in order, when filming, to obtain the desired greyish hue 
(unfortunately, the scene was in the end not shot as the sunshine was too bright). Michelangelo 
Antonioni, “II bosco bianco,” in II deserto rosso, ed. Carlo di Carlo (Bologna: Cappelli, 1964).
Antonioni is here not simply, or not quite, saying that “very short shots” are the 
medium for colour in the film, but, rather, he is outlining a correspondence between 
them. By aligning the film’s sustained work of cutting with its treatment of colour as 
“blots,” he suggests that Giuliana’s mental state is rendered not simply through the 
hue, the “look” of colour in the film, but through the film’s dynamics. Thinking of 
colour itself as perceptual pulsation, intrinsically mobile, Antonioni is postulating a 
formal equivalence between short shot and colour, suggesting that it is as the rapid 
cutting could both evoke and enact the way in which colours -  as stimuli from the 
outside -  are experienced by Giuliana as “pulsations.”103 Cutting, that is, is 
presented as the cinematic form through which the very dynamics of the subject’s 
“psychic machinery” is enacted, rendered.
This idea of colours as stimuli, sampled by the subject intermittently, 
according to an on/off, on/off dynamics, is reminiscent of the syncopated functioning 
of consciousness described by Freud in “A Note Upon the Mystic Writing-Pad,” or, 
similarly, by Frampton. Yet, we seem far from the regular interruptions hinted at by 
either of them. With its “pulsations penetrating confusedly into the character,” the 
working Antonioni evokes is disorderly, irregular, almost a mechanism on the verge 
of breaking, wreaking havoc within the subject, rather than keeping it ticking over. 
Though, like Zorns Lemma, Red Desert employs cutting and the cut itself as a rendu 
-  as content “rendered” by film form -  of the mechanics of the mind, in Antonioni’s 
film we do not have the highly ordered systematicity, or the smooth dynamics 
orchestrated by Frampton. The “psychic machinery” Red Desert both enacts and
102 Antonioni, “II deserto rosso,” 251.
103 When working as a film  critic in the 1940s, Antonioni, drawing on Hegel’s aesthetics, had written 
about colour as “infinite oscillations o f movement.” See: Michelangelo Antonioni, “I suggerimenti di 
Hegel,” Cinema 155 (December 1942), 702-703. For a discussion on the relation between colour, 
movement and the pictorial in Antonioni, vis a vis the anti-pictorial concerns o f the art of the period,
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constructs is one that misses beats and gets stuck: that of a subject, as Giuliana’s 
husband Ugo puts it, who “isn’t able to mesh” (“non riesce a ingranare”) and is, one 
may say, therefore “out of gear.” Indeed, while in Zorns Lemma the cut was a motor, 
denoting that which propels consciousness and gives rise to “the pointed sense of the 
passage of time,” as Frampton put it, here it is a halt.104 It is something that engulfs 
and stalls the subject, blocking or undoing his or her sense of time’s passage.
This use of the cut to denote and model, rather than a simple “interruption,” a 
slippage or breakage in subjectivity and the experience of time, chimes, as 
mentioned, with its function in Last Year at Marienbad. Here, in fact, the cut 
articulates the paradox of what Alain Robbe-Grillet -  who wrote the film’s 
screenplay -  will later describe as “time cut off from its temporality,” a time that 
“doesn’t flow anymore.”105 Relentlessly punctuated by straight editing cuts, Last 
Year is also, moreover, often internally split by an unsynchronized soundtrack. 
Crucially, the off-screen narration of the male protagonist (played by Giorgio 
Albertazzi, called “X” in the script) is often at odds with the unfolding imagery.106 
Did the two main characters meet and have an affair at Marienbad the year before? 
Was it there, or then? Did he rape her, or did she give herself to him 
spontananeously? Did anything, in fact, ever take place at all? Throughout, the cut is 
used to disconnect, unhinge and confuse temporal (and spatial) co-ordinates, thus at 
the same time demonstrating the characters’ own disorientation as to what happened 
when, and arousing it in the viewers. What, in relation to the story, counts as past or
see: Briony Fer, The Infinite Line: Remaking Art After Modernism  (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004), esp. 171-172.
104 Gidal, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” 101.
105 Alain Robbe-Grillet, “Time and Description in Contemporary Narrative” [1963], in Snapshots
[1962] and Towards a New Novel [1963], trans. Barbara Wright (London: Calder and Boyars, 1965), 
151.
106 Alain Robbe-Grillet, “Introduction,” in Last Year a t M arienbad: A Cine-Novel [1961], trans. 
Richard Howard (London: John Calder, 1962), 10.
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present, memory, fantasy or reality is fundamentally muddled up, rendered radically 
ambiguous and, in the end, indiscernible. The most glaring indicators of the temporal 
disruptions introduced by the cuts are perhaps the outfits of the female protagonist 
(Delphine Seyrig, “A” in the script), a range of dresses and gowns in either black or 
white. As they often change from one shot to the other, they alert us to, and function 
as “precipitates” of, the discontinuities through which the film is woven. So, a shot 
where, in white, A is shown walking through the corridors and salons of the grand 
baroque palace, may be cut and resumed by one in which, though apparently 
following on the action of the preceding one, or reversing it, she is wearing black.
Or, more subtly, she may come to be in an only slightly different outfit of the same 
colour, as when, framed talking to X on a bench in the park, a cut yields a scene 
identical to the previous one in all but the model of her (still) white dress. This, 
however, seems random rather than logical. There is no distinguishable pattern by 
which we can safely associate one colour with the past, memory or fantasy, and the 
other with the present, or reality. Indeed, in contemporary interviews, Resnais and 
Robbe-Grillet themselves played up to this undecidability, staging disagreement over 
what and when may or may not have happened at Marienbad.107 Constructed through 
such recursive alternation and mirroring, doubling and re-doubling between shots 
(also echoed by the repetitious structure of the dialogue), Last Year uses the cut as 
the operation of interruption and disconnection through which a time that “doesn’t 
flow anymore” is articulated.108 The film evokes a time that is not simply 
discontinuous, stop and start, but repetitive and circular, stumbling again and again 
over the very interruptions, the very gaps.
107 Cf: Leutrat, L ’annee derniere a Marienbad, 19.
108 Robbe-Grillet, “Time and Description in Contemporary Narrative,” 151.
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While Red Desert’s thread of events is not as obscured by the cutting as is 
that of Last Year, a similar strategy, with radical, rapid re-framings and jump cuts, is 
employed to embody the breaking up of Giuliana’s time, her missing beats. This 
emerges pointedly in one of the sequences dedicated to Giuliana’s recurrent “crises.” 
Disturbed by the fact that her son has feigned paralysis, she has left her house and 
wandered around the town, eventually ending up at the hotel where Corrado, an old 
school friend of Ugo’s is staying. Unlike the distant and cold Ugo, Corrado has 
shown her some sympathy and understanding -  he is himself at a point of crisis in 
his life -  and the two will embark on a brief affair. Increasingly distraught, we see 
her run down a stark white, futuristic-looking hotel corridor, and enter Corrado’s 
room (ill. 6, p. 334). The wood panelling partly covering the room, the thick curtain 
and carpet, the brown or red no-frills angular furniture, make the room severe and 
cosy, conveying a sense of both entrapment and protection. It is here, as the two talk 
and then make love (an attempt on his side to “calm” her and/or take advantage of 
the situation?), that Giuliana’s crisis unfolds. As her crisis reaches its peak, the 
cutting becomes increasingly fast, jerky and disconnected. The electronic,
“metallic,” noises, reminiscent of radio-wave interferences, that pierce the room in 
brief bursts (discussed in Chapter 3), and which Giuliana alone seems to hear, also 
earmark her acutely disturbed state. It is as if the dysfunctional “mechanism” of 
Giuliana’s mind, generating and experiencing a temporal flow on the verge of 
disintegration, radical breakage, were embedded in the cinematic tempo, at the level 
of both the image and the sound track. As her “rhythm” starts to malfunction, glitch, 
miss, or repeat beats, get stuck, so does the pace of the unfolding sequence, a far cry 
from the controlled, regular metre of Frampton’s Zorns Lemma.
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From the initial shot-reverse-shot alternation between the two characters, 
through to the more confusing shots towards the end, when both spatial and temporal 
co-ordinates become unclear, the sequence’s flow is continuously not simply 
interrupted, but, more strongly, disrupted by cuts. As it follows and embodies the 
crescendo of Giuliana’s crisis, the scene is chopped up by drastic and sudden re­
framings, obtained through jump cuts (and, to the same effect, some zip pans), 
which, in a different context, Zizek has characterized as “hystericizing” film (ills. 7 
and 8, pp. 335-36).109 Rather than moving towards them gradually, the camera skips 
to different comers of the room (the bare walls, the bed’s red metal railing, a sofa by 
the window), and/or the actors’ faces and bodies (often cropped, as in the views of 
Giuliana’s writhing legs), generating an effect both of disconnection and of collision. 
Indeed, the “shocks and collisions” of “moving through traffic” that film, according 
to Benjamin, “established as a formal principle,” thus recapitulating the quintessence 
of the experience of modernity, are here literally, and doubly, internalized: brought 
into the enclosed space of the room, and made an obvious marker of psychic life.110
Especially as, towards the end of the sequence, Giuliana and/or Corrado 
move between the bed, the window, and the sofa there, this series of cuts engenders a 
certain degree of confusion as to where exactly the lovers are in the room. Certainly, 
the lack of establishing shots, and the prevalence of medium and close-up views, 
together with the relative darkness of the scene at this point, also contribute to this 
confusion. The disorientation that ensues from this spatial disconnectedness is also, 
pointedly, temporally inflected. As the film shifts rapidly between enigmatic shots of 
Giuliana by the window alone, then, apparently, back on the bed, fending off
109 Cf. Zizek, Looking Awry, 96. In relation to a traumatic scene in Alfred Hitchcock’s The Birds
(1963), Zizek talks of its “‘hystericized’ tracking shot.” The “tracking” across a room onto one o f the 
birds’ disfigured victims is obtained, instead, through a fast succession o f jump cuts, drawing 
precipitously, without transition, into the scooped-out eye.
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Corrado’s embrace, or, again, on the sofa by the window with and then without 
Corrado, we realize that these cuts are also indices of time, cuts in time. While they 
are temporal ellipses, they are not such that through them the succession of events is 
told, though discontinuously, in a linear and smooth progression. Indeed, in its use of 
cutting, this scene offers a micro-view of the stories without “connective links,” 
without “logical narrative transitions,” which Antonioni starts to tell in the 1960s.111 
The cuts, as Deleuze says, gain hold “in themselves,” as something between images, 
and which, though not exactly at the same level as in Zorns Lemma, replaces a 
logical and hypotactical organization of shots with a more paratactical and serial 
arrangement. More than ellipses, these cuts are holes in time: they radically disrupt 
and break up the temporality of the scene. As they riddle it with lacunae, they render 
it murky, awkward, even ambiguous as to the interpretation of before and after. It is 
through this work of cutting that Antonioni exteriorizes the dynamics of Giuliana’s 
psyche, at the same time embodying and constructing cinematically the radically 
heterogeneous, and irregularly discontinuous time she experiences and, as Laplanche 
would say, “secretes.”112
The Time of the Cut
Giuliana’s crisis in Corrado’s room ends with a puzzling twist. A glimpse of their 
lovemaking is interrupted by a cut onto what looks almost like a still life, though an
110 Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 171.
111 Antonioni, “A Talk with Michelangelo Antonioni on His Work,” 202.
112 The human being, has Laplanche puts it, has “the capacity [ ...]  o f creating, o f secreting -  sic tenia 
verbo -  his own time.” Laplanche, “Psychoanalysis, Time and Translation,” 162.
74
odd one: a composition, somewhat frivolous in its pinks and whites (literally painted 
on the objects) of books and lampshade on a night table. A close-up of Giuliana 
asleep follows, which then cuts to a shot showing the whole room. This reveals that, 
suffused in a pastel-colour light, perhaps reverberating from the pink walls and the 
tulle curtains, the room is a completely unfamiliar one, looking neither like 
Corrado’s, nor Giuliana’s at home. Where, or what is this room?
Let us recall Antonioni’s provocative assertions with regard to time in the 
cinema, ostensibly split between his intolerance of “real time,” because of its excess 
of “useless moments,” and his desire to include in film the very “pauses” constitutive 
of “the rhythm of life.”113 Antonioni’s agenda of inclusions and exclusions is one, 
paradoxically, in which the moments deemed crucial and indispensable for the 
rendering of the modern subject’s experience of time are precisely those when time 
itself seems to stop or wane. It is when it falters or freezes, it seems, as in neurosis -  
or, as I discuss in the next chapter, in boredom -  that time in modernity must most be 
sought and analysed. The puzzling ending to this sequence is emblematic of 
Antonioni’s attempt to include in his films these stoppages, these gaps, to make their 
reality palpable, visible.
There is, here, a further resonance with Last Year at Marienbad. If, in fact, in 
Resnais’s film the editing cuts may function as markers of the breaks, the lacunae in 
the characters’ time, they also become the means through which the “negative” or 
“other” temporality of these breaks, o/these lacunae themselves can be embodied as 
a “positive” on the screen.114 Through its cutting operations, that is, Last Year also 
strives to incarnate, to reify, the reality of the cut in time itself. This is perhaps best
113 See above, pp. 2-4.
114 On the cut -  or, on the celluloid itself, the splice -  as a “negative duration,” that is, as a marker o f a 
segment o f time left out o f the film, see Pier Paolo Pasolini’s essays “The Theory o f Splices” [1971] 
and “The Rheme” [1971], in H eretical Empiricism.
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crystallized in a scene in which A (who is the “amnesiac” in the film, though X is 
ridden by certain doubts too) is listening to X’s recollection of some detail of their 
alleged encounter the previous year. The scene is rather dark: the characters are 
leaning against the counter of the bar in the dimly lit palace, Seyrig is wearing black. 
At a point, this is interrupted by a very rapid insert of Seyrig, in white, standing in 
front of a window inundating with light the surrounding space. Repeated several 
times, this generates a pulsating effect. Introduced by cuts whose “moments” 
themselves seem brought into relief (perhaps extended by some blank frames), these 
luminous inserts are in a way the reverse of these cuts, their flip-side. Rather literal 
“flashbacks,” they visualize the time “lost” by A (whether real or imagined), and, 
that, though we “see” it on the screen, she is apparently unable to “find” again. With 
their violent bursting into the film, to a certain extent they conjure up the radically 
heterogeneous and discontinuous image of time evoked by Benjamin when he wrote 
that the present is “shot through with chips” of the past.115 Here, Deleuze’s notion of 
the cut as a topos of modern cinema is both literalized and, in a way, turned inside 
out. The “interval,” the “interstice” itself becomes an image. At play in the otherness 
of the inserts is the cut as thing, segment -  both spatial and temporal - , employed to 
articulate, by turning it into a “positive” on screen, the “negative,” or flip-sided 
temporality of the cut in time itself.
Where here the inserts embody X’s “flashback,” the pink room in Red Desert 
incarnates Giuliana’s “blackout.” In its puzzling alterity, the pink room is an 
embodiment of Giuliana’s cut in time, and of the time o/this cut, rendered, quite 
literally, as an image of “another place.” Through its focus on neurosis, Red Desert 
has other such moments of blackout, or in fact, of “blanking out,” as when the screen
115 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” [1940], in Illuminations, 255.
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fills with fog and turns white, momentarily obliterating not only the characters but 
the cinematic image itself. The most striking, though, is the famously odd interlude 
of the picture-perfect island, almost “an antifilm within the film,” as Millicent 
Marcus has called it, that does not so much divide the film in two parts as break into 
it.116 Here, a solitary girl swims peacefully in crystalline waters and is caressed by 
soft pink sand and rounded rocks. Man -  or more precisely, and perhaps tellingly, 
woman -  and nature, subject and object, organic and inorganic, seem to 
interpenetrate and blend into each other.117 The girl is at one with her surrounding 
landscape and its cyclical rhythms; and the landscape, on the other hand, is 
anthropomorphic: the rocks, Giuliana says, are “like flesh” and “everything” sings 
with a sweet female’s voice. Where throughout the rest of the movie the “desert” of 
the title can be associated with a poisoned and sinister industrialized landscape, here 
it becomes synonymous with an earthly paradise. Dull hues give way to bright 
colours, haziness to crisply focused images, the noise of machinery to the lull of the 
waves, electronic music to a solo singing voice.118
A stark contrast to the rest of the film in both style and setting, the ostensible 
justification for this sequence is a story Giuliana tells her son (who, as mentioned, is 
pretending to be paralysed), of which, accompanied by her off-screen narration, it 
provides the visual illustration. Yet, in its radical otherness and dream-like vividness 
it also stands out, in a film portraying reality through Giuliana’s gaze, as her own 
reverie, or fantasy. The way in which the sequence is wedged into the film reinforces
116 Millicent Marcus, Italian Film in the Light o f  Neorealism  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986), 202.
117 On this, see Marcus’s discussion, ibid. Focusing on the figure o f the pubescent girl, Sitney has also 
offered a reading o f this sequence that draws a parallel between environmental and sexual “pollution.” 
See: Adams Sitney, Vital Crises in Italian Cinema, esp. 216-217.
118 As Antonioni himself has pointed out, this, shot in Technicolor, is the only point in the film where 
the colours o f reality have not been tampered with by using filters, or even, as mentioned, by directly 
painting parts o f the landscape or objects to be filmed. See Antonioni, “II deserto rosso,” 253.
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this effect. At one end, in fact, it comes after a shot in which Giuliana apparently 
puts off telling her son the story he wants. At the other, the film avoids showing us 
the child again, but inter-cuts close-ups of an absorbed Giuliana with views of the 
bleak reality outside the window (the house looks out on the industrial port). Almost 
like a foreign body in the predominant fabric of the film, yet still part of it, this 
sequence chimes with the way in which fantasy has been described in psychoanalysis 
as an “intrusion” on the ego of “another level of itself,” causing “a break in its 
continuity.”119 But fantasies, Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok have also written, as 
they do this, are paradoxical, in that they “indicate the [very] denial of a gap.”120 In 
other words, they try to patch the very breach of which they are at once cause and 
symptom. And Red Deserfs pink beach is indeed a scenario of plenitude, unity and 
continuity, which, nevertheless, points to the “gap” in Giuliana’s psyche, marks what 
Antonioni has called her moment of “absence.”121 Underlining, in fact, the idea of a 
symbiotic relationship between the film and its protagonist, Antonioni has said that 
there “the plot is suspended, as if the eye and consciousness of the narrator had 
absented themselves.”122 Yet, this twin “suspension” of the film and the subject’s 
consciousness is made, and presented as, integral to both, part of the film as such, 
and of the psyche it endeavours to narrate and embody, as an “other” within.
Interestingly, this time of the cut, this most private and interior moment of 
the subject, presented here as the “space” of fantasy, is also the most conventionally 
“cinematic” part of the film, both aesthetically and conceptually. The saturation and
119 Maria Torok, “Fantasy: An Attempt to Define Its Structure and Operation” [1959], in Nicolas 
Abraham and Maria Torok, The Shell and the Kernel, ed. and trans. Nicholas T. Rand (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 30.
120 Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, “Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection versus Incorporation” 
[1972], in The Shell and the Kernel, 128 cited.
121 In Cinema II, Deleuze remarks that Antonioni’s characters suffer “less from the absence of 
another, then from their absence from themselves,” 9.
122 Antonioni, “II deserto rosso,” 253.
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glossiness of the colours, and the stereotyped banality of the story (solitary girl, 
desert exotic island, mysterious sailing ship arriving) are redolent of the 
Hollywoodian spectacle, especially as, in the wake of the diffusion of television in 
the 1950s and 1960s, cinema upped the ante with more garishness and opulence 
(such as CinemaScope, etc.)123 And this perhaps throws into relief how, more than 
simply helping to visualize and embody time and its others (i.e. its “suspensions” or 
its “negatives”), cinema participates in their very (con)figuration. The experience 
and cognition of time and temporality in modernity are shaped through the cinematic 
in fundamental ways. Time’s discontinuity and heterogeneity, the very idea of a 
“mixed” model of time, made up of different temporalities, is not simply 
“incarnated” by the cinema, but it is also “produced” by it.
In an essay entitled “The Instant” (1932) -  largely a refutation of Bergson’s concept 
of lived time as continuous duration -  Bachelard argued that, despite numerous 
attempts to discover and experience this sense of duration inside himself, he 
“remained [...] quite incapable of finding these endless, unbroken lines within us.” 
“However small the fragment under consideration,” he continues, “always it was the 
embroidery that we saw, never the fabric.” 124 My focus in this chapter has been with 
some of the ways in which, through the fundamental operation of the cut, the cinema
123 Andre Bazin, “Will CinemaScope Save the Film Industry?” [1953], in Jeffrey Show and Peter 
Weibl, eds., The Cinematic Imaginary After Film (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), is an 
interesting contemporary reflection on that moment o f crisis for the cinema.
124 Gaston Bachelard, “The Instant” [1932], trans. Mary McAllester Jones, in Robin Durie, ed., Time 
and the Instant: Essays in the Physics and Philosophy o f  Time (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000), 
77.
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may be seen to represent, inform and form this sense of the “embroidery” of time, if 
not, even, of time as embroidery. For Bachelard time is an “embroidery,” as he 
explains in the slightly later The Dialectic of Duration (1936), because it is “a 
succession that is plainly heterogeneous, clearly marked by occurrences of newness 
and surprise and by breaks, cut too by voids.”125 And whereas time may well “appear 
to be continuous,” it does so precisely “through its heterogeneity”: time, that is, 
“needs alterity” to look like a flow.126 This view can be seen to chime, in important 
respects, with Antonioni’s reflection on the “rhythm of life” as made up of different 
“beatjs]” and punctuated by “pauses,” and with Frampton’s assertion that it is 
precisely the experienced interruption of time’s flow (“the cut in duration”) to give 
us a notion of its passage.127
In Bachelard’s view, furthermore, time is truly paradoxical, or indeed, as he 
puts it, truly “dialectical,” because it “is really constructed starting from instants.”128 
Diametrically opposed to Bergson’s, Bachelard’s argument is that the instant, 
usually thought of as a sort of point -  dimensionless, durationless, motionless -  is 
the spark out of which the “dimension” of time emerges, the unit with which the 
“movement” of duration is threaded.129 Thus, in Bachelard’s view, time is 
intrinsically dependent on what may appear to be antithetical to it: its length, 
extension and flow are borne out of contrary attributes -  like, in a way, in the 
cinema.
In fact, whilst Bachelard’s ostensible subject is, of course, time, his 
descriptions (“a succession [...] marked by occurrences of newness and surprise and
125 Bachelard, The D ialectic o f  Duration, 47.
126 Ibid., 65. My emphasis.
127 Antonioni, “A Talk with Michelangelo Antonioni on His Work,” 202; Gidal, “Interview with 
Hollis Frampton,” 101.
128 Bachelard, “The Instant,” 83.
129 Cf. Robin Durie, “The Strange Nature o f the Instant,” in Durie, Time and the Instant.
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by breaks,” a “heterogeneity” striving for “continuity,” “constructed starting from 
instants”) could well function as an account of cinema -  or of the aesthetic strategies 
peculiar to it They could, indeed, be used to evoke the sustained, intermittent 
bombardment of colourful shots of Zorns Lemma, the desultory pace of Last Year, 
the unexpected “intrusion” of the beach sequence in Red Desert. And, as in Freud’s 
“A Note Upon the Mystic Writing-Pad,” it is possible that cinema might constitute 
Bachelard’s implicit referent After all, Bergson, whose view Bachelard is confuting, 
had explicitly used cinema in Creative Evolution to describe what he saw as an 
erroneous and artificial understanding of time.
If the attributes of time Bachelard outlines sound cinematic (and, in this 
respect, whether he was in fact thinking of cinema is irrelevant), then it is not 
surprising that they seem to find a most vivid and concise crystallization in a 
cinematic meditation on cinema. This is a film by the American Gary Beydler, 
Pasadena Freeway Stills (1974), which conveys not only the “embroidered” nature 
of cinema -  constructed of fragments stitched together, dependent on a tension 
between inclusions and exclusions -  but, also, the stillness/movement oxymoron at 
its very core. The film -  only approximately six minutes in length -  starts with a 
male figure, face to the camera, intent on sticking a photograph within a rectangle 
outlined by masking tape on a glass surface in front of him. As the image-side of the 
print is turned towards us rather than him, a frame-within-the-frame effect ensues, 
reinforced by the contrast between the black and white of the photograph and the 
colour of the rest of the film. Showing cars entering a tunnel (probably, indeed, the 
Pasadena freeway), this still is then replaced, one after the other, by a series of 
apparently identical images. At first, the whole process of replacing the photographs 
within the rectangle is shown: we see the actor remove the print, place it on a table to
his right, select another image and stick it on the pane of glass. As the film goes on, 
however, this action is progressively edited, “cut out” of the film, with the result 
that, at a point, the interval between one black and white still and the other is all but 
eliminated. In a way, where we started by watching a colour film, we seem now to 
be left with a black and white one. The colour footage of the process of placing and 
replacing the stills that we understand to have been “excised” from the film, stands 
vividly in our memory as a “positive” segment, an image of what, paraphrasing 
Frampton, we could call “the duration of a cut.” And of these “excised” actions and 
their duration, a gentle throb -  a trace -  is left between one photo and the other. The 
contrast and alternation between colour and black and white shots had already 
created a sense of the film as a heterogeneous “patchwork.” This light quiver further 
evokes Bachelard’s metaphorics of time as “embroidery”: a piece of fabric, a 
surface, on which he could not lose sight of the stitches. In fact, as we keep looking 
at the photographs -  on which the camera now remains fixed in close-up -  we notice 
that the cars are speeding through the tunnel. We thus realize that the film has, so to 
speak, taken us through the constitutive principles of the cinema as such: its 
historical origin and material basis in photographic stillness, “set in motion” by the 
projector.
Moving to the next chapter, it is not so much to these as such that I turn, as to 
the consideration of how photographic stillness “re-emerges” from within cinema 
during the 1960s and 1970s (as, indeed, Beydler’s film shows), and of how this 
relates to the problem of time.
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Chapter 2: The Still
About thirty minutes into L ’eclisse (Eclipse, 1962), there is a strange and striking 
sequence. It is late at night, but Vittoria is awake and banging a nail into the wall in 
order to hang a newly bought artefact in her modem apartment. Soon Anita, her 
neighbour and friend, is at the door. Although complaining about the noise on behalf 
of her husband, she herself, seemingly also unable to sleep, seems rather relieved to 
have found an excuse to have a chat and moan about her comfortable yet uneventful 
life, whose only pleasures appear to be sweets. For her part, Vittoria recounts how 
she spent the whole of the previous night awake too, breaking up with her long-term 
fiance (a relationship, we infer from the film’s initial sequence, which had dried up 
and become routinized). She is tired, but of a tiredness, she specifies, which is not 
sleepiness: “There are days,” she tries to explain, “in which to have in your hands a 
needle, a piece of cloth, a book, a man, is the same thing.” While they are talking, 
the phone rings. It is yet another neighbour, Marta, a white Kenyan who lives in the 
opposite building. She too cannot sleep, since a mixture of loneliness and frustrated 
homesickness keep her awake -  her husband is temporarily away, and she will later 
explain that her life in Italy is empty: she never goes out and has nothing to do all 
day. Now, having seen the two conversing in Vittoria’s illuminated flat through her 
window, she is calling to invite them over to hers for company. Thus wakefulness, 
insomnia, restlessness set the context for what is about to happen, and are the 
outward signs of the boredom these three women share: three women who should be 
still (i.e. asleep), but are, instead, still moving.
83
At this point, the scene cuts to a wall in a dark interior, on which is a large 
photograph of an African woman in tribal dress. It is through this silent and static 
shot of a still image that Marta’s apartment, as yet unidentified, is first introduced on 
the screen. This cut to the still sets the pace for what follows: the striking formal 
theme of the unfolding sequence is in fact the filming of photographs. Marta’s flat is 
like a reliquary or, perhaps, a kitsch souvenir-shop: large photographic images of 
Kenya are tacked to the walls, and a multitude of ethnic artefacts lies scattered 
around its open-plan layout. Vittoria browses around the flat, lazily perusing the 
pictures on the walls; Anita, reclining on the bed, looks unexcitedly at the images of 
an illustrated book through which Marta leafs as she talks of Africa. The camera 
alternates between the women and the photos. Indeed, it is on these latter in 
particular that it emphatically lingers, whether with a static close-up, by gently 
zooming into a detail, or by unhurriedly panning across their whole surfaces. 
Protractedly framing the stills full-screen, the camera, with its almost torpid 
movements, emphasizes their nature as photographic objects: their flatness, their 
grainy texture, the stasis of their imagery.
The co-presence of the boredom of the three women and the still photographs 
is not incidental: on the contrary, it is precisely through the women’s (and 
particularly Vittoria’s) relation to the photographs that their boredom is articulated. 
Via the photographs, boredom is specified as a problem of modernity, and of time in 
modernity. Furthermore, it is again through the women’s engagement with the stills 
that boredom’s relation to “distraction,” a term with which the critical history of 
boredom itself is linked, is crystallized. The scene, in fact, shows how distraction 
may be a form 0/ boredom, rather than its antidote. Articulated through distraction
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and other terms, such as restlessness, that might appear antithetical to it, the scene 
encapsulates the paradoxes or contradictions inherent in the condition.
But boredom enters L ’eclisse at the formal as well as at the diegetic level. In 
addition to being a hinge for the women’s state represented in the narrative, the 
photographs also have a key role in its “formal” rendering. Through them, in fact, is 
engendered an oscillation, a tension between stasis and motion that resonates with 
boredom’s temporal structure. The insertion of the stills discloses the very dynamics 
by which Antonioni may be seen actively to court an aesthetics of boredom, 
transferring “narrative” boredom onto the spectator, making it “felt” as well as 
“seen” in the cinematic experience. L’eclisse, possibly one of Antonioni’s slowest 
films, is exemplary of this mutual relation between the diegetic description and the 
structural incarnation of boredom, so that in the viewing experience boredom may be 
both represented and produced.
Antonioni’s films are often described as “slow,” and seen to possess a certain 
stillness. Adorno was struck by how in La notte (1961) this “uncinematic” quality 
“both provocatively denied and yet preserved, in negative form,” the essential trait of 
the cinema, “the movement of objects.”1 Antonioni had, in fact, already pursued 
stillness and the photographic quite explicitly in his early short L ’amorosa menzogna 
(Loving Lie, 1949). This dealt with the popular phenomenon of the fotoromanzo 
(“photoromances”), a photographic -  and romantic -  version of the comic-strip 
story, whose actors and readers stood in the shadow of the more glamorous world of 
Cinecitta.2 In this pseudo-documentary (out of which Antonioni developed the script
1 Theodor W. Adorno, “Transparencies on Film” [1966], trans.Thomas Y. Levin, in The Culture 
Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. J.M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1993), 156.
2 For a study on the phenomenon of the fotorom anzo  in Italy, see: Maria Teresa Anelli et al., 
Fotoromanzo: fascino e pregiudizio -  storia, documenti e immagini d i un grande fenomeno popolare 
1946-1978  (Rome: Savelli, 1979). Stephen Gundle, Between H ollywood and M oscow: The Italian 
Communists and the Challenge to Mass Culture 1943-1991 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000),
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for The White Sheik3), the movie camera captures the actors while they “freeze” into 
a succession of poses for the still camera -  whose static images are in the context of 
the fotoromanzo the very backbone of narrative movement. Where L’amorosa 
menzogna addressed photographic stasis as, physically, the very foundation of 
cinema, it also suggested that, culturally, this form had become subaltern to the 
moving image. With L’eclisse and, later, Blow-up (1966), Antonioni continued his 
exploration of the photographic image, both in terms of its positioning and 
significance within visual culture, and of its stillness in relation to cinematic 
movement. Indeed, in these films, this “uncinematic” quality which Adorno 
diagnosed in Antonioni’s work is fixed, exposed and literalized in the stills 
punctuating them.
Where the 1960s and 1970s were a time of intensive reflection on 
photographic stillness in relation to, and within, movement, this was also a period in 
which boredom became strongly thematized. Boredom, in the arts at least, became of 
interest not only as a condition to be analysed and yet, if possible, avoided, but as a 
phenomenon to be actively taken up aesthetically -  taken up by extending duration, 
dragging out time. As we have seen, Antonioni argued that the “pauses” of time, the 
slits in which time itself seems to stop or wane, should be included in film -  because, 
in his view, they would, in fact, constitute the very core of “modern cinema.”4 If
briefly discussing the fotorom anzo  notes how, though the medium was in the first instance a “by­
product o f the cinema age,” crucially, it also reached peasant and remote audiences for whom cinema 
itself was “a very distant reality,” 34. Thus, for these audiences, the still image was the medium that 
also gave them some form of vicarious access to the moving image as such.
3 Federico Fellini’s The White Sheik (Lo sceicco bianco , 1952), which picks up and expands the theme 
and visual motifs o f L ’amorosa menzogna, should have been Antonioni’s first feature-length film. For 
a series o f reasons, the story ended up being sold to the producer Carlo Ponti, who gave the direction 
to Fellini. Aldo Tassone, “La storia del cinema la fanno i film ” [ interview with Antonioni, 1979], in 
Fare un film  e per me vivere,Scritti sul cinema, ed. Carlo di Carlo and Giorgio Tinazzi (Venice: 
Marsilio, 1994), 176.
4 Michelangelo Antonioni, “A Talk with Michelangelo Antonioni on His Work” [1961], in Harry M. 
Geduld, ed., Film Makers on Film Making: Statements on Their Art by Thirty D irectors  
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), 202. Antonioni’s project is o f course related to
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these, as I discussed in the previous chapter, may denote a moment of crisis, of 
neurosis even, when the subject’s (experience of) time breaks down, they may also, 
and not necessarily at the exclusion of the former, be indicative of the condition of 
boredom. Thus, Antonioni’s pursuit of “the idle periods of everyday banality,”5 as 
Gilles Deleuze has put it, chimes in many important respects with Andy Warhol’s 
often-quoted assertion that he “like[d] boring things.”6
Here, I propose and explore an interrelation between this (re)emergence of 
photographic stillness within cinema and boredom. Focusing on a number of 
experimental works, and in particular Hollis Frampton’s nostalgia (1971), as well as 
Blow-up, I begin by considering the formal aspects, dynamics and implications of 
this encounter between cinema and photography, stasis and motion, within the 
terrain of the cinematic. I then move on to discuss how in Ueclisse the thematization 
of photography’s visual culture bears on the articulation of boredom as a problem of 
modernity, and of the occupancy of time in modernity. Locating Antonioni’s films in 
the wider context of the “pursuit of boredom,” as we may call it, of the 1960s and 
1970s, I conclude by returning to the phenomenology of stillness in the cinema, 
which is, in fact, still moving. This oxymoron of a motionlessness in movement 
echoes the very experience of time in boredom. For, in boredom, time comes to be 
felt as just this contradictory structure, as its passage is experienced as a painful
neorealism’s pursuit o f the ordinary and the everyday. His early documentaries Gente del Po  (People 
o f  the Po, shot 1942-43; edited and released 1947) and Nettezza Urbana (N.U., 1948) informed, and 
were informed by, a neorealist programme and aesthetics. However, Antonioni’s focus in the later 
films is significantly different from neorealism. Where the latter aimed to highlight the tragedies to be 
found within the lives o f ordinary people (as Zavattini once put it, “I’m interested in the dramas of  
things we happen to encounter, not those we plan”) Antonioni shows that the real problem is, in a 
way, the very absence of drama. Cesare Zavattini, “Some Ideas on the Cinema” [1952], Sight and  
Sound 23 (October-December 1953), 64-69; 69 cited. For a discussion o f the ways in which 
neorealism’s emphasis on the ordinary may be seen to inform the aesthetics o f boredom of 1960s and 
1970s filmmaking, see; Ivone Margulies, Nothing Happens: Chantal Akerman’s H yperrealist 
Everyday (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), esp. chapter 1.
5 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image [1985], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(London; Athlone Press, 1989), 5.
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tension between mobility and immobility; something that passes and, yet, fails to 
pass soon enough.
Still, Moving: Photography in Cinema
Frampton once wrote that Etienne-Jules Marey’s chronophotographs, which slightly 
predate the “birth” of the movies, represent “a point of disjunction between the still 
photograph and cinema.”7 These images incorporate successive exposures of a body 
in motion on a single plate.8 The static sequencing of Marey’s photos, which on 
occasions results in a blur where, so to speak, movement is frozen somewhat 
between analysis and synthesis, was for Frampton a symbol of the point at which the 
kinesis of cinema originated from within photographic stasis (ill. 9, p. 337).9 Thus,
6 Andy Warhol and Pat Hackett, Popism: The W arhol’60s [1980] (London: Hutchinson, 1981), 50.
7 Hollis Frampton, “Eadweard Muybridge: Fragments of a Tesseract,” Artforum  11 (March 1973), 43- 
52. 50 cited.
8 For a comprehensive study o f Marey’s work see: Marta Braun, Picturing Time: The Work o f  
Etienne-Jules Marey (1830-1904) (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1992) and Francois 
Dagognet, Etienne-Jules Marey: A Passion fo r  the Trace [1987], trans. Robert Galeta with Jeanine 
Herman (New York: Zone Books, 1992).
9 Marey’s objective -  like Muybridge’s -  was actually the opposite of what cinema attains. His aim, in 
fact, was not the synthesis o f movement, but, precisely, its analysis and deconstruction into minimal, 
yet, o f course, arbitrarily delimited, “components” made visible to the human eye thanks to camera 
technology. Though he did make one short film , Marey, as Mary Ann Doane has pointed out, did not 
simply have little interest in the medium, but actually resisted it, seeing its “illusionistic” essence at 
odds with scientific endeavours. See: Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence o f  Cinematic Time: 
Modernity, Contingency and the Archive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), ch. 2. A 
similar point is made by Noel Burch, Life to Those Shadows, trans. and ed. Ben Brewster (London: 
BFI, 1990), 10-11. Burch argues that, in line with the “science o f the period,” Muybridge’s and 
Marey’s interest lay with “analytic description” rather than “naturalistic representation,” which was 
deemed to be “redundant” and “a regression” (emphasis in original). The scientific basis of 
Muybridge’s work in particular, however, may itself be contestable. Braun (among others) has 
problematized it in her Picturing Time, esp. 237-251. From a careful analysis of Muybridge’s 781 
plates in his eleven-volume Animal Locomotion  (1887), Braun has showed that Muybridge’s 
sequencing in his composite plates is often an edited reconstruction, rather than a faithful 
reproduction of successive (reading the plates horizontally) and simultaneous (reading the plates 
vertically) views, as he had claimed. This is mainly because “void” plates and repeated plates are a 
frequent feature of his grids. See also Marta Braun, “The Expanding Present: Photographing
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the very hybridity of Marey’s images actually foretold the incipient separation 
between an art of stillness and one of movement, between, as Frampton puts it, “an 
illusionistic cinema of incessant motion and a static photographic art that remained 
frozen solid for decades.”10
However, in this scenario of disjunction, the 1960s and 1970s inscribed a 
moment of conjunction. During these decades, in fact, stillness and the photographic 
image itself surfaced with particular insistence and intensity from within cinematic 
movement. The scene from L’eclisse discussed above, or Gary Beydler’s Pasadena 
Freeway Stills (1974), in which -  as we have seen in the previous chapter -  black 
and white stills punctuate (and eventually “take over”) the otherwise colour film, 
vividly convey this. On the one hand, actual filmed still images emerged 
prominently in a varied spectrum of works from the period. This spans from more 
overtly experimental pieces, such as Chris Marker’s La Jetee (1962), Michael 
Snow’s Wavelength and One Second in Montreal (1967 and 1969), to feature films 
such as Ingmar Bergman’s Persona (1966), Terrence Malick’s Badlands (1973),
Alan Pakula’s The Parallax View (1974) and, even, a “blockbuster” like George Roy 
Hill’s Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (1969). On the other, the stillness of the 
photographic may be seen to have seeped into the static quality of Andy Warhol’s 
notorious early films, the near-immobility of Bruce Nauman’s and Yoko Ono’s 
slow-motion pieces, such as his Pulling Mouth (1969) or her Eye Blink (1966), or the 
motionless tableaux vivants of Marguerite Duras’s India Song (1975).
As the didactic vein of Pasadena Freeway Stills shows, this (re)emergence of 
stillness and of the still itself in cinema took place in the context of the intensive 
inquiry into the nature and mechanics of cinema characterizing the period. This
Movement,” in Ann Thomas, ed., Beauty o f  Another Order (New Haven: Yale University Press,
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investigation of the material conditions of the medium, as I discuss in the general 
introduction, also spurred an interest in its early history and, indeed, pre-history. 
When Frampton wrote his observation on Marey, he was working on both still and 
moving images visually indebted to the French physiologist’s time-photography (the 
photographic series A Visitation from Insomnia, 1970-1973 [ill. 10, p. 338] and the 
film Vernal Equinox, 1975, respectively). His remark, moreover, is drawn from an 
essay on that other important figure of cinema’s “prehistory”: Eadweard Muybridge. 
And in fact, at around the same time, Frampton also produced a photographic series 
that humorously pays homage to Muybridge’s famous studies of animal and human 
motion. Subverting both the content and the title of the early photographer’s eleven- 
volume collection Animal Locomotion, Frampton entitled his own series Vegetable 
Locomotion and, in imitation of the characteristic sequential template of 
Muybridge’s composite images, portrayed a variety of vegetables “falling,” 
“revolving” and “flying” (ill. 11, p. 339).11 By reflecting on the basis and the origin 
of the cinematic in the photographic, as well as on their interrelation, Frampton’s 
own work and writings testify to his involvement with a moment of rapprochement 
between the still and the moving image. The imagery and rapid montage of Zorns 
Lemma (1970) in many ways allude to photographic snapshots; and indeed, though 
there are no still images in it, Frampton once explained it as “a way of handling 
stills.”12 The following year, in 1971, Frampton made nostalgia, not only a much
1997), 172.
10 Frampton, “Eadweard Muybridge: Fragments of a Tesseract,” 50.
11 For Frampton’s series see: Bruce Jenkins and Susan Krane, eds., Hollis Frampton: Recollections/ 
Recreations, exhibition-catalogue: Albright-Knox Art Gallery, Buffalo, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1984), esp. 70ff. Eadweard Muybridge, Animal Locomotion: An Electro-Photographic Investigation  
o f Consecutive Phases o f  Animal Movement 1872-1885, 11 vols. (Philadelphia, 1887).
12 Peter Gidal, “Interview with Hollis Frampton”[London, 24 May 1972], O ctober 32, Hollis 
Frampton: A Special Issue (Spring 1985), 93-117. 93 cited.
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more “static” film than Zorns Lemma, but also one revolving entirely around the 
filming of still photographs.
Lasting approximately thirty-six minutes, nostalgia consists of thirteen static 
shots, each dedicated to one of Frampton’s own photographs (with the exception, to 
be precise, of the penultimate, which is a found photograph, and of the last one, to 
which I’ll come later). These, self-portraits, portraits of friends (including Carl 
Andre and James Rosenquist), images of places and objects (such as the artist’s 
studio, a loo that reminded him of the Crucifixion), refer to moments in Frampton’s 
life between his move to New York to practise as a photographer, in 1958, and the 
year he made the film, 1971. Shown on the same plane as the screen, as if they were 
pictures mounted on a wall facing us, the stills are accompanied by a first-person 
voiceover describing them and providing a series of autobiographical anecdotes. Yet, 
the film subverts the “documentary” idiom that the disembodied voice and the still as 
a “testimony” of the past might be seen to evoke. For the autobiographical 
commentaries are often mocking in tone, if not spurious and, disorientatingly, told 
not over the image they purport to “illustrate” but the one before it.13
Though filmed in close-up, the photographs do not quite fill the screen: the 
gaps left on each side, therefore, encase them in a sort of frame-within-the-frame, 
reinforcing the picture effect. Each print, “fixated” by the camera, is protractedly 
held in view. For Raymond Bellour, a freeze frame, a close-up on a photograph or, 
even, on the “immobility” of the face or a moment of inaction, are moments in which
13 The use o f stills as “documents” o f the past and o f the disembodied narrating voice are typical o f 
the idiom of the documentary (as, for example, in Alain Resnais’s Nuit e t Brouillard [Night and Fog, 
1955]). For Frampton’s comments on the pseudo-documentary nature of the film, which fuses 
autobiography and fiction, see Scott MacDonald, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” Film Culture, 
67-9 (1979), 158-180; esp. 158-161. Philippe Dubois discusses the use o f the photographs in 
nostalgia as “screens” behind, and through which the self is masked and fictionalized. See: Philippe 
Dubois, “Photography Mise-en-Film: Autobiographical (Hi)stories and Psychic Apparatuses,” trans. 
Lynne Kirby, in Patrice Petro, ed., Fugitive Images: From Photography to Video (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1995).
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the very mobility of the cinematic seems to be negated, “stilled.” In such instances, 
film can be “grasped through the specter of photography,” a medium which, in 
fundamental ways, haunts cinema from within.14 For, historically speaking, the still 
photographic image was a precursor of the moving photographic image and, in the 
form of the film frame, also constitutes the inner skeleton of cinema itself.
The awareness thus afforded is also important, for Bellour, because it brings 
into relief how two seemingly antithetical, if complementary manifestations of time 
cohabit in the movies. This is to say that, even within the moving image, time, in 
Bellour’s view, may be contemplated in stillness, as well as in movement. Where 
Andre Bazin valued the cinema for the possibility it afforded of superseding the 
“frozen” instant of the photograph, Bellour instead admires its contrary capacity to 
return this frozen instant to full presence.15 For these outer signs of the photographic 
within the cinematic disclose the inherently oxymoronic structure of time itself in the 
cinema, whose dynamic flux is precisely composed of motionless points, instants 
seized and immobilized out of duration, re-animated mechanically.16 “These instants 
that suspend the time of movement,” as Bellour puts it, reveal and “open up, inside 
of time, another time,” the time of stillness which the photographic encapsulates.17
nostalgia seems to convey all this quite emphatically. In fact, the whole of 
the film is, as it were, “constructed” through photographs, its. cinematic time
14 Raymond Bellour, “The Film Stilled,” trans. Alison Rowe and Elisabeth Lyon, Camera Obscura  24  
(1990), 99-123. 105 cited. There are echoes, here, o f Jean-Louis Baudry’s famous argument on 
photographic stillness -  in the form of the film  frame -  as the “repressed” of cinema, in his 
“Ideological Effects o f the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus” [1970], trans. Alan Williams, in Philip 
Rosen, ed. Narrative/  Apparatus/Ideology: A Film Theory Reader (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986). See also Raymond Bellour, “The Pensive Spectator” [1984], trans. Lynne Kirby, Wide 
Angle 9, Special Issue on Film and Photography (1987), 6-10 and Laura Mulvey, “Death 24 Times a 
Second: The Tension Between Stillness and Movement in the Cinema,” Coil, 9/10 (2000), 
unpaginated.
15 Andre Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image” [1945], in What Is Cinema? trans. Hugh 
Gray, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1967).
composed, manifestly, of an articulation of stills, which, to some extent, mark and 
redouble the inner stasis of the film-frames themselves. In certain respects, this 
series of long, static shots of still images recalls a slide show. Yet nostalgia also 
differs fundamentally from such a presentation, because movement is inscribed 
within the images themselves. For, at a point, each of the photographs begins to 
blacken, shrivel up, smoke and burn until, eventually, it is completely carbonised (ill. 
12, p. 340). And indeed, as the first photo slowly turns to ashes, we realize that the 
camera is not looking out, on to a wall, but down, on to an incandescent hotplate. It 
is this burning that introduces visible movement, and, with it, an index of the passage 
of time, of time as passage, within the otherwise static imagery. In so doing, it alerts 
us to the fact that this is a movie, a motion picture, and not a projection of stills.
Remastering/Remediation
Filmed by the movie camera, a still photograph is morphed into an object which, in 
many important, if obvious respects, is crucially different from a photographic print 
we can hold, handle and discard at will. At a remove from its original material 
support -  in the pre-digital age, most commonly, the paper of the print - , a 
“cinematic photograph”18 is also, in a way, less material: projected onto the screen, it 
becomes physically impalpable. In fact, there is something paradoxical about the 
burning of the photographs in nostalgia, a sort of technological “alchemy” -  even if 
the passage in question is not exactly from mud to gold. While the prints are
16 This was, in fact, the crux o f Bergson’s argument against the cinema as an embodiment o f the 
“real” duration of being, which is, according to him, a continuum. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution 
[1907], trans. Arthur Mitchell (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1998), esp. chapter 4.
17 Bellour, “The Film Stilled,” 108.
181 take this expression from Corey J. Creekmur, “The Cinematic Photograph and the Possibility of 
Mourning,” Wide Angle 9 (1987), 42-49, in which he also discusses Frampton’s nostalgia.
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carbonized on the electric hotplate, they are also recorded on film. As Frampton 
himself has put it: “they are not destroyed; they can be resurrected by rewinding the 
film.”19
Frampton was keen to problematize a reading of nostalgia in purely 
autobiographical terms. Stressing that a “diaristic memoir” or a “confessional” was 
not in his intention, he aligned the film with the predominantly phenomenological 
concerns of much of the contemporary avant-garde.20 “The film is not about me,” he 
declared a few years after its release, thus echoing the motto “this is a film about 
you, not about its maker,” that, in large superimposed lettering, crowns George 
Landow’s Remedial Reading Comprehension (1970).21 However, despite, or along 
with, these protestations, Frampton himself openly called the personal into play 
when discussing nostalgia, describing it as “a remastering of a certain number of 
lumps I took during those years as a still photographer in New York.” “It was quite 
dreadful,” he reflected,
I didn’t find it a picnic to be a photographer, through the Sixties, not because 
photography was disregarded, although of course that was true, but because 
my predicament was that of a committed illusionist in an environment that 
was officially dedicated to the eradication of illusion.22
As well as hinting at the subaltern position of photography vis a vis the other arts, 
Frampton’s notion of a “remastering” of distressing past events, in order to take 
cognizance and some kind of control over them, resonates with Franz Kafka’s 
reflection on the apotropaic function of photography itself. For Kafka, in fact, quoted
19 MacDonald, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” 159.
20 Ibid., 160.
21 Ibid., 160. George Landow is now known as Owen Land.
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by Roland Barthes in Camera Lucida, “we photograph things in order to drive them 
out of our minds.”23 If the photograph is presented as a “form of exorcism,” its 
power to rid us of an obsession, a trauma, is, paradoxically, predicated on a form of 
repetition: the thing in our minds is in a way re-produced in the image.24 nostalgia 
redoubles this account. Through the filming of the stills, that is, the very act of 
repetition, of re-production of a mental image which the photograph may be seen to 
embody is, in its turn, repeated. Indeed, Frampton’s allusion to the fact that he can 
return to the prints by “rewinding the film” may be seen to lay further emphasis on it 
as a process of “working through” of trauma by repetition.25 Yet, what interests me 
here is the “remastering” of the photographic images themselves, in the sense in 
which a “master” is used to produce copies. Destroyed, yet preserved in a different 
form, they are translated from one representational technology into another. Jay 
Bolter and Richard Grusin have termed this recycling between media 
“remediation.”26 In this specific context, “remediation” -  or, to use Frampton’s term, 
“remastering” -  points to a mapping onto each other of personal history and visual 
culture. On the one hand, it is symbolic of Frampton’s rhetorical -  if not actual -  
liquidation of photography for cinema in the early 1970s: nostalgia itself ends with 
the artist’s off-screen voice (in fact played by Snow) vowing to “never dare to make 
another photograph again.”27 On the other, as with Antonioni’s L ’amorosa
22 Ibid., 159.
23 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography [1980], trans. Richard Howard 
(London: Vintage, 2000), 53.
24 Cf. George Baker “Reanimations (I)” [2002], October 104 (Spring 2003), 28 -7 0 .4 0  cited.
25 Cf. Sigmund Freud, “Screen Memories” [1899] and “Remembering, Repeating and Working- 
Through” [1914], Standard Edition o f  the Complete Psychological Works o f  Sigmund Freud, trans. 
and ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1953-1974), vol. 3 and vol. 12 respectively.
26 Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New M edia  (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1999).
27 Though he lessened his photographic activity in the 1970s, Frampton never abandoned the medium  
altogether, nostalgia  itself also appeared as a photographic portfolio in 1971, in which each of the 
prints featured in the film  is accompanied by its commentary. The nostalgia  portfolio is included in 
Jenkins and Krane, Hollis Frampton: Recollections/ Recreation, from where I quote page 69. Rachel
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menzogna, it may be seen to refer to a process of demotion and banalization of 
photography in culture at large. I shall return to this at length later. Here, I want to 
focus on the formal aspects and implications of this passage of the photographic 
image from a “still” to a “moving” medium. For both photography and cinema are 
transformed by this “remediation.” Where cinema may become “uncinematic,” 
moving towards the stillness Adorno diagnosed in Antonioni’s films, photography, 
in its turn, becomes “unphotographic.”
“The current of frames through the projector,” Stanley Cavell remarked in 
The World Viewed (1971), “cannot be stilled (unless for analysis), so that the 
liveness of a motionless camera on a motionless subject remains altogether different 
in its significance from the stillness of a still depiction.”28 Since cinema is made up 
of a series of single images in motion, the apparent stillness it may contain -  a filmed 
still photograph, freeze frame, or static shot of a motionless pose or scene -  is never 
quite immobility. While probably not as “lively” as Cavell would have it, a 
“cinematic photograph” is certainly different from an actual photograph in this 
respect: it is still, yet moving; its stillness is in motion. To a certain extent, this 
oxymoronic condition is a point of friction; a point where cinema’s inner stasis 
brushes against, and seemingly disrupts -  if it does not interrupt -  its manifest 
kinesis. As such, it at once echoes and recapitulates the very “tension between 
stillness and movement,” as Laura Mulvey has succinctly put it, that “is essential to 
cinema as a technology and as an illusion.”29 Related to the fact that it is put “in
O. Moore, in Savage Theory: Cinema as Modern M agic (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 
chapter 10, analyzes the historical and cultural implications of Frampton’s act o f burning o f the 
photographs in his “switch” to the cinematic medium.
28 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology o f  Film [1971] (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, enlarged edition 1979), 202.
29 Mulvey, “Death 24 Times a Second,” unpaginated.
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motion,” there is another, crucial, aspect of this “remediation” of photographic 
stillness within the cinematic.
“At the point where the cinematographic image most directly confronts the 
photo,” Deleuze argues in Cinema II, “it also becomes most radically distinct from 
it.” “[Yasujiro] Ozu’s still lifes,” he continues, “endure, have a duration, over ten 
seconds of the vase.”30 Though Deleuze is here referring to the Japanese director’s 
static framings, rather than specifically to the filming of a still image, he is 
nevertheless presenting them as a moment in which the movies come head on with 
the photographic. In fact, the point he thus makes about stillness in the cinema 
having a duration is certainly true of a filmed photograph: a “mise-en-filrrC still 
endures for a pre-ordained amount of time.31 “Still,” as George Baker has noted in 
another context, “also means a continuation. ‘Encore’, as the French would say, 
signifying both repetition and prolongation.”32 nostalgia -  of which Frampton spoke 
as a way, paradoxically, of preserving the destroyed photographs -  epitomizes this 
cinematic “continuation” of the still. The still is “encored:” something that persists, 
and reappears -  both within the film, as an object, a format, repeated a dozen times, 
and in its “resurrection” when the reel is replayed. The “instant” of the photographic 
is dragged out, and reiterated.
Snow’s by now classic Wavelength also vividly brings the paradox of the 
filmed still into relief. As, for the whole duration of the film’s forty-five minutes, the 
movie camera slowly zooms onto a photograph of the sea tacked to a wall at the 
opposite end of the room, a tension between stillness and movement is put in play
30 Deleuze, Cinema II, 17. My emphasis.
311 take the expression “mise-en-film” from the aforementioned article by Phillippe Dubois, 
“Photography Mise-eh-Film: Autobiographical (Hi)stories and Psychic Apparatuses.”
32 Baker “Reanimations (I),” 34. Baker’s article is on the films and slide-projections o f James 
Coleman. He draws on Kaja Silverman’s essay “Growing Still,” in Susanne Gaensheimer, ed., James
both visually and formally. As the adjustment of the camera lens gradually enlarges 
the image of the far wall on which the photograph hangs, the rest of the room is 
progressively cut out of the frame: this static image becomes the film’s fulcrum, its 
“still point,” as Annette Michelson called i t 33 Conversely, though, this still by which 
the movie camera seems attracted, magnetized, is itself visibly caught within the 
movement of the film. By the end of the film, the photograph fills the screen 
completely. This view is sustained for the concluding minutes, as the camera lingers, 
scans and zooms further into the picture’s grainy surface. This probing even suggests 
the idea that, at the same time as the movie camera, as in nostalgia, is making the 
still endure, continue, it is also, in a way, trying to draw the time of stillness out of 
the photograph as such.
Snow, who said that with Wavelength he “was thinking of, planning for, a 
time monument,” similarly endowed photography with duration in the slightly later 
One Second in Montreal.34 In this film, not one, but a series of stills are protractedly 
held on the screen. Unlike in Wavelength, here the camera is rather inert, simply 
“holding” the stills with a static shot that neither zooms into, nor scans their surface. 
Similarly to Frampton’s film, the photographs appear in succession, one after the 
other. However, they are rather -  as in Marker’s La Jetee -  what the film is made of, 
so to speak, than, as in nostalgia, an element within it, the very subject of the film. 
On the one hand, the fixity of the camera and the static nature of the stills themselves 
are as if reinforced by the (in some respect literal) “frozen” quality of the depicted 
imagery. Though, as the title intimates, this consists of photos (or, as the “one 
second” may suggest, rapidly composed snapshots) of Montreal, the images do not
Coleman (Monaco: Hatje Cant, 2002), which reflects on the double use o f the word “still” in one of  
Coleman’s works.
33 Annette Michelson, “Toward Snow,” Artforum  9 (June 1971), 30-34. 32 cited.
show the characteristic landmarks of the city, but, rather, its anonymous and liminal 
spaces: crossroads, green expanses, parks. Covered in snow and deserted, even 
desolate, this is an urban landscape, which, but for some sporadic car, is eerily 
devoid of people, or more, generally, “life.” On the other hand, this very stillness is 
embedded within cinematic movement. Indeed, the length of the cinematic 
“exposure” of the photographs, which varies throughout the film, contributes to 
bring into relief both the fact that they are “set in motion” by the cinema and that 
they are turned into durational objects. The stills’ pattern of appearance on screen, in 
fact, describes an ascending curve in the first part, in which each picture is held for 
slightly longer than the preceding one, and a descending one in the second part, 
where the opposite happens. Thus, as in nostalgia, the very idea of an “enduring” 
still is, in its turn, “encored,” reiterated -  with variations -  for the duration of the 
film itself. Apart from the very last few images, which are fired relatively rapidly, 
the overall rhythm is ponderous. “Remediated” in the cinema, these photos of 
Montreal largely outlast the “one second” alluded to in the title. “Shown for much 
longer than it took to expose the [photographic] camera,” as Malcolm Le Grice has 
pointed out, each photograph’s screening time is thus “an extreme extension of the 
‘shooting’ time.”35 Indeed, the prolonged duration of their cinematic incarnation 
generates a contrast with the instantaneousness which both the film’s very title and 
their “snapshot aesthetics” seem to invoke.
An even stronger tension of this kind originates in Blow-up, probably still the 
best known example of a film about still photography, and one in which still 
photographs -  or, more precisely, snapshots -  play a prominent part. Released in 
1966, Antonioni’s film slightly precedes Snow’s and Frampton’s (in fact, in the case
34 Snow’s description of his film for the 1967 International Experimental Film Festival o f Knokke-le-
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of Wavelength, by less than one year). And whilst my argument is not about 
“influence,” the fact that Blow-up's reflection on the photographic image addressed a 
wider concern within the period -  and also, more specifically, the relation between 
photography and cinema -, must have certainly been a factor in its immediate 
success and resonance among artists and filmmakers.36
In the park, David Hemmings’s character -  Thomas, the disenchanted 
fashion photographer styled on David Bailey -  is oddly interested in what seems, at 
all effects, a “non-event”: the inconspicuous ordinariness of a flirting couple in a 
setting just as banal.37 He captures this scene with an extensive series of snapshots, 
rapidly clicking away at his camera, swiftly (and almost acrobatically) running here 
and there to frame different viewpoints. Indeed, the speed and energy employed 
appear excessive vis a vis the ostensible banality of the situation. When, developed 
and printed by Thomas, these snapshots are then introduced in the film, the very 
rapidity, the instantaneousness of their making, engenders a stark contrast with their 
prolonged presence on screen. As in Frampton’s and Snow’s films, the movie 
camera lingers over the photographs, so that the mise-en-film stills outlast the time 
taken to generate them as images. The “instant” captured by the photographic is 
extended, dilated, drawn out into duration.
Famously, trying to describe -  and categorize -  what he saw as the new self­
reflexive tendency of experimental filmmaking in the late 1960s, P. Adams Sitney
Zoute, quoted by Michelson, “Toward Snow,” 31.
35 Malcolm Le Grice, Abstract Film and Beyond (London: Studio Vista, 1977), 120.
36 The D irector and His Actor Look a t Footage Showing Preparations fo r  an Unmade Film (2)
(1968), by the American experimental filmmaker and conceptual artist Morgan Fisher, for example, is 
strongly evocative of Blow-up. Similarly to Blow-up, Fisher’s self-reflexive meditation revolves 
around the idea of (re)constructing a story, an event, out o f still photographs documenting it. Unlike 
Blow-up, the event to be pieced together is the process o f making the film itself. Fisher also made 
Production Stills (1970), another film about “its own making,” centred on the prolonged filming of 
Polaroids taken during production.
37 Though he is seemingly not named in the film, the photographer is identified as “Thomas” in the 
script. Michelangelo Antonioni, Blow-up: A Film  [1966] (London: Lorrimer Publishing, 1971).
described the work of Snow and Frampton, among others, as “a cinema of structure.” 
“The aesthetic crux of the structural film,” he wrote in his landmark essay of 1969, is 
“the principle of elongation rather than condensation.”38 According to Sitney, the 
“elongation” at issue in the structural film can be aligned with the logic of 
estrangement championed by the Russian formalist school. More precisely, Sitney 
quotes from Victor Shklovsky’s “Art as Technique” (1917), in which it is argued 
that “the technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar’” by producing a “slowness 
of perception.”39 Not only in the “structural” films of Snow and Frampton but, also, 
in Blow-up, the “principle of elongation” thus outlined by Sitney operates within the 
temporal dilation of the stills. In Blow-up, Thomas’s snapshots are in black and 
white. Registered by the colour film, this quality already somewhat “defamiliarizes” 
the photos from the very scene in the park from which, plot-wise, they derive. But, in 
fact, it is the protracted look of the movie camera (with the “slowness of perception” 
this enforces on the viewer) that marks out and constructs as “arresting” the banality 
of their imagery -  also, indeed, by drawing out and emphasizing the colour contrast 
with the rest of the film. Through cinematic “persistence,” the momentariness of 
these images is endowed with the weight of the momentous, the ordinariness of the 
“non-event” they denote is qualified as extraordinary -  and this even before, via the 
enlargements, an actual “extraordinary” event is disclosed within their very 
ordinariness.
Even a static camera on a static subject possesses, as Cavell put it, a certain 
“liveness,” since it is, so to speak, “animated” by its own mechanical movement. In 
this instance, furthermore, while, at a figurative level, the camera “pauses” on the 
stills, it does not actually stop on the images with a static shot but, rather, zooms in
38 P. Adams Sitney, “Structural Film” [1969], in P. Adams Sitney, ed., Film Culture Reader [1970],
and out of them, scans across their surfaces, pans from one to the other. The film, we 
could say, is not so much “stilled,” as Bellour suggested, by this emergence of the 
photographic image, as slowed down.40 Paradoxically, the “condensed” time that the 
stills themselves -  as captured instants, representative moments of a more extensive 
event -  can be seen to embody, is here precisely that which “elongates” the 
cinematic time.
Opening up this oxymoronic moment of “moving” stillness within the film, 
the photographs, in more than one sense, are Blow-up's kernel. They are not only its 
narrative core (around which Thomas’s quest revolves), but, also, a core that can be 
seen to allude, self-reflexively, to the photographic root of the cinema itself. This is 
further evoked by the way in which Thomas displays the photographs in his studio. 
The woman’s distress at having being photographed (she has even, in vain, turned up 
at his studio, hoping to recover the roll in exchange for sexual favours), has further 
fuelled Thomas’s interest in what he has seen in the park. Trying to reconstruct and 
analyse the earlier episode, he pins his snapshots along the walls of his studio. This 
very soon leads him to enlarge some of the images and, even, to enlarge the 
enlargements, or re-photograph some details of them (ills. 13 and 14, pp. 341-42). 
Indeed, this process of “dilating” the instant captured by the photographic by 
excavating it, so to speak, spatially, will eventually reveal the uncanny within the 
banal as, in the abstract graininess of these extreme blow-ups, Thomas will discern a 
killer and a corpse. The horizontal succession he arranges along his walls -  in which 
the duration and the dynamics of the scene are indexed through a series of still
(New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 335.
39 Quoted in ibid.
40 Bellour, “The Film Stilled.”
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moments -  recalls, Seymour Chatman has suggested, “a kind of storyboard.”41 
Conceptually, a storyboard is not dissimilar from a fotoromanzo, which, as we have 
seen, had captured Antonioni’s attention early on in his career. With the 
fotoromanzo, the reader reconstructs narrative dynamics -  the “movement” of 
narrative itself -  out of representative still points, what Lessing, as Barthes reminded 
us, would have called “pregnant moments.”42 A cognate principle is at work in the 
storyboard, which, prior to the realization of the film as such, functions as its 
presentation “in a nutshell,” an embodiment of its minimal, yet essential, structure as 
a series of still images and captions. But where a storyboard usually consists of 
drawn sketches, a “photo-novel” is, by definition, made of photographs. Crucially, in 
Blow-up, Thomas’s display is photographic, rendering his a posteriori “storyboard” 
even more reminiscent of thefotoromanzo. While Uamorosa menzogna and The 
White Sheik presented the “photonovel” as, culturally speaking, the “underside” of 
the movies, they nonetheless suggested the idea that its very medium and format 
embodied cinema “cut to the bone”: reduced to bare essentials, and, in a way, 
stripped bare. Thus if Thomas’s arrangement of his snapshots is a bit like a 
storyboard, this also invokes photography as the very embryo and backbone of the 
cinema. “Extracted,” as it were, from a sequence of the film itself (that of the episode 
in the park), the photos almost appear as its hidden skeleton, revealed. Placed one 
next to the other with almost no gaps between them, the stills, thus aligned, are also 
reminiscent of the filmstrip, therefore calling into play the photographic usually 
“concealed” within -  or, as Baudry argued, “repressed” by -  the cinematic as such 43
41 Seymour Chatman, Antonioni, or the Surface o f  the World (Berkeley: University o f California 
Press, 1985), 149.
42 Roland Barthes, “Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein” [1973], in Image, Music, Text, trans.Stephen Heath 
Image (London: Fontana Press, 1977), 73. Cf.Victor Burgin, “Diderot, Barthes, Vertigo,” in Victor 
Burgin, James Donald and Cora Kaplan, eds., Formations o f  Fantasy (London: Methuen, 1986).
43 Baudry, “Ideological Effects o f the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus.”
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One After the Other: Photography, Seriality, Reproducibility
What the fotoromanzo and the filmstrip share is not simply a photographic basis, but, 
more precisely, the way in which this basis is articulated. For, in fact, serialization is 
at the heart of both. This serialization is spatial in the first instance, as images are 
laid one next to the other. However, it also corresponds to a temporal sequence: 
indeed, it is “converted” into a succession in time by either the reader or the 
projector. In its cinematic incarnation of thz fotoromanzo and the filmstrip, Blow-up 
visualizes this translation from “next to” to “after.” As the camera zooms and 
ponders on each individual still consecutively, Thomas’s spatial display is also a 
temporal series in the film -  and a dilated one at that.
As we have seen, this temporal prolongation of not just one photograph but 
many photographs, is also at work in nostalgia. And, indeed, something of Blow-up 
permeates nostalgia. In Frampton’s film, too, the photos are resonant of a hybrid 
between the storyboard and the fotoromanzo. As, in Antonioni’s film, Thomas uses 
the stills to (re)construct the episode in the park, so, in nostalgia, Frampton’s 
pseudo-autobiography is (re)composed through the photographs, as a springboard, a 
visual aid, for the narrated anecdotes. But whereas the episode in the park is 
reconstructed, via the enlargements, as much “more” of a story than one would 
initially expect (the murder Thomas may have witnessed), in nostalgia, the “story” -  
however fictionalized -  of Frampton’s life, is hardly there at all. What we have, 
rather, is a succession of isolated vignettes, just as a disparate number of photos is 
connected together as “a series” by being thus arranged in the film. As in Blow-up, 
but more emphatically and extremely, the succinctness of the still is stretched out.
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The photographic instant is elongated and repeated, to the point that the whole of the 
film’s time is woven upon and with it. As each shot lingers meditatively on the 
print’s burnt remains, we could furthermore say that film time is here, quite literally, 
also built with the “ashes” of photographic time -  as if cinematic duration were at 
the same time an expiration and a dragging out of the instant of photography.
Cinema itself, in a way, is presented as a serialization and an extension of the 
photographic and its time. This elasticization of photographic time is enhanced by 
the “out of synch” effect between the images and the soundtrack in the film, whereby 
the commentary pertaining to each of the photos relates to the image yet to come. By 
engendering a sense of disjunction and of delay/anticipation between the still visible 
on screen and the one being verbally described, this further extends the “moment” of 
the photographic. The instant of exposure indexically captured by the photograph is 
as if confused -  problematized -  by the voiceover narration and its reliance on 
another nuance of indexicality, that of what Roman Jakobson called “shifters” -  
words such as “this” and “here.” “The voice describes ‘this photograph,’ as Mulvey 
has recently noted, “but it is not ‘this’ one seen by the spectator.”44 Yet, while 
“confusing” the photographic index and its instant, the narrator’s very use of “this” 
and “here” also “stretches” them into both the past and the future. And, indeed, we 
are “stretched” too, as our faculties -  memory, attention, imagination -  are, so to 
speak, “divided,” or made to move “back and forth,” between what we have heard 
and what we see, and what we hear and what we will see.
But the most obvious resonance of Antonioni’s film is in nostalgia1 s 
concluding sketch, in which, echoing Thomas’s adventure, Blow-up is invoked in all 
but name. The narrator recounts how, though having “largely given up still
photography,” he had recently felt compelled to obey an “obtrusive need” to “take 
my camera out of doors” again. 45 On the occasion, however, he explains, he made 
only one photograph, its composition furthermore spoiled by a truck getting in the 
way. On printing the negative though, “something” -  “only a tiny detail,” “reflected 
in a factory window, and then reflected once more in the rear-view mirror attached to 
the truck door” -  caught his attention:
Since then, I have enlarged this small section of my negative enormously.
The grain of the film all but obliterates the features of the image. It is 
obscure; by any possible reckoning, it is hopelessly ambiguous. Nevertheless, 
what I believe I see recorded, in that speck of film, fills me with such fear, 
such utter dread and loathing, that I think I shall never dare to make another 
photograph again.46
The allusion to Thomas’s blow-ups of his park snapshots, and the mystery 
concealed/revealed there, is quite evident. As in Frampton’s anecdote, Thomas’s 
series of enlargements -  and furthermore, enlargements of enlargements- end up, 
paradoxically, dissolving the image. The attempt to “magnify” photographic 
evidence, to get to the core of the “real” captured by the camera, destroys that very 
evidence. Yet, though the image may be lost, what is maintained, and multiplied in 
this process is the photograph itself. In both Blow-up and nostalgia the concept of 
the blow-up further emphasizes the seriality of the photographic. If the physical 
serialization of the photographs crystallizes their “repeatability” (their standardized
44 Laura Mulvey, Death 24 X  a Second: Stillness and the M oving Image (London: Reaktion, 2006), 
189.
45 Jenkins and Krane, Hollis Frampton: Recollections/ Recreations, 69.
46 Ibid.
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dimensions; the characteristic consistency of photographic paper, etc.), the notion of 
the enlargement evokes their reproducibility. Even Frampton’s only and “ultimate” 
picture is, as it were, in the plural: it is made “many” by a succession of blow-ups.
As the image gives way to the grain of the medium, the reproducibility of the format 
itself -  the potential seriality of even a single photograph -  is brought into relief.
This “remediation” of photography, and its seriality, in the moving image is 
certainly indicative of cinema’s intensive self-reflexive inquiry during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. Yet, this emergence is also, at the same time, symptomatic of the 
very conditions of visuality -  and, even, experience more generally -  engendered by 
the mass diffusion of these representational technologies themselves. No one would 
dispute that photography and cinema have transformed our very modes of seeing, 
and expanded enormously the realm of the visible. As Benjamin argued, 
photography and cinema have dramatically re-trained the human eye: the former by 
making it more sensitive to the “moment,” and to the detail within it, the latter by 
accustoming it to the visual speed of modern life.47 Furthermore, as Blow-up and 
nostalgia suggest, the domain of the visible is augmented by what the naked eye fails 
to notice (Benjamin’s “optical unconscious”48), and broadened -  as the photos of 
Africa in L ’eclisse show -by the evidence of “different” cultural and geographical 
realities. In short, by extending the range of what is brought to light and represented, 
photography and cinema inserted much that had previously been “invisible” into the 
realm of visibility.
But, precisely by so doing, these media rendered the hitherto invisible, 
commonplace, banal, or even boring. For the very principles on which photography
47 E.g. Walter Benjamin, “The Work o f Art in the Age o f Mechanical Reproduction” [1936], in 
Illuminations, trans. Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999).
^Walter Benjamin, “A Small History of Photography” [1931], in One-W ay Street and Other Writings, 
trans. Edmund Jephcott (London: Verso, 2000), 243.
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and cinema are based -  reproducibility and seriality -  inevitably extended to the 
objects being represented. So, whilst nostalgia’s anecdotes may aim to highlight the 
“interesting” in Frampton’s photographs, their forcedly deadpan, monotone delivery 
undermines this. If the “dull sentences” and the “repetitive forms” of the narration, 
together with the slow pace of the film, bore us, they also suggest Frampton’s own 
boredom with his photographs -  boredom, we may infer, he tried to avert by doing 
something “different” with them, if not, in fact, by switching to cinema.49 And, by 
going back to L ’eclisse, and the women’s engagement with photography with which 
I started, it is to boredom itself that I now turn.
Boredom
As early as 1916, the imbrication of boredom and visuality in a photographic age 
was already a hard fact for Marcel Proust. For the narrator of In Search of Lost Time, 
Venice’s unique charm and beauty was sullied and dulled by the mere thought -  let 
alone the actual sight -  of the photograph or, more precisely, its plurality:
49 Moore, Savage Theory, 146. Moore links nostalgia's humdrum narration to Julia Kristeva’s 
characterization of melancholic speech as “repetitive” and “monotonous.” It is here that she suggests 
that “[t]he dull, declarative sentences, the repetitive forms bore you, while the threat o f ‘cognitive 
chaos’ build towards fatigue” from where I quote. Cf. Julia Kristeva, Depression and Melancholia, 
trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). There are certainly affinities 
and overlaps between depression and boredom. Otto Fenichel, whom I shall discuss later, pointed this 
out in the first psychoanalytical paper dedicated to boredom.
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I tried next to draw from my memory other “snapshots,” those in particular 
which it had taken in Venice, but the mere word “snapshot” made Venice 
seem to me as boring as an exhibition of photographs..
Proust’s denigration of the snapshot highlights a triangulation between the 
exponential diffusion of representational technologies, the expansion of the category 
of the everyday, and the propagation of boredom in modernity.51 A few decades 
later, this triangulation was recapitulated, and spelled out more overtly, by Maurice 
Blanchot, for whom “boredom” is nothing less than “the everyday become manifest: 
as a consequence of having lost its essential -  constitutive -  trait of being 
unperceived”52 What makes the everyday manifest, perceivable (though mostly by 
transfiguring it into something allegedly “sensational”53) are precisely the 
technologies of representation developed within modernity. The reason for this lies 
not only in the fact that mass media such as photography (“mobile, immobile”) and 
television constitute the means through which, as Blanchot suggests, the quotidian
50 Marcel Proust, In Search o f  Lost Time [1913-1927], 6 vols., vol. 6: Time Regained  [written c.1916], 
trans.Andreas Mayor and Terence Kilmartin (London: Vintage, 2000), 2 1 5 .1 owe this reference to 
Elena Gualtieri, “Bored by Photographs: Proust in V enice,” in David Cunningham, Andrew Fisher, 
Sas Mays, eds., Photography and Literature in the Twentieth Century (Newcastle Upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Press, 2005). Drawing on Bergson, Gualtieri discusses how Proust’s 
understanding of perception and memory is deeply linked to photography and, more specifically, the 
snapshot. For Proust, she argues, voluntary memory is homologous to the photograph, the snapshot. 
Meanwhile, however, the past Proust seeks to recover exceeds both -  hence his boredom and 
frustration with the photograph and voluntary memory alike, which only preserve cliched and “dead” 
images of the past.
51 Cf. John Roberts, The Art o f  Interruption: Realism, Photography and the Everyday (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998). For Roberts, the parallel development o f photography and 
cinema on one side, and psychoanalysis on the other, constitutes the joint factor for the expansion, in 
both depth and extension, o f the category o f the “everyday” in the twentieth century. Where cinema 
and photography augment the visibility and reproduction of ordinary objects and activities, 
psychoanalysis endows the prosaic with a whole new depth, by placing emphasis on its hidden 
significance.
52 Maurice Blanchot, “Everyday Speech” [1959], trans. Susan Hanson, Yale French Studies 73, 
Everyday Life (1987), 12-20. 16 cited.
53 Ibid., 18.
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finds “exposition,” but also, in the fact that these technologies themselves have 
become an integral part of our daily life.54
Novelty, and the Epidemic of Monotony
“Boredom,” as Lars Svendsen has recently noted, “has only been a central cultural 
phenomenon for a couple of centuries.”55 Its history, in fact, is not only inextricably 
linked with, but also defined in relation to, the experience of modernity in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Since the Middle Ages, accidia, tedium vitae and 
melancholy, among other terms, had indicated a sense of spiritual dejection ensuing 
from the isolation of religious or scholarly life. In contrast to these terms’ association 
with a contemplative existence, during the past two centuries, expressions denoting a 
rather mundane feeling of dreariness, produced by the drudgery of the quotidian, 
emerged and developed across Western languages. In this respect, the development 
of the concept in the English language is perhaps the most exemplary, as the word 
itself emerges within this very time-span. Originating in the mid- and late- 
eighteenth-century terms “to bore,” or “a bore,” the word “boredom,” in fact, was 
first used (if not coined) in 1852 by Charles Dickens in Bleak House, where it is 
described as a “chronic malady,” a “weariness of soul.”56 In French, meanwhile, 
Gustave Flaubert felt the need to qualify the existing French word “ennui” with the 
adjective “moderne,” in order to specify the gravity of the new condition, whilst 
Charles Baudelaire chose to adopt the English “spleen.”57 Similarly, Alberto
54 Ibid.
55 Lars Svendsen, A Philosophy o f  Boredom, trans. John Irons (London: Reaktion Books, 2005), 11.
56 Charles Dickens, Bleak House [1852] (Ware: Wandsworth Editions, 1993), 324 and 128 
respectively.
57 Gustave Flaubert, “Letter to Louis de Cormerin, 7 June 1844,” quoted by Sean Desmond Healy, 
Boredom: Self and Culture (London: Associated University Presses, 1984), 28. For a history of
Moravia, though using “noicC’ (the Italian for boredom, which, like the French ennui, 
is of medieval origin, from the Latin in odium -  “in hatred”) in his 1960 novel of the 
same title, differentiated between its “ordinary,” older form, and its contemporary 
manifestation. Whereas the former, contingent on a specific circumstance or person, 
is considered a passing and “solvable” situation, the latter is described as an 
insurmountable state of mind.58 Yet, for all this emphasis on the soul and the mind, 
the crux of the problem is felt to lie precisely in the fact that the condition is not, 
essentially, a matter of interiority but, rather, something objectively attributable to 
the external world, and to the modern world more precisely. For the narrator of 
Georges Bernanos’s The Diary of a Country Priest (1936), boredom is “like dust”: it 
slowly settles “coating your face and hands,” and “you breathe it in,” “eat” it,
“drink” it.59
Though they wrote about modernity in terms of “shock,” both Kracauer and 
Benjamin also addressed the problem of boredom within it. Indeed, together with 
Georg Simmel, Otto Fenichel and Martin Heidegger, they were among the first to 
analyse and expound a theory of the phenomenon as a specifically modern category. 
Though coming to it from different perspectives, they all agreed that it was both a 
social and a psychic phenomenon, whose roots were in the technological, economic 
and cultural processes of modernization of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Their analyses are in fact eminently tied to large urban realities, seen as focal centres 
of such processes. It is these multiple aspects of modernization, epitomized by the
boredom, see also: Patricia Meyer Spacks, Boredom: The Literary History o f  a State o f  Mind 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Reinhard Kuhn, The Demon o f  Noontide: Ennui in 
Western Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
58 Alberto Moravia, La noia (Milano: Bombiani, 1960), 14-16. Initially published in English under the 
title The Empty Canvas, trans. Angus Davidson (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1961), the novel has 
more recently been re-published under the titled Boredom, trans. Angus Davidson (New York: New  
York Review of Books, 1999).
59 Georges Bernanos, The D iary o f  a Country Priest [1936], trans. Pamela Morris (London:
Boris wood, 1937), 10.
metropolis, centre of cutting-edge innovations and huge anonymous crowds at both 
labour and leisure, which are the prerequisites of boredom. Though the “new” at first 
can provoke shock, it can also quickly generate indifference and apathy as a reaction 
formation. “There is perhaps no psychic phenomenon,” Simmel suggests in his essay 
“The Metropolis and Mental Life,” “which has been so unconditionally reserved to 
the metropolis as the blase outlook.”60
Exhausted by excessive sensory stimulation, by the constant perceptual assault of the 
new, the city dweller soon turns blase, copes with the urban spectacle through a state 
of bored indifference and distracted perception. In a passage that chimes with 
Vittoria’s description of her tired indifference, when, in her words, “to have in your 
hands a needle, a piece of cloth, a book, a man is the same thing,” Simmel goes on to 
argue:
The essence of the blase attitude consists in the blunting of discrimination. 
This does not mean that the objects are not perceived [...] but rather that the 
meaning and differing values of things, and thereby the things themselves, 
are experienced as insubstantial. They appear to the blase person in an evenly 
flat and grey tone; no one object deserves preference over any other.61
This “blunting of discrimination” and general apathy towards the external world are 
precisely what, in Moravia’s Boredom, summarizes the narrator’s condition, 
explained as “a lack of relationship with external objects,” in which things “wither 
away.”62 In Simmel’s view, this indifference to things is at once the product and the
60 Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life” [1903], in The Sociology o f  Georg Simmel, ed. 
and trans. Kurt H. W olff (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 413.
61 Ibid., 414.
62 Moravia, La noia, 9.
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replication, the “subjective reflection,” of the homogenization and serialization of 
things that “the ‘money economy’ introduces.”63 This connection further resonates 
with the three women’s boredom in L’eclisse, rooted in, and symptomatic of, the 
levelling and standardizing effects of the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s. In 
fact, the transformations in Italy during those decades were all the more intense and 
radical for being largely unprecedented, as the country had until then lagged behind 
the pace of industrialization and modernization prevailing in northern Europe and the 
USA. With an expression conveying some of the astonishing impact of such changes 
on the Italian reality, the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s is commonly 
referred to as “the economic miracle.” During those years the middle-classes swelled 
incrementally, a consumer society emerged and rapidly developed, the emancipation 
of women (who had gained the vote for the first time only in 1946), although 
gradual, began to leave its mark on societal structure and relations.64
Simmel’s comments point to how, within modernity, boredom itself can only 
emerge when the “new” generated by it begins to turn ordinary; when, that is, the 
various forms of novelty associated with modernization gradually become standard 
and routine, and are progressively incorporated into the everyday. “Monotony,” 
Benjamin writes in the “Boredom, Eternal Return” convolute of his unfinished The 
Arcades Project, “feeds on the new”; it is when the new itself passes into a 
monotony of both production and reception that boredom, in its turn, finds a 
breeding ground.65 For Patrice Petro, this idea is condensed in the concept of “after
63 Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” 414.
64 For discussions o f Antonioni’s film in the context o f the country’s econom ic boom, see P. Adams 
Sitney, Vital Crises in Italian Cinema (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1995) and Angelo Restivo, 
The Cinema o f Economic Miracles: Visuality and Modernization in the Italian Art Film (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2002). An earlier film by Antonioni dealing specifically with women’s 
increasing social mobility in the postwar period, and a related “crisis o f masculinity,” is Le amiche 
(The Girlfriends, 1955).
65 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project [1927-1940], trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1999), 111.
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shock” which she identifies as, within modernity, an intermediary zone after the 
initial impact of the new. “[AJfter shock retains an element of shock, but nonetheless 
signals the fading of its initial intensity. Not unlike the term afterimage” Petro 
explains, “it invokes an impression, or experience, or affect that persists long after an 
image or stimulus has passed from view.”66 As such, “after shock” designates
a moment when the new ceases to be shocking, when leisure as well as 
labour time becomes routinized, fetishized, commodified, and when the 
extraordinary, the unusual, and the unfamiliar are inextricably linked to the 
boring, the prosaic, the everyday.67
Directly related to the standardizing and routinizing aspects of 
modernization, another facet of boredom to which both Kracauer and Benjamin give 
prominence is its “collective” dimension. In the Arcades, Benjamin often looks at 
contemporary Paris through the lens of the previous century. Despite mostly basing 
his account of the phenomenon around fin-de-siecle declasse or bourgeois (male) 
figures, such as the flaneur, the gambler, and the dandy, he still sets it forth as a 
collective rather than an individual experience. He points to its “epidemic 
proportions,” characterizing it as the “index to participation in the sleep of the 
collective.”68 Kracauer, with his more specific focus on the twentieth century, and on 
the leisure and labour time of the urban working masses, accentuates even further 
this shared and participatory aspect of boredom. For both, marking the individual’s 
involvement in collective alienation, boredom ironically comes to stand as “the”
66 Patrice Petro “After Shock/ Between Boredom and History,” in Patrice Petro, ed., Fugitive Images: 
From Photography to Video (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 265.
67 Ibid.
68 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 108.
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democratic and democratizing by-product of a capitalist system. Blanchot, 
paraphrasing Friedrich Schlegel, once compared boredom to the accumulation of 
carbon dioxide “in a closed space when too many people find themselves together 
there.”69 As well as evoking the idea that the individual is both actively and 
passively involved in boredom -  something, like carbon dioxide, to which one is 
subjected, while, at the same time, producing it -  this claustrophobic image also 
crystallizes its communal and levelling dimension. In principle, boredom can affect 
all classes, and both sexes. Gendering the condition in the feminine, L ’eclisse gives 
particular prominence to this “epidemic” and “demotic” aspect of boredom, 
simultaneously highlighting both its possibilities and its limits for women. With its 
three women awake at night, still moving when they should be still, the film 
encapsulates how boredom is in fact also the index of a new social mobility, of 
gender as well as class -  Marta and Anita are comfortably-off housewives, Vittoria a 
professional translator. Yet, the very situation through which boredom unfolds in this 
scene, in the enclosed space of their apartments, and via the oppression of being 
awake at the “wrong” time, also evokes the image of its stifling and paralyzing 
accumulation sketched by Blanchot and Schlegel. So, in fact, at the same time as it 
signals their increased “freedom,” the women’s boredom -  manifested here in their 
nocturnal wakefulness and restlessness -  is also a form of estrangement from the 
greater mobility of men, and from their time. Notably, one husband is away on 
business; the other, in view of the next day’s work as a pilot, is using his night-time 
“productively,” to sleep.70
69 Blanchot, “Everyday Speech,” 16.
70 For a discussion of boredom in terms o f gender, and as a feminist question, see: Patrice Petro, 
‘Historical ennui, Feminist Boredom’, in Vivian Schobank, ed., The Persistence o f  History: Cinema, 
Television, and the Modern Event (New York: Routledge, 1996).
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From both Benjamin’s and Kracauer’s writings, boredom emerges as 
essentially a problem of time in modernity, and of what to do with it. Through the 
types of the gambler, the flaneur, and “he who waits,” Benjamin describes different 
strategies “to pass the time”: one can “kill/expel” time, “store” it, or “wait” it 
through (“take time in and render it up in altered form -  that of expectation”).71 
Fenichel very effectively makes boredom’s intrinsic link to time explicit by pointing 
to how, in German, the very word for the condition expresses this relation. 
Langeweile, literally “long while,” he suggests, “indicates that in this state there are 
always changes in the person’s subjective experience of time.”72 Fenichel offers the 
example of “‘Sunday neurotics,’ whose symptom is merely that on Sundays, or 
during vacations, they are bored.” For these people, when time is not regimented, 
boredom creeps up: on Sundays, “the ‘while is long.’”73 As an apparent defence 
against this “long while,” Kracauer underlines the regimentation of leisure time itself 
in the big city, which actually comes to constitute a replication of Taylorized labour 
time rather than an alternative respite from it.74 “The form of free time busy-ness,” 
strategies to while the hours away, Kracauer writes in “The Cult of Distraction,” 
“corresponds to the form of business.”75 By arguing that “boredom springs from the 
temporality of D a s e in from the very time, that is, of situated being, Heidegger
71 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 107.
72 Otto Fenichel, “On the Psychology o f Boredom” [1934], The Collected Papers o f  Otto Fenichel, ed. 
Hanna Fenichel and David Rapaport (London: Routledge, 1954), 301.
73 Ibid., 300 and 301. Fenichel is drawing here on an earlier paper by Sandor Ferenczi, “Sunday 
Neurosis” (1919), who had first drawn attention to the phenomenon. Ferenczi’s paper can be found in 
John Rickman, ed., Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique o f  Psychoanalysis (London: 
Hogarth Press, 1926).
74 See: Anson Rabinbach, The Human M otor: Energy, Fatigue and the Origins o f  Modernity 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), esp. 38-44, where he juxtaposes ennui (as a 
melancholic or depressed state typical o f the leisure classes) to “fatigue” (as a physical and mental 
condition linked to mechanization and Taylorization).
75 Siegfried Kracauer, “The Cult o f Distraction” [1926], The M ass Ornament: Weimar Essays, ed. and 
trans. Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 325.
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similarly relates the condition to the routinization of time in modernity.76 Like 
Kracauer, he suggests that the attempts to escape its “dullness” actually often end up 
mirroring its very structure, so that the ways by which the subject seeks evasion from 
the rigidly systematized “everydayness” in which it feels to be “sink[ing] away,” 
amount to a “dispersion” in which being is “further dispersed.”77
Distraction is an almost ubiquitous term in theories of boredom. Distraction 
could describe the form of sensory reception at play in Simmel’s “blase attitude,” 
involving a muffling of perception and a lowering of attention, a tired indifference 
and a habituation to the excessive stimuli of metropolitan life. Of this type is the 
aboulia of Dino, the protagonist of Moravia’s Boredom, of the women in L’eclisse, 
and, also, of Thomas in Blow-up, who, though immersed in the “swinging” London 
of the 1960s, admits to having “gone o ff’ it: “it doesn’t do anything for me,” he says. 
But, in addition to denoting a mode of perception -  or even, as Heidegger puts it, “a 
pallid lack of mood”78 -  distraction can indicate entertainment. And both these 
conceptions, as is suggested in Moravia’s novel, can be present and can indeed 
coexist in boredom:
For many people boredom is the opposite of amusement; and amusement 
means distraction, forgetfulness. For me, on the contrary, boredom is not the 
opposite of amusement; I might even go so far as to say that in certain of its
76 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts o f  M etaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude [1953], 
trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 127.
77 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time [1927], trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), 422. See also Theodor W. Adorno, “Free Time” [1969], trans. Thomas Y. Levin, in 
The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on M ass Culture, ed. J.M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 
1993), in which Adorno argues that “ ‘free time’ tends towards its own [apparent] opposite,” labour 
time, and is, effectively, a “compulsory” form of “organized freedom” (163 and 165).
78 Ibid.
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aspects it actually resembles amusement inasmuch as it in fact gives rise to 
distraction and forgetfulness, even if of a very special type.79
So, for example, Thomas’s boredom in Blow-up is manifested by his “blase attitude” 
towards the glamour of London, but, also, by the fact that he is, continuously, 
distracted by distractions of various kind. His “murder investigation” is, again and 
again, interrupted by forms of entertainment -  including organized, public spectacle 
-  that not only, rather literally, “hold” him from his proposed line of action but that, 
actually, make him temporarily oblivious to it. Many have highlighted Blow-up’s 
centrifugal narrative, in which, as Chatman has put it, “distractions interrupt 
distractions.”80 So, for example, when Thomas is studying his enlargements, he is 
interrupted by two models that perform, and engage him in, a scene of quasi-sexual 
frolics in front of the coloured paper-screens in his studio -  a sort of set in which he 
becomes himself a performer. Or, having apparently caught sight of the woman from 
the park, he begins by following her, but is soon side-tracked by a Yardbirds concert 
in which he becomes engrossed, even fighting to obtain a piece of smashed guitar (a 
piece that, however, he discards once out of the club). Indeed, the investigation itself 
originates as, and constitutes, one of Thomas’s distractions. For it is in order to kill 
time that he visits the park in the first place and thus becomes the unwitting witness 
of a murder. And, subsequently, his investigation of the event is just an attempt to 
find some diversion from a job and lifestyle that, whilst “glamorous,” have become 
immensely tedious to him.
79 Moravia, La noia, 7.
80 Chatman, Antonioni, or The Surface o f  the World, 140. See also: Sam Rohdie, Antonioni (London: 
BFI, 1990), 178 and Giorgio Tinazzi, “The Gaze and the Story,” in Michelangelo Antonioni, The 
Architecture o f  Vision: Writings and Interviews on Cinema, ed. Carlo di Carlo and Giorgio Tinazzi 
(New York: Marsilio, 1996), xxii.
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Kracauer, notably, focused on the notion of distraction as amusement, 
entertainment, “spectacle” in his essays of the 1920s and 1930s on the markedly 
urban proliferation of the new leisure industries. Outstanding among them were 
Berlin’s huge movie houses, “optical fairylands,” he notes, which it “would be 
disrespectful” to call anything less than “palaces of distraction.”81 Superficially, this 
metropolitan “addiction to distraction” may look like an antidote to, or a defence 
against boredom.82 Yet, while leisure and entertainment should provide relief from 
the stressful yet unfulfilling monotony of labour, these distractions, Kracauer argues, 
are actually a form of boredom itself. For Fenichel, “Sunday neurosis” is nothing 
more than a “hitherto latent boredom become[s] manifest” through lack of 
“diversion.”83 Conversely, in Kracauer’s analysis -  and as is surmised by the 
protagonist of Moravia’s novel -  distraction itself can in turn also function as the 
very demonstration of boredom. On the one hand, modern forms of mass 
entertainment, providing diversions with which to fill the emptiness of free time, 
may serve to perpetuate the latency of boredom, to keep it “unconscious” of itself.
On the other hand as, moreover, they replicate the standardized and rationalized 
“form of business,” they are also set to become as everyday and monotonous, and 
hence as boring, as the technological, economic and social transformations with 
which they are contemporaneous and from which they derive. So, in fact, the same 
blase attitude that the city dweller has developed in response to the urban spectacle at 
large, may also be adopted for the spectacle of entertainment. “At the movies,” for 
example, Benjamin observes, “the public is an examiner, but an absent-minded one.” 
“Reception in a state of distraction,” he explains, actually enthusiastic about the 
enfranchising aspects of such a mode of consumption, “finds in the film its true
81 Kracauer, “The Cult o f Distraction,” 323.
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means of exercise,” both in spite and because of its initial “shock effect,” like that 
earlier generated by photography.84
Let us recall, here, once again, the three women in Ueclisse. Is their 
engagement with the photographic stills a distraction from, or rather, as Kracauer 
would argue, a form o/the very boredom from which they suffer? To answer this, we 
must turn, once again, to consider photography itself.
The Photographic Face of Modernity
As well as writing about boredom, Benjamin and Kracauer were also, as is widely 
known, keenly interested in photography. On the one hand, as I mentioned earlier, 
Benjamin talked of photography, similarly to the way he described cinema, in terms 
of shock. “The photograph,” he famously wrote, “gave the moment a posthumous 
shock.”85 As it “fix[es] an event,”86 a photograph also captures “the tiny spark of 
contingency”; through slow motion and enlargement, it can further reveal what 
usually escapes the human eye.87 Yet, for Benjamin, the genuinely revolutionary 
aspect of photography lies in the fact that, thanks to its reproducibility and expansion 
as a mass medium, its “shocks” and optical secrets have largely become part of the 
everyday and are available to all.
If Benjamin appears more enthusiastic about the emancipatory promises of 
the medium, Kracauer, whilst not negating the possibility of a redemptive function, 
takes a bleaker view of its mass diffusion, more clearly implicating photography in
82 Ibid., 325.
83 Fenichel, “On the Psychology o f Boredom,” 300.
84 Benjamin, “The Work o f Art in the Age o f Mechanical Reproduction,” 233-34.
85 Walter Benjamin, “Some Motifs in Baudelaire” [1939], in Illuminations, 171.
86 Ibid.
87 Benjamin, “A Small History of Photography,” 243.
boredom. ‘The blizzard of photographs,” he argues, with echoes of Simmel’s idea of 
the blase, “betrays an indifference toward what the things mean.”88 As the over­
abundance and universal availability of photography encapsulates its ordinariness, it 
also recapitulates the collectivization of boredom that Kracauer describes through the 
category of “distraction.” It is no mere chance that his essay entitled “Photography” 
should start with the description of the photo of a film diva on the cover of an 
illustrated magazine. The medium, through its diffusion in press and advertising, is 
considered by Kracauer in relation to, and in collusion with, other forms of mass 
entertainment, including cinema. As the sheer number of photographs contributes to 
the diffusion and glamorization of “spectacle,” it also increasingly makes it part of 
the banality of daily life, and promotes the diffusion of photographic cliches. 
Circulated through a plethora of photographic “likeness[es],” the very uniqueness of 
the film diva is undermined, constantly at risk of being revealed as, or reduced to, 
“only one-twelfth of a dozen Tiller girls.”89 In fact, in this “flood of photos” that 
“destroy[s] the potentially existing awareness of crucial traits,” and makes the 
“original” “disappear in its multiplicity,” “the world itself,” in Kracauer’s view, “has 
taken on a ‘photographic face.’”90
Over thirty years after Kracauer’s and Benjamin’s interventions, L’eclisse 
presents a reality where the diffusion and ordinariness of the medium is immediately 
obvious. The abundance of photographs in Marta’s apartment, as wall decorations 
and book illustrations, is buttressed by the recursive presence of photos throughout 
the film (as old family portraits, posters, or on newspapers or gadgets). While this 
underscores photography’s mass dissemination as a technology of image production 
and reproduction/it is not only the medium that appears ordinary. The subjects of
88 Siegfried Kracauer, “Photography” [1927], in The Mass Ornament, 58.
the photographs are cliched too. The fact that the images in Marta’s apartment depict 
Africa actually reinforces this.91 It spotlights that it is precisely because of the 
diffusion of photography (and other mass media such as film and television), that 
such hitherto unfamiliar subject matter is “domesticated” and becomes thoroughly 
commonplace. Marta’s photographs portray Africa through a tourist-brochure kind 
of imagery. As some of them may well be enlargements of Marta’s own snapshots, 
this points to how even such personal images, rather than being idiosyncratically 
original, tend often to replicate and feed on photographic tropes and conventions. 
Among others, the camera closes-up on sunsets over Lake Naivasha, Mount 
Kilimanjaro, the savannah with lions and, as Vittoria casually engages the needle 
into a record which, fittingly, starts playing some African drumming, “ethnic” 
images of Kenyan men and women in full tribal attire. The basic photographic 
attributes of “there” and “then”92 are in these images further endowed with 
connotations of the “exotic” and the “primitive,” through which Africa is inserted 
into the ordinary as a tamed extraordinary: the typical “place of escape” advertised in 
holiday brochures.
Yet, the scene does more than register a historical relation between 
photography and boredom. It also articulates a dynamics of boredom in relation to 
the photographs, through which, in accordance with the arguments of Benjamin, 
Kracauer, Fenichel and Heidegger, the phenomenon is problematized as
89 Ibid., 47.
90 Ibid., 58-59.
91 For a compelling discussion o f L ’eclisse in the context o f post-colonialism in Italy, see: Karen 
Pinkus, “Empty Spaces: Decolonization in Italy,” Patrizia Palumbo, ed., A Place in the Sun: Africa in 
Italian Colonial Culture from  Post-Unification to the Present (Berkeley: University o f California 
Press, 2003). Drawing on the relation between EUR (the quarter in Rome in which most o f L ’eclisse 
is set) and fascist imperialism, Pinkus offers a reading o f Antonioni’s film , and this scene in 
particular, in terms of Italian imperialism and decolonization, two equally “eclipsed” phases o f Italian 
history.
quintessentially a question of what to do with time. While at first the women kill 
time by looking at the photographs, on which the movie camera itself zooms and 
lingers, at a point a different way of filling it is devised. An abrupt cut interrupts the 
protracted pan across the photos of tribespeople being contemplated by Vittoria. The 
next shot, announced by a livelier, more sustained African rhythm, reveals an 
unrecognizable Vittoria (indeed, it takes a while to work out that the actress is still 
Monica Vitti). In “blackface,” minstrel-like, with earrings and a heavy choker around 
her neck, she stands next to a photograph that has served as “model.” Wrapped in a 
white sheath and with spear in hand, she is now a tribeswoman herself or, at least, so 
thinks Anita who, pointing at the photo, exclaims: “Doesn’t she look like it? 
Identical!” This cut has introduced a temporal ellipsis: and, indeed, as we do not see 
the lengthy process of Vittoria’s transformation, a rather disorienting one at first.
But, in so doing, it also functions as another sort of spatial and temporal dislocation: 
that of Vittoria’s imaginary escape into the space and time of the stills, through her 
act of mimicry.
For Roger Caillois, mimicry could be called upon to illustrate the delusions 
characteristic of certain mental disorders, whereby the person affected feels as if 
separated from his/her self. In schizophrenia, for example, “the individual,” so to 
speak, “breaks the boundaries of his skin and occupies the other side of his senses.”93 
At play in psychic phenomena of this type is, according to Caillois, a process of 
“depersonalization by assimilation to s p a c e a process to which, in nature, one finds 
an equivalent in the mimetic faculty.94 But if Vittoria’s imitation may evoke the
92 Cf. Barthes’s characterization, in Camera Lucida, o f the photograph as “that-has-been.” “In 
Photography,” he argues, “I can never deny that the thing has been there," 76-77 (emphasis in 
original).
93 Roger Caillois, “Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia” [1935], trans. John Shepley, October 31 
(Winter 1984), 17-32. 30 cited.
94 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
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'''‘depersonalization by assimilation” that, for Caillois, is central to both mimicry and 
certain disturbances of subjectivity, her very attempt to become, in a way, like the 
photograph, further resonates with his characterization of mimicry itself as a kind of 
photography. “Morphological mimicry,” Caillois in fact proposes, “could then be, 
after the fashion of chromatic mimicry, an actual photography, but of the form and 
the relief, a photography on the level of the object and not of the image, a 
reproduction in three-dimensional space.”95 In Vittoria’s act of mimicry, on the other 
hand, the model to “reproduce” is precisely the two-dimensionality of the 
photographic image itself: is this an allusion to Kracauer’s reflection that reality has 
assumed a “photographic face”?
For Marta, the photographs may well have significance because of their 
indexical specificity: she may cherish them as “props” for remembering, tools for 
managing her personal memories. For the other two women, on the contrary, not 
only do the photographs belong to a collective -  if not “impersonal” -  dimension 
but, also, they function as objects of entertainment and distraction, aids, we could 
say, for forgetting oneself and one’s boredom. What Vittoria and Anita value in their 
holiday-brochure imagery is the kitsch, and racially laden, spatial ambiguity of the 
“exotic” and temporal a-temporality of the “primitive.” While these images provide 
the inspiration for Vittoria’s mimetic game, and one photo in particular constitutes 
her “model,” she does not fall still like them. Unlike some of Thomas’s real-life 
models in Blow-up, who maintain the same rigidity and, indeed, stillness they have 
assumed for the camera even when they are not posing for it anymore, Vittoria, 
though imitating an actual photograph, does not simply strike a pose, as one might in 
a tableau vivant. Inspired by the photographic spectacle as a whole, in fact, she
95 Ibid., 23.
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proceeds, in her turn, to make herself spectacle. And, as she energetically spins and 
whirls around the flat in a mock tribal dance and chant, this is, indeed, quite literal 
(ill. 15, p. 343).
And, now, in light of Vittoria’s “show,” we can reconsider the relation 
between the women’s boredom and photography. Her performance hinges around 
the intrinsic link between distraction and boredom pinpointed by Kracauer, Fenichel, 
and Moravia, for all of whom the former (as simple diversion or organized 
entertainment) is a latent manifestation of the latter. Indeed, Vittoria mimes the very 
forms of spectacle analysed by Kracauer, through which, though ostensibly evaded, 
boredom is in fact, at the same time, manifested. As she literally makes herself 
entertainment, we could say that her boredom does not simply become like, but is 
actually embodied as, distraction -  a distraction that belies the “special type” of 
“forgetfulness” highlighted in Moravia’s novel. Furthermore, what she imitates, or 
even incarnates, is the very medium of photography, the looking at of which has 
been an early symptom of her boredom. Her reproduction of the photos also 
reiterates the reproducibility of the medium itself, thus gearing her boredom to the 
aesthetics of repetition, and economy of mass (re)production, in which it is 
historically rooted.
Significantly, though, as Vittoria’s boredom is exhibited through the 
apparently antithetical category of distraction, she is not spectator but actor. 
Therefore her condition is also, to paraphrase Benjamin’s expression, an “index of 
participation” in modernity. Whether or not her immersion in modernity is a sign of 
her partaking of collective alienation (Benjamin’s “sleep”), it is an active one. The 
frenetic yet purposeless dynamism of Vittoria’s performative act crystallizes how her 
boredom is both a marker and a direct precipitate of her social mobility, with its
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limitations and accompanying dissatisfactions. In fact, it is precisely by being thus 
articulated that boredom’s paradoxical, contradictory structure is further thrown into 
relief. For Fenichel, boredom specifies an ambivalent relation between apathy and 
unrest, activity and inactivity. Even when it manifests itself as external “quiet,” 
boredom belies “internal restlessness.”96 This is so, according to Fenichel, because 
boredom is a form of desire: a “craving for adequate objects” which is, however, 
aimless, as the desired object is identified only in the negative, by excluding as 
“inadequate” all that is available.97 (Indeed, perhaps this very negativity makes of 
boredom a self-reflexive demonstration of desire itself as, more recently, Adam 
Phillips has suggested by summarising the condition as “the wish for a desire.”98) As 
the tension and agitation structuring desire can be both internal and external, so 
boredom’s inner restlessness, in Fenichel’s view, can sometimes spill over on the 
outside, become manifested externally as “motor restlessness,” “fidgetiness,” or even 
“the instinct for wandering” and for “findfing] ‘distraction’ through a change of 
environment” which affect the psychopath.99 As the relative repose of looking at the 
photographs gives way to the agitation and the “escape” of Vittoria’s dance, 
boredom in L’eclisse is presented in just these terms: a phenomenological alternation 
between action and inaction, as well as an unresolved tension between apathy and 
restlessness, mobility and stagnation. Punctuating the film with stillness, but a
96 Fenichel, “On the Psychology of Boredom,” 294.
97 Ibid., 293.
98 Adam Phillips, On Kissing, Tickling, and Being Bored  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1993), 68.
99 Fenichel, “On the Psychology of Boredom,” 294 and 300. Whilst Fenichel was keen to categorize 
boredom on its own as, in effect, a condition generated by the routinization o f metropolitan life, he 
also drew a parallel between boredom and manic-depressive states (300). The structure o f tension and  
alternation between quiet and restlessness Fenichel outlines in boredom chimes, in many respects, 
with the cyclical recurrence o f apparently opposed states in manic-depression first described by Karl 
Abraham, “Notes on the Psycho-Analytical Investigation and Treatment o f Manic-Depressive 
Insanity and Allied Conditions” [1911], in Selected Papers o f  Karl Abraham, ed. Ernest Jones 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1949). In the 1950s and 1960s, the psychiatrist Schachtel aligned boredom 
and depression again precisely by discussing them both as a cyclical alternation of restless and manic
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stillness that is, in fact, “moving”, the photographs accentuate and underscore both 
this alternation and this tension. And it is to a consideration of how boredom may 
not only be “described” in L ’eclisse's story but also, at some level, “embodied” in 
the film that I shall turn shortly. First, however, we need to look more closely at the 
temporal structure of boredom itself.
Boredom, Cinema and the Photographic
Making Time Palpable
Addressing the phenomenon via the exemplary figures of the gambler, the flaneur, 
and “he who waits,” Benjamin, as we have seen, emphasizes the intrinsic link 
between boredom and temporality. In doing so, furthermore, he sketches, in terms 
similar to Fenichel, a polarity between repose and action within the time of boredom. 
The mobility of the gambler and the flaneur is juxtaposed to the stasis of the person 
who waits. Each of their conditions, in turn, is not permanent but, to a certain extent, 
interchangeable, and thus representative of moments within boredom itself. This 
same co-existence of movement and stillness surfaces in Kracauer’s accounts of the 
occupancy of time in boredom. Indeed, as “saunter[ing] through the streets” gives 
way to sitting “silent and lifeless,” in the process of “gawking at the silver screen,” 
and waiting and “busy-ness” rotate, moments of activity and passivity emerge as 
different sides of the same coin.100 For Warhol, too, who notoriously thrived in the 
boring, boredom’s temporality consisted of a hovering between action and
phases. See Ernest G. Schachtel, Metamorphoses: On the Developm ent o f  Affect, Perception,
inaction.101 “Everyone knows how it is,” he explained, “some days one can sit and 
look out of the windows for hours and hours and some days one can’t sit still for a 
single second.”102 As well as outlining a co-existence of apparent opposites within 
boredom -  such as social mobility and stagnation, psychic aboulia and restlessness, 
physical motion and stasis -  Moravia also lays emphasis on the recursive structure of 
its temporality. Indeed, it is these very alternations that engender the recurrence. This 
is concisely summarized by Dino, who compares the condition to the “repeated and 
mysterious interruption of the electric current inside a house,” whereby one moment 
there is light and the next “darkness and an empty void.”103 Through these metaphors 
of intermittence, the time of boredom is presented not only as a flow that includes its 
own negation -  its own interruptions -  but, also, as repetitive and, even, somewhat 
circular.
Commenting on one of Baudelaire’s poems in the “Spleen et ideal” cycle of 
Les Fleurs du Mai, Benjamin paraphrases that “in the spleen, time becomes palpable; 
the minutes cover a man like snowflakes.”104 While the two states certainly diverge 
in many ways (Baudelaire’s spleen is tinged with melancholia), this “palpability” of 
time applies to boredom too. Indeed, it is one of the consequences of boredom being 
a problem of time and how to occupy it, that time itself comes to be felt as an excess, 
a weight, when one would otherwise be unconscious or unaware of it. Fenichel’s 
polarity between quiet and restlessness, Dino’s metaphor of a recurrent blackout, 
Benjamin’s, Kracauer’s and Warhol’s descriptions of an alternation of repose and 
action, all draw attention to the how, to the dynamics by which time becomes
Attention and Memory [1959] (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 233-234.
100 Siegfried Kracauer, “Boredom” [1924], in The Mass Ornament, 332-33.
101 For a discussion o f Warhol and boredom alternative to the one I pursue here, see: Svendsen, A 
Philosophy o f  Boredom, 100-106.
102 Warhol and Hackett, POPism, 50.
103 Moravia, La noia, 1.
“palpable.” What materializes time in boredom, renders it evident and felt, is 
precisely a dialectic between stillness and movement. For, in boredom, time is 
experienced as just this painful tension: something that fails to pass while passing 
nevertheless, falling with the same unhurried suspension as snowflakes. In the 
paradox, the oxymoron, of this suspension, time becomes long. This same dialectic 
is at play in L ’eclisse and, indeed, it is the means through which, as well as being 
described diegetically, the time of boredom is also rendered in the “form” of the 
film. Where the photographs are the diegetic element through which the women’s 
boredom is articulated, they also crystallize and disclose the dynamics by which the 
phenomenon is made a “matter” of aesthetics.
With its rather emphatic focus on the stills, the scene in Marta’s apartment 
stages an encounter between photography and cinema. Deeply imbricated with time 
since their very emergence -  from its capture and representation, to its 
reconceptualization and management - , these technologies are usually related to two 
different aspects of it. Where photography, as in Bazin’s famous account, is linked to 
stillness and the instant, cinema is associated with movement and duration. And, 
together, these technologies do not simply “manifest” these opposing attributes of 
time but, in fact, actively contribute to configure them as such. If photography seizes 
the instant, the very notion of the instant is, in turn, dependent on the photographic. 
Bellour, as I have discussed, has analysed the scenario in which, within the terrain of 
the moving image, cinema and photography meet. For Bellour, this photographic 
time being opened up inside cinematic time “becomes both the pose and the pause of 
the film.”105 “The film,” the tile of the essay intimates, is “stilled,” giving us time to 
reflect on the motionless and photographic basis, as well as origin, of cinema itself.
104 Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 180.
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This “remediation” of photography in cinema, however, changes both media. Where 
the emergence of photographic stillness may seem to take the moving image against 
its own grain, a filmed photograph is still, yet moving; it is a stillness in movement, 
with a set duration. And while, as in The Parallax View, we may find a montage of 
still images in rapid succession in a film, most often, when the photograph emerges 
within the cinema, it is made to last, to endure. The movie camera, that is, generally 
“holds” it and lingers over it for a time that outlasts the “instant” embodied by the 
photographic itself.
As in nostalgia and Blow-up, it is not one still photograph, but many, that are 
filmed in L’eclisse: the photographic instant is “encored,” it is repeated as well as 
prolonged. Indeed, while there is a surfacing of the static time of the photographic in 
L ’eclisse, the film is not so much “stilled” by this emergence as, rather, slowed, over 
a period of a few minutes during which the camera continues to alternate between 
the African images and the women. In fact, the camera does not fixate upon the 
photographs statically. Rather, it slowly zooms in on them and then lingers, perhaps 
focusing on a detail, or it gradually reveals their surface by unhurriedly scanning 
across one or a horizontal series of photos tacked to the wall, as in the shot preceding 
Vittoria’s dressing up. The cumulative effect of the recurrence of the still lingered 
over, zoomed in, panned across, is a still mg that does not quite stop the film; it is the 
production, indeed, of a certain slowness.
For the Belgian kinetic artist Pol Bury, writing in a short manifesto entitled 
“Time Dilated” (1964), “slowness” lay “between the immobile and mobility.” 
Revealed as a paradoxical suspension between these antithetical poles, slowness is,
105 Bellour, “The Film Stilled,” 108.
for Bury, a “quality” that “dilates” time.106 Generated by the insertion of the still in 
the moving image, a poise between mobility and immobility is what characterizes 
the scene in L ’eclisse. Indeed, Bury’s formulation illuminates how slowness, here, is 
a feature of the polarity, and consequent “elongation,” of time that the cinematic 
remediation of the photographs generates. The slowness of this scene, to a certain 
extent functioning as, in its turn, the “still” core within the moving image of the film 
as such, is also a precipitate of the overall slowness of L’eclisse. The oscillation at 
play here, in fact, pertains to the film in its entirety, which, formally and diegetically 
is composed of a dialectic between stasis and motion that dilates its time, renders it 
long. Actual still images, as well as people looking like stills, punctuate the film. So 
for example, Vittoria’s apartment, like the cut to the photograph re-locating to 
Marta’s, is also introduced by a protracted shot of a poster on one of its walls, and 
Vittoria herself is often framed standing still within the frame of a window. And, 
narratively too, L’eclisse is threaded through with stillness, with “the moments 
when, apparently, nothing is happening,” that Antonioni asserted he “liked” in films, 
and wanted to include in his own.107 From the dialogue-less opening sequence 
chronicling not “the end” of a love affair, but the moments just afterwards, when all 
has been said, to the long concluding one from which the protagonists have 
vanished, the film is embroidered with the “dead times” of time itself. Adorno 
pointed to this tension in La notte, in whose pursuit of the “uncinematic” within the 
cinematic, in his view, movement was both “denied and yet preserved” through the 
stasis of the characters. This paradox, for Adorno, gave the film “the power to 
express, as if with hollow eyes, the emptiness of time.”108 And, as boredom is a
106 Pol Bury, “Time Dilated” [1964], in Dore Ashton, Pol Bury (Paris: Maeght Editeur, 1970), 107.
107 Aldo Tassone, “Conversazione” [interview with Michelangelo Antonioni, 1985], in Antonioni, 
Fare un film  e per me vivere, 209.
108 Adorno, “Transparencies on Film,” 156.
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problem of time’s emptiness and how to fill it, we could even say that it is precisely 
L ’eclisse9s literal remediation of the photographic that encapsulates and discloses the 
dynamics by which Antonioni’s cinema may be seen to court an aesthetics of 
boredom. The way in which Antonioni’s films, through a paradoxical dynamics of 
stillness, may elicit boredom as an experiential response is both symptomatic of, and 
embedded within, the valorization of slowness, duration and, indeed, boredom itself, 
as aesthetic strategies in the period at large. I shall conclude this chapter with a brief 
overview of this wider context. Focusing on Warhol and Duras in particular, I shall 
consider how, though not through the insertion of actual photographs, the stillness of 
the photographic may nevertheless be seen to (re)emerge within cinema, and be 
yoked to a phenomenology of boredom.
The Pursuit of Boredom
“Blow-up viewed as a video in 1995,” Iain Sinclair proclaims in Lights Out for the 
Territory,
provokes an overwhelming urge to rush the tape to the cutting-room for 
emergency amputation: lose those appalling rag day students, the tennis court 
mime, most of the secondary performances. Hack it to the bone: some urban 
driving, some interplay in the studio, the park. Reduce it to essence, to 
Cortazar’s original story.109
109 Iain Sinclair, Lights Out fo r  the Territory [1997] (London: Granta Books, 1998), 351. Antonioni’s 
Blow-up is loosely inspired by a short story by the Argentinian Julio Cortazar, “Las babas del diablo” 
[1959], translated as “Blow-up,” in Blow-up and Other Stories, trans. Paul Blackburn (New York: 
Collier, 1974).
“Hack it to the bone”: Sinclair seems to have gone some way towards this mandate 
in his own VHS copy. ‘The start of my version of the film,” he explains, “after I’ve 
eliminated all the tedious cross-cutting with white-face extras,” is the shot in which 
Thomas leaves the doss house where he has spent the night.110 Sinclair’s impatience 
brings to mind an episode involving Yvonne Rainer, who recently expressed a 
similar frustration with one of her own films. After a screening of her Lives of 
Performers (1972) at the Whitechapel Art Gallery in 2003, she thanked the audience 
for putting up with it and apologized for the film being too long, saying that she 
“would not do that kind of duration, now.”111 Her first feature-length film, Lives of 
Performers runs at 90 minutes: where it may be slightly long with respect to the 
average duration of an experimental piece, it is not long as a “narrative” film. And, 
indeed, for this work, as well as for her filmic oeuvre as a whole, which Noel Carroll 
characterizes as “novelistic,” Rainer is credited with being among those who re­
introduced “story” within avant-garde cinema, after the “abstractions” of the 
structural film.112
Teasing as they may be, Sinclair’s and Rainer’s contemporary reactions to 
the “kind of duration” of these films bring into focus the shared territory between 
Antonioni’s -  “commercial” -  cinema and the art scene of the time if not, even, more 
broadly, a key aspect of the aesthetics of that moment. Whilst Rainer, and Frampton 
(who greatly admired her work), injected some storytelling into the experimental 
film of the 1960s and 1970s, Antonioni is often seen to have taken the narrative 
away from the narrative film itself.113 In fact, in Blow-up, as in most of Antonioni’s 
cinema, it is not so much that there is no story, as that the “essence” Sinclair wants to
110 Ibid.
111 Yvonne Rainer speaking at the Whitechapel Art Gallery, London, 30 July 2003.
112 Noel Carroll, Interpreting the Moving Image (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 321.
113 See e.g. Rohdie, Antonioni, 68.
get to is inextricably imbricated with “the echo, the refractions, and the eccentric 
waves of events” the film also “gather[s],” as Giorgio Tinazzi put it.114 So that, in 
fact, one might even be tempted to say that there is no “bone” to be hacked to, or 
that, on the contrary, all is “bone.” In the end, the point is that, bone or not, the film 
stands as it is. At just under two hours, its being “long” is not so much a matter of 
actual length but, as with Rainer’s film, of pace -  and indeed, we could say, 
remembering Bury’s paradoxical definition, of slowness. Its dilution of narrative and 
dilation of duration, through, in fact, an antithesis of stasis and motion that the 
inclusion of the photographs, like in L ’eclisse, redoubles formally, manifests 
Antonioni’s project to “reproduce,” cinematically, “the rhythm of life.”115 For 
Antonioni, as we have seen, this rhythm is stop and start, “motionless” and 
“spinning,” and in fact its “pauses, transitions, silences” are actually “the most 
authentic part of human experience.”116 If, rather than on video, we sit through Blow­
up in the cinema, the endurance of the “tedious” bits which, like Sinclair, we may 
want to fast-forward -  if not, rather drastically, delete -  is precisely part of the 
experience. So, the diegetic inclusion of what Deleuze calls Antonioni’s “idle 
periods of everyday banality,” is also, at some level, translated into the form of the 
film, called into play in its reception.117
For John Cage, the endurance of extended -  and extensible -  duration was 
crucial to experience, and to the experience of art in particular. He praised it in his 
“Lecture on Indeterminacy,” which, consisting of thirty one-minute stories when 
first performed in 1958, had tripled to ninety by the following year. “If something is 
boring after two minutes,” Cage suggested there, “try it for four. If still boring, try it
114 Tinazzi, “The Gaze and the Story,” xxii.
115 Antonioni, “A Talk with Michelangelo Antonioni on His Work,” 202.
116 Ibid., and Aldo Tassone, “Conversazione,” 208.
117 Deleuze, Cinema II, 5.
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for eight, sixteen, thirty-two and so on. Eventually one discovers that it’s not boring 
at all but very interesting.”118 Relating boredom to repetition and to the dragging out 
of time, Cage’s provocative statement earmarked this moment when, in the arts, it 
became of interest as a condition to be actively pursued. Cage was indeed suggesting 
that we should pursue the boring -  that we should, in fact, repeat it again and again, 
as repetition will make even the boring interesting. Where Cage might have 
recouped the boring by means of the interesting, Warhol was happy to like it for 
being just boring: “I’ve been quoted a lot as saying, ‘I like boring things.’ Well, I 
said it and I meant it. But that doesn’t mean I’m not bored by them.”119 Both Cage’s 
and Warhol’s statements are exemplary of the self-conscious way in which boredom 
was pursued in the 1960s and 1970s.
Inscribed within the wider project of attempting a reconciliation between 
“art” and “life,” whether the intention -  as with Warhol -  might have been to elevate 
quotidian drudgery to art and “fame” or -  as with Cage -  to bring art down to the 
ordinary, this often involved the use of prosaic objects, noises, banal actions. And, in 
this “project,” photography, film, and the then emerging technologies of magnetic 
sound recording and video played a crucial role. Of course, their diffusion, and the 
development of lightweight and affordable equipment, provided the very means with 
which, easily and almost effortlessly, to seize the everyday and the banal. Warhol 
was obsessed by recording; as Peter Wollen put it, “he was a compulsive hoarder of 
every detail of his daily life,” who at his death, in addition to nearly 300 films, left 
over 4,000 sound and video tapes.120 Indeed, Warhol had meant to “record
118 Cage first delivered the lecture in 1958 in Brussels, and, in 1959, at Teachers College, Columbia, 
where sixty more stories had been added. See: John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 93, where this story appears as a filler, and 260.
119 Warhol and Hackett, POPism, 50.
120 Peter Wollen, “Raiding the Ice Box,” in Michael O ’Pray, ed., Andy Warhol Film Factory (London: 
BFI, 1989), 21. Warhol bought a tape recorder in 1964, and a portable video camera in 1970, and kept
everything” quite literally but, as he confessed to Jonas Mekas, had to admit it was 
physically impossible.121 Claiming that “reality” was his ultimate cinematic aim, 
Antonioni, too, was not immune from this Warholian dream of documentation. 
Fittingly, perhaps, given his interest in the dead times of time, he once remembered 
how he had wished to “sleep with the movie camera at my side -  so as to document 
what happens while I am absent, while I am sleeping; and also, what happens to 
me.”122 As these technologies enabled the capture and storage of the everyday (if not 
all of it, at least good chunks), they also, in so doing, offered a means to fill the time 
of the everyday itself. Nauruan’s series of films of his solitary, and apparently 
aimless, “exercises” in his studio -  such as Walking in an Exaggerated Manner 
Around the Perimeter of a Square, or Playing a Note on the Violin While I Walk 
Around the Studio (both 1967-68) -  represent both a way to kill time and to record it. 
(And of course, the question these films raise is also, specifically, that of the artist’s 
time, and of what to do with it once the traditional art object has been 
“dematerialized.”123) Thus Nauman’s films, like Warhol’s obsessive recording, while 
making representational technologies part of the attempt to evade boredom also, at 
some level, function as a manifestation, if not even a materialization, of the very 
phenomenon. Contemporary with the proliferation of boredom, these technologies 
do not simply “represent” it: they contribute to configuring it, and to structuring our
audio and film “diaries.” For further details about Warhol’s sound and video recording see: Mark 
Francis, ed., Andy Warhol: The Late Work (Munich: Prestel Verlag, 2004), esp. 122, and Glenn 
O ’Brian “Interview with Andy Warhol” [1976], esp. 60.
121 Jonas Mekas, “Notes After Seeing the Films o f Andy Warhol,” in John Coplans, ed., Andy Warhol 
(New York: New York Graphic Society, 1970), 41.
122 Michelangelo Antonioni, “D ied  Domande” [1985], in Fare un film  e p er  me vivere, 203.
123 Cf. Lucy R. Lippard, Six Years: The Dematerialization o f  the Art O bject from  1966-1972  [1973] 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1997). Joanna Lowry discussed this triangulation between 
artistic production, technology and boredom in her paper “Playing with Time,” delivered at 
“Old/New?” 30th Annual Conference o f the Association of Art Historians, University o f Nottingham, 
UK, 1-3 April 2004.
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experience of its time. And, perhaps, boredom’s temporality may even be said to 
have something of the photographic, or of the cinematic or, indeed, of both.
For Le Grice, Warhol’s films, which Sitney saw as at the origin of the self- 
reflexivity of the structural film, designated a moment when boredom started to 
become “a cinematic principle.”124 But, in fact, the early films to which Le Grice is 
especially alluding are very “uncinematic,” as Adorno might have put it. Empire 
(1964) and Sleep (1963), perhaps the most notorious among the dozens Warhol made 
in the mid-1960s, deliver no more than what they promise in their titles: fixed-angle 
views respectively of the Empire State building and of a man sleeping. Referring to 
these early films in a late interview, Warhol said that his “old stuff is better to talk 
about than to see. It always sounds better than it really is.”125 And, certainly, these 
works are more often talked about than watched in their entirety, for, if they fulfil the 
expectation raised by their titles, they also exceed it. Empire and Sleep present us 
with their “subject” for the unendurable lengths of eight and six hours respectively, 
and, just in case the “action” should be too fast, though shot at twenty-four frames 
per second, they are meant to be viewed at the slower rate of sixteen. Outraged when 
seeing Sleep at standard speed, Stan Brakhage was apparently won over when Mekas 
convinced him to sit down again and watch it at 16fps.126 What may this slowing 
down reveal? While, in their excessiveness, the very durations of Empire and Sleep 
may suggest an inevitable link with the “long while” of boredom, it is precisely their 
slowness that is the key to how an actual, measurable length (indeed, quite great in 
this case) is made to feel long. Their slowness (of the projection speed and of the 
shots as such) is indeed the tension “between the immobile and mobility” outlined by
124 Le Grice, Abstract Film and Beyond , 121, my emphasis. Adams Sitney, “Structural Film,” 321ff.
125 Gleen O ’Brian, “Interview with Andy Warhol,” 59. On Warhol’s dissatisfaction with his films see 
also: Wayne Koestenbaum, Andy Warhol (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001), 56.
126 Mekas, “Notes After Re-seeing the Films o f Andy Warhol,” 28-30.
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Bury, by which the films look still, yet are still moving and, like boredom’s temporal 
structure itself, their time seems not to pass, while, indeed, it does.
While not literally, as in nostalgia, One Second in Montreal, Blow-up and 
L’eclisse, Warhol’s films, too, stage an encounter between photography and cinema 
and, indeed, a remediation of the one into the other. Their overtly static quality 
remediates the photographic within the cinematic. Remediation here may even seem 
to call into play the idea of a “reversion” of the moving to the still image. Yet, this 
convergence, this assimilation between the two media is at once evoked and negated; 
it is, in a way, permanently “in process,” and suspended, within the films 
themselves.
This is perhaps best encapsulated by the “Screen Tests” produced by Warhol 
between 1964 and 1966. They consist of portraits of visitors to his Factory whom 
Warhol deemed to have a “star” quality, whether actually already famous or not. 
These visitors -  among whom were “Baby” Jane Holzer, Salvador Dali, Bob Dylan 
and Susan Sontag -  would be seated in front of a 16mm movie camera, fixed on a 
tripod, and asked to keep as still as possible for three to four minutes (the time, that 
is, taken by a 100-foot reel of film to run through the camera). Overall, the Warhol 
Foundation has now about 500 of these units: yet more still might have been 
produced, and gone astray, or be in possession of some of the sitters. A bit like 
individual photographs extracted from a series, or an album, some of the “Screen 
Tests” have been used within different films, including 13 Most Beautiful Women 
and 13 Most Beautiful Boys (both 1964).127
127 While they often get passim  mentions, the “Screen Tests” have not been thoroughly analysed. 
Patrick S. Smith, Andy W arhol’s Art and Films [1981] (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1986), 154- 
160, was probably the first to discuss the project in some detail. The most extensive account to date is 
Paul Arthur, “No Longer Absolute: Portraiture in American Avant-Garde Documentary Films of the 
Sixties,” in Ivone Margulies, ed., Rites o f  Realism: Essays on Corporeal Cinema (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003), which discusses them within the genre o f the “portrait film .” See esp. 106-
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Mekas, Paul Arthur reminds us, had been among the first to highlight the 
“primitive” qualities of Warhol’s films (the fixed camera, the idea of filming until 
stock runs out, and so on). Warhol, Mekas argued, was “taking cinema back to its 
origins, to the days of Lumiere, for a rejuvenation and a cleansing.”128 Yet, Arthur 
retorts, “the remark does not go far enough. In truth Warhol took cinema back to the 
dawn of still photography.”129 The “Screen Tests” in particular, he continues, revisit 
the nineteenth-century practice of using a small mounted photographic portrait as a 
carte-de-visite. For not only do Warhol’s “film portraits” function as a modern carte- 
de-visite -  both, in a way, constitute a “passport” into a certain social milieu - , but 
they also echo the long posing times early photography required. Asked to “freeze” 
for several minutes, Warhol’s sitters had to behave in front of the movie camera in 
the same way in which patrons of early photographic studios had to behave in front 
of the still camera.130 Yet, faced by the prospect of four minutes of motionlessness, 
not all sitters followed Warhol’s instructions: some openly subverted them, moving 
about both within and without the frame, others engaged in more contained 
“performances” or, even, just some banal action (like fiddling with hair). In any case, 
however still they might have tried to be, in these prolonged close-ups one can 
always detect the movements of the face: breathing, blinking, small twitches, a slight 
parting of the lips, a sniffle. Apparently, the idea for these portraits came from 
Warhol’s friend and collaborator Gerard Malanga, who, needing a publicity still of 
himself, thought he would go about it by having a long cinematic close-up made,
109. Paul Arthur previously analysed the role o f portraiture in Warhol in “Flesh o f Absence: 
Resighting the Warhol Catechism,” in O ’Pray, Andy Warhol Film Factory. David E. James,
Allegories o f  Cinema: American Film o f  the Sixties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 68- 
69 also considers the “portraiture” and “documentary” features o f Warhol’s films. See also: Patrick S. 
Smith, Andy W arhol’s Art and Films (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1986), 154-56.
128“The Independent Film Award” [Jonas Mekas’s speech for the 6th Award, 1964] in Sitney, Film 
Culture Reader, 427.
129 Arthur, “No Longer Absolute,” 107.
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from which he would then select a frame to have printed as a photograph. As this 
anecdote further crystallizes, where the “Screen Tests” certainly represent a moment 
in which cinema most overtly approximates the photographic, they are also, at the 
same time, very different from photography as such. Crucially, it is only by undoing 
the cinematic that an actual photograph can be obtained. Warhol’s cumulative series 
of “moving” and “durational” stills brings to light how boredom became (in Le 
Grice’s expression) “a cinematic principle” when, paradoxically, cinema became, in 
a way, less like itself, and more, but not quite, like the photograph.
Many of the features characterizing Warhol’s films -  the haunting of cinema 
by the photograph, the representation of the banality and repetitiveness of the 
everyday, and the aesthetic “reproduction” of boredom itself in the encounter with 
the viewer -  are also at play in Duras’s India Song. Itself a story about boredom, 
India Song also dovetails with the scene from L’eclisse with which I started, but 
without photographs. For where in Antonioni’s film the women look at actual 
photographs, as souvenirs, or relics of Africa, in India Song it is the characters 
themselves that are relics, or ghosts. In India Song, photographic stillness 
impregnates the film because the story and the characters themselves are, in a way, 
“cinematic photographs.” The film, in fact, is composed of a repetitive series of 
“snapshots” and “tableaux” -  at aural as well as visual level -  in which the 
characters are often static, if not, even, “frozen.”
India Song revolves around the character of Anne-Marie Stretter, the 
promiscuous wife of a French diplomat in a province of Indochina in the 1920s. 
Stretter, we learn, commits suicide after one of her lovers (“the man from Lahore”) 
has also done so. This story is told, only fragmentarily and disconnectedly, through a
130 Benjamin, “A Small History o f Photography” [1931], suggests that, because o f the long exposure
collage of off-screen voices largely based on repetitions and refrains. This narration 
post-dates the event, as the voices are meant to belong to guests gossiping about it 
some time (maybe years) later at an embassy party in Calcutta. The on-screen 
characters belong to yet another, more recent, timeframe. Wandering through the 
now empty salons and derelict gardens of the embassy palace, they silently 
“incarnate” the subject of the scandalous rumours being reported on the soundtrack, 
“re-enacting” the fateful reception at the end of which, feeling rejected by her, 
Stretter’s lover goes mad and kills himself. Thus, in this palimpsest of different 
times, Stretter and the man from Lahore themselves are only ever evoked. Whether 
in the voices or in the images, they are only ever a ghostlike presence whose very 
absence, as in a relic (which, of course, a photograph or a film also are themselves) 
haunts the film.
India Song's story is one of colonial oppression, but in which, ironically, it is 
the oppressors who are the oppressed: buried alive in -  and indeed killed by -  their 
own “privileged” situation.131 The voices evoke “the heat, the monotony, the 
boredom” stifling that world. At one point, the boredom afflicting it is referred to as 
“a leprosy of the heart” that, like the disease, “slows down people’s movements.” 
And, indeed, the on-screen characters do not do much. As the aural narration 
proceeds by the reiterated evocation of certain “images,” so the visible actors 
constantly loop between a fixed, and limited, repertoire of actions. In effect, this 
consists of either strolling and dancing with each other, or giving in to a lethargy that 
makes them lie on the floor, slump into sofas and armchairs or, sometimes, freeze 
into a kind of tableau (ills. 16 and!7, pp. 344-45).
time, “the subject as it were grew into the picture,” 245 and 247.
131 Cf. Renate Gunther, M arguerite Duras (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 33.
“There is a new dimension,” Duras tried to explain in an interview just after 
the film’s release:
I don’t know offhand, I can’t quite put it into words. It’s a co-existential 
dimension, something similar to what one finds in chemistry, simultaneously 
in the film and in the person watching it [...] It is no longer a story which 
you are being told from the outside, and from which you remain aloof. 
Spectator and spectacle share a common existence. [...] You’re being invited 
to come to another place. And it’s not just the place the narration tells about, 
it’s also the place where the narration is happening.132
This “co-existential dimension,” this other place “where the narration is happening” 
is in fact, also, a time, the very time of the characters’ boredom, which cinematic 
time, impregnated with the stillness and repetitiveness of the photographic, both 
reproduces and produces in its unfolding.133 Boredom’s contradictory structure, that 
is, is made a “matter” of aesthetics through its isomorphism with the paradoxical 
qualities of stasis in the cinema.
132 Carlos Clarens, “India Song and Marguerite Duras,” Sight and Sound 45 (Winter 1975-76), 32-35. 
34 and 35 cited.
133 For a different reading, see Daniela Trastulli, Dalla Parola alVimmagine: viaggio nel cinema di 
Marguerite Duras (Genoa: Bomi Editore, 1982), in whose view India Song induces a sort of 
“hypnosis” in the spectator, 103.
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Chapter 3: Sound and Sound Recording
Time.. .is what we and sounds happen in.
John Cage1
It began early in life. [...] It then turned into an enthusiasm for editing shorthand
records, gramophone recordings. Into a special interest in the possibility of 
\
documentary sound recording. Into experiments in recording, with words and 
letters, the noise of a waterfall, the sounds of a lumbermill, etc. And one day in 
the spring of 1918...returning from a train station. There lingered in my ears the 
sighs and rumble of the departing train... someone’s swearing...a 
kiss... someone’s exclamation... laughter, a whistle, voices, the ringing of the 
station bell, the puffing of the locomotive... whispers, cries, farewells.... And 
thoughts while walking: I must get a piece of equipment that won’t describe, but 
will record, photograph these sounds. Otherwise it’s impossible to organize, edit 
them. They rush past, like time. But the movie camera perhaps? Record the 
visible.. ..Organize not the audible, but the visible world. Perhaps that’s the way 
out?2
Dziga Vertov’s 1924 manifesto “The Birth of Kino-Eye,” in which the filmmaker 
who gave us Man with a Movie Camera (1929) sets out his ideas on the 
emancipatory potential of “camera vision,” is prefaced by this impressionistic tale- 
of-origin anecdote. With these few enticing lines, Vertov traces the origin of his
1 John Cage, “4 5 ’ For a Speaker” [1954], in Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1961), 151.
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“Kino-Eye,” the use of moving image technology to record “the visible world,” back 
to his early attempts to employ sound technology to organize “the audible.” In fact, 
Vertov is suggesting that he initially considered the turn to the movie camera as, and 
only possibly, a “way out” In those early days, phonographic media, compared to 
cinematography, offered very limited manipulability: recordings were taken on metal 
cylinders or discs, and could not be assembled and managed as easily as Vertov 
might have wished.3 The facility with which one could cut film stock must have 
looked like heaven (in Man with a Movie Camera cutting and splicing is presented 
and revealed as “the” simple, yet inexhaustible, magic of cinema). Unable to “get a 
piece of equipment” that would allow him not simply to “record, photograph these 
sounds,” but also “to organize, edit them,” Vertov saw hope in cinematography, and 
-  inevitably before the development of a successful technique for synchronising 
sound with images -  resigned himself to trade in the audible for the visible.
On the one hand, Vertov’s move from phonography to cinematography -  and 
from one sensorial order to another -  attracts our attention to the curious irony that 
the work of a filmmaker extolled and fetishized as a visualist par excellence was in 
fact “the result of a frustrated ear.”4 Yet, on the other, Vertov’s very break is bridged 
by a line of continuity, which subtends both his oeuvre and these representational
2 Dziga Vertov, “The Birth o f Kino-Eye” [1924], in Kino-Eye: The Writings o fD ziga  Vertov, ed. 
Annette Michelson, trans. Kevin O’Brien (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1984), 40.
3 In addition to poor reproduction quality, Vertov must have been frustrated by the fact that recordings 
on cylinders or discs were virtually impossible to cut and edit. (This could only be done by the 
cumbersome and expensive process o f re-recording the master copy on to another disc, stopping and 
starting when a passage in the original needed to be omitted from the edited version.). For histories of  
phonographic technology see: Michael Chanan, Repeated Takes: A Short History o f  Recording and Its 
Effects on Music (London: Verso, 1994); Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter [1986], 
trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); 
Roland Gelatt, The Fabulous Phonograph 1877-1977, second revised edition (London: Cassell,
1977).
4 Douglas Kahn, “Introduction: Histories o f Sound Once Removed,” in Douglas Kahn and Gregory 
Whitehead, eds., Wireless Imagination: Sound, Radio and the Avant-Garde (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1992), 10. For an account o f Vertov’s experimentation with sound before and in cinema, see: 
Lucy Fisher, “Enthusiasm: From Kino-Eye to Radio-Eye,” in Elisabeth Weis and John Belton, eds.,
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technologies themselves. Indeed, by writing of his desire to “photograph these 
sounds,” Vertov himself sketches out an area of contiguity between visual and aural 
technologies.5 He wishes that phonography could do to audible reality what 
photography does to the visible world: enable its representation by permitting one 
not simply to “describe” it, but actually to capture it physically, to inscribe it 
indexically, and hence, literally, to preserve it in some form.6
Vertov’s urge to record the world, in its acoustic or visual dimension, stems 
from an awareness that reality is “rush[ing] past,” in constant movement, and rapidly 
changing. As this response may be seen as symptomatic of the experience of 
modernity and modernization at large during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
it was also certainly intensified, in Vertov’s case, by the radical and unprecedented 
scale of the transformations affecting Russia during the revolutionary period. It is not 
incidental that for his anecdote Vertov should choose such an emblematic topos of 
the modern world: the train station.7 Rather than simply describing it “with words 
and letters,” as he had previously attempted, he wants a machine that can physically 
catch a reality as it changes. The flow of life in modernity, the processes
Film Sound: Theory and Practice  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) and Douglas Kahn, 
Noise, Water, Meat: A H istory o f  Sound in the Arts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 139-144.
5 As will be discussed later, the cutting and splicing o f sound recordings (as opposed to film  
soundtracks), together with the portability o f equipment Vertov’s documentaristic intent required, 
only became practically and economically feasible with the diffusion of magnetic tape after World 
War II. This notwithstanding, when optical soundtrack at last became available in the Soviet Union, 
Vertov was stopped neither by the bulkiness nor the poor performance o f the camera, though 
lamenting both. He lugged twenty-seven hundred pounds of equipment all the way to the Donbas 
region in order to record the authentic landscape o f industrialization -  “mines, factories, trains” -  
which he then creatively montaged in his first sound film: Enthusiasm: Symphony o f  the Donbas, 
completed in 1930. See Dziga Vertov, “Let’s Discuss Ukrainfilm’s First Sound Film: Symphony o f  
the Donbas” [1930] in Vertov, Kino-Eye, 109.
6 1 glossed the “index” in the Introduction.
7 Cf. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization o f  Space and Time in the 
Nineteenth Century [1971] (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1986).
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transforming it so rapidly and radically, altering and accelerating its pace, should be 
represented with new means, with the technologies that modernity itself produces.8
Vertov suggests a dual role for representational technologies. They provide 
not only a “record” of the real, but also a means to “organize, edit” it, and as such 
their function is both indexical and cognitive. The state-of-the-art phonograph 
Vertov dreams of would enable the “material” apprehension of the sounds of modern 
reality by turning them into manipulable recordings to be preserved, organized, 
archived. Facilitating their study and analysis, this would, in turn, contribute to the 
critical understanding of modernity itself.
If change and process in the world are a manifestation of the passage of time, 
then those technologies which enable the capture of events or, even down to the 
instant, parts of events as they happen, also somehow seize and manifest time itself. 
As I discussed in the Introduction, the idea that representational technologies 
(photography, phonography, telephony, cinema, television and so on) both reflect 
and reflect upon time is a prominent feature of discourse throughout their history, 
one which coexists with a manifold preoccupation with time itself in modernity. As 
Mary Ann Doane has argued, sound and image reproduction technologies “are 
crucial to modernity’s reconceptualization of time and its representability,” to the 
extent that, in their turn, they actually greatly influence and shape our very notions 
and experiences of temporality.9 In short, it is in great part through these 
technologies that we “imagine” or think time.
8 Cf. Bertolt Brecht’s discussion o f realism in “Popularity and Realism” [written c. 1938; first 
published 1967], trans. Stuart Hood, in Ronald Taylor, ed., Aesthetics and Politics (London: NLB, 
1977), where he suggests: “New problems appear and demand new methods. Reality changes; in 
order to represent it, modes o f representation must also change,” 82.
9 Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence o f  Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 4.
Andre Bazin’s juxtaposition of photography as preserving the instant, 
immobilized as if “in amber,” and cinema as “change mummified,” that which 
“embalms” things in their durational flux, is a most famous account of the different 
ways in which these technologies are seen, more than simply to represent, actually to 
embody time.10 Whilst conceding that phonography is also bestowed with this 
capacity, Bazin seems to think of it as mainly a means for storing music and, 
therefore, what he considers “aesthetic” as opposed to “real” time. Meanwhile, 
though his argument hinges on the indexicality of both photography and cinema, it is 
the latter that Bazin favours and deems the most complete “art of time.”11 For, unlike 
photography, the moving image seems to him to capture what is the essential trait of 
time: the fact that it passes. Because of movement, that is, cinema can catch time in 
its very unfolding. It is clear that Vertov also favours technologies of movement. 
Though talking of “photographing sounds,” it is not still photography he is thinking 
of. And in fact when, frustrated by the inadequacy of phonography, he decides to 
switch medium, it is to the moving version of photography he turns.
Sounds “rush past, like time,” Vertov comments. His suggestion of an 
equation between sound and time is based on the intuitive notion that sounds are 
essentially temporal: very simply, they take time, a length of time, however short.
Yet the subtler point being made is also that of an inextricable and, even, a reciprocal 
relation between the two: as sound depends on and takes time, so time takes sound, 
among other things, to manifest itself. Just as for Bazin it is the cinematic image that 
constitutes the ideal vehicle for time to “expose” itself, so for Vertov -  in this 
instance -  it is sound to provide that vehicle, that body. The alluring promise of
10 Andre Bazin, “The Ontology o f the Photographic Image” [1945], in What Is Cinema? trans. Hugh 
Gray, 2 vols., vol. 1, (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1967), 14-15.
11 Andre Bazin, “Death Every Afternoon” [1949], trans. Mark A. Cohen, in Ivone Margulies, ed.,
Rites o f  Realism: Essays on Corporeal Cinema (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 30.
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phonographic technology would then reside precisely in the fact that it might provide 
him with the means to capture, to imprint, two things at once: time and sound, or 
time through and as sound. In providing the means to turn temporal structures like 
sounds into manipulable objects (recordings), phonography could, quite literally, 
“materialize” time. More precisely, in both phonography and cinematography, it is 
the possibility of technologically preserving and articulating the unfolding of time 
that captivates him. Like Bazin, Vertov is intrigued that these technologies may be 
made to perform the paradoxical function of preserving something that passes.
While the phonographic technology available to him is not yet quite as sensitive, 
supple and malleable as he would wish it to be, and the time of sounds, or indeed, 
time as sound, still slips away, cinema seems to provide him with the ideal machine. 
Kino-Eye, he explains, “is a victory against time”: it “is the negative of time,” it 
counters its passing by storing it.12 However, with either phonography or 
cinematography, it is not plain recording of a real duration that is at issue. What is at 
issue, rather, is the opportunity to articulate time through technology: to employ it, 
that is, both to reproduce and to produce a representation of time. Just as important 
as recording, the possibility to organize through editing is that which renders these 
technologies a tool for the intellectual apprehension, the “thinkability,” of time as 
well as its “material” capture.
The historical moments considered in this chapter and in my thesis as a 
whole stand one or more generations apart from that in which the disappointed 
Vertov is obliged to swap the ear for the eye. The postwar decades marked the 
moment when the equipment Vertov could only dream of finally became available: 
the period from the late 1940s to the 1960s saw the gradual development and then
12 Vertov, “The Birth o f Kino-Eye,”41.
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commercial diffusion and popularization of portable magnetic tape recording. 
Economical, light and pliable, magnetic tape revolutionized the cinema and the 
music industry alike, both at the point of production and at that of reception. While 
the phonograph -  such as Edison’s prototype of 1877 -  was originally both a sound 
recording and a sound reproduction apparatus in one, the bulk of its commercial 
diffusion, in its descendants from the gramophone to the turntable, took the format of 
a playback machine only. After decades, the magnetic tape recorder reversed this: as 
the technology gradually became more affordable, laypersons and ordinary 
households could easily obtain a system with which to inscribe as well as listen to 
sounds.13 Well into the age of the talkies, the “magnetic tape revolution” brought 
substantial changes to cinema, and sound production therein. It facilitated both direct 
recording on set and post-production mixing by being cheaper and easier to edit than 
optical film soundtrack (on which, in the last instance, the completed audio would 
usually be transferred for distribution).
My aim here is to highlight and discuss the same triangulation between time, 
sound and technology observed in Vertov’s manifesto from the standpoint, or, if we 
like, the “vantage” point of audio-visual media. A parallel can be drawn between 
Vertov and Antonioni with regard to their cultural and artistic concerns, as well as 
with respect to a certain neglect, in criticism, of their attraction to aurality and 
acoustic technologies.14 While, unlike Vertov, Antonioni’s engagement with the
13 For discussions on the impact o f magnetic tape see: Chanan, Repeated Takes, 92-115; Gellatt, The 
Fabulous Phonograph, 286ff.; Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, 106ff.
14 Fisher’s article: “Enthusiasm: From Kino-Eye to Radio-Eye,” and Kahn’s discussion in Noise, 
Water, Meat, 139-144 partially redress the balance with regard to Vertov. “ The conference “Le 
sonorita del visibile: immagini, suoni e musica nel cinema di Michelangelo Antonioni,” held in 
Ravenna, Italy, on 21-22 May 1999, has partially attempted to redress the balance for Antonioni. The 
emphasis, however, is on the music in his film s rather than sound in general. The conference 
proceedings have been published as: Alberto Achilli, Alberto Boschi, Gianfranco Casadio, eds., Le 
sonorita del visibile: immagini, suoni e musica nel cinema di Michelangelo Antonioni (Regione 
Emilia Romagna: Assessorato alia Cultura, 1999). See also: Giuseppe D ’Amato, “Antonioni: la 
poetica dei materiali,” Bianco e Nero  62 ( January/April 2001), 152-181, which, though reflecting on
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cinema is not, in the era of sound film, the result of a “frustrated ear,”15 he too, like 
Vertov, is usually extolled as a quintessentially visual director. But Antonioni speaks 
through sounds, and silences, no less than he speaks through images.16 
Notwithstanding the obvious historical, social and political differences of their 
respective situations and aims, akin to Vertov’s, Antonioni’s overarching goal is “the 
expression of the reality of our time,” the representational and formal rendering of 
the specificity of modernity and time, of time in modernity.17 With regard to this 
“apprehension” of time and modernity, Antonioni shares with the Soviet filmmaker a 
keen enthusiasm for the possibilities offered by media technologies produced and 
evolving within modernity itself. In particular, as in Vertov, there is in Antonioni a 
far from marginal concern with representing the acoustic landscape of modernity, 
and with the possibility of embodying and organizing time through sound. Not only 
is Antonioni as attentive to the aural dimension of modern temporality as he is to its 
visual aspect, but sound itself is often employed to articulate time, to embed and map 
temporality into the image. Furthermore, as we shall see, Antonioni shares with 
Vertov “a phonographic attitude [...] towards the world,” a specific interest in 
phonographic recording and reproduction, which sometimes surfaces in his films as 
an actual staging of sound technologies themselves; staging that makes visible the 
areas of contiguity, continuity and convergence between phonography and cinema.18
the decrease in extra-diegetic music in Antonioni’s films since 1960s, concentrates on the use o f the 
musical soundtrack in Cronaca d i un am ore (Chronicle o f  a Love, 1950), and II grido  (The Cry, 
1957).
15 Kahn and Whitehead, Wireless Imagination, 10.
16 Antonioni himself has often noted his attention to sound. See e.g. Betty Jeffries Demby and Larry 
Sturhahn, “Professione: Reporter” [interview with Antonioni, 1975], in Michelangelo Antonioni, 
Fare un film  e per  me vivere: Scritti sul cinema, ed. Carlo di Carlo and Giorgio Tinazzi (Venezia: 
Marsilio, 1994), 301, where he argues: “a film  is image as well as sound. Which one is more 
important? I put them both on the same level.”
17 Michelangelo Antonioni, “II deserto rosso” [1964], ed. Fran5 ois Maurin, in Fare un film  e per me 
vivere, 251.
18D ’Amato, “Antonioni: la poeticadei materiali,” 154.
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There is, in Antonioni, what we could call an “acoustic turn.” With 
L ’avventura (1960), in fact, the soundtrack of his films changes quite radically. This 
turn, and the overarching interest in sound and phonographic technologies 
subsuming it, will be set against the wider artistic context of the period. I start by 
discussing the role and impact of novel recording technologies as a means for the 
representation of acoustic landscapes, and, through this, the manifestation of time 
and its passing. Changing the conditions of aurality, these technologies transformed 
the domain of sonority, promoting shifting redefinitions of the very notions of sound, 
noise, silence, music. Paradoxically, the drastic decrease of (extra-diegetic) musical 
accompaniment in Antonioni’s films since L ’avventura can be illuminated by a 
discussion of experimentation in the field of music itself. Recording technology 
promoted the entry of environmental, prosaic sounds and noises into music, whether 
to regenerate it or disintegrate it as an autonomous category. Here, I draw in 
particular on the interest in such sounds on the part of the musique concrete 
movement and John Cage. This, I suggest, provides the context for Antonioni’s 
silencing of the musician and concomitant increased attention to “soundscape” in his 
films of the 1960s. In particular, Antonioni’s focus on acoustic landscapes in this 
period needs to be seen in the context of Cage’s ideas on silence and its sonority, and 
on the special relationship between silence and time.
In the second part of the chapter, in view of Antonioni’s actual staging of the 
tape recorder in La notte and The Passenger, I consider the appearance of sound 
technology itself as a subject, rather than simply an unseen means, of representation. 
What are the dynamics set in place by the actual portrayal of sound technology in 
visual media? In the scenes where it appears, Antonioni chooses to show the tape 
recorder as a tool for capturing the human voice. Shifting from acoustic landscapes
151
to the human voice, from the temporality of the outside world to the temporality of 
the self, the focus of the discussion becomes more intimate: the psychic register and 
subjectivity. When considered from the point of view of the storage of the voice, 
phonographic technologies’ power to store time seems more poignantly and 
ineluctably always already haunted by absence, lack, death. Drawing also on Samuel 
Beckett’s Krapp’s Last Tape (1958), I consider how the mise-en-abyme of recording 
technology and the recording voice, allowing the paradoxical representation of 
different times visually coexisting, enables the visualization of a subject in thrall to 
time, “fractured” by temporality.
Finally, I conclude with a coda on an installation by Atom Egoyan at the 
Former Museum of Mankind in London in 2002, in which his film of Beckett’s play 
(produced in 2000) is central.
Sound, Silence and Technology
Vertov’s very succinct account of the sonic landscape surrounding him in a train 
station resonates in Antonioni’s later, and more extensive description, of the 
“acoustic bath” to which he awakens one morning in New York:19
There is a background noise, incessant, hollow, dull: it’s the traffic of the 
city. Then, another noise, less unbroken: the wind. It comes in gusts, but even 
during the pauses, one can hear it blow further away, against the skyscrapers.
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Then the other noises. Intermittent, a very brief and faint siren. Two short 
toots on a horn. A receding dull rumble, which suddenly gets closer, but is 
immediately struck out by an abrupt, dry, irritated gust.
It’s six o’ clock in the morning.
Another roar couples with the first, eclipses it. A muted blast, far-off.
Surging up as if from nowhere, the wind comes back, swells and seems to 
expand more and more, but at a point, unexpectedly, stops. Again, a hint of a 
tram. No, it’s not a tram, at last it becomes clear: it’s a car. This other...it 
could be a motorbike, but too soon it turns into another indistinguishable 
noise. A truck, another truck accelerating. Two or three cars passing: the 
roads around Central Park bend going uphill. A series of car roars, petering 
away quickly. A moment of absolute void, which is almost frightening. A big 
lorry, extremely close, as if we were on the second floor, while we are at the 
thirty-seventh. But it drops immediately. A screech: impossible to say what it 
is. A ship siren, protracted, hoarse. Apparently there is no wind anymore. The 
siren continues. The background noise, below the siren. A bell toll: it sounds 
wrong, as if it hadn’t come out well, clumsy. Maybe it’s not a bell, but a 
blow struck on iron. Another one. Enraged intrusion of a car engine speeding 
up, very brief. The siren continues in the distance. It’s emerging, just now, 
something like the echo of that metallic knock. But it must be something else. 
A very noisy lorry, seemingly driving up towards the window. But it’s an 
aeroplane. All the noises now intensify: the horns, the siren even, then 
descend little by little. It’s almost silence. But no: another roar, and then
19 Cf. Didier Anzieu’s expression “sonorous bath” or “sound-bath.” Didier Anzieu, “The Sound 
Envelope” [1976], in The Skin Ego [1985], trans. Chris Turner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989), 167.
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again, louder, the siren. Irritating yet suggestive: it makes one feel the 
horizon.
It’s quarter past six.20
Dated “New York, April 1961,” this “phonodiary” continues for several more 
paragraphs, its meticulously detailed chronicle punctuated here and there by the terse 
statement of the time, breaking the text into paragraphs.21 Covering a period of about 
three hours in the early morning, the text analyses the sounds of the quintessentially 
modern city: the rumble of rush-hour traffic resounding up to the thirty-seventh 
floor, the roar of aeroplanes cutting through the skyscrapers.
Antonioni’s verbal description may strike us as redundant at a time when 
portable recording technology was becoming increasingly available. Yet the careful 
attention to the diapason of city traffic displayed in this text is itself indicative of the 
growth of recording technologies throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
In other words, Antonioni’s subtle and punctilious account may be seen as the 
product of the very conditions which shape the experience of aurality in the 
“phonographic” age. Its enhanced discrimination of sounds denotes both a 
phonographic sensibility -  an aesthetic shaped by the existence of sound 
reproduction technology -  and a phonographic sensitivity -  an ear whose 
perceptiveness has been trained on the model of the heightened receptiveness of the 
machine. Antonioni’s focus is on the non- or extra-musical, on what Bela Balazs
20 Notes by Michelangelo Antonioni, dated New York, April 1961. Published in: Carlo di Carlo, 
“Antonioni,” in Carlo di Carlo, ed., Michelangelo Antonioni (Rome: Bianco e Nero, 1964), 29-31, 
footnote 11. Antonioni’s text has later been published under the title “From a Thirty-seventh Floor 
over Central Park: Soundtrack for a Film in New York” [1961], in the collection o f writings: 
Michelangelo Antonioni, That Bowling A lley Down the Tiber [1983], trans. William Arrowsmith 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
211 borrow the term from D ’Amato, “Antonioni: la poetica dei materiali,” 177, footnote 8 .
154
termed “the acoustic landscape in which we live,”22 and on what we could indeed 
describe as a typical “soundscape” of modernity. That is to say, Antonioni 
concentrates on that range of environmental sounds and noises that, having 
customarily come to provide the acoustic backdrop to everyday activities, often may 
go as unnoticed as to even pass for silence. His ear and pen, picking them up and 
transcribing them on paper, seem almost to imitate a recording machine: more 
sensitive yet, because automatic, unselective. “The phonograph,” Friedrich Kittler 
points out, “does not hear as do ears that have been trained immediately to filter 
voices, words, and sounds out of noise; it registers acoustic events as such.”23
The thought of Antonioni’s ear as phonographic brings to mind Benjamin’s 
famous contention that “the mode of human sense perception” changes throughout 
history together “with humanity’s entire mode of existence.” “The manner in which 
human sense perception is organized,” Benjamin suggests, “the medium in which it 
is accomplished, is determined not only by nature but by historical circumstances as 
well.”24 The development of representational technologies is for Benjamin, thinking 
in particular, in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” of 
photography and sound film -  high in the list of “historical circumstances” that 
contribute radically to re-organize sense perception in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.
Thomas Alva Edison, who, having invented the phonograph, also went on to 
develop cinematographic devices, including the kinetoscope and the kinetograph, is 
reported to have claimed:
22 Bela Balazs, Theory o f  the Film: Character and Growth o f  a New Art [1945], trans. from Hungarian 
edition of 1948 by Edith Bone (New York: Dover, 1970), 197.
23 Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, 23.
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In the year 1887, the idea occurred to me that it was possible to devise an 
instrument which should do for the eye what the phonograph does for the ear, 
and that by a combination of the two all motion and sound could be recorded 
and reproduced simultaneously.25
In spite of several trials, such as the production of a kinetophonograph, which should 
have synchronized sounds to moving images, the faithfulness and simultaneity of 
aural and visual recording and reproduction Edison hoped for did not happen quite as 
early. Audiences, as Vertov’s frustration reminds us, had to wait for another thirty 
years. Yet, if initially along separate lines, the diffusion of representational 
technologies has transformed the conditions of visuality and aurality from before, 
even, Edison’s statement, and -  as recent developments show -  continues to do so. 
These changes, reshaping the experience of the visual and the aural, promote a re­
organization of the very domain of the visible and the audible (of what, that is, is 
visibe and audible), and categories therein.
Just as Benjamin argued that, by revealing an “optical unconscious,” hitherto 
invisible aspects of reality, photography and cinema transfigure the field of the 
visible, so Jean Epstein and Balazs saluted sound technology in the cinema as that 
which would reveal a hitherto aural unconscious. Sound technology, Epstein mused, 
could disclose an “acoustic dimension which the ear itself had not been accustomed 
to hear before.”26
24 Walter Benjamin, “The Work o f Art in the A ge o f Mechanical Reproduction” [1936], in 
Illuminations, trans. Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999), 216.
25 W.K. L. Dickson and Antonia Dickson, History o f  the Kinetograph, Kinetoscope and Kineto- 
Phonograph [1895] (facsimile edition; New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2001), 4.
26 Walter Benjamin, “A Small History o f Photography” [1931], in One-Way Street and Other 
Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott (London: Verso, 2000), 243. Jean Epstein, “Le Gros plan du son,” 
in Ecrits sur le cinema 1921-1953, ed. Pierre Leprohon, 2 vols., vol. 2 : 1946-1953  (Paris: Seghers, 
1975), 107 (my translation).
156
“The Future of Music”
For Epstein, Balazs and, rather less emphatically, for Benjamin, the advent of cinema 
sound had momentous consequences for aurality. Allowing the pairing of the 
previously invisible to the previously inaudible, it seemed to promise a sizeable 
extension of both sensorial domains. But where cinema sound spurred increased 
attention to ordinary noises, to the previously unknown or unnoticed sounds of 
“things,” rather than those of musical instruments, the reconfiguration of the domain 
of sonority also largely took place from within music itself, the art of sounds par 
excellence. In addition to transforming the way in which music was produced and 
consumed, auditive technologies promoted a radical reconfiguration of the very 
categories of music, sound, noise and silence. In fact, they rendered these categories’ 
respective boundaries remarkably malleable.
The Futurist Luigi Russolo with his intonarumori, a machine “to tune” 
noises, is exemplary of this elasticization of acoustic categories. As his manifestos 
and essays on the “art of noises” show, music could be rejuvenated, in Russolo’s 
view, through the use of non-musical sounds. These would be the sounds of 
modernity itself: “the noises of trams, of automobile engines, of carriages and 
brawling crowds.”27 By “tuning” it, Russolo aimed to recuperate prosaic noise as 
music, re-defining both concepts in the process. The development of radio and 
cinema sound during the 1920s and 1930s further galvanised attempts to reform 
music through extra-musical sounds. After the war, these were rekindled and
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facilitated by the diffusion of portable magnetic tape recording. In France, the 
musique concrete movement, founded by Pierre Schaeffer in 1948, aimed to create 
musical arrangements out of environmental, “natural” sounds, rather than orthodox 
instruments, much along the line of the Italian Futurists a few decades earlier.
Thanks to portable recording technology (Schaeffer actually used phonographic 
equipment before switching to tape recorders), the sonority of the outside world 
could be brought “in,” and to music. Sounds such as those of the railway, that is, as 
in Schaeffer’s seminal work Etude aux chemins de fer (1948), could be “liberated” 
from their natural source and turned into manipulable “sound objects.”28 As with 
Russolo’s “tuning,” Schaeffer’s aim was not the straight importation of common 
noises into music: he did not want to make music noise, but to make noise music, 
using recording technology to transfigure mundane sounds. As Douglas Kahn 
reports, not only did Schaeffer repudiate his Etude “soon after completion because 
the train station sounds remained too recognizable,” he eventually came to reject the 
whole musique concrete enterprise, saying that it “assembled] sound...but not 
music.”29 Indeed, both Russolo’s and the musique concrete composers are part of 
what John Cage has pointedly described as the “tendency [running] through the 
whole twentieth-century, from the Futurists on, to use noises, anything that produced 
sound, as a musical instrument” -  of which, of course, Cage is himself a part.30
But whereas for Schaeffer, plain, unmanipulated prosaic sounds were still too 
prosaic to count as music, Cage went further. For he proposed to expand the category
27 Luigi Russolo, “The Art of Noises Futurist Manifesto” [1913], in The Art o f  Noises [1916], trans. 
Barclay Brown (New York: Pendragon Press, 1986), 25 (the original passage is in italics, which I 
have omitted).
28 Schaeffer’s Etude aux chemins d e fe r  is produced entirely by editing recordings o f railway trains. 
See Paul Griffiths, Modern Music: The Avant-Garde Since 1945  (London: J. M Dent and Sons, 1981), 
31-32.
29 Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat, 110. Kahn comments on, and quotes from an interview between Pierre 
Schaeffer and Tim Hodgkinson in Re Records Quarterly Magazine 2 (March 1987), 8.
30 Richard Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2003), 165.
of music to all sounds. “It wasn’t really a leap on my part,” Cage demurs “it was, 
rather, simply opening my ears to what was in the air.”31 On the one hand, this 
opening his ears “to what was in the air” meant becoming attuned to the artistic 
tendency of his century, following the direction in which the cultural wind blew: in 
short, make music out of noise. Yet, and with deeper implications, it also meant, 
quite literally, to tune in to “the air” surrounding him, and to all the sounds that may, 
or may not, be in it. Cage’s “delight”32 and pursuit of noises, in fact, is underscored 
by a more fundamental concern for silence: a concern that, far from being 
incompatible with attention to sound, is actually its premise. Because, for Cage, the 
more one listens in to silence, the more one hears it or, rather, realizes that she or he 
does not, and cannot, quite hear it.
Cage’s firm stance on silence, in fact, is that, in absolute terms, it does not 
exist. His most reported -  by himself no less than others -  pronouncement on the 
matter argues the point by narrating his experience of entering an anechoic chamber:
There is no such thing as an empty space or an empty time. There is always 
something to see, something to hear. In fact, try as we may to make a silence, 
we cannot. For certain engineering purposes, it is desirable to have as silent a 
situation as possible. Such a room is called an anechoic chamber, its six walls 
made of special material, a room without echoes. I entered one at Harvard 
University several years ago and heard two sounds, one high and one low. 
When I described them to the engineer in charge, he informed me that the 
high one was my nervous system in operation, the low one my blood in
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circulation. Until I die there will be sounds. And they will continue after my 
death. One need not fear about the future of music.33
As becomes clear from later explanations, the point of this anecdote is not so 
much that the body produces sounds by virtue of being alive. Rather, for Cage, the 
body in this respect is like the rest of matter: in a state of constant vibration and 
process, which, given the suitable techniques and technologies, we can be made to 
hear:
Look at this ashtray: it’s in a state of vibration. We’re sure of that, and the 
physicist can prove it to us. But we can’t hear those vibrations. When I went 
into the anechoic chamber I could hear myself. Well, now, instead of 
listening to myself, I want to listen to this ashtray. But I won’t strike it as I 
would a percussion instrument. I’m going to listen to its inner life thanks to a 
suitable technology....34
The Futurists and the musique concrete composers, among others, had tried 
to import non-musical sounds into music. More radically, and from the premise that 
everything -  even what one would commonly think of as silence -  is sound, Cage 
advocates the equation of music with sound. “One need not fear about the future of 
music,” because, always (“until I die” and “after my death”), “there will be 
sounds.”35 He propounds that the “future of music” lies in stretching the category to 
the point that there is nothing that is outside of it: “the entire field of sound” (which
33 John Cage, “Experimental Music” [1957], in Cage, Silence, 8.
34 John Cage, For the Birds: In Conversation with Daniel Charles [1976] (Boston: Maryon Boyars, 
1981), 196.
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includes the sonority of silence), just by existing, is music. For Cage, that is, the 
avant-garde tradition of noise in music to which he attunes himself bears the seeds 
for the annihilation of the very category, suggesting the possibility of substituting the 
term “music” itself with “a more meaningful term: organization of sound.”36
Cage’s explanation that he won’t “strike” the ashtray, but “listen” to it with 
“a suitable technology,” just as the technology of the anechoic chamber had enabled 
him to listen to his own body, brings into relief an important aspect in Cage’s 
practice, and its rootedness in twentieth-century sonority. Indeed, it demonstrates the 
role sound technologies play in constructing, as well as disclosing, new aspects of 
aurality in modernity, providing the means with which to detect and create new 
sounds, including those of silence. For the ear Cage opened to the air was, indeed, 
not only often aided by technology, but also, like Antonioni’s ear in New York, 
already in itself phonographic.
The acoustic landscapes, the noises of everyday objects, the sounds big and 
small that Cage tunes in to are not only those of his historical moment. They are also 
those which the very technology of the historical moment attunes him to, providing 
the means for their pursuit, revelation, “organization], edit[ing]” (as Vertov would 
say) and, even, their moulding, transfiguration and generation. “The magnetic plate 
of tape,” argues Cage, has “handed to us” a whole new range of sounds, “in any 
combination and any continuity issuing from any point in space in any 
transformation.”37 Therefore “current musical activities,” or what we have seen he 
may opt to call the “organization of sounds,” can consist of no other than 
“discovering and acting upon these new...resources” with these new technologies
35 John Cage, “The Future o f Music: Credo” [1958], in Cage, Silence, 8. A first version o f this was 
delivered as a paper in 1937.
36 Ibid., 4.
37 John Cage, “Erik Satie” [1958], in Cage, Silence, 77.
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themselves.38 For Cage that is, as he had already explained in 1937, “the future of 
music” needs to be pursued with “twentieth-century means”: “oscillators, turntables, 
generators... film phonographs,” microphones, receivers, etc., as these technologies 
themselves are that which puts new sounds into the air.39
Cage was excited about the opportunities afforded by tape recording, not only 
because “the sound materials available now through magnetic tape are virtually 
unlimited,” but also because, as he said to an audience of “creative” film-makers in 
1956, “anything can be done.”40 The thought that “[w]ith magnetic tape, the 
possibility exists to use the literature of music as material (cutting it up, transforming 
it, etc.); this is the best thing that could have happened to it.”41 Provocatively 
irreverent, Cage shows admiration for the innovative potential offered by magnetic 
tape, which allows the manipulation and recycling of past music as “material” to be 
cut up and spliced elsewhere. In his pursuit of impermanence and chance, Cage 
appreciated the extreme ease with which tape could be edited, and used to produce 
stochastic “DIY” sound collages and arrangements -  as in his minutely spliced 
Williams Mix (1952).42 There is a touch of irony in the fact that, “fighting [...] the 
notion of art itself as something that we preserve,” and “promoting,” instead, “the 
notion of impermanen[ce],” Cage saw magnetic recording as an important ally 43 
But, in fact, he saw it as a means of storing something which was less permanent
38 Ibid.
39 Cage, “The Future o f M usic,” 5-6.
40 John Cage, “On Film” [1956], in Richard Kostelanetz, ed., John Cage (London: Allen Lane, 1971), 
115. The speech was delivered to the Creative Film Foundation in New York City, 6 April 1956.
41 Ibid.
42 Cage describes the laborious process o f physically making the piece by splicing tiny segments of 
magnetic tape in Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 168-170. See also: James Pritchett, The Music 
o f  John Cage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 90-91.
43 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 230.
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than written notation: just like “sand painting,” “work with magnetic wires [...] can 
quickly and easily be erased, rubbed off.”44
In the course of the 1950s and 1960s, Cage’s enthusiasm was shared by a 
number of other people, and not only musicians or artists, like the musique concrete 
composers, William Burroughs, Antonin Artaud, Yoko Ono, but also laypersons and 
amateurs. Walter Murch, the cinema sound designer who produced, among others, 
the soundtrack for that self-reflexive investigation of sound technologies which is 
Coppolas’s The Conversation (1974), recalls how, when he was a little boy in the 
early 1950s, magnetic tape fired his imagination. Before managing to convince his 
parents to buy him his own tape recorder for Christmas, he would regularly -  with a 
variety of excuses -  call round at a neighbour, who owned one, just in the off-chance 
that he may
be allowed to play with that miraculous machine: hanging the microphone 
out of the window and capturing the back-alley reverberations of Manhattan, 
Scotchtaping it to the shaft of a swing-arm lamp and rapping the bell-shaped 
shade with pencils, inserting it into one end of the vacuum cleaner tube.. .45
Indeed, together with Cage and Schaeffer, the ten-year-old Murch “capturing the 
back-alley reverberations of Manhattan,” is part of the immediate historical and 
cultural background to Antonioni’s own record of New York noises. In its attention
44 John Cage, “Forerunners o f Modern M usic” [1949], in Cage, Silence, 65.
45 Walter Murch, “Preface” to Michel Chion, Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen [1990], trans. Claudia 
Gorbman (New York; Columbia University Press, 1994), xiii. Indeed, in this preface to the English 
translation o f Chion’s book, Murch tells o f his early interest for musique concrete, noting the porosity 
between this and the field of cinema sound effects, xiii-xv. Chion is in his turn a musique concrete 
artist who has composed for film, as well as directing shorts and writing extensively on sound and 
cinema. See also: Michel Chion, The Voice in Cinema [1982], trans. Claudia Gorbman (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999).
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to environmental -  and, more specifically, urban -  sounds, Antonioni’s verbal 
account of an early morning in Manhattan speaks of the impact of magnetic tape 
recording, and of the heterogeneous flurry of experiments it encouraged, at least as 
much as it evokes the actual noises therein described.
Written shortly after the release of La notte (1961), Antonioni’s text on urban 
noise marks an acoustic turning point in his cinema. In fact, it signals a moment 
when, paradoxically, Antonioni’s films become more silent. From L ’avventura 
(1960) onwards, there is a progressive diminution in the overall use of music in his 
films, as Giuseppe D’Amato’s diagram illustrates (ill. 18, p. 346). While Red Desert 
(1964) marks a peak -  also because of the highly experimental character of the little 
music that is used -  the films which follow, though not included in this graph, 
continue this trend, with the exception of the sui generis Zabriskie Point (1970).46 
The diagram also throws into relief Antonioni’s penchant, present early on in his 
career, for integrating the music within the narration. Rather than an external 
commentary to the story, Antonioni prefers the music to be part of the story, with its 
source (a radio, a record player, a live performance) in the diegetic space of the film. 
As he suggested in the course of an interview in 1965, he had actually “always been 
opposed to the ‘musical comment’ in the conventional sense, to the soporific 
function which is usually assigned to it.” “It’s the idea of ‘setting images to music’ 
that I don’t like,” he continues:
as if a film were an opera libretto. It’s something I reject, this urge to deny
room to silence, to fill up alleged voids. It’s a necessity born with silent
46 In its choice o f contemporary pop music (though specifically commissioned), as opposed to a more 
conventionally cinematic “mood” or “themed” soundtrack, Zabriskie Point anticipates a tendency that 
will take root in cinema during the 1970s. (Antonioni had already introduced some pop music,
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cinema, when the piano was used to cover the cranking noise of the projector, 
to create an atmosphere. All in all since then we’ve progressed very little.”47
In the earlier films, up to II grido (The Cry, 1957), the music tended to be made 
up of more conventionally melodic “mood” tracks -  mostly composed by Giovanni 
Fusco, whose collaborations with Antonioni dated back to the director’s 
documentaries of the late 1940s. In the subsequent films, by contrast, the musical 
soundtrack changes in two ways. Not only is there a radical diminution of the 
amount of extra-diegetic music but also the character and density of the music that 
does remain is drastically different. It becomes more and more experimental, atonal, 
fragmentary, and certainly is not allowed to blossom into a musical “theme” for the 
narratives or the characters. With L ’avventura, the contributions of Fusco -  whose 
style, very different from that of the earlier films, testifies to the composer’s 
flexibility -  enter a descending curve, both in terms of “internal” volume and screen 
presence. On the one hand, as the number and range of instruments is gradually 
reduced (up to the unaccompanied singing voice of Red Desert), the pieces become 
more rarefied and economical, more like disarticulated and disjointed sounds which 
are not allowed to coalesce into a melody. On the other, the proportion, in minutes, 
of the total soundtrack they are allowed to take up is sizeably decreased, as 
Antonioni also introduces music by other composers. So, for example, there is the 
jazz of Giorgio Gaslini’s quartet in La notte, which, performed diegetically, provides
diegetically, in Blow-up.) See: Alberto Boschi, “ ‘La musica che meglio si adatta alle immagini’: 
suoni e rumori nel cinema di Antonioni,” in Le sonorita del visibile, 87.
47 Pierre Billard, “L’idea mi viene attraverso le immagini” [interview with Antonioni; 1965], in 
Antonioni, Fare un film  e p er  me vivere, 134.
47 For an in-depth analysis o f Fusco’s career overall, see: Roberto Calabretto, “Giovanni Fusco: 
musicista per il cinema di Antonioni,” in Le sonorita del visibile.
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the totality of the music in this film, or the sparse, and very avant-garde for the time, 
electronic montages of Vittorio Gelmetti in Red Desert.4*
The technological manipulation of “natural” sounds (as in musique concrete), 
if not, even, the creation of new, “artificial” sounds out of the technologies 
themselves (as in electronic music), may certainly have influenced the radical change 
of music style in Antonioni’s films of the 1960s. Yet it is not only -  or in fact, not 
primarily -  in the musical soundtrack as such that Antonioni’s receptivity to the 
experiments transfiguring the category of “music” is shown. For the drastic decrease 
in the overall amount of music, and in the quantity and the harmony of the extra- 
diegetic tunes in particular, is matched, as critics have noted, by a concomitant 
“valorization of the sonorous environment,” in which the narrative action takes 
place.49 It is mainly here, in Antonioni’s attention to soundscape, that the period’s 
remapping of acoustic categories is manifested. The progressive introduction of 
quotidian sonorities into music at large may be what promoted the disintegration of 
the music in his cinema. Somewhat paradoxically, the mark of Antonioni’s interest -  
if not engagement -  in the contemporary debates reconfiguring the field of music 
may lie in his decision to suppress the musical soundtrack in favour of an intensified 
rendition of the aural dimension of a given location or situation. After all, as Cage 
had noted, this gradual expansion into noise of the musical diapason suggested the 
possibility of equating music itself to “the entire field of sound,” of which the 
composer would become the organizer.50 From this perspective, the figures of 
musician and cinema-sound designer start to resemble one another...
48 In fact, Fusco’s part for Red D esert's  solo voice can also somewhat be seen as the com poser’s swan 
song to Antonioni’s cinema, marking the end o f his collaboration with the director.
49 Boschi, “ ‘La musica che m eglio si adatta alle immagini,’”87.
50 Cage, “The Future of Music,” 4-5.
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Interviewed in 1960, Antonioni said he dreamt of “using only a soundtrack of 
noises” in his films. However, as he quickly pointed out, this seemed destined to 
remain a dream as -  inevitably -  he would have to reach a compromise with the 
divergent opinion of his producers, unwilling to back a film completely without 
music.51 The rarefaction of the music in L ’avventura is counterbalanced by the 
striking acoustics of environmental sounds in the film -  such as those of the sea and 
wind in the sequences shot in the Eolian Islands, off Sicily. And of course, for these, 
unlike Vertov, Antonioni had available portable magnetic-recording equipment, a 
selection of sensitive microphones and amplifiers, as well as the possibility to 
“organize, edit” as he pleased. In a 1960 interview, he enthusiastically explains how 
for the marine sequences:
I got the sound engineers to record a huge quantity of sound effects: every 
possible type of sea, from smooth to choppy to very rough, the rumble of the 
waves as they break against the rocks, and so on. I had at my disposal over a 
hundred reels, only for the sound effects. Then I selected those that now 
constitute the soundtrack of the film. To me, this is the music that best fits the 
images. It’s rare for music to really fuse with the images, generally it is used 
to stupefy the spectator, to obfuscate the sharpness of his vision. [...]
The ideal would be to compose, exclusively with noises, a beautiful 
soundtrack, and to get an orchestra director to conduct it.... Even though, 
perhaps, in the end the only one able to conduct it would be the director 
himself.52
51 “Questions a Antonioni,” P ositif 30 (July 1959), 7-10. 10 cited (my translation).
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It certainly testifies to the porosity between the sonic and the visual arts and 
media in the twentieth century that, more or less at the same time in which Antonioni 
jokingly fancied himself as a “musician,” Cage was trying himself out as a sound- 
effects engineer. Less than a year before Antonioni, selecting tape recordings of the 
Sicilian sea, got down to composing his symphony of noises, Cage too was absorbed 
by aquatic sounds and tapes. In fact, between 1958 and 1959, at the end of his fourth 
European “grand tour,” Cage was in Milan, spending a few months at the studio 
which the Italian experimental musicians Luciano Berio and Bruno Maderna had set 
up at a local radio station in 1955. The Studio di Fonologia aimed to fuse the 
compositional tenets of the musique-concrete group, which favoured recorded 
natural sounds, with those of the electronic music laboratory of Herbert Eimert and 
Karlheinz Stockhausen, whose initial idea was to create sounds exclusively through 
recording technology itself.53 What is more curious, however, is that Cage 
performed some of the pieces he produced during this sojourn in an unlikely, yet 
hugely popular, venue. Bizarrely, for five weeks Cage participated in the television 
quiz-show Lascia o Raddoppia -a  not-to-be-missed weekly appointment for millions 
of Italians throughout the 1950s and 1960s, whose host, now in his eighties, has been 
conducting variations of it ever since -  as a mushroom expert (winning a jackpot of 
$ 6,000!).54 In the course of the show, in addition to the older Amores (1943), Cage 
premiered Water Walk and Sounds of Venice (both 1959), which included material 
from Fontana Mix (1958), a work based on chance cutting and editing of magnetic
52 Andre S. Labarthe, “A ll’origine del cinema c ’e una scelta” [interview with Antonioni; 1960], in 
Antonioni, Fare un film , 127.
53 On Cage in Europe, and on his relation to Europe, see Christopher Shultis, “Cage and Europe,” in 
David Nicholls, ed., The Cambridge Companion to John Cage (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). On the experimental laboratories o f Berio, Maderna and Stockhousen, see e.g. Chanan, 
Repeated Takes, 142.
54 Kostelanetz, John Cage, 39-40. For discussions of Italian television broadcasting and the popularity 
o f Lascia o Raddoppia, see: David Forgacs, Italian Culture in the Industrial Era 1880-1980: Cultural 
Industries, Politics and the Public (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), esp. 24 and 126.
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tape recordings he produced at the Studio di Fonologia. Water Walk and Sounds of 
Venice involved playing single-track magnetic tapes, and producing sounds with an 
array of objects relating, respectively, to water in general, and to the peculiarly 
aquatic dimension of Venice’s sonorous landscape, (ill. 19, p. 347).55
Moving in intellectual and artistic milieux, and being particularly attracted to 
and knowledgeable about the anglophone arts circuit in particular, Antonioni 
certainly did not need to hear, or hear about, Cage’s performances at Lascia o 
Raddoppia in order to be introduced to the experimentations of the American 
composer.56 If an echo of Cage’s ideas may have already been present in Antonioni’s 
earlier films, Cage’s strategies to make objects “speak”, in their turn, owe something 
to cinema itself. Amidst his idiosyncratic concoction of objects for the premiere of 
Water Walk, Cage looks a bit like a Foley artist performing sound effects for an 
invisible, or non-existent, film.57 And, indeed, in his “Credo” on “The Future of 
Music” Cage praises the film phonograph for the control it affords over sounds’ 
amplitude, frequency and rhythm. “Given four film phonographs,” he writes there, 
“we can compose and perform a quartet for explosive motor, wind, heartbeat and 
landslide.”58 As Cage elsewhere recalls, he was in fact led to percussion via a 
seminal meeting with Oskar Fischinger, who, in the 1930s, was experimenting with
55 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 113-114. See also: Andre Chaudron, “John Cage Database”: 
<http://vvwvv.johncage.info/vvorkscage/fontana.html :>  
<http://www.johncage.info/workscage/soundsvenice.html:>
<http://www.johncage.info/vvorkscage/vvaterwalk.html> Accessed 18 November 2004.
56 As I have mentioned in the Introduction, Antonioni followed the American art scene. See e.g. 
Seymour Chatman, Antonioni, or The Surface o f  the World (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 
1985), esp. 54; Jean-Luc Godard, “La notte, L ’ec lisse...V aurora” [interview with Antonioni, 1964] 
and Giorgio Tinazzi, “L’esperienza americana” [interview with Antonioni; 1969], both in Antonioni, 
Fare un film  e per me vivere, esp. 259 and 278-79 respectively. Furthermore, both Gelmetti and 
Antonioni had links with the circuit o f Italian experimental cinema, with which Cage himself was 
briefly involved. See: Bruno di Marino, Sguardo inconscio azione: cinema sperimentale e 
underground a Roma 1965-75  (Rome: Lithos, 1999), esp. 35 and 48.
57 Cinema composer Franco Mannino, in Visconti e la musica (Lucca: Akademos and Lim, 1994), 
recounts how Cage good-humouredly accepted Mannino’s remark that musique concrete had not been 
“invented” by experimental musicians like Cage himself, but cinema sound-effects technicians and 
composers, 5.
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the graphic notation of sounds on film, and talked to him of releasing the (sonorous) 
“spirit” inside objects.59 In what we may call the Cagean traits of Antonioni’s take on 
sonority, it is less a matter of Cage the individual artist than of the wider cultural and 
artistic movement he stands for. As the self-effacing Cage describes his actual 
listening to “air,” and sounds thereof, as simply being receptive to contemporary 
trends, so an Antonioni-Cage nexus needs to be considered in the historical 
exchanges between the sonic and the visual arts during the period.60 This 
notwithstanding, it is tantalizing to note that Cage’s echo gets significantly louder 
just after the composer’s stay in Italy, when, in fact, Antonioni’s cinema, with the 
acoustic turning point of L ’avventura, becomes more silent. It is with this film that, 
overall volume and internal density of the musical accompaniment drastically 
reduced, Antonioni starts to focus on the narrative “soundscapes,” strikingly also 
giving “room to silence.”61 This “silence,” however, his cinematic work discovers 
and reveals as already full of sonority, since silences, for Antonioni, as for Cage, are 
“voids” only “alleged[ly].”62
58 Cage, “The Future of Music,” 3.
59 “When I was introduced to him,” Cage explains, “he began to talk with me about the spirit which is 
inside each of the objects o f this world. So, he told me, all we need to do to liberate that spirit is to 
brush past the object, and to draw forth its sound. That’s the idea which lead me to percussion. In all 
the many years that followed up to the war, I never stopped touching things, making them sound and 
resound, to discover what sound they could produce. Wherever I went, I always listened to objects.” 
Cage, For the Birds, 73-74. This is discussed by Kahn, in Noise, Water, M eat, 196-197.
60 For a history of sound in twentieth-century arts, see the already cited: Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat, 
and Kahn and Whitehead, Wireless Imagination: Sound, Radio and the Avant-Garde. See also Shaw- 
Milller, Visible D eeds o f  Music. For analyses o f the relation between cinema and sound, see, among 
others: Weis and Belton, Film Sound: Theory and Practice; Rick Altman, ed., Sound Theory/Sound 
Practice (London: Routledge, 1992); Chion, The Voice in the Cinema', Chion, Audio Vision', James 
Lastra, Sound Technology and the American Cinema: Perception, Representation, M odernity (New  
York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Paola Valentini, “La ricezione della rivoluzione sonora in 
Italia,” Bianco e Nero 62 (May/June 2001), 5-17.
61 Pierre Billard, “L’idea mi viene attraverso le immagini” [interview with Antonioni; 1965], 134.
Sonic immersions
We have seen how, for Cage, “there is no such thing as an absolute silence.”63 Since 
matter is in a process of continuous vibration, for Cage any situation normally 
thought of as “silent” is always already full of sonority. But the sounds of silence, 
for Cage, are not just the humanly imperceptible or the barely audible, like the voice 
of the ashtray, the buzzing of the nervous system or the beat of circulating blood. 
The sonority of silence is also composed of perfectly audible, loud or soft sounds, 
which, however, because they have become banal and everyday, we do not notice 
any more. “Water,” Cage has commented on the pieces he presented at Lascia o 
Raddoppia, “was a useful thing to concentrate on,” precisely because of its 
“banal[ity].5,64 Indeed, these performances put into relief Cage’s interest in ordinary 
sonority, in all those sounds which one may even not hear any more and hence pass 
as “silence”: environmental noises, produced by everyday, modern, objects (an 
electric mixer, a pressure cooker, radios, boat horns, etc.). “Silence,” he argues:
is all of the sound we don’t intend. [...] Therefore silence may well include 
loud sounds and more and more in the twentieth century does. The sounds of 
jet planes, of sirens, et cetera.65
For Cage, that is, from the heartbeat to the jet plane, our exposure to sound is 
unavoidable. But where we are “open” to it because of our very own physiology -  
the body cannot block it out -  our exposure is also greater in modernity, where 
sounds are simply, in Cage’s view, more abundant and louder.
62 Ibid.
63 Michael Zwerin, “A Lethal Measurement” [interview with Cage; 1966] in Kostelanetz, John Cage, 
166.
64 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 113.
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For all his attempts to prove that silence does not exist, to make us “listen to 
[the] inner life” of “the ashtray,” Cage relies not only on cultural and technological 
amplification of apparent silences, but also, paradoxically, on a concomitant form of 
silence itself. The complementary flipside of Cagean amplifications, as Douglas 
Kahn has noted, is “silencing.”66 The most clamorous demonstration of this is 
Cage’s famous 4 ’33”, also known as silent piece. When it was premiered in 1952 in 
New York, David Tudor, the performer, came on stage and sat at the piano without 
playing, timing himself with a watch for the duration of four minutes and thirty-three 
seconds. Here, the resulting cultural amplification of the silence of the audience, 
revealing its sonority - coughs, laughs, shuffles, mutters, etc. -  is dependent on the 
silencing of the musician.67
It is a similar operation that, in many respects, is at work in Antonioni’s films 
from L’avventura onwards. As with Cage, with Antonioni, too, making silence, or 
the otherwise imperceptible or neglected sounds of silence audible, is not simply a 
matter of listening to “what [is] in the air,” but relies, in its turn, on selective 
silencing as well as amplification.68 A certain type of silence becomes sonorous 
because something is being abated while something else is boosted. The partial 
silencing of the musical soundtrack -  and, often, of the actors’ dialogues -  is a 
prerequisite for the valorization of the sonic landscape, indeed, for the sonorization 
of its silence, whether absolute silence is considered an actual possibility or not. As 
with the silencing of the musician in silent piece, Antonioni’s abatement is already a 
form of cultural amplification. It stakes out a zone for the audience to prick up their 
ears and tune in to: anything within that zone will be not simply heard, but listened
65Zwerin, “A Lethal Measurement,” 166.
66 For this discussion see: Kahn, “Noise, Water, Meat, chapter 6 on “John Cage: Silence and 
Silencing.”
67 Ibid., 161.
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to. Unlike Cage, it is neither, self-reflexively, the sonorous silence of the cinema 
audience Antonioni wants to attract attention to, nor the cranking of the projector, 
but the acoustic landscape of the cinematic narrative -  whose sounds, noises and 
silences are henceforth valorized. It is here, in this carefully demarcated and 
culturally amplified cinematic zone, that -  as it does for Cage -  technology also 
comes to the aid of Antonioni.
Like the camera eye, the ear of the phonograph (and of its re-incarnations in 
subsequent sound recording machines) is seen to imitate, and often surpass, the 
ability of the human organ. The history of technology is dotted with comparisons to 
the human senses and faculties, with the machines variously being presented as 
inferior copies, enhancing prostheses, or even superior models of their human 
counterparts.69 Whether enthusiastic or critical, the comparison usually hinges on 
what are taken to be the distinctive traits of the mechanical: unselective automation 
and sensitivity. Phonography, and sound recording and/or reproduction technologies 
more widely, including telephony and radiophony, are no exception.70 In fact, the 
dynamics of these comparisons are effectively illuminated by the inventor of the 
phonograph himself, Edison, when he reverses the ear metaphor from the
68 Kostelanetz, Conversing with Cage, 165.
69 Just two examples among many could be: Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents”
[1930], in The Standard Edition o f  the Complete Psychological Works o f  Sigmund Freud, trans. James 
Strachey, 24 vols., vol. 21 (London: Vintage, 2001), and Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: 
The Extensions o f  Man (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964). Freud famously suggests that 
technological inventions, from “the photographic camera” to “the gramophone disc” are like 
“auxiliary organs,” thanks to which “man has, as it were, become like a kind o f prosthetic God.” 
“[B]ut those organs have not grown on him and still give him much trouble at times” (91-92). For a 
discussion of technology as prosthesis, see: Tim Armstrong, Modernsim, Technology and the Body: A 
Cultural Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp. chapter 3.
70 A s Jonathan Sterne observes, even though sound recording and/or reproduction apparatuses, from 
the phonograph to the telephone and radio, may often be thought o f as “talking” -  and indeed the 
phonograph was referred to as such when it first appeared -  they actually are “hearing machines.” 
The model on which they still function (through microphones and amplifiers), and on which the first 
prototypes were built, is the human ear and its tympanic function. The forerunner of the phonograph, 
Alexander Graham B ell’s and Clarence Blake’s phonoautograph (1874), was actually constructed 
with an excised human ear. See: Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past: Cultural Origins o f  Sound
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phonograph back to his own, partially deaf, ears. “I am like a phonograph,” he 
explains:
My ears, being a little deaf, seem to catch all the useless noises more readily 
than the musical tones, just as the phonograph exaggerates all the faults of a 
singer.... From a mechanical point of view, music is in pretty bad shape.71
Here, with an evocative inversion, Edison likens his own (impaired) human 
ears to the mechanical sensitivity of the phonographic apparatus, which 
automatically records and amplifies anything, anywhere, without discrimination 
between “music” and “noise,” intentional or unintentional, significant or 
insignificant sounds. Paradoxically, it is by virtue of being faulty that the human 
faculty is able to catch up with the machine. And it is precisely this enhanced 
sensitivity and indiscriminate automatism of the mechanical -  from whose point of 
view, as Edison argued, music, or all that is intentional and meaningful sound, “is in 
pretty bad shape” -  that Antonioni appreciates in sound technology:
Most professional microphones are much more sensitive than the human ear, 
and often a soundtrack obtained through direct recording is enriched by 
thousands of unforeseen noises and sounds.72
Writing at about the same time, in 1964, he praises these same qualities in 
visual technology too, enthusing that perhaps, on exposure, “film stock registers
Reproduction  (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), esp. chapter 1. See also: Chanan, Repeated  
Takes.
71 Quoted in Lastra, Sound Technology and the American Cinema, 87, from: Paul J. Morris, “Making 
Music More Musical,” Musician 21 (1916).
everything...like an American military device of recent invention,” and that “only 
our technological backwardness prevents us from revealing all that is [imprinted] on 
the film frame.”73 As camera technology transforms visuality by initiating us into 
what Benjamin called the “optical unconscious,” so sound technologies transfigure 
aurality by rendering audible usually unnoticed or imperceptible sonorities, and by 
giving a voice to silence, whether mute, whispering, or loud. The means by which 
they can make audible the previously inaudible is not simply amplification, but, 
crucially, the capacity for collecting and storing sounds. Indeed, the clear advantage 
of technology over the human ear (even the phonographic one Antonioni displays in 
his account of New York’s acoustic landscape) is that technology can store the 
audible, so that it does not simply, irretrievably -  as Vertov said -  “rush past, like 
time.”74 Sounds, Antonioni emphasizes, are “collected by the microphone.”75 The 
“thousands of unforeseen noises and sounds” by which direct recording is 
“enriched,” are not so much heard during the act itself, as noticed afterwards, on 
playback. In fact, it is in post-production that they become particularly precious. For 
then it becomes evident just how crucial to the sonority of a given situation are all 
those sounds that, normally unnoticed, may even be considered below the threshold 
of the audible. Paradoxically, as Antonioni suggests, it may largely be on these that a 
soundscape’s constitutive traits, its distinctive “features,” depend:
72 Billard, “L’idea mi viene attraverso le immagini,” 132.
73 Michelangelo Antonioni, Sei film  (Torino: Einaudi, 1964), xiv.
74 Vertov, “The Birth of Kino-Eye,” 40.
75 Billard, “L’idea mi viene attraverso le immagini,” 132-133. The microphone was at the outset called 
“pick-up.” See: Chanan, Repeated Takes, 67.
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When I can I prefer direct recording. Sounds, noises and natural voices 
collected by the microphone have a power of suggestion which is not 
possible to obtain with post-synchronization.76
Yet, just as the frustrated Vertov valued “editing” and “organizing” on the 
same level as “recording,” so Antonioni’s cinematic rendering of the “audible world” 
does not entail a naturalistic aesthetic. When, in the course of the 1960s, Antonioni 
increasingly tunes in to the acoustic landscape, preferring, as he says, direct 
recording where possible, he does not perceive this as incompatible with making full 
use of the possibilities for manipulation and transfiguration offered by the 
technology. In the same paragraph, in fact, he adds:
I believe that sometimes the transformation of a noise or a sound is 
indispensable in order to obtain specific effects. In the same way, in some 
cases it is necessary to alter the human voice.77
The transformation of noises and the alteration of the human voice through 
technology are not, for Antonioni, at odds with his aim to express “the reality of our 
time” in his films.78 This is partly because, as Benjamin argues, technology is itself 
already part of our modern reality, whose experience is not only transformed by 
technology but also formed through it.79 The means for representing an acoustic or 
visual experience are themselves (part of) the experience, to the point that, like 
Antonioni in his New York text, we may perceive sounds, noises, or indeed the
76 Billard, “L’idea mi viene attraverso le immagini,” 132-133.
77 Ibid.
78 Antonioni, “II deserto rosso,” 251.
79 Benjamin, “The Work o f Art in the A ge o f Mechanical Reproduction,” 216.
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sonority of silence, somewhat phonographically. Indeed, just as photography might 
have made us see photographically, and cinema “cinematized” our vision, so our 
hearing might have been “transformed” by sound technology.
In Red Desert, Antonioni offers an extreme example of this in the character 
of the neurotic Giuliana, all of whose senses have been profoundly affected by the 
mechanization of reality. It is precisely this that has caused her condition, 
constituting her -  all too real -  “nightmare.” For, as an early scene concisely 
suggests, the nightmare that disturbs her sleep turns out to have a physical cause in 
reality. Her bad dream, in fact, is provoked by her son’s toy-robot moving back and 
forth in the adjacent room, hitting the wall repeatedly. Meanwhile, from the 
uncoordinated dangling of her arms when she runs, to the lifeless slumping pose to 
which she abandons herself when sitting, Giuliana herself behaves remarkably like 
an automaton. But what is particularly of interest in this context is that she has 
almost herself become a sound recording machine. Similarly to Edison, whose 
partially deaf ears unselectively catch all the white noise spoiling a music recording, 
she seems to pick up sounds other people do not hear -  perhaps vibrations of matter, 
collisions of particles in the airwaves. Presented as disturbances to a meaningful 
acoustic environment (i.e. conversation, humanly perceptible landscape noises), 
these are the sounds for which Antonioni employed Gelmetti’s electronic music. 
“The sonic impressions perceived by Giuliana,” explains Antonioni, “correspond” to 
the technological “transfiguration of real noises” we find in electronic music.80 
Giuliana’s hearing, in a way, is homologous with the way in which technology 
records and transforms sounds.
80 Antonioni, “II deserto rosso,” 253.
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Whilst reaching a turning point with L ’avventura, Antonioni’s attention to 
environmental sonority is enhanced and radicalized in La notte (1961). In this film 
Antonioni even introduces a self-reflexive commentary on the capture of 
“soundscape” through technology, by having one of the characters, Valentina, 
produce an aural equivalent of his text on New York noises. At one point in the film, 
in fact, we are made to listen to an extract of the diary of sounds, the “phonodiary,” 
Valentina keeps on her magnetic tape recorder.81 A sequence shows her dragging her 
portable -  yet not quite so portable -  tape recorder into the middle of the room. As 
she switches it on, we hear her recorded voice, describing what she herself defines as 
the “sonic landscape” around her:
Today, from the living room, I heard snatches of dialogue of a film shown on 
television. “Follow that car!”, “Some more whiskey?”, “If I were you, Jim, I 
wouldn’t do it.” After this line... the howling of a dog: sustained, sincere, 
perfect. It rose and then fizzled out, its sound tracing a trajectory of pain into 
the air.... Then, at first I thought I’d heard an aeroplane...but it was silence. 
And I was very happy about it. The park is full of silence made of noises. If 
you press your ear against a tree, and stay like this for a while, eventually you 
hear a noise. Maybe it depends on us, but I prefer to think that it’s the tree.... 
Then, in that silence, all in a sudden, some strange bangs, disturbing the sonic 
landscape around me.82
At first, it may strike us as odd that Valentina should decide to produce an a- 
posteriori monologue describing her surrounding soundscape, rather than
81 See: D ’Amato, “Antonioni: la poeticadei materiali,” 177.
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reproducing the sounds themselves as they happen. Though the relative bulkiness of 
the recorder, and the limited sensitivity of the microphone, may serve as partial 
explanations, both the narrative and the meta-narrative motivation for this choice 
become clearer as her recorded account progresses:
.. .1 didn’t want to hear them. I shut the window but the noise persisted, 
driving me mad. I wouldn’t want to hear useless sounds, I’d like to be able to 
select them throughout the day...and to select voices and words.... Oh, so 
many words I’d rather not listen to.. .but you can’t avoid them, you’re 
subjected to them and can only try to endure them, like you ride the waves 
you’re exposed to when you float in the sea..
While putting in the frame the portable tape recorder, Antonioni does not seem too 
concerned to show off its conquest of the outdoors. This happens, for example, in the 
contemporary La dolce vita (1960), where the guests at the party of the intellectual 
and socialite Steiner are entertained and fascinated by a recording of outdoor natural 
sounds (birds, water, wind) played off a visibly displayed machine. Rather,
Antonioni uses Valentina’s recorded monologue to embed within the cinematic 
narrative a “manifesto” of the acoustic strategy adopted in the film as a whole, and, 
indeed, in his films of the period.
Angela Dalle Vacche, discussing the use of colour in Red Desert, has talked 
of Antonioni’s “visual ventriloquism.” She coins the expression on the basis of Pier 
Paolo Pasolini’s interpretation of the “look” of the film as portraying Giuliana’s 
vision of reality, which he calls the cinematic use of the “free indirect point-of-view”
82 From La notte, my translation.
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and sees as a director’s expedient to channel his own view through his character’s 
eyes.84 Valentina’s taped monologue is perhaps a more straightforward case of aural 
ventriloquism: through her voice Antonioni speaks his aesthetic intentions and 
concerns. Valentina’s poetic phonodiary elucidates the practice adopted for the 
soundtrack of La notte itself: the attention to acoustic landscape and to the ordinary 
and everyday noises of modernity (such as the snatches of what sounds like a 
Hollywood film dialogue on television, with the related allusion to the 
Americanization of Italian life), including the murmur of silence (the roar of an 
aeroplane resembles silence to Valentina’s ears). In fact, through Valentina, 
Antonioni also exposes a more general reflection on his conception of sonority. 
Indeed, we could say that Valentina’s recorded voice, which, in its turn, sounds quite 
Cagean, echoes throughout Antonioni’s writings -  such as the New York phonodiary 
-  and interviews of the period. As Antonioni describes his unavoidable immersion -  
even from inside his hotel room -  in the outdoor sounds of New York traffic, so, for 
Valentina, we are immersed in sound as we are immersed in water when swimming. 
Sound is pervasive and persistent, and we are as unavoidably exposed to it as we are 
to waves in the sea. The Cagean ring of this idea of an inescapable bath of sound -  
sound always and everywhere -  is even more direct in Valentina’s comments on the 
sonority of silence. Here, as for Cage, sound emerges as a condition of experience, 
even of the experience of silence: “The park is full of silence made of noises,” says 
Valentina, a few years before Antonioni explicates in an interview that a silence is 
not a “void.”85 But the pervasiveness of sound may be intrinsically threatening. If,
83 Ibid.
84 Angela Dalle Vacche, “Michelangelo Antonioni’s Red Desert. Painting as Ventriloquism and 
Colour as Movement,” in her book Cinema and Painting: H ow Art Is Used in Film (London: Athlone 
Press, 1996), esp. 48-49. Pier Paolo Pasolini, “The ‘Cinema of Poetry’” [1965], in H eretical 
Empiricism, ed. Louise K. Barnett (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), esp. 178-79.
85 Billard, “L’idea mi viene attraverso le immagini,” 134.
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like phonographic machines, we cannot select what we hear, the danger of noise 
pollution looms -  and Valentina’s view in this respect seems bleak (even though, 
unlike machines, we are often able to choose what to listen to). It may be possible 
that, at some level, Valentina’s sense of powerlessness at shutting out what disturbs 
her belies an anxiety on Antonioni’s part towards the sonic bombardment of modern 
life. What it certainly, implicitly, reveals, is the flip side of Antonioni’s cinematic 
pursuit of “soundscape”: whilst it is a matter of valorizing certain sounds, it is also a 
matter of abating, or trying to abate, others.
Some of what will become Antonioni’s concerns had been anticipated by 
Balazs, who, in 1945, wrote that the “business” of film sound should be:
to reveal for us our acoustic environment, the acoustic landscape in which we 
live, the speech of things and the intimate whisperings of nature; all that has 
speech beyond human speech [...] from the muttering of the sea to the din of 
a great city.86
In the passage from L ’avventura to La notte, it is “from the muttering of the sea to 
the din of a great city” that Antonioni moves. Where the former film was set in the 
marine, rural and provincial environments of Sicily and adjacent islands, the latter is 
set in Milan, the slick and affluent metropolis of the industrialized North. As in the 
earlier film, Antonioni’s characters are still the bored upper-middle classes. Yet, 
L ’avventura situated them out of their milieu, in search of adventure and diversion in 
a supposedly benignly “exotic” land -  which turns out to be indecipherably and 
sinisterly alien in the course of the film. By contrast, La notte observes them in their
86 Balazs, Theory o f  the Film , 197.
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own architectural and social surroundings: the skyscrapers of Milan’s business 
district, the buzz of traffic, the jazz and chattering of voguish night bars and jet-set 
parties.
Where Valentina’s recorded monologue counts as a mise-en-abyme statement of 
intent, in the rest of La notte -  more radically than in L ’avventura, where narrative 
soundscape is sometimes covered by extra-diegetic music -  we can actually 
experience in action Antonioni’s strategy of pursuing the acoustic environment of 
the narrative. As already noted, in La notte, the percentage of soundtrack dedicated 
to music is higher than in the longer L ’avventura. Yet, by contrast to the earlier film, 
the whole of the music (performed by Gaslini’s jazz quartet) is embedded in the 
filmic action, with the exception of that of the opening credits sequence.
It appears as the live accompaniment to both the night-club and the grand party in 
the villa of a rich Milanese industrialist which the protagonists attend in the course 
of the twenty-four hour period whose “night” -  literally and metaphorically -  gives 
the film its title. But if the music in the film is part of the acoustic environment, 
indeed qualifying as fashionably modem the Milan in which its characters move, 
Antonioni’s attention to the urban soundscape is also emphatically dedicated to its 
specific noises and sounds -  and, of course, to its “apparent” silences. Not 
surprisingly, these stand out with particular relief or, I should say, can be heard most 
vividly, in the long, almost dialogue-less sequence towards the beginning of the film. 
In this apparently “silent” scene, in which Lidia wanders aimlessly from the city 
centre to the outskirts, the insistent and subsistent sounds of the metropolis are 
brought, so to speak, to the surface. From its incessant, but perhaps often unnoticed 
murmur, to its most obviously loud and disruptive noises, this sequence brings into
182
relief what, in a different context, J.G. Ballard once described as “the cacophonic 
musique concrete of civilization.” 87
The silence of this sequence is impregnated by the same kind of sonority of 
which Antonioni becomes aware in his New York hotel room when he puts his pen, 
as well as its ears, to it. As the camera follows Lidia from the core of the city to its 
periphery, the soundtrack describes and organizes a plethora of sounds characteristic 
of modern experience. The buzzing noises of the business centre -  cars, motorbikes, 
horns and voices in the crowds -  give way to relative quietness as she walks through 
working-class and industrial districts. Here, in the absence of the incessant murmur 
of heavy traffic, a few sounds stand out more distinctly, almost amplified: church 
bells, an aeroplane crashing the sound barrier, a factory siren announcing the end of 
a shift. As, having taken a taxi, Lidia reaches the semi-rural outer edges of town, the 
soundscape changes yet again. Here, unlike earlier in the day in the city centre, car 
noises fade muffled into the background, while relaxed leisurely voices stand out 
more clearly -  it is even possible to catch snippets of conversation -  and mellow 
music can be heard from a radio in a bar kiosk.
As Lidia’s stroll lasts from midday to early evening, from the peak of 
business hours to the unwinding at the end of the working day, the sounds here are 
indexes not simply of modernity but also of time. The changing sonority inscribes 
and punctuates the changing time of the day. More specifically, these urban sounds 
(from the factory siren to the modulation of the traffic) signpost temporality in 
modernity: they are indicators of the regimentation and scansion of the working day 
in the metropolis. Through these sounds, a temporality of routine and every day ness 
is evoked. But not only: modernity itself is described in temporal terms, presented as
87 G.J. Ballard, “The Sound-Sweep”[1960], in The Voices o f  Time (London: Phoenix, 1992), 62.
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a set of temporal relations. The changing soundscapes inscribe a temporal element 
into Lidia’s spatial movement: her journey from centre to periphery is also a journey 
through different time zones. She moves from the “now” and “new” of the business 
district, to the “then” and “old” of the semi-rural outskirts. Indeed, this is also 
visually rendered by markers of obsolescence and time past which punctuate her 
journey out of town, attracting her attention: a broken clock which she picks up and 
peruses in a scrapyard, a frail and hunched elderly woman she crosses on the 
pavement. Her journey takes her, figuratively, back in time, in terms of both 
collective and personal history. If the urban core of the city is in the time zone of 
modernity and the new, its outer edges are in a more heterogeneous one, still 
suffused with the time of the old, of a pre-industrial past. Here, among other things, 
by contrast with the unification of the language brought by national television in the 
post-war period, people can still be heard speaking their own regional dialect. In fact, 
its time zone is perhaps gradually losing its link with modernity, being cut off from 
the present: Lidia will notice the disused railtracks, covered with weeds, that were 
still functioning when she and her now husband used to go there in their dating days.
In this sequence then, sounds -  temporal structures, structures that take time 
-  are employed to articulate time itself in its passing. An inextricable relation 
between time and sound is evoked and dramatized. The notion that sound takes time 
suggests here that the opposite may also apply. For the scene takes -  uses -  sound as 
a medium through which time is, as it were, materialized, or embodied. Furthermore, 
sounds contribute to embed temporality in the cinematic image as such. But before 
we can discuss the articulation of time through sound in the cinema, we need to 
consider, briefly, the relation between time and sonority.
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Time and the Sound of Silence
“Of Bergsonism,” Gaston Bachelard declared in The Dialectic of Duration (1936), 
“we accept everything but continuity.”88 This was a provocative way of saying that 
he accepted next to nothing of it. Effectively, to set out to “break up” (in Bachelard’s 
own expression) the continuity of duration postulated by Bergson was tantamount to 
turning Bergsonism itself on its head.89 As I have mentioned in Chapter 1, he had 
already essayed this project in an earlier work, entitled “The Instant” (1932). Here, 
Bachelard pitted Bergson’s “philosophy of duration” against the “philosophy of the 
instant” of Gaston Roupnel (a colleague of Bachelard’s at the University of Dijon), 
proposing that th& former could be redressed by taking account of the latter.90 
Whether these terms are reconciled in a dialectic (as in Bachelard), or one is refuted 
in favour of the other (as in Bergson), the instant and duration appear to be 
inescapable basic elements in the thought of time. The “thinkability” of time seems 
indeed to depend on this very polarity between the protracted and the instantaneous, 
the “extensive” and the “intensive”; between, in short, the line and the point. And 
certainly the potential for disruption that each has on the other testifies, since and 
before Zeno’s paradoxes, to the intrinsic difficulty of thinking, or “imaging,” time.91
88 Gaston Bachelard, The D ialectic o f  Duration  [1936], trans. Mary McAllester Jones (Manchester: 
Clinamen Press, 2000), 2 8 .1 have relied here on Cristina Chimisso’s discussion in the introduction, 1- 
13.
89 Ibid., 37.
90 Gaston Bachelard, “The Instant” [1932], trans. Mary McAllester Jones, in Robin Durie, ed., Time 
and the Instant: Essays in the Physics and Philosophy o f  Time (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000), 
66. See footnote 2, page 93, for translator’s note on Gaston Roupnel.
91 Cf. Robin Durie, “The Strange Nature o f the Instant,” in Durie, Time and the Instant, 1-24.
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Where a photograph is often deemed to give us a “snapshot” of time, a 
frozen instant, we can’t hear a “snapshot” of sound in quite the same way. Certainly, 
the idea of the photograph as the embodiment of an instant plucked out of duration, 
of ongoing time, raises the question of the duration of the instant as such. For, 
indeed, even the “instant” required to press the camera shutter might in itself be 
durational (it may, that is, be a stretch of time we can measure). However, and at a 
more obvious level, sound conveys the durational aspect of time more 
straightforwardly. However brief, a sound has duration in that it unfolds in time, in a 
succession of instants. For Cage, duration is the very basis of sonority. He derives 
this idea from “music” as it is commonly understood, in which silence is distinct 
from sounds, even as both form part of it, as when instruments are paused rather than 
played:
Silence cannot be heard in terms of pitch or harmony: it is heard in terms of 
time length. There is no music that doesn’t structure itself from the very roots 
of sound and silence -  lengths of time.92
While, as he explains elsewhere, “a sound has four characteristics: frequency, 
amplitude, timbre and duration,” “silence only has duration. A zero musical structure 
must be just an empty time.”93 However, as we saw, we can talk of “an empty time” 
only conventionally -  as for an intended pause within a musical composition -  
because, in Cage’s view, absolute silence is actually impossible. Any silence, in fact, 
is already sonorous, inevitably full of non-composed sounds: accidental like that of
92 John Cage, “Defence o f Satie” [1948], in Kostelanetz, John Cage, 81-82.
93 John Cage, “Erik Satie” [1958], in Cage, Silence, 80.
186
the aeroplane in the sky, “breaking into” our soundscape, or involuntary and constant 
like that of our very own heartbeat.
Where the silencing of the musician in 4 ’33” discloses the sounds of silence, 
it does so by also revealing what for Cage is the fundamental point about sonority in 
general: its inextricable relation to time. From its very title -  a precise length of 
time-, and its alternative name -  silent piece - ,  4 ’33” proposes silence as a temporal 
structure, as something which, because it is sound, takes time. While in traditional 
terms we can think of a pause as an empty time, in real terms, for Cage, “[t]here is 
no such a thing ... as an empty time [since] there is always something ... to hear.”94 
The use of the words “thing” and “something” is important: it is thingness that draws 
together time and sound. Cage, for whom matter is vibrations, sees sound as the 
“something,” the material which substantiates time. From this perspective, the reason 
why the sonority of silence, as in 4 ’33”, can be seen to put forth time more 
effectively than music, conventionally understood, becomes clearer. While “made 
o f ’ time, indeed, having time as its basic element, music also tends to conceal, or 
erase, its own temporality: harmony and pulse distract from duration.95
At the premiere of 4 ’33” -  and in subsequent live performances of the piece 
-  the articulation of time through silence was not only something to be heard but, 
also, seen. Indeed, an audience not distracted by the music is able to turn to viewing 
even more than one “absorbed” by a melody and observe more carefully the visual 
cues. The musician comes on stage, sits in front of the piano, raises the keyboard 
cover but stops short of playing, lowers the keyboard at the end of the “first 
movement,” raises it again at the beginning of the “second movement,” and so on 96
94 Cage, “Experimental M usic,” 8.
95 Chanan makes this point very effectively in Repeated Takes, 125.
96 The first published version o f the work, in 1960, consists o f a typewritten script in which the 
Roman numerals I, II, III are used to indicate the three “movements” of the piece. Under each
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In fact, as it is reflected in the expression “going to see a concert,” any audience to a 
musical performance is made of viewers, in the same way in which cinema 
spectators are also hearers. In fact, this even applies to silent-era cinema goers, 
where the show would routinely include live music accompaniment or, even, 
rudimental sound effects.
Cage’s 4'33” puts into relief the link between time and the sonority of 
silence, and between silence and its visuality. These links had also been outlined by 
Balazs in the chapter on sound of his Theory of Film. For Cage, as we have seen, the 
often unnoticed sonority of silence needs a strategy of amplification in order to be 
heard, be it a technique (the silencing of the musician), or a technology (the anechoic 
chamber).
Writing about cinema sound specifically, Balazs notes that “silence, too, is an 
acoustic effect, but only when sounds can be heard.”97 By this he means that silence 
only becomes possible with the advent of sound cinema, where, paradoxically, it was 
not with silent film. It is only where sounds can be silenced that silence becomes 
possible, and that, of course, talking of cinema, it becomes possible to “see” it. Yet, 
there is another way in which cinematic silence is actually an “acoustic effect,” 
according to Balazs. He continues shortly after:
numeral, is the Latin word tacet (“stays silent”), as an instruction to the performer. A note specifies 
that, while at its premiere (at Woodstock, NY, August 29, 1952) the total duration was 4 ’33” and “the 
three parts were 55”, 2 ’40 ” and 1 ’20”, “the work may be performed by any instrumentalist or 
combination o f instrumentalists and last any length o f time.” See: Simon Shaw-Miller, Visible D eeds 
o f  Music: Art and Music from  Wagner to Cage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), chapter 6, 
for both an account o f subsequent performances o f silent p iece, and a discussion o f the visual element 
o f Cage’s performances in general.
97 Balazs, Theory o f  Film, 205.
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Silence is when the buzzing of a fly on the window-pane fills the whole room 
with sound and the ticking of a clock smashes time into fragments with 
sledge-hammer blows.98
With this image, ambiguously blurring the boundaries between the “real” and the 
“cinematic,” Balazs is suggesting that silence is not silent at all. Indeed, as with 
Cage, the sonority of silence to which Balazs attracts attention is simultaneously 
dependent both on amplifications and abatements (dialogue, music). Like Cage with 
his 4 ’33”, Balazs is furthermore proposing that silence’s understated, often 
unnoticed aurality is that which most effectively concretizes time. It is the 
inescapable and foundational sonority of silence, the very sounds which constitute it 
as such -  “the buzzing of a fly,” “the ticking of the clock” -  that make time matter 
or, even, reveal time as matter; matter that can be smashed into fragments. Of 
course, in the case of an audio-visual technology like the cinema, silence is 
essentially related to images -  more inextricably than in Cage’s 4*33”, which can 
exist as just an audio-recording. In cinema, therefore, the sonority of silence embeds 
time in the image, thus adding to the way in which the dynamics of the images may 
give us time in its unfolding, “change mummified,” as Bazin put it.
The “stroll sequence” in La notte effectively crystallizes the “acoustic effect” of 
silence Balazs describes, rendered feasible by the advent of cinema sound itself. The 
zone of relative quietness Antonioni stakes out through the muting of dialogue and 
music is in fact revealed to be full of sonority. And indeed, it is the same routine, 
banal sonority to resonate in Balazs’s, Cage’s and Antonioni’s silences. A similar 
logic is at work: it is the everydayness, the ordinariness of the sonority of silence that
98 Balazs, Theory o f  the Film, 205.
makes time matter. Antonioni’s sonorous silences, which the audience can hear as 
well as “see” in the images, concretize duration, the passage of time. Indeed they do 
so, in Deleuze’s words, through “an astonishing development of the idle periods of 
everyday banality.”99 And, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, this 
“development” of banality and “prolongation” of dead times may make the 
experience of time as such a primary condition of spectatorship.
Technology and Time
Vertov’s silent-era switch from phonography to cinematography, out of frustration 
with the former, helps to bring into relief the extent to which the two technologies 
are cognate. As noted at the beginning, a line of continuity subtends the apparent cut 
that Vertov’s turn from one to the other would seem, at first sight, to denote. And, in 
fact, the filmmaker returned to sound technology, combining it with cinema, as soon 
as a system that began to satisfy his requirements became available to him.100 The 
consideration that, in the forms developed and patented by Edison, sound and visual 
technologies share, so to speak, a “father,” further throws into relief their intertwined 
histories. A fundamental area of contiguity, from the beginning of their 
development, is the purchase these technologies are seen to have on time. In fact, 
understood as means for “seizing” and “archiving” time they also, in turn, shape the 
“thinking” of time itself. In important respects, more than simply contributing to
99 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image [1985], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Gal eta 
(London: Athlone Press, 1989), 5. In the French original, Deleuze writes “temps morts de la banalite 
quotidienne,” thus creating a resonance with the cinematographic notion o f temps morts for which 
Antonioni is also famous. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: L ’lmage-Temps (Paris: de Minuit, 1985), 12.
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making time manifest, they “demonstrate” it. And where photography could only 
capture discrete instants, the revolutionary promise of phonography and cinema lay 
in their ability to seize instants in their actual succession -  time in its unfolding as 
such. Vertov’s frustration at the beginning of the “Kino-Eye” manifesto makes it 
easy to deduce what, for him, would have been the optimum solution. It would have 
been to have the phonograph and the movie camera capture the aural and the visual 
as “they rush past, like time,” so that both could be preserved, “organiz[ed]” and, 
indeed, played-back.101
Recorded Voices: Preserving the Passage of Time
The link between time and sound technologies comes to the fore most dramatically 
in relation to the human voice. By enabling the capture and/or preservation of the 
voice, sound technologies play a key role in the apprehension of a temporal subject, 
and of the passage of the self through time in particular. This is cogently conveyed 
by a sequence at the beginning of The Passenger.
Here Locke, a television reporter, goes back to the small, forsaken hotel in 
the North African desert where he is staying and, in the room adjacent to his, finds 
Robertson (whom he had befriended the night before), dead in his bed. At this sight, 
Locke’s reaction is to browse around the room and into Robertson’s diary and 
documents, casually put on a shirt belonging to the now dead man and, finally, pick 
up the telephone by the bed. On speaking to the hotel’s receptionist, he neither 
identifies himself nor mentions his discovery, but enquires about departing planes.
As becomes clear in the course of the sequence, Locke sees this death as an
100 See footnote 5.
101 Vertov, “The Birth o f Kino-Eye,” 40.
191
opportunity for him to get out of the life, and indeed the “person” (his own) in which 
he feels stuck. This phone conversation, in which the receptionist is led to believe he 
is talking to the man he does not know is already dead (since the call comes from his 
room) is used to introduce the narrative core of the film: exchanged identity. To this 
end, the scene levers on the dislocation between body and voice which sound 
technology -  here telephony -  has rendered possible. In fact, further dislocations of 
this kind, and ensuing disorientation, will provide the formal means to consolidate 
this narrative theme as the sequence unfolds.
After hanging up, and having taken the dead man’s passport, Locke goes 
back to his room. In the next shot, he is sitting at his desk, looking down at both his 
and Robertson’s documents, open at the photograph page. Off-screen, there is a 
knock at the door. Locke looks up. A man’s voice, its source still off-screen, says: 
“Sorry to bother you like this, but I have seen your light was on and thought you 
might like a drink.” Locke looks back down and proceeds to switch the photos from 
one passport to the other. As two male voices -  one of which Locke’s -  start talking, 
even though Locke himself is obviously alone in the room, we realize that no one 
was actually at the door. Therefore, the soundtrack must refer to a conversation 
between the two men that Locke is recollecting, or imagining. At one point, 
however, the camera briefly pans to a tape recorder on a chair nearby: Locke is not 
reminiscing, but actually listening to a recorded conversation.
Yet, with this ambiguity resolved, the scene unfolds into another. A pensive 
Locke looks up from his counterfeiting job and looks away, towards the window 
which the camera, having followed the trajectory of his eyes, is now framing. A male 
figure enters the frame from the right, walks along the balcony and leans against the 
banister, looking out at the view. Seen from behind, it could be Locke himself, as he
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is wearing the same light blue shirt. We are, again, disoriented: since the view of the 
balcony is, ostensibly, a point-of-view shot from Locke’s perspective, he cannot, 
logically, be on the balcony at the same time. Soon, the man on the balcony is joined 
by another man, of whom we are offered a frontal view. Unmistakably, it is this 
second man who is Locke. Gradually, clues click into place. This shot must be a 
flashback to the night before, most probably Locke’s own recollection. The man in 
the light-blue shirt Locke joins outside must be the now dead Robertson (whose 
shirt, in fact, we know Locke has just put on). The voices we were hearing from the 
tape recorder are now joined to bodies: the on-screen actors speak them, or speak in 
synch to them. Yet, after a while, the voices revert to their initially disembodied 
status. The camera pans back right and returns to Locke working at the passports on 
his desk, listening to the tape recorder, which, eventually, he switches off. Soon 
after, he will drag the corpse into his own room and then take possession of 
Robertson’s room and luggage, thus -  effectively -  also donning Robertson’s 
identity as such to the outside world.
Through the phone call first and, then, the taped conversation, this sequence 
hinges on the motif of the voice wrenched from its body through technology. Indeed, 
with sound technologies, the voice can be taken out of its own body, displaced 
spatially, as with telephony, and/or temporally, as with recording. This scene from 
The Passenger plays on both these dimensions: the voices on the telephone, spatially 
dislocated across the hotel, and the taped voices, temporally dislocated from the 
previous day.
In a famous passage of In Search of Lost Time, Proust’s narrator is describing 
being on the telephone with his beloved grandmother for the first time. On the one 
hand, he is enthralled by the telephone’s power to make present the voice of a person
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miles away. Indeed, as the voice seems “altered in its proportions from the moment it 
was a whole,” in close-up, so to speak, and isolated from “her face and features,” the 
effect of presence is almost uncanny, excessive.102 Yet, at the same time, this larger- 
than-life presence is the very marker of absence. “This isolation of the voice” from 
the body is “like a symbol, an evocation, a direct consequence of another isolation”: 
the narrator’s physical separation from his grandmother.103 In fact this absence is for 
him not only that of their current spatial distance, but also a foreboding of the 
permanent separation her death will bring:
‘Granny!’ I cried to her, ‘Granny!’ and I longed to kiss her, but I had beside 
me only the voice, a phantom as impalpable as the one that would perhaps 
come back to visit me when my grandmother was dead.104
So here, a physical distance, a provisional and surmountable separation on a spatial 
axis, is felt to encapsulate and foretell a temporal distance, an unavoidable and 
irreversible separation along the axis of time. The grandmother’s distance in space, 
her physical absence from the place where the narrator is, makes him think of her 
distance in time -  of a future, that is, in which her time will be irretrievably past.
‘Speak to me!’ But then, suddenly, I ceased to hear her voice, and was left 
even more alone. My grandmother could no longer hear me; she was no 
longer in communication with me; we had ceased to be close to each other, to
102 Marcel Proust, In Search o f  Lost Time, 6 vols., vol. 3: The Guermantes Way, trans. C.K. Scott 
Moncrieff and Terence-Kilmartin (London: Vintage, 2000), 149. On this point see Steve Connor, 
Dumbstruck: A Cultural H istory o f  Ventriloquism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 380-381. 
Connor discusses how early users o f the telephone were fascinated by the way in which the voices 
that emanated from the receiver “were both more mechanical and more human than ordinary voices.”
103 Proust, The Guermantes Way, 149.
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be audible to each other; I continued to call her, groping in the empty 
darkness [....] It seemed to me as though it was already a beloved ghost that I 
had allowed to lose herself in the ghostly world, and, standing alone before 
the instrument, I went on vainly repeating: ‘Granny! Granny!’ as Orpheus, 
left alone, repeats the name of his dead wife.105
Sensing a presage of permanent separation into temporary physical distance, 
Proust is using telephony, a medium whose features would seem more directly 
linked to the dimension of space, to evoke the dimension of time.106 This latter is 
more intuitively associated with phonographic technologies, as they not only wrench 
the voice from the body but, also, enable its preservation. Thus, a voice from the past 
can be brought up to the present, as the taped conversation with the recently dead 
man in The Passenger brings into relief. Once recorded, an utterance can be 
dislodged from both the temporal and spatial co-ordinates in which it originated, 
transported to different times and places. Furthermore, sound recording technologies 
enable us to do this with our own voices. As Kahn has noted, one of the crucial 
consequences of phonography, was that “with it came the unique ability to return the 
subject’s voice to his or her own ears.”107 People became able to hear their own voice 
“deboned,” as opposed to through their bones and body, as they normally do.108 For 
when one hears oneself speak, the voice is heard both externally, through its 
vibrations in the air, and “intracranially,” along an internal circuit of utterance and
104 Ibid., 150.
105 Ibid., 150-151.
106 For a discussion o f Proust and technology, see Sara Danius, The Senses o f  Modernism: 
Technology, Perception and Aesthetics (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2002).
107 Douglas Kahn, “Track Organology,” O ctober 55 (Winter 1990), 6 7 -78 .72  cited.
108 Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat, 7.
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audition, “as it is conducted from the throat and mouth through bone to the inner 
regions of the ear.”109 “The phonograph’s discursive gear,” writes Kahn:
produced a veritable machine critique of the presence of the voice. No longer 
was the ability to hear oneself speak restricted to a fleeting moment. It 
became locked in a materiality that could both stand still and mute and also 
time travel by taking ones’ voice far afield from one’s own presence. A new 
loop of utterance and audition was interjected into the existing one, which in 
effect had been stretched and broken.110
But as sound recording technology returns the voice to its own speaker purely from 
the outside, it also enables the speaker to return, again (and again) to his or her own 
past utterances, as the characters re-listening to their own taped voices in La notte 
and The Passenger crystallize.
Early accounts of possible applications of the phonograph often emphasized 
its ability to preserve one’s own voice for family and posterity, envisaging, alongside 
a more public and impersonal use, a very intimate and private one. In 1878, listing 
ten possible ways in which his recent invention could “benefit mankind,” Edison 
himself included that of enabling the creation of a “‘Family Record’ -  a registry of 
sayings, reminiscences, etc., by members of a family in their own voices, and of the 
last words of dying persons.”111 As Jonathan Sterne has recently observed, this needs 
to be seen in the context of a culture of preservation -  from the canning of food to 
the embalming of bodies -  in which sound recording seemed at last to offer the
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid., 8.
111 Thomas Alva Edison, in an article o f June 1878 for North American Review, quoted by Roland 
Gellat, The Fabulous Phonograph, 29.
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opportunity to catch and keep that most ephemeral of entities.112 “The voice,” Sterne 
quotes from the first issue, dated 1896, of a publication dedicated to phonography, 
“formerly invisible and irretrievably lost as uttered, can now be caught in its passage 
and preserved practically forever....Death has lost some of its sting since we are able 
to forever retain the voices of the dead.”113 Though the discourse was framed by 
pitting the permanence of the technology against the transience of human life, and by 
presenting the former as a means to partially revoke the latter, early recordings were 
actually extremely ephemeral and fragile. For all the emphasis on preserving 
“practically forever,” those on tinfoil would basically disintegrate once removed 
from the machine, while the later ones on removable wax cylinders would wear off 
pretty quickly too. Furthermore, even when recordings become more robust and 
durable, the very notion of preserving the voice seems to be always already haunted 
by the idea of absence, loss, distance, death -  as The Passenger cogently conveys. 
Indeed, as Proust writes of telephony, the isolated close-up on the voice functions as 
the very marker of the body’s physical absence and, consequently, as a memento 
mori of the technological age.
The more personal, intimate function of the technology -  the possibility of 
recording oneself and one’s own family -  was in practice precluded when the 
phonographic industry, after a halted start, eventually took off at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The models that were patented and put on the market were 
reproducing -  playback -  machines only, and phonography became chiefly a means 
for the diffusion of music. Hence perhaps Adorno’s statement, in the late 1920s, on 
the vicarious relation between the voice of the singer and the one of the owner of the 
record:
112 Sterne, The Audible Past, esp. chapter 6.
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What the gramophone listener actually wants to hear is himself, and the artist 
merely offers him a substitute for the sounding image of his own person, 
which he would like to safeguard as a possession. The only reason that he 
accords the record such value is because he himself could also be just as well 
preserved.114
It is only with the emergence of magnetic tape after the Second World War that 
recording and hearing one’s own voice becomes feasible and easy, as the hitherto 
previously separated functions of incision and reproduction are reunited within a 
single machine. In fact, as noted earlier, with the commercial development of 
lightweight and economical models in the course of the 1950s and 1960s, this 
opportunity becomes open to professionals and amateurs alike. The intimate use of 
the technology Edison had envisaged becomes viable, and Samuel Beckett’s one- 
man play Krapp ’s Last Tape, written in the early years of the magnetic tape 
revolution, offers a very compelling reflection on it.115
Over forty years, Krapp has accumulated a meticulously archived phonodiary 
on magnetic reels. Now an old man, he is listening to extracts from his past, as he 
sets out to record what he has decided is his last tape. Centred around Krapp’s 
quixotic attempt to preserve, if not time, then at least the passage of his own self 
through it, Beckett’s play brings into relief the problematic tension between 
technological permanence and human ephemerality. Krapp has lived his life trying to 
counter this transience by way of technology. With his tapes, he has attempted to
113 “Voices o f the Dead,” Phonoscope 1( 15  November 1896), 1: quoted by Jonathan Sterne, The 
Audible Past, 308.
114 Theodor W. Adorno, “The Curves o f the Needle” [1927], trans. Thomas Y. Levin, Essays on 
Music, selected by Richard Leppert (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 2002), 274.
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create a solid, durable record of his own evanescent existence in time, capturing “the 
grain” (as opposed to “the husks”): “those things worth having when all the dust has 
-  when all my dust has settled.” 116 “Moments,” he says, “[h]er moments, my 
moments. The dog’s moments.”117 In a way, Krapp’s own temporality is preserved 
on magnetic tape, as Bazin wrote of cinema, as in a sort of “mummy” of change 
itself. Just by digging out an old reel, he can call up to the present his younger self, 
narrating a time and a place from the past.118 Yet, the more these moments are 
replayed -  and Krapp insists on one in particular -  the less tangible and real they 
become, the more their fundamental irretrievability becomes evident.119 Listening to 
his own younger self again and again, to a moment in his life again and again, is not, 
as Krapp had realized decades earlier, like “be[ing] again.”120 Indeed, Krapp’s entire 
enterprise is permeated by an intrinsic sense of loss, as if the materiality of the tapes 
were the very token of the impossibility to preserve what he set out to seize through 
technology in the first place. In spite of the meticulous abundance of recordings, the 
passage of time and the passage of the self through time have escaped technology: 
the “best years are gone” and all that old Krapp has left in exchange are reels of 
tape.121 As for Barthes, by its very nature, a photograph is always an “imperious sign” 
of death, telling “death in the future,” so here the recordings also work as just such a
• • i y ypremonition.
115 Samuel Beckett, K rapp’s Last Tape [1958] and Embers [1959] (London: Faber and Faber, 1959).
116 Beckett, K rapp’s Last Tape, 12.
117 Ibid., 15.
118 Bazin, “The Ontology o f the Photographic Image,” 14.
119 Bazin’s argument in “Death Every Afternoon” that the cinematic representation o f death is obscene 
draws on this contrast between actual loss and technological re-presentation. Since, “for every 
creature, death is the unique moment par excellence,” Bazin argues, the possibility o f its repetition on 
screen time and again is a form o f “desecration,” 30-31.
120 Beckett, K rapp’s Last Tape, 19.
121 Ibid., 20.
122 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography [1980], trans. Richard Howard 
(London: Vintage, 2000), 95-96.
Robertson’s recorded voice in The Passenger functions as a premonition in 
reverse. Heard after the character’s death, it highlights the transience and 
irreversibility of human time, precisely by drawing attention to the very paradox on 
which recording is predicated. Technologies of recording in general are seen to make 
present what is, crucially, not fully there: yet, as they make “present” an absence, the 
constitutive absence of the thing itself is also inevitably foregrounded. In Fellini’s La 
dolce vita, a mise-en-scene of the recorded voice is used in similar ways to The 
Passenger, both to reveal and produce a tension between technological permanence 
and human ephemerality, preservation and loss, presence and absence. As briefly 
mentioned, in the scene set in Steiner’s house, a portable tape recorder, on which a 
compilation of natural sounds is played, enchants the guests at his party. But in fact, 
just before this, we are shown one of the guests, perhaps bored with the evening, 
resort to the novelty machine to tape the ongoing conversation. Only seconds later, 
he rewinds the reel and plays back some snippets of it -  Steiner’s reflections on his 
own insignificance in particular. This recording of the human voice, only fractionally 
dislocated, in both time and space, from the body of the speaker, inspires an eerie 
mood. It works to create an awareness of the permanence of the recording as against 
the impermanence of human temporality, and the relentlessness of the passage of 
time. This recorded voice, speaking words spoken, and heard, only minutes before, 
resounds with a spectral presence amongst the guests. Steiner, there -  alive -  in the 
room, is enveloped by his own recorded voice as if by an omen of death. Shortly 
after, he will kill his two children before committing suicide. The film does not show 
us this, but returns to the scene the morning after the tragic event, where the deaths 
are being investigated by the police. Here, the earlier recording is played once more. 
Now the grain of Steiner’s voice is a relic: in its very presence it ciphers a lack of
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body, irreparable loss and death. Endlessly repeatable, lending itself to fast- 
forwarding and rewinding, being paused and resumed at leisure, the recording is the 
very token of the irretrievability and irreversibility of human life; playable only 
once, in one direction.
Common to The Passenger, La dolce vita, and Krapp’s Last Tape (performed 
on stage or on screen, as in Egoyan’s film adaptation of 2000, starring John Hurt) is 
that they, as visual representations, are constructed around a mise-en-scene of the 
technology itself. As such, they allow a visualization of the temporal and spatial 
dislocation of the voice at the heart of recording technology, of the separation of the 
voice from the body. In fact, the audio-visual representation does not simply stage 
this “split” between the voice and its body, but endows it with temporal depth. 
Indeed, in each of my three examples, the temporal dimension of this dislocation is 
given particular emphasis. Whether on stage or on screen, a sixty-nine year old 
Krapp is juxtaposed to a recording of his voice when he was thirty-nine; Steiner’s 
taped voice is played before and after the irreversible temporal cut of death, as in 
The Passenger. The result is a representation where the past, in some form, returns to 
the present, where the present, in Benjamin’s words, “is shot through with chips” of 
the past.123 This juxtaposition of before and after is very poignant, as it highlights the 
fundamental difference between human and technological time: a recording can be 
repeated, human existence cannot, the former is reversible, the latter is not. Where 
these three works articulate the temporality of the human subject through the allusion 
or the inclusion of death, the scene from La notte of Valentina by her tape recorder, 
playing back an extract of her phonodiary, does so in a less tragic fashion.
123 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy o f History” [completed 1940; published 
posthumously 1950], in Illuminations, 255.
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Through the mise-en-scene of the recorded voice, two different times are made 
to coincide in the moving, or, as Michel Chion pointedly prefers to call it, in the 
“audio-visual” image124: a “past” and a “present.” If on the one hand this rehearses 
the temporal and spatial separation of body from voice which sound technology 
enables, on the other, the body and its voice, temporally separated, are also rejoined 
in the image. They are sutured around a cut, a split, we could say. Indeed, this is also 
the cut “internal” to the image of which Deleuze talks in the last chapter of his 
Cinema //, whose discussion is inspired by Chion’s thinking in particular.
“The sound film is dualistic,” Chion argues in The Voice in the Cinema, 
continuing:
The physical nature of cinema necessarily makes an incision or cut between 
the body and the voice. Then the cinema does its best to re-stitch the two 
together at the seam.125
Yet sometimes, Chion notes, “cinema’s split is even on display.”126 Indeed, his book 
is in great part dedicated to discussing theses particular cases. These range from the 
de-synchronization between characters and their voices typical of Fellini’s films, to 
the more radical disconnection between sound and image track in Marguerite 
Duras’s India Song (1975), where the on-screen actors do not speak, but only loosely 
enact the fragmentary story being told by a collage of off-screen voices.127
Duras’s films are the examples on which Deleuze draws when he considers 
sound in his taxonomic analysis of the cinema of the time-image. The great divide
124 Chion, Audio-Vision.
125 Chion, The Voice in the Cinema, 125.
126 Ibid.
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between “so-called classic cinema and so-called modern cinema does not coincide 
with that between the silent film and the talkie,” Deleuze argues. On the contrary, the 
“modern implies a new use of the talking, the sound and the musical.”128 This is 
characterized by the presence of “two ‘heautonomous’ images, one visual and one 
sound, with a fault, an interstice, an irrational cut between them.” For Deleuze, this 
“interstice between two framings, the visual and the sound,” internal to the cinematic 
image itself, is what defines modern cinema, the “second stage of the talkie,” as he 
also calls it from the perspective of sound. Composed of “an auditory image and an 
optical image,” the cinematic image becomes thoroughly “audio-visual.” (The term’s 
allusion to televisual and video technology is intended by Deleuze, who asserts that 
“this second stage would never have arisen without television.”) Yet, for Deleuze, 
this radical independence between the two, this “heautonomy,” “does not burst [the 
image] into pieces”; on the contrary, it “reinforces” it, giving it “a new consistency, 
which depends on a more complex link,” or, as he also calls this “new intertwining,” 
“a specific relinkage.”129
The Passenger, Krapp’s Last Tape, La dolce vita and La notte all stage voice 
recording equipment, and make us hear a diegetic recording of the voice of one of 
their characters while their body is also on screen. Their demonstration of sound 
technology is hinged around a cutting and re-stitching, a separating and re-joining of 
the voice with its body. What is made visible of this re-stitching and re-joining, 
though, is an irremediable interstice between the two, in the form of a temporal gap 
between body and voice. Stored, the voice can be delayed with respect to its body, 
returned to it from a different time. Where in La notte and Krapp’s Last Tape the
127 Ibid., 129-130. For a reading the off-screen voices alternative to Deleuze’s, see: Joan Copjec, Read  
My Desire (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 183ff.
128 Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image, 241.
129 This quote and all o f the above: ibid., 251-253. Emphasis in original.
voice is clearly made to come from the past, in The Passenger its temporal location 
is more ambiguous. When it is “attached” to Locke’s flashback, the recorded voice 
comes from the future of the moment visualized on screen. In this instance, this re­
joining -  which, for a few shots, is manifested through the synching of images to 
sound -  is in fact an imaginary construction: diegetically, it is, indeed, Locke’s 
memory. Thus, as when the conversation of the night before is replayed after 
Steiner’s suicide in La dolce vita, the film shows that, so to speak, the voice 
“returns” too late, for its body has gone. Through the recorded voice the human 
subject is presented as being at the mercy of time. The subject is either “fractured” 
by time, his/her present shot through with fragments of the past (memories here 
taking the very material form of recordings), or swept away by its passage (the taped 
voice as the material trace of his/her former presence). On the one hand, all these 
examples seem to hinge on notions of technological permanence in order to draw out 
a contrast with the fragility and transience of human life. They pit machine time, a 
time that endures and returns, versus human time -  a time that passes irreversibly. 
Yet, crucially, La notte also brings into relief the very ephemeral, fugitive and fragile 
nature of the technology itself. When, having played an extract of her phonodiary, 
Valentina seems to be rewinding the reel she is, on the contrary, erasing everything. 
On a whim of dissatisfaction, she has deleted all her work, to the disappointment and 
regret of her fascinated guest.
Capturing Time, but in Time
This act of erasure pushes to the foreground the very limits of recording technologies 
(both aural and visual), thus drawing attention to a fundamental paradox on which
204
they are predicated. Charged with the task of registering and conserving the passage 
of time, they are not themselves outside of it Neither are they immune to its ravages.
The logic of repetition at the heart of their functioning would seem to 
immunize them from irreversibility and to provide a means of escape from it. Yet, 
even endless playbacks, however circular the internal logic, unfold cumulatively in 
time, producing an external duration which is irreversible and unrepeatable. In fact, 
the major paradox of recording technologies is that, though they may preserve time, 
they do not -  cannot -  do so outside of it. They are not suspended out of time, but 
immersed in it, capturing time in time. When considered from the perspective of the 
digital age, the 1960s’ proud mise-en-scene of magnetic tape recorders throws into 
relief the historicity of the medium itself. Observing Valentina while she drags her 
bulky yet, by the standards of the time, portable machine across the room, and 
fiddles with large reels of tape, we are reminded that what we now perceive as old 
was once (not long ago) new and current.130 While Krapp’s magnetic spools are now 
obsolete, when the play was written, in 1958, it had to be set “in the future.”131 Tape 
recording technology had not been around long enough to make good the claim that 
Krapp, on his sixty-ninth birthday, had been recording his life for over forty years.
Atom Egoyan distilled this tension between timelessness and timeliness 
inherent to recording technologies in a London installation of 2002. Artangel (the 
UK arts charity that commissioned the project) described the work as “a monument 
to analogue.”132 And indeed it was monumentally that Steenbeckett addressed the 
twilight of analogue technologies, overtaken by the diffusion of digital alternatives.
130 On this, see Laura Mulvey, “Passing Time: Reflections on Cinema from a New Technological 
A ge,” Screen 45, Special Issue: Mediated Times (Summer 2004), 142-155. Thinking o f cinema in 
particular, Mulvey considers how digital technology not only throws into relief “cinema’s ageing” but 
also grants “new” visibility and accessibility to the old (143).
131 Beckett, K rapp’s Last Tape and Embers, 9.
132 See <http://www.artangel.org.uk/pages/past/02/02 egoyan.htm> . accessed 23 September 2004.
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Yet, installed for just about a month, in a venue otherwise (provisionally) disused, 
Steenbeckett was a temporary monument: the ineluctability of the passing of time it 
evoked in relation to celluloid and magnetic tape, was also directly demonstrated by 
the work’s very own timed existence.133 Housed in the former Museum of Mankind, 
the installation was impregnated with obsolescence by the very site, and not only 
because it had already been mothballed for a few years by 2002.134 Host to the 
British Museum’s ethnographic collection, the imposing neoclassical building had in 
many ways become an increasingly problematic venue for the material, too redolent 
of a negatively obsolete and contested way of thinking and classifying humanity, in 
spite of curatorial efforts at reform.135 Indeed, perhaps the fraught status of the venue 
itself was what contributed to render Egoyan’s tribute to analogue precisely not a 
romanticized, nostalgic longing for an irretrievable past, but a critical staging of the 
technology, its purchase on time, and its location in time.
Using a number of rooms inside the museum, Egoyan’s dramatic display 
vividly brought into focus how technologies, and related practices and techniques, 
seen to be quintessentially dedicated to the preservation, documentation and 
archiving of time itself, are, in their turn, subject to time. Walking through semi­
darkness, the viewer would initially come to a passageway crowded with the 
scattered contents of an old ethnographic film archive. Unfurled from their spools, 
feet of film lay strewn across the floor, rising to a small heap in some corners. Rusty 
canisters, yellowed index cards and instruction sheets, the spilled contents of filing 
cabinets dotted across the space, old lenses (some smashed), various types of 
cameras and an unwieldy reel tape recorder also added to the orchestrated mess. In
133 Steenbeckett was shown from 15 February to 17 March 2002.
134 The building has now re-opened, and is used by the Royal Academy for temporary exhibitions.
135 Cf. Annie E. Coombes, “Atom Egoyan’s Steenbeckett -  An Installation,” American Anthropologist 
105 (March 2003), 161-163.
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their sheer abundance, these by now redundant if not defunct objects created a sense, 
as one critic put it, “of time recorded then forgotten.”136 These technologies here 
demonstrated time like a wrinkled face does: on show was their own age(ing) and 
historicity.137
Through another corridor, the installation continued in a differently cramped 
space: a narrow room, whose long walls were occupied, on one side, by a couple of 
benches and, on the other, by a projection of Egoyan’s aforementioned own film for 
television of Beckett’s Krapp’s Last Tape. Here, the effect was both cinematic and 
televisual. Larger than life, the images filled the entire wall, as at the cinema, yet the 
size of the room was more that of a private living room, bringing the visitor right up 
under the disproportionately large projection. This tension between contrasting sizes 
created an effect of suffocating intimacy -  certainly in tone with Krapp’s 
asphyxiating enclosure within the circuit of his own temporality, with the 
overbearing (and very material) burden of his memories and his spools. Yet, too 
close for comfortable viewing, at such extreme proximity “the cinematic spectacle,” 
according to Annie Coombes, “disintegrates.” Rather than “seductive 
verisimilitude,” she explains, Egoyan’s strategy gave us “the materiality of both the 
screen and the film itself.”138 While the installation certainly did attract attention to 
these structural aspects, I think that it did so precisely by holding in place cinematic 
spectacle, to which, by collapsing the distance, it gave us unusual “access.” Nose to 
the screen, we were made to enter the imaginary space of the cinematic image,
136 Andrew Lockhart, “Steenbeckett Reviewed,” at http://www.myvillage.co.uk/pages/arts-steen.htm. 
accessed 23 September 2004.
137 As artist-in-residence at the Museum of Contemporary Art of Montreal, in 2003, Egoyan realised 
another “monument to analogue,” one which focused, in fact, on the obsolescence o f magnetic tape. 
Out o f  Use constited o f an assemblage o f forty reel-to-reel recording machines, with a system that 
interconnected and amplified the tapes being played. For the project, Egoyan asked people to bring 
their old and disused recording machines and tapes, and encouraged them to record a final tape with 
their recollections o f the last time they used the machine. See: John K. Grande, “Montreal -  Atom  
Egoyan,” Sculpture 22 (June 2003), 76-77.
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drawn into Krapp’s claustrophobic studio, brought face to face with his spools, his 
tape recorder, as just another space of the installation itself. This space, focusing on 
the fall into “pastness” of magnetic tape, offered a further reflection on technology’s 
exposure to the ravages of time, via Krapp’s very failure to save his time through it.
Conversely, rather than making spectacle by projecting film, the final part of 
the installation made film itself- its physical properties and mechanics -  quite 
literally, spectacle. Aptly situated in the auditorium of what was once the Museum’s 
cinema, it created a moving sculpture in celluloid, which viewers were allowed to 
see from a perspective unconventional for both sculpture and cinematic spectacle. 
Purchase on the piece, in fact, was from the elevated and relatively distant angle of 
the cinema’s projection booth. From behind its glass, visitors could see a long loop 
of 35 mm film, suspended between floor and ceiling, transversing and criss-crossing 
the large auditorium space. Feeding in and out of a Steenbeck editing machine in the 
far corner, the film would form an intricate, shuddering pattern, “like a quivering 
spider’s web.”139 On the Steenbeck’s small monitor, a flickering image of the film 
just left in the previous room could be glimpsed.
Here, the materiality of celluloid was emphasized through an evocation of 
sculpture, the quintessential medium of matter and three-dimensionality. Yet, the 
close-up contemplation of the object that sculpture usually invites was denied, as the 
film-sculpture lay behind glass, in a way replicating, but in reverse, the “screening” 
of a cinematic situation. The palpability and materiality of celluloid itself, its 
“thingness,” were put on display, made spectacle, yet rendered literally ungraspable 
and impalpable. And through these altered conditions of viewing, both here and in 
the previous room, the installation evoked a series of contrasts through which
138 Combes, “Atom Egoyan’s S te e n b e c k e t t162.
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recording technologies, time and memory alike are defined, such as the unresolved 
tension between palpability and impalpability, materiality and immateriality, 
presence and absence, persistence and transience. In so doing, Egoyan’s work 
pointed to the paradoxes intrinsic to each as well as to those that, consequently, are 
inherent in their interrelations.
The installation used the ageing of technologies largely dedicated to the 
capture and storage of time to convey the notion of the ineluctability of the passing 
of time itself. In Egogyan’s scenario, both the private and the public archive, having 
set out to seize and preserve time through these technologies, have resulted in 
failure. Krapp’s extended phonodiary, as discussed, is haunted by the fundamental 
absence of “the life” it wanted to save. The public archive is equally unsatisfactory, 
inadequate and fragmentary in Steenbeckett: it is just discarded remnants. The 
installation was at once a reflection on the twilight of analogue technologies from the 
threshold of the digital age, and an assessment of their insufficiencies or, perhaps, of 
the inadequacy of any attempt to preserve and archive time as such.140. Yet, 
paradoxically, what emerged from this focus on technology’s ultimate failure to 
capture time, was a glimpse of “time itself,” as Deleuze, in his Proustian voice, 
would put it.141 If we can “extract from the event the part that cannot be reduced to 
what happens,” he writes, “that part of inexhaustible possibility” is time itself.142
139 Lockhart, “Steenbeckett Reviewed.”
140 The fact that Egoyan’s film , though originally shot on 35 mm, was transferred on digital video for 
projection, illuminates the fact that Egoyan himself, though producing work that reflects on this 
twilight phase of analogue, does not have a “reactionary” attitude to the new. We could say that the 
tone o f the exhibition was nostalgic, but not regretful, like Krapp’s own attitude to his past. A s a 
reviewer put it, “Krapp’s closing lines of speech [begin] to sound like the voice o f film itself, musing 
on its historical destiny: “Perhaps my best years are gone. But I wouldn’t want them back. Not with 
the fire in me now. No, I wouldn’t want them back.” See Martin Herbert, “Temporary Memory Loss,” 
Art Review  53 (April 2002), 82-83. 83 cited.
141 For a discussion o f the role o f Proust in D eleuze’s thought, see: Patrick ffrench, “ ‘Time in the Pure 
State’: Deleuze, Proust and the Image o f Time,” in Gill, Time and the Image, 161-171.
142 Deleuze, Cinema II^  19.
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“For everything that changes is in time, but time does not itself change”143; time, in 
short, is constant change, the very form of change.144
143 Ibid., 17.
144 Cf. D.N. Rodowick, Gilles D eleuze’s Time Machine (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).
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Chapter 4: Ends (and Beginnings)
After the huge success of Blow up (1966), the film’s producer, Metro-Goldwyn- 
Mayer, invested five times as much in the making of Zabriskie Point (1970), 
Antonioni first “American” film.1 Despite the lavish costs, Zabriskie Point was a 
critical and commercial disaster: as the Canadian artist Rodney Graham put it, it was 
“the bomb that almost sunk Antonioni’s film career.”2 Ironically, the film ends with 
a real bomb, used to blow a lush mansion into smithereens. The scene itself is 
spectacular: for several minutes, the screen fills with smoke, debris and blazing fire, 
climaxing in an almost monochrome red at the point in which the explosion is 
eventually shown in close-up. After this, the view turns “cooler,” and more surreal.
A series of smaller detonations -  of a clothes’ rack, a bookcase, a television set, a 
fridge -  sends the multifarious contents of these objects floating into an icy-blue 
background. And so, for several more minutes, and to a hallucinatory track by Pink 
Floyd, we follow roast chickens, Kellogg’s corn flakes, packs of sliced bread, books, 
t-shirts, flowers, in their centrifugal, slow-motion flight across the sky.
This extraordinary final scene entailed an enormously costly operation, for 
which the latest technology was used. Seventeen synchronized cameras, placed at 
different distances and angles, captured the explosion of the house. The smaller, 
slow-motion blasts were shot with special high-speed machines, on film stock
1 See: Seymour Chatman, Antonioni, or The Surface o f  the World (Berkeley: University o f California 
Press, 1985). Chatman reports that Zabriskie Point's return was $891,918 for an investment o f about 
$ 7,000,000 -  “the most expensive failure ever made” (160).
2 Rodney Graham, “Softcore: More Solo Guitar Music fo r  the Sex Scene, Zabriskie Point," artist’s 
notes for live performance on 8 March 2001, part o f Rodney Graham, solo exhibition, 9 March to 7 
April 2001, at Galerie Micheline Szwajcer, Belgium.
Website:<http://w\vw. gms.be/graham exhibition 2001.html> . accessed 3 March 2004.
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without sprocket holes so as to allow for even greater velocity.3 Antonioni revelled 
in it. Though the making of Zabriskie Point had been fraught with controversy with 
the American studio, he would later remember this massive act of destruction as 
“one of the rare times” in which he actually enjoyed filming: “I was very tense but 
happy. There was something very daring about that scene!”4 Was Antonioni perhaps 
thinking of going out with a bang? Zabriskie Point had been awaited with huge 
anticipation both in America and in Europe. Antonioni had gained international fame 
throughout the 1960s, praised by critics -  but for the notorious booing of 
L ’avventura (1960) at its Cannes premiere, which, in fact, furthered rather than 
lessened the film’s success -  and awarded prizes at the major European festivals.5 
Indeed, it was this that had won him American backing for Blow up, whose amazing 
results persuaded MGM to offer the Italian director a contract for two more films.
So, with the benefit of hindsight, Zabriskie Point's catastrophic explosion seems 
prophetic -  if not, in fact, mimetic -  of the effect the film itself was going to have on 
Antonioni’s career. While not quite ending it, the film certainly dealt it a major blow, 
from which, further hampered by other factors (including the stroke Antonioni 
suffered in the early 1980s), it never completely recovered.
That Zabriskie Point buttresses and redoubles its own end with a violent 
image of destruction, that, in short, the film ends with an “ending,” is somewhat
3 For this, see among others Peter Bondanella, Italian Cinema from  Neorealism to the Present, third 
edition (New York: Continuum, 2001), 227-228; and the documentary by Sandro Lai, Michelangelo 
Antonioni: lo sguardo che ha cambiato il cinema (M ichelangelo Antonioni: The Eye that Changed 
Cinema, 2001).
4 Aldo Tassone, “La storia del cinema la fanno i film ” [interview with Antonioni; 1979], in 
Michelangelo Antonioni, Fare un film  e p er  me vivere: Scritti sul cinema , ed. Carlo di Carlo and 
Giorgio Tinazzi (Venezia: Marsilio, 1994), 191. For Antonioni’s conflicts with MGM see: Marsha 
Kinder, “Zabriskie Point” [interview with Antonioni; 1968], in Antonioni, Fare un film  e p e r  me 
vivere, esp. 274-75.
5 L'aw entura  won the Jury Prize at Cannes, and so did L ’eclisse in 1962. Among other prizes, 
Antonioni obtained the Golden Bear at the Berlin Film Festival for La notte in 1961, and the Golden 
Lion at the Venice Film Festival for Red D esert in 1964. In 1968 he was garnered the Cannes Golden 
Palm for Blow up.
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anomalous. For Antonioni’s films of the previous decade had seemed to follow a 
trend of ending with a “beginning,” or indeed their own beginning, as the narrative 
would be brought back to more or less the point where it had started. This is most 
evident in Red Desert (1964), whose finale, more than just echoing the initial 
sequence, seems to repeat it almost exactly. As at the start of the film, Giuliana is 
seen walking with her son outside the bleak industrial plant owned by her husband. 
The two characters are wearing precisely the same clothes as before (whose green 
and yellow we are likely to remember for the contrast they cut with the surrounding 
greyness), and the chimneys are still belching the same deadly fumes into an all but 
lifeless environment.
Despite this contrast, Zabriskie Point and Red Desert share much more than 
it may initially appear. Firstly, although Red Desert duplicates, and thus dovetails 
with its own beginning both narratively and visually, there is also a sense in which, 
through and through, it is a film about endings, if not even, indeed, “The End.” Is the 
“desert” of the title the utopian beach of Giuliana’s fantasy, or the barren, polluted 
landscape through which the characters normally move? Does “red” designate the 
soft, warm sand she dreams of, or the poisoned, slimy waters from which all fish, as 
Giuliana’s husband casually observes, have disappeared? If the camera seems intent 
on revealing, or even making, the beauty of the industrial spaces it depicts, this very 
quality lies as much in the air of devastation and degradation they exude as in their 
“modernity” and “newness.” The futuristic-looking present that Red Desert 
embodies is (already) broken, faded, consumed. Its modem reality is eroded by 
decay: it is also, in a way, in ruins and archaic.
Secondly, this thematic of ‘The End” hinges on the idea of the desert in both 
films. Evoked as a space at once utopian and dystopian in Red Desert, in Zabriskie
213
Point this is an actual geographical location: the Mojave Desert and Death Valley in 
California. Ravaged mercilessly by processes of corrosion and depletion, deserts are, 
quintessentially, places of deterioration. In Zabriskie Point, corrosion seems to be 
presented as a millennial -  and mostly “natural” -  activity: the specific “point” in 
Death Valley after which the film is named, as the sign over which the characters 
pause tells us, is between five and ten million years old. In Red Desert, by contrast, 
destruction has occurred over a much shorter time span, and is largely a (by)product 
of civilization or in fact, more specifically, modernization. Yet, Zabriskie Point 
shows this too. As the final explosion vividly encapsulates, “nature’s desert” is also 
the site of devastating operations of desertification at the hand of man.
Thirdly, and for this reason, the association of “The End” with the desert also 
connects to the notion of time and its apparent irreversibility. Desertification and the 
desert manifest the tightness of time’s “direction,” and with it, the intrinsic 
unrepeatability and evanescence of time itself.
In their use of the desert as a site, and a sign, of devastation and catastrophe, 
Red Desert and Zabriskie Point encapsulate many of the period’s anxieties about 
“The End.” The Sense of an Ending (1967), Frank Kermode’s famous diagnosis of 
apocalyptic fears as intrinsic to humanity, can be seen as symptomatic of the very 
fear it scrutinizes, and therefore, of the acuteness of this idea at that time.6 
Undoubtedly, an imaginary of “The End” multiplied in literature, film and the arts in 
general. Antonioni’s desolate landscapes crystallize so vividly how the buoyancy of 
construction and reconstruction in the postwar boom also had destruction as its 
complement, given the negative effects of industrialization itself as well as the 
political climate of the cold war. Italo Calvino evoked similar scenarios in some of
6 Frank Kermode, The Sense o f  an Ending (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
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his novels. In “Smog” (1958), the spectre of irreparable pollution is coupled with 
that of nuclear devastation as (the desert, again) a mysterious fine powder, at once a 
cipher of industrial detritus and of atomic dust, slowly, but relentlessly covers the 
world.7 In his dystopian science-fiction novels, J.G. Ballard addressed the idea of the 
apocalypse most insistently, and prolifically, throughout the 1960s. In ‘The Voices 
of Time” (1960), an intergalactic telegraph wires through to Earth, second by 
second, the irreversible countdown to ‘The End.”8 Ballard imagined and re-imagined 
this final moment through a plethora of ecological cataclysms and “post-human” 
worlds (sand-flooded in “The Cage of Sand,” devastated by nuclear explosion in 
“The Terminal Beach,” desiccated in “The Drought”), still populated, however, by a 
few dazed and isolated survivors struggling to get by.9 These stories were high 
among the texts that inspired Robert Smithson to think about endings through the 
idea of the desert as, both geologically and metaphorically, a place of time and its 
irreversibility; or, as he would like to call it, of entropy. Yet, as we shall see, for 
Smithson, the entropic condition the desert exemplifies is not only contradictory but 
also highly ambivalent: the place where the end and the beginning become 
contiguous, if not thoroughly confused.
While the desert in Zabriskie Point is an exemplary entropic scenario, just as 
the devastating final blast is a powerful image of ‘The End,” the film also 
encapsulates how these can be a lure as well as a threat. For endings can also, 
paradoxically, embody a fantasy of beginnings. Indeed, “fantasy” is the status 
assigned to this real explosion in the context of the film’s narrative, where it is 
eventually revealed to be the product of the protagonist’s imagination. A phantasmic
7 Italo Calvino, “La nuvola di sm og” [1958], in Romanzi e racconti, eds. Mario Barenghi and Bruno 
Falcetto, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Milan: Mondadori, 1991).
8 J.G. Ballard, “The V oices o f Time” [1960], in The Voices o f  Time (London: Phoenix, 1992).
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precipitate of her anger, it also therefore designates “The End” as a radical, if largely 
utopian, gesture of obliteration and annihilation that is certainly exhilarating and 
may, even, be ultimately generative. And so, where Red Desert reveals an affinity 
with Zabriskie Point by being about endings or, in fact, “The End,” Zabriskie Point, 
conversely, discloses one with Red Desert because, paradoxically, it “ends with a 
beginning,” as Jonas Mekas saw it.10 For Mekas, in fact, the explosive finale 
symbolized a sort of tabula rasa, the “Zero Point” that the space of the desert itself -  
and Death Valley in particular -  incarnated.11
But before returning to the desert, let me consider how cinema, an epitome of 
repetition in various ways, whose “guiding myth,” for Andre Bazin, is “an image 
unburdened by [...] the irreversibility of time,” can also be an embodiment of 
exactly the opposite principles.12
Cinema and Repetition, or The Line in the Loop
According to Kermode, in order to try and make sense of the world, humanity has 
always had -  and, indeed, has always needed -  a fictional account of its end. “And of 
course,” he writes, coming to discuss what, in 1967, was the present, “we have it 
now, the sense of an ending.” 13 Kermode has more recently surmised that even his
9 J.G. Ballard, “The Cage o f Sand” (1961), in The Voices o f  Time', “The Terminal Beach” [1964], in 
The Terminal Beach (London: Phoenix, 2001), The Drought (London: Cape, 1965).
10 Jonas Mekas, Movie Journal: The Rise o f  the New American Cinema 1959-1971  (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1972), 373. The entry is for “February 19,1970: In Defense o f Zabriskie Point 
(2).”
11 Ibid.
12 Andre Bazin, “The Myth o f Total Cinema” [1946], in What Is Cinema? trans. and ed. Hugh Gray, 2 
vols., vol. 1 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1967), 21.
13 Kermode, The Sense o f  an Ending, 98.
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own landmark text was itself partly a product of the intensity of that “sense” in the 
1960s. Amidst events such as the Cuban missile crisis and Kennedy’s assassination, 
the war in Vietnam and the race riots on US soil, “words like ‘megadeath’ were 
common currency,” he observes, and “it seemed more than merely possible that there 
was some bad time coming, possibly a terminally bad time.”14 For Kermode -  who 
was here writing an epilogue for a re-edition of The Sense of an Ending published to 
coincide with the end of the millennium -  this reinforces, and demonstrates, his 
overall thesis. Not only do apocalyptic anxieties “threaten us at any time,” quite 
independently of millennia but, in fact, the thought of ‘The End” is constitutive of 
humanity itself.15
At the same time, however, the forms these scenarios of “The End” may take 
vary historically. So the “apocalypse of the twentieth century,” Kermode argues, is a 
largely secular and “demythologized” affair.16 Coincident with the sense of crisis, 
transition, rupture embedded within, and constitutive of, modernity itself, the sense 
of an ending has become “endemic.”17 As such, Kermode argues, it is characterized 
by “the conviction that the end is immanent rather then imminent.” 18 In short, the 
end itself becomes, paradoxically, somewhat endless, “recurrent, if not perpetual.”19 
And perhaps Zabriskie Point's protracted closing sequence crystallizes precisely this 
notion of an end that “returns” and does not want to end as, furthermore, the moment 
of the house explosion itself is repeated over a dozen times. Thus, in this dramatic 
sequence, the idea of a catastrophic ending is paradoxically confronted with its own 
repetition. So whilst this repetitiousness may indeed evoke the “immanence” of the
14 Frank Kermode, “Epilogue: The Sense o f an Ending, 1999,” in The Sense o f  an Ending (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 181-182.
15 Ibid., 182.
16 Kermode, The Sense o f  an Ending (1967),133.
17 Ibid., 102.
18 Ibid., 101.
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apocalypse in modernity, as Kermode suggests, it also raises the issue of repetition 
itself as a kind of “end.” For the end did not necessarily need to be a big last “bang” 
but could, in fact, take the semblance of obstinate, repetitive persistence. This was 
indeed what it consisted of for E.M. Cioran, for whom it was the increasing 
routinization and standardization of contemporary life that amounted to a form of 
ending, a “fall out of time” and into the “sterile zone, ” the “sub-temporal 
desolation” of “this motionless present, this tension in monotony.”20 “Blind 
repetition” is a “burial,” an “abyss where one hopes in vain for denouement, where 
one rots in immortality.”21
And where the monotony and dullness of modernized reality might be 
represented through cinema (as, in fact, Antonioni himself had done), the technology 
of cinema, itself an emblem of modernity and the processes of mechanization and 
automation therein, could be brought into relief as an incarnation of repetition as 
such. In a way, this is what Zabriskie Point's final scene does. Despite being planned 
and staged, the film’s explosion was a “real” -  and indeed, in many ways, “unique”
-  event. Independently of having been inserted in the fiction of the narrative, its 
reality, recorded on film, is not ontologically different from the “facts” captured by 
documentary. Yet, simultaneously shot by seventeen different cameras, and 
reproduced in the film itself almost as many times, the very uniqueness of this 
documentary event is at once multiplied and denied by its recursiveness. The tension 
engendered between the actual unrepeatability of the blast itself and its cinematic 
repetition is the “contradiction” inherent in technologies of recording as such vis a 
vis time. Widely perceived not simply to be crucial to, but actually to enable the
19 Ibid., 94.
20 E.M. Cioran, The Fall Into Time [1964], trans. Richard Howard (Chicago: Quadrangle Books,
1970), 174 and 178. The chapter is entitled: “The Fall Out o f Time” (my emphasis).
21 Cioran, The Fall Into Time, 178-179.
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“apprehension” of time and its passing, these technologies do so by putting what is 
intrinsically fleeting into a circuit of repeatability and reproducibility. Andre Bazin 
conveyed some of the force of this paradox when he wrote that the cinema, the most 
complete “art of time” in his view (photography lacks movement, and phonography 
he saw as dedicated not to “real,” or “lived” time but to the “aesthetic time” of 
music), had “the exorbitant privilege of repeating it.”22 “Exorbitant” because, Bazin 
argues, cinema can make “lived time,” “essentially irreversible and qualitative,” 
somewhat reversible and quantitative -  measured, indeed, in fdm frames.23 
Embalmed in celluloid, the time that has been lived can be re-animated; spent once, 
it can be spent again, by the audience, since -  at some level -  time itself has been 
turned into an object of repetition, and a repetitive object, like the filmstrip that 
“carries” it.
In fact, repetition is at the heart of cinema in many ways. It is not only in the 
mechanical succession of frames and in the repeatability of the film as a whole, but 
also in the various rehearsals and takes during production; in the recursiveness of 
diegetic conventions and codes; in its historical origin in the loops of optical toys 
and early devices such as the kinetoscope. And, of course, all of these were under 
analysis and were, so to speak, being rediscovered in the course of the 1960s and 
1970s. For, as we have seen, this was a period of intensive inquiry into all aspects of 
cinema, characterized not only by unprecedented experimentation with the medium 
but also, among other things, by the institutionalization of film studies as an 
academic discipline.24 The filmstrip and its repetitive format became “visible”:
22 Andre Bazin, “DeatH Every Afternoon” [1949], trans. Mark A. Cohen, in Ivone Margulies, ed.,
Rites o f  Realism: Essays on Corporeal Cinema (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 30.
23 Ibid.
24 For a contemporary reflection on the “history” o f the institutionalization o f film  studies, see: Patrice 
Petro, Aftershocks o f  the New: Feminism and Film H istory (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 2002).
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physically flaunted, as in Paul Sharks’ installations, made the very subject of the 
film, as in Malcolm Le Grice’s Little Dog for Roger (1967), disruptively propelled 
into view in Ingmar Bergman’ Persona (1966), used by scholars for frame-by-frame 
analysis in the 1970s. Furthermore, experimental filmmakers started to project 
footage on a loop. This would echo both the “spliceless loops” of “paleocinema,” the 
“eternity of hurdling horses and bouncing balls” of the zoetrope and other devices, as 
Frampton once put it, and the early history of cinema itself, when, reels being short, 
film would often be spliced on a continuous band.25
In his “movie-journal” columns for The Village Voice during the 1960s 
(anthologized in a book in 1972), Mekas would often report on some of these soirees 
dedicated to “loops.” The entry for 30 April 1964, for example, describes a screening 
of Dick Higgins’ Invocation of Canyons and Boulders for Stan Brakhage (1963), in 
itself a one-minute film of a close-up of a man (Higgins himself) chewing an 
imaginary object. On the occasion attended by Mekas, projected on a loop, this was 
shown uninterruptedly from eight in the evening, and was still running at one in the 
morning when Mekas eventually decided to leave.26 In addition to being used as a 
method of projection, the “loop” came to be applied to printing and editing. Pieces 
that started life as projected loops may be reprinted onto continuous film, as with 
George Landow’s Film in Which There Appear Edge Lettering, Sprocket Holes, Dirt 
Particles, Etc. (1965/66). The basic principle of reproducing the reproducible, of 
copying film again and again and splicing it together (be this a work in its entirety, a
25 Hollis Frampton “For a Metahistory o f Film: Commonplace and Hypotheses,” Artforum  10 
(September 1971), 32-35. 33 cited. For an account o f technologies and practices o f projection in early 
cinema see: Charles Musser, H istory o f  the American Cinema, vol. 1: The Emergence o f  Cinema: The 
American Screen to 1907  (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1990); and Michael Chanan, The 
Dream that Kicks: The Prehistory and Early Years o f  Cinema in Britain [1980] (London: Routledge, 
1996).
26Mekas, Movie Journal, 136. This entry is entitled “April 30, 1964: On Purity and on Anti-Art as 
Art.”
sequence, or a fragment of a sequence) became a “formal device” popular with many 
avant-garde filmmakers.27 Functioning, at some level, as a transposition of the 
micro-logic of frame repetition onto the larger scale of a sequence of frames, loop 
printing, employed extensively and insistently, constituted a way of experimenting 
with both repetition and cinema. This is apparent not only within Landow’s Film in 
Which There Appear, and the subsequent Bardo Follies (1967), but also, so to speak, 
“without” them. For where the sustained repetition of short clips of found footage is 
the governing principle of both -  and re-cycling itself is also, in a way, a kind of 
repetition -  they also both exist in multiple versions, “equivalent” in all but length.
In these different versions, in fact, it is not so much what is being shown that varies, 
as how long -  or how many times -  it is shown for. So, just by varying the number of 
times the basic sequence is repeated, Landow has produced a five-minute and a 
twenty-minute Film in Which There Appear. This latter is also known as “Wide 
Screen Version” as, in fact, it is composed of two prints of the same material for 
simultaneous projection onto adjacent screens.28 Similarly, there are several 
(progressively shorter) incarnations of Bardo Follies, developed throughout the 
years out of the initial forty-five minute film -  with the most recent and, in 
Landow’s own view, “definitive print” being a seven-minute version made in 1978.29
The repeated explosion of Zabriskie Point seems certainly to address, if not 
even to imitate, the sustained looping structures dear to the cinema avant-garde of 
the time. Yet, whilst it does so, it also, at the same time, negates them by not being a 
loop o/film. For Zabriskie Point's repetitions are also, in a way, not repetitions: 
where each reproduces the same instant, none of them is a duplication. As the scene
27 Cf. Malcolm Le Grice, Abstract Film and Beyond  (London: Studio Vista, 1977), 108ff.
28 Owen Land (formerly known as George Landow) and Mark Webber, Two Films by Owen Land  
(London: Lux, 2005), 116.
was captured with a battery of different cameras, in different places, neither actual 
footage nor, indeed, viewpoint ever recurs -  though, of course, the recorded event is 
the same. Raymond Bellour considered this situation (without the specific reference 
to Zabriskie Point) in “Cine-Repetitions,” an essay of 1979 in which he set out to 
examine the various instances of repetition to be found in cinema.30 While 
“repeating” at one level, that “of time,” whose identical instant is replayed again and 
again, Bellour notes how this form of repetition is not quite a return of the same.31 
Indeed, as we see in Zabriskie Point, not only is there visual variation in the film 
itself, but the recorded moment as such is somewhat multiplied from within -  a 
kaleidoscope of the instant. As it further emerges from the other “cases” Bellour 
goes on to analyse, difference seems to be inescapably part of cinema’s repetitions. 
For, in fact, not only does difference -  in the incremental variations from one frame 
to the next -  constitute the “look” of the filmstrip itself, but it also informs 
conditions and dynamics of projection, narrative structures and visual codes, up to 
the “institution” itself, “reproduced” historically yet subject to evolution. And so 
Zabriskie Point's “differential” repetitions, too -  its fake loops, so to speak -  have 
quite a lot in common with the “real” loops of experimental filmmaking. For even 
those loops would not be identical to themselves, but would contain change: both 
intentionally and inevitably, evidently and less evidently.
For Le Grice, the loop offered precisely this opportunity for exploring and 
developing “transforming repetition.”32 In addition to staging the filmstrip, Little 
Dog for Roger is based on the recursive looping of a short sequence of home-movie 
footage (re-cycled, in fact, from the artist’s own childhood). This repeated sequence
29 Ibid., 117-121. Meanwhile, Bardo Follies was re-baptized Diploteratology, because Landow 
thought it “a better name” (117).
30 Raymond Bellour, “Cine-Repetitions,” trans. Kari Hanet, Screen 20 (Summer 1979), 65-72.
31 Ibid., 65.
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is “transformed” by variations in length, superimposition, and by being “frozen” at 
different moments and then set “in motion” again. A perhaps wider range of 
differentiation is at play in Berlin Horse (1970), in which the same sequence of a 
horse drawn around in a circle is presented in negative as well as positive, played 
backward as well as forward, modified by red, blue, green colour filters and flicker 
effects. These series of modifications are certainly immediately noticeable. By 
contrast with this differentiality, the film’s iconography, the horse with its repetitive 
circular movement, is strongly reminiscent of the unchanging loops (“the eternity of 
hurdling horses”) of proto-cinematic devices -  whose theme and monotony the 
merry-go-round drone by Brian Eno accompanying the film both cites and enacts.
And, in fact, Le Grice’s array of changes is more than just cosmetic. The 
variations within the repetitions constitute a sort of outer sign of the “difference” 
inherent to repetition as such when considered from the viewpoint of time. In a way, 
they play out the dialectic that, in Kierkegaard’s view -  and, in fundamental respects, 
in Gilles Deleuze’s re-appropriation, in the 1960s, of the Danish philosopher’s 
thought in Difference and Repetition -  structures repetition itself.33 “That which is 
repeated,” Kierkegaard maintains, “has been -  otherwise it could not be repeated -  
but the very fact that it has been makes the repetition into something new.”34 What is 
repeated has, by definition, been and now is again. Therefore the intrinsic difference 
of repetition, its newness is, for Kierkegaard, a question of time or, rather, of the 
impossibility of “something” occupying the same time. At some level, this notion
32 Le Grice, Abstract Film and Beyond, 110.
33 S0ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition  [both 1843, under pseudonyms], ed. and trans. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). Cf. Gilles 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition  [1968], trans. Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2001). A few  
years before Deleuze, at his eleventh Seminar at the Ecole Normale Superieure in 1964, Jacques 
Lacan too had drawn on Kierkegaard for his own notion o f “repetition,” which, however, is somewhat 
at the antipodes of Deleuze’s. See: Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts o f  
Psychoanalysis [1973], trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1977), esp. 61.
34 Kierkegaard, Repetition, 149.
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finds dramatization in Le Grice’s diversified loops, which literally make visible the 
fact that each repetition takes time and, indeed, takes up a different time (which is 
also, in this case, a different space on the filmstrip). In this respect, if the loops were, 
at a common sense level, aesthetically identical, each one would still differ from any 
of the other with regard to time.
In fact, even when the piece of film being screened is materially the same, as 
in the projected loop of Higgins’ Invocations of Canyons and Boulders, each of its 
runs through the projector occurs at a different time. The footage’s time (its one- 
minute length, and the time therein recorded, or “constructed” through editing), in 
turn, takes another time to unfold, the time of its screening. And as the cycles follow 
one another, Higgins’ looped film shows this to occupy a longer and longer stretch, 
as in the five hours attended by Mekas. Thus we could also say that while the loop’s 
time is being reproduced again and again, its accumulation produces a duration. This 
is the duration of the cinematic performance, for whose attendance, as Le Grice has 
recently noted, “the spectator (collectively the audience) gives time -  invests a short 
period of life.”35 So in both Little Dog for Roger and Berlin Horse, the loop’s 
variations can be seen to operate as a visible marker of the passage of the very time 
the audience “gives.” In the absence of “narrative,” they are the indexes of “the 
dramaturgy of a work unfolding across time.”36 But indeed, precisely because the 
“distraction” of narrative is absent -  just as the “distraction” of music, as we have 
seen, is absent from Cage’s 4 ’33” -  it is “the material passage of time” itself that 
comes to the fore.37 Whereas for Cage the audience could be made aware of time by 
silencing the music, for Le Grice this can similarly be achieved in cinema “by
35 Malcolm Le Grice, “Improvising Time and Image,” Filmwaves 114 (Winter/Spring 2001), 15-18.
18 cited.
36 Ibid.
37 Le Grice, Abstract Film and Beyond, 121.
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reducing the information within the film” to bare essentials.38 Thus the loops operate 
“in the rhythmic sense,” as a visual metronome or temporal scansion, which, 
however, being differential, also communicates something of time’s intrinsic 
unrepeatability.39 For indeed, time itself, in Le Grice’s view, is not only “a ‘concrete’ 
dimension of cinema” -  something cinema captures, re-presents and, even, 
materially embodies -  but, in fact, “the dominant dimension of cinematic 
experience,” where time is spent.40
So, ostensibly, here lies the contradiction. The film loop, a distillation of the 
principles of repetition and reproduction constitutive of cinema as such (as a 
technology and a practice), would naturally seem to incarnate an idea of time as 
inherently repeatable, or indeed, repetitive, as in Cioran’s notion of the “wrong 
eternity” of modernity.41 Devoid of apparent extrinsic changes -  as the copied and 
re-copied clip in Bardo Follies -  or, even, intrinsic ones, as with Higgins’ 
continuous projection, the loop could intuitively seem to manifest and, indeed, 
reiterate Bazin’s view that cinema “embalms” and “repeats” time, thus making time 
itself somewhat repeatable and reproducible 42 A projection-loop in particular 
displays and enacts the reversibility of film as such; its recursiveness could even be 
assimilated to the circularity of time the relentless revolution of the hands of the 
clock -  considered in absolute rather than, in fact, as it normally is, in relative terms, 
designates. Yet, this repeatability of film that the loop makes plain would, in the 
1960s, often be seen to manifest the unrepeatability of time, rather than its
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 110.
40 Le Grice, Abstract Film and Beyond, 118; and Le Grice, “Improvising Time and Image,” 18.
41 Cioran, The Fall into Time, 174.
42 Andre Bazin, “The Ontology o f the Photographic Image” [1945], in What Is Cinema?, vol. 1, trans. 
by Hugh Gray (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1967), 14. Bazin, “Death Every Afternoon,” 
68.
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repetitiveness; its evanescence, rather than its permanence; its irreversibility, rather 
than its reversibility.
In fact, precisely because time comes to be understood as relative and 
multiple in the course of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (within an “anti- 
Newtonian” model, as Smithson wrote, “time breaks down into many times”43) its 
direction becomes tighter. Once it is no longer an absolute, homogeneous “ether,” 
equal at every point, but is understood as inextricable from the processes and 
substances which it is used to describe, then time itself comes to bear the signs, so to 
speak, of its own temporality.44 These processes of relativization and multiplication 
of time are, in part, at once demonstrated and constructed through cinema itself. For 
cinema is par excellence a system of interlocking temporalities: the moments 
captured by the camera (a Barthesian “that-has-been” whether acted or not45); the 
fictional time of the unfolding story; the length of the film and the duration of its 
screening (which, as we have noted, may differ); the time -  as Le Grice puts it -  
“invested” by the audience. And cinema, though perhaps counterintuitively, is 
similarly implicated in the thought and embodiment of irreversibility.46 Indeed, 
cinema’s technology itself could, and in the 1960s often would, be taken as “proof’ 
of it
In arguing for his “anti-Newtonian” view of time, Smithson did in fact start 
from the apparent disproof of irreversibility cinema would seem to afford. For, he
43 Robert Smithson, “Entropy and the New Monuments’^  1966], in Smithson, The Collected Writings, 
ed. Jack Flam (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1996), 11.
44 Cf. Ronald Schleifer, Modernism and Time: The Logic o f  Abundance in Literature, Science, and  
Culture 1880-1930  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), esp. the Introduction.
45 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida [1980], trans. Richard Howard (London: Random House Vintage, 
2000). For a discussion o f cinema, reality and fiction inspired by Bazin, see: Stanley Cavell, The 
World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology o f  Film [1971] (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
enlarged edition 1979). For this point in particular, see the appendix: “More o f the World Viewed” 
[1974], esp. 184.
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considers, if we filmed an irreversible experiment, “we could prove the reversibility 
of eternity by showing the film backwards.” “But then,” he immediately counters, 
“sooner or later the film itself would crumble or get lost and enter the state of 
irreversibility.”47 Certainly when, in the mid-1960s, Smithson wrote this, there was 
no short supply of contemporary avant-garde works demonstrating, and playing out, 
the “crumbling” of film.
In Film in Which There Appear Edge Lettering, Sprocket Holes, Dirt 
Particles, Etc., Landow self-reflexively appropriated technical footage, the “China 
Girl” of colour-density test patches, to display, among other things -  including, in 
fact, the film frame itself -  this very decay. Initially, as mentioned, the film was 
shown on a continuous loop. As the title announces, the “dirt particles” accumulating 
on its surface in this process are an integral feature of the work itself. The reference 
to signs of wear and tear draws attention to the fact that the more film is projected, 
the more it deteriorates -  and the more frequently, the more rapidly; as, indeed, with 
the projected loops that were again becoming popular in those years. In fact, Landow 
himself, having shown this brief clip on looped projection for some time, had it 
reprinted on continuous film, albeit without repairing or cleaning away the dirt and 
scratches that had meanwhile accrued. So where the accumulation of “dirt particles” 
signals decay and temporal irreversibility, their “fixing” on the new print takes a 
“snapshot” of this very process from within, while also, of course, partly attempting 
to alleviate the problem. The following year, Landow presented more extreme 
deterioration in Bardo Follies. Indeed, here it seems that rather than trying to delay 
it, Landow, in a way, “accelerated” it by eventually burning the very footage whose
46 Cf. Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence o f  Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), esp. chapter 4  “Temporal Irreversibility and the Logic 
of Statistics.”
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recurrence the first part of the film is literally made of. At one point, in fact, this 
sequence of a waving woman -  insistently repeated in space as well as time, 
appearing, as it does, not only sequentially, but also tripled across the split screen -  
is replaced by an image of melting celluloid. Some of the initial footage, as Landow 
explains, was “heated in a specially modified projector, projected and refilmed” from 
the screen, so that “the melting of the film engenders all of the subsequent 
‘images.’”48 A few years earlier, Nam June Paik, with perhaps the most minimal set­
up possible, had also employed the repetitiveness of the loop to highlight the 
inevitability of erosion and the unrepeatability of time. His Zen for Film (1964) 
consisted of a loop of plain, unexposed film leader, destined to be projected again 
and again and allowed to collect dust and scratches until, eventually, it might 
become unplayable. This is a repetition in which “the image,” as Ina Blom has put it, 
“always changes” and is, in fact, the very imprint of the film’s own deterioration.49 
Intrinsically reversible -  as, indeed, its abstract “imagery” could equally be played 
both forward and backward -  Zen for Film nevertheless crystallizes the 
irreversibility of time itself. Dirt and scratches show that the loop’s repetitions are 
temporally cumulative: while the film rewinds back to the “beginning,” the time 
already past does not.
The film’s apparent “cyclicality” is therefore precisely that which would 
confirm Smithson’s conviction that things do not go “in cycles,” since on the 
contrary “there’s really no return.”50 Indeed, “cinema,” Smithson suggest, offers at
47 Robert Smithson, “A Tour o f the Monuments o f Passaic, New Jersey” [1967], in The Collected  
Writings, 74.
48 See Lux online catalogue, <http://catalogue.lux.org.uk/alphabetical/index.html> . accessed 4  
October 2005.
49 Ina Blom, “Boredom and Oblivion,” in Ken Friedman, ed., The Fluxus Reader (Chichester: 
Academy Editions, 1998), 83.
50 Robert Smithson, “Entropy Made Visible: Interview with Alison Sky” [1973], in The Collected  
Writings, 309.
best “an illusive or temporary escape from physical dissolution.”51 What for Bazin 
was cinema’s “exorbitant privilege” of “embalming” and “repeating” time is, for 
Smithson a “false immortality,” which “gives the viewer an illusion of control over 
eternity -  but ‘the superstars’ are fading.”52 Thus from the material repeatability and 
reproducibility of film, to the repetitive structures and codes -  such as those of the 
“star system” -  of cinema as an industry and a cultural practice, cinema is for 
Smithson the embodiment of the “deceivingly” eternal revolutions of, and within, the 
universe as a whole. Indeed, perhaps it is as a reminder of this “fading” that 
Smithson’s own film, Spiral Jetty (1970) -  among other things, a document of his 
earthwork of the same name -  starts with a close-up on a still of the sun and its 
flares. As it prefaces the beginning of cinematic movement with the idea of its end in 
(and return to) stasis, is this “frozen” image also a sort of memento of cosmic 
cooling, of a time when even the apparently never-ending orbiting of stars and 
planets will have come to a stop?53 Whilst some see the sun as “the giver of life [...] 
to me it is a portent of entropy, a kind of groaning circle of hot marmalade,” 
Smithson once explained: “I used a stock shot of the sun at the beginning of the film 
as what I would call entropic footage.”54
For, indeed, the tightness of time’s direction is for Smithson both included 
within, and demonstrated by, the concept of entropy. This was a buzzword of the 
period -  frequently invoked not only by Smithson, but also by a host of other artists, 
filmmakers, novelists, critics and scholars. And while entropy could be many things
51 Robert Smithson, “A Tour o f the Monuments o f Passaic, New Jersey” [1967], in The Collected  
Writings, 74.
52 Ibid. It is, also, probably more than accidental that this staged decay or even “death” of celluloid 
coincides with the introduction o f video technology.
53 In a recent article, Andrew V. Uroskie, drawing on Deleuze’s notion o f the time-image, charts an 
affinity between time, and stillness, in Smithson’s Spiral Jetty and Chris Marker’s La Jetee (1962), by 
which Smithson had been fascinated. See: Andrew V. Uroskie, “La Jetee en Spirale: Robert 
Smithson’s stratigraphic Cinema,” G rey Room 19 (Spring 2005), 54-79.
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at once, and mean different things to different people -  perhaps just because, as 
Smithson said, there were in fact many “different entropies” -  a core meaning was 
nevertheless shared across this spectrum: that of functioning as a reminder of “The 
End.”55 And so it is to entropy that we now turn.
Entropy
Smithson’s verification of what he calls “the irreversibility of eternity” through the 
technology of cinema is, so to speak, a “counter- proof’ of it. For in the preceding 
paragraph he had in fact set out “to prove” it “by using a jejune experiment for 
proving entropy” (which, indeed, is the very experiment that, as we have seen, he 
contemplates filming).56 Both these quasi-scientific demonstrations conclude 
Smithson’s presentation of industrial and construction sites around his hometown in 
“A Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey” (1967), and are in fact triggered 
by the last “monument” he describes: a children’s sand box. Whilst this object may 
seem thematically out of place, aesthetically it blends in with the other sites, 
photographed by Smithson with his Kodak Instamatic: like the others, it is deserted; 
and its metal frame could well be some kind of industrial ruin. More than 
recapitulating it, the sand box illuminates the whole article. For “[ujnder the dead 
light of the Passaic afternoon,” Smithson writes, “[t]his sand-box somehow doubled
54 Kenneth Baker, “Talking with Robert Smithson” [c.1971], in Lynne Cooke, Karen Kelly et al., eds., 
Robert Smithson: Spiral Jetty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 160 and 159.
55 Robert Smithson, “ ...The Earth, Subject to Cataclysms, Is a Cruel Master,” interview with Gregoire 
MUller [1971], in The Collected Writings, 256.
56 Smithson, “A Tour o f the Monuments o f Passaic, New Jersey,” 74.
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as an open grave.”57 Thus it is this funereal image that inspires him to talk of, and “to 
prove,” the irreversibility of time via entropy:
Picture in your mind’s eye the sand box divided in half with black sand on 
one side and white sand on the other. We take a child and have him run 
hundreds of times clockwise in the box until the sand gets mixed and begins 
to turn grey; after that we have him run anti-clockwise, but the result will not 
be a restoration of the original division but a greater degree of greyness and 
an increase in entropy.
Coined in 1865 by Rudolf Clausius, the term “entropy” somehow at once 
fixed and rendered culturally mobile the content of the second law of 
thermodynamics, which a number of scientists had elaborated through various 
experiments and formulations in the course of the nineteenth century. The second 
law established the principle of the dissipation of energy: in a closed system, when 
energy is turned into work, there is always some that escapes conversion and 
degrades into unusable waste, something that cannot be converted back into energy. 
Entropy is the measure of this degradation and waste, which, in a closed system -  
and the universe as a whole, too, is considered to be such a system -  is inevitably 
bound to increase. Thus, given this -  in many cases -  verifiable irreversibility, one of 
the consequences of the law of entropy is a conceptualisation of time itself as 
irreversible: entropy, that is, functions as “time’s arrow.”59 Furthermore, energy is
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 See, among others: Peter Coveney and Roger Highfield, The Arrow o f  Time: The Quest to Solve 
Science’s Greatest M ysteries [1990] (London: Flamingo: 1991); Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, 
Order Out o f  Chaos: M an’s Dialogue with Nature (London: Flamingo, 1984); Richard Morris, Tim e’s
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thermodynamically measured as heat, which tends to distribute evenly across a given 
system. Therefore a decrease of energy and consequent increase in entropy also 
corresponds to a move towards thermal equilibrium -  and, indeed, progressive 
cooling. In turn, since heat designates a state of high molecular movement, an 
increasing degree of entropy would mean a state of low, and eventually null, 
molecular movement.
Smithson sometimes drew on this strictly thermodynamics definition, as in 
his famous reading of minimalist sculpture as entropic. So, for example, Dan 
Flavin’s neons are “frozen” action and Robert Morris’s work “conveys a mood of 
vast immobility,” “engulfed by many types of stillness: delayed action, inadequate 
energy, general slowness, an all over sluggishness.”60 The above example of the 
sand, however, is derived from the statistical reconceptualization of the term, which 
establishes entropy as the index of disorder of a system -  and disorder, in turn, as the 
more likely development of a system over time than order. In thermodynamic terms, 
this means that in a condition of maximum entropy high-energy molecules (i.e. 
molecules possessing “heat,” and therefore “mobile”), and low-energy molecules 
(colder and therefore slower, if not static) have thoroughly “mixed” within a system. 
Counterintuitively then, in this context the disorder of a system is greater when its 
degree of thermal -  and kinetic -  uniformity is higher. Thus the increasing evenness 
of the colour of the sand -  its turning into overall greyness -  is, somewhat 
paradoxically, the measure of its increasing chaos in entropic terms. Developed early 
on in the history of the concept -  James Clerk Maxwell popularized it with a 
prosopopoeia in 1870, and Ludwig Boltzmann devised a formula for probabilistic 
quantification a few years later -  this statistical interpretation became increasingly
Arrows: Scientific Attitudes Towards Time (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), on whose history
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current as entropy entered “the information age.”61 Revamped by its application to 
information theories -  ideas that, among others, the mathematician Norbert Wiener 
exposed for the layperson in his The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and 
Society (1950; rev. 1954)62 -  the term enjoyed a resurgence in the 1960s. Indeed, it 
is then that entropy became popular in the arts, if not even popularized through them, 
as in Thomas Pynchon’s almost “didactic” exposition in “Entropy” (1960), the short 
story providing the core ideas for his more famous The Crying of Lot 49 (1966).63
The science of communication systems championed by Wiener was based on 
the idea that the amount of entropy -  disorder, or indeed, as it may also be called in 
this context, “noise” -  of a system could somehow be managed (cybernetics comes 
from the Greek for “steerman”). Set in two separate flats within the same building, 
Pynchon’s novella uses the one below to illustrate cybernetic entropy -  and the 
regulation, or lack thereof, of the transmission of information -  and the one above 
for thermodynamic entropy. And ultimately it is the latter that “wins.” Downstairs, 
where a chaotic party with people of all sorts coming and going is in full swing, it 
proves possible to stall, if temporarily, the increasing disorganization of the system 
from a “communication” point of view. Yet, these measures appear futile in the face
and account of entropy I have also relied.
60 Smithson, “Entropy and the New Monuments,” 12, 14 and 19.
61 See: Bruce Clarke and Linda Dalrymple Henderson, eds., From Energy to Information: 
Representation in Science and Technology, Art, and Literature (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2002), especially Bruce Clarke, “From Thermodynamics to Virtuality.” For a study o f the early 
development o f statistics, see: Ian Hacking, The Taming o f  Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).
62 Norbert Wiener, The Human Use o f  Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society [1950], revised edition 
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1954). Another early exponent -  and follower o f Wiener -  was the 
British William Ross Ashby, whose An Introduction to Cybernetics (London: Chapman and Hall, 
1956), as opposed to Wiener’s discursive and philosophical justification o f the discipline in The 
Human Use o f  Human Beings, provides a more technical presentation o f its principles, aimed at 
practically promoting its interdisciplinary application. For a discussion o f works concerned with the 
application o f cybernetics as such, rather than entropic concepts derived from it, see: Edward A. 
Shanken, “Cybernetics and Art: Cultural Convergence in the 1960s,” in Clarke and Henderson, From  
Energy to Information.
63 Thomas Pynchon, “Entropy” [1960], in Slow Learner: Early Stories (London: Cape, 1985); and 
Thomas Pynchon The Crying o f  Lot 49  [1966] (London: Cape, 1967).
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of what is revealed upstairs. There, in fact, the characters know that the problem is 
much larger: the world outside has been at a constant temperature for days. This is 
the “thermal equilibrium” of physics’ entropy, which, with respect to the universe as 
a whole, announces its ultimate “heat death.” Whereas, living in a sort of 
greenhouse, they have been keeping their windows and doors shut, the people 
downstairs, obviously, have not. Perhaps perceiving that steps of this kind to isolate 
themselves are merely a delay of the inevitable, one of the characters breaks open the 
window.
In fact, just as in Pynchon’s story “heat death” will have its way, so the 
optimism of Wiener himself about the effectiveness of cybernetics is underscored -  
and tempered -  by his acceptance of the inevitable increase of thermodynamic 
entropy. Whereas the entropy of a restricted domain may successfully be controlled, 
at the universal level this power eludes us: thus ours can only be “a local and 
temporary fight against the Niagara of increasing entropy.”64 And whilst, in Wiener’s 
view, this is no excuse for fatalism, entropy is nevertheless a “compelling” and 
“persuasive” “memento m o r i that communicates to us “the very true sense in which 
we are shipwrecked passengers on a doomed planet.”65 Even if adapted for the 
“information age,” this apocalyptic understanding of entropy remained pervasive -  if 
not even prevalent. Certainly, it is this that Ballard evoked in his plethora of 
cataclysmic scenarios, from which -  as well as, among other things, from Wiener’s 
ideas- Smithson himself drew inspiration.66 Indeed, the “sluggishness” Smithson
64 Wiener, The Human Use o f  Human Beings, 134.
65 Ibid., 26.
66 An epigraph from Ballard’s The Terminal Beach opens Robert Smithson’s “The Artist as Site-Seer; 
or, a Dintorphic Essay” [1966-67], in The Collected Writings, 340. In this posthumously published 
text, referring to a number o f other novels by Ballard, including The Waiting Grounds and The Voices 
o f  Time -  Smithson draws on their eerie, devastated landscapes, and the presence of enigmatic 
“megaliths” therein. Quotes from both Wiener and Ballard appear in the collage o f epigraphs around 
Smithson’s own main text in his “Quasi-Infinites and the Waning o f Space,” originally published in 
the November 1966 issue of the Arts M agazine, now in The Collected Writings. Smithson also glosses
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saw in Morris’s sculptures is at some level cognate with the extreme lethargy Ballard 
describes in ‘The Voices of Time,” probably a metabolic response to the coming end 
of the universe, for which one of the characters, Kaldren, gets a “live” countdown 
through a strange machine.67 For, in fact, in Smithson’s view, the work of Morris, 
Flavin, Judd, LeWitt and others functioned as a sort of countdown too: it “provided a 
visible analog for the Second Law of Thermodynamics,” whose forecast is that “in 
the ultimate future the whole universe will burn out.”68
Yet, if thermodynamic interpretations -  with the cosmic “End” they seemed 
to postulate -  provided the bottom line, the application of a concept of entropy to 
information theories was far from inconsequential. Though entropy had had cultural 
resonance from the outset -  Henri Bergson, among others, tried to discourage 
pessimistic extrapolations in Creative Evolution 69~ its expansion in this direction 
promoted a wider, and wide-ranging, proliferation of the concept. In part, this is due 
to the fact that the various strands of information theory, cybernetics and systems 
theory emerging and developing in the postwar decades are based on an abstract 
definition of “system,” designed, in fact, to be applicable to any type of phenomena, 
be they “natural” or “cultural.”70 In principle, almost anything can be treated, and
Wiener’s views in “Entropy Made V isible,” 302. Indeed, the inventory o f Smithson’s extensive 
library shows this to have contained classics such as P.W. Bridgman’s The Nature o f  
Thermodynamics (1941), as well as contemporary information-theory studies, such as, in addition to 
Wiener’s The Human Use o f  Human Beings, John Robinson Pierce’s Symbols, Signals and Noise: The 
Nature and Process o f  Communication (1961), and John Von Neumann’s Theory o f  Self-Reproducing 
Automata (1966). For the complete list o f Smithson’s library, see: Ann Reynolds, Robert Smithson: 
Learning from  New Jersey and Elsewhere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), 297-345. Pamela M. Lee 
discusses links between Wiener’s ideas and Smithson in Chronophobia: On Time in the Art o f  the 
1960s (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), chapter 4.
67 Ballard, “The Voices o f Time.”
68 Smithson, “Entropy and the New Monuments,” 11.
69 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution [1907], trans. Arthur Mitchell (Mineola: Dover Publications, 
1998), 241-246.
70 Whilst all these disciplines are at some level related, broadly originating within the field of 
mathematics in the wake o f the development o f artificial intelligence in the postwar decades, they are 
not totally congruent. Strictly speaking, “information theory” was founded by Claude Shannon and 
Warren Weaver in the late 1940s (see their The M athematical Theory o f  Communication [Urbana: 
University o f Illinois Press, 1949]). At about the same time, in 1945, Ludwig von Bertalanffy first
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studied, as a system. And whereas these disciplines were essentially predicated on 
the limitation of entropy, one of the consequences of this kind of thinking was, 
ironically, its “multiplication,” as disparate systems might be seen to have their own 
kind of entropy -  be it chaos or noise, waste or corrosion.
So just as time, as Smithson put it, was really “many times,” entropy became 
many entropies. Indeed, Smithson himself hoped some day “to compile all the 
different entropies.”71 For where “geology has its own kind of entropy,” “the current 
Watergate situation,” he elsewhere explained, was another “example.”72 And of 
course, as I have mentioned, art had its entropy too. Where, on his part, Smithson 
was particularly “interested in collaborating” with “geological entropy” in his own 
work, he saw parallel -  if, we could say, “synthetic” -  forms of it in contemporary 
art.73 As well as in the “stationary” look of minimalist sculpture, he observed it in the 
strategies of contemporary avant-garde cinema, as in “the deteriorated images” of 
Maxwell’s Demon (1968), Frampton’s own tribute to the nineteenth-century 
physicist -  and the fictional being the latter had introduced to explain entropy.74 
“After the structural film,” Smithson wrote -  referring rather, it seems, to what the 
structural film itself left in its own wake, than to a phase of filmmaking after it -
announced his “general systems theory.” A s he explained in the preface o f his General System Theory 
- a collection of papers written in the arc o f four decades, and first published in the US in 1968, and 
the UK in 1971 -  “general system theory” is a “broad view that far transcends technological 
problems.” For Bertalanffy, systems theory represents “a re-orientation that has become necessary in 
science in general and in the gamut o f disciplines from physics to biology, to the behavioural and 
social sciences and to philosophy,” where the increasing complexity of structures requires an 
“holistic” approach, a consideration o f the organized “whole.” See: Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, General 
System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications [1968] (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1971), xi. Ross Ashby (see above, footnote 62) was one o f the founding fathers o f both cybernetics 
and  systems theory. For a discussion o f systems theory and cybernetics in the art o f the 1960s, Cf. 
Lee, Chronophobia, esp. 62-76 and 233-256.
71 Smithson, “ ...The Earth, Subject to Cataclysms, Is a Cruel Master,” 256.
72 Ibid., and Smithson, “Entropy Made V isible,” 301.
73 Smithson, “ ...The Earth, Subject to Cataclysms, Is a Cruel Master,” 256.
74 Smithson, “Entropy and the New Monuments,” 11; and Robert Smithson, “A Cinematic Atopia” 
[1971], in The Collected Writings, 139.
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“there is the sprawl of entropy.”75 Though he does not mention them directly, it is 
also likely that he saw this in Zen for Film, as well as in the burning celluloid of 
Bardo Follies, in which, as P. Adams Sitney said, “the screen itself seems to throb 
and be consumed [...] the film itself seems to die.”76
Only a few years earlier, Mekas and Max Kozloff had similarly noted -  and 
appreciated -  “the sprawl of entropy” in Antonioni’s films too. Reviewing Ueclisse 
for his Village Voice column in 1962, Mekas admired the general sense of 
deterioration and death exuding from people and landscapes alike in what, as some 
do, he liked to refer to as Antonioni’s “trilogy” (of L’avventura, 1960, La notte,
1961, and Ueclisse, 1962). With the same fascination for the decay of the new with 
which Smithson will write of Passaic, Mekas singled out how, in La notte, Antonioni 
lingered on “the walls peeling off as if touched by some radioactive disease” and 
“the rusty abandoned railroad tracks” of “the suburbs of modern Milan.”77 Kozloff, 
on the other hand, was obviously thinking in cybernetic terms when he wrote that 
Blow up followed an “entropic format”: “the whole piece is a network of [...] 
dissipations,” in which “the central event submerges mysteriously within a welter of 
unforeseen ‘data.’”78 It was indeed in alarm at this widespread courting of entropic 
processes -  whether “thermodynamic,” “informatic” or, in fact, both -  that Gestalt 
psychologist Rudolf Arnheim wrote Entropy and Art (1971), trying to argue, instead, 
for the pursuit of “good form” and “order.”79 And, in a similar vein, it had actually 
been the contemplation of the relative rarity of “beauty” and “order” in the arts that
75 Smithson, “A Cinematic Atopia,” 139.
76 P. Adams Sitney, “Structural Film” [1969] in P. Adams Sitney, ed., Film Culture Reader [1970] 
(New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 340.
77 Mekas, Movie Journal, 51. The entry is entitled: “February 18,1962: Antonioni and La notte.”
78 Max Kozloff, “The Blow-Up” [1967], in Roy Huss, ed., Focus on Blow-up (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall, 1971), 63.
79 Rudolf Arnheim, Entropy and Art: An Essay on D isorder and Order (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1971).
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had prompted Wiener to make his more general -  and pessimistic -  remark on “the 
Niagara of increasing entropy.”80
Another repercussion of this re-thinking of entropy in terms, or even just in 
the light of, information and systems theories is an understanding of systems as 
being not as closed as those of classical thermodynamics. One of the founders of 
systems theory, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, largely based his thought on the 
observation of biological systems -  “open” par excellence, because reliant on the 
exchange of both matter and energy with their environment.81 In fact, in the second 
half of the twentieth century, even thermodynamics moved further away from the 
“ideal” of a closed system, with which -  having essentially been developed for, and 
applied to, the study of engines and machinery -  it had primarily been concerned at 
the outset. Notably, Ilya Prigogine applied thermodynamics itself to the analysis of 
the behaviour of open systems, in order to observe how their communications and 
exchanges with their surroundings enable them to delay thermodynamic equilibrium, 
maximum entropy: en route to entropic disorder, even order might arise, albeit 
randomly and temporarily. Indeed, it was precisely for his contributions to “non­
equilibrium thermodynamics” through his study of “dissipative structures” that 
Prigogine was awarded the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1977.82
So these different entropies ultimately highlighted not the “sealed” status of 
the systems to which they pertained but, on the contrary, their interconnectedness.
As systems come to be perceived as relative to each other and interdependent -
80 Wiener, The Human Use o f  Human Beings, 134. For a re-evaluation of entropic processes in the arts 
-  including experimental filmmaking -  o f the 1960s and 1970s, see Yve Alain Bois and Rosalind E. 
Krauss, Formless: A U ser’s Guide (New York: Zone Books, 1997).
81 Von Bertalanffy, General System Theory, esp. chapters 5 and 6.
82 Working on irreversible processes since the 1940s, Prigogine had elaborated a “theorem of 
minimum entropy production” in 1945. Most o f his fundamental research was published throughout 
the 1960s. See, for example: Paul Glansdorff and Ilya Prigogine, Thermodynamic Theory o f  Structure, 
Stability and Fluctuations (New York: W iley, 1971). In 1984, with Isabelle Stengers, he published the 
popular science book Order Out o f  Chaos.
238
rather than autonomous and absolute so their various entropies are seen to be 
deeply imbricated. If for Smithson entropy summarized the “look” of a certain art, 
this aesthetic entropy, in turn, would function not so much as a “representation” of 
wider phenomena but would be aimed at revealing how the artwork itself is part and 
parcel of these very phenomena. Smithson, of course, made this quite evident with 
his own art. If the earthworks are by definition exposed to, if not indeed made of,\ 
materials and processes in the outer environment, Smithson’s Nonsites -  an “indoor 
earthwork” -  “transported” the outdoor inside the gallery itself, reproducing the 
actual site by “analogy” or “metaphor” (a map or a model), through the logic of the 
fragment (piles of rocks, sand, salt) or, as with the film of Spiral Jetty, the index.83 
As, built around this relationality and porosity of inside and outside, Smithson’s 
dialectic of site and non-site postulates the openness of systems -  the notion of 
exchanges, traffic, from one to the other -  it also suggests the idea of an equivalence 
between them.
Ballard vividly suggested this intertwining of, and equivalence between, 
“systems” -  and indeed their entropies -  in “The Voices of Time.” Through the 
terminals of his intergalactic telegraph, Kaldren receives not one but many accurate 
“diminishing mathematical progression[s],” from an array of celestial bodies.84 Each 
of them is wiring through the time left to its own end, one of which also happens to 
coincide with that of the end of the universe itself. In Powers (the protagonist)’s eye, 
the discovery of these countdowns turns the starry sky into “an endless babel, the 
time-song of a thousand galaxies overlaying each other.”85 The “countdown” to his
83 Robert Smithson, “A Provisional Theory o f Non-Sites” [1968], The Collected Writings, 364. On the 
Spiral Jetty film as “non-site” o f the homonym earthwork, see: George Baker, “The Cinema Model,” 
in Cooke and Kelly, Robert Smithson: Spiral Jetty, 84ff; and Elizabeth E. Childs, “Robert Smithson 
and Film: The Spiral Jetty Reconsidered,” Arts M agazine 58 (October 1981), 68-81.
84 Ballard, “The Voices o f Time,” 33.
85 Ibid., 39.
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own foretold death is measured with similar precision -  indeed, by Powers himself, 
who also keeps an accurate diary of his fast shrinking periods of wakefulness. 
Ultimately, however, it would seem to be irrelevant that Powers’ own end is only 
three months away, while that of the universe is counted on a fifty-million-digit 
number. ‘Think of yourself in a wider context,” Kaldren tells him:
Every particle in your body, every grain of sand, every galaxy carries the 
same signature. As you’ve just said, you know what the time is now, so what 
does the rest matter? There’s no need to go on looking at the clock.86
For Kaldren, that is -  and as Powers, too, appears to realize -  it is not so much the 
count of time that counts, or even the fact that each organism or thing has its own 
time, as the fact that each shares the inevitability of an entropic ending. As each 
individual end is inscribed within, and partakes of, ‘The End,” temporal 
irreversibility becomes that by which things -  or indeed, systems -  are “united”: 
different yet equal. In fact, this idea of body, sand and galaxy carrying “the same 
signature” resonates with the claim advanced by Deleuze in Difference and 
Repetition -  even as Deleuze’s vitalistic emphasis may seem at the antipodes of 
Ballard’s apparent gloom. For in some respects the multiplicity in unity, or manifold 
“oneness,” that underscores Ballard’s story is also indeed what Deleuze celebrates in 
the concluding lines of his landmark book of the time: “A single and same voice for 
the thousand-voiced multiple, a single and same Ocean for all the drops, a single 
clamour of being for all beings.”87 Ballard’s story of interlocking “ends” crystallizes
86 Ibid., 35.
87 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 304. For a discussion o f univocity and multiplicity in Deleuze, 
see: Alain Badiou, in Deleuze: The Clamour o f  Being [1997], trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002).
how, as Bruce Clarke has put it, in the cross-over “from energy to information the 
concept of entropy initiated an ongoing shift away from the vision of a simple or 
homogeneous universe” and “toward a cognition of complexity,” in which 
phenomena are nevertheless “reunified],” among other things, “in terms of a shared 
order of multiplicity and irreversible time.”88
Irreversible and even, in a way, “linear,” time in Ballard’s story is, however, 
not “progressive.” Indeed, a great part of the allure entropy held during the period 
was due to the fact that it seemed to rid time of the idea of “progress.” For, if entropy 
proved the irreversibility and uni-directionality of time itself -  but a uni­
directionality that, structured by randomness and chance, as in the sand box of 
Smithson’s experiment, could entail a plurality of routes to the same “destination”-  
it also, in so doing, stripped time of its progressivist underpinnings. This is because, 
as Smithson put it, entropy is “evolutionary, but it’s not evolutionary in terms of any 
idealism.”89
Frampton spelled out quite bluntly his conviction that entropy and progress 
are mutually exclusive:
art doesn’t progress, of course; we don’t progress either, we are just subject 
to more and more entropy, right? That’s the gist of the dust to dust business.90
88 Clarke, “From Thermodynamics to Virtuality,” 27.
89 Smithson, “Entropy Made V isible,” 303. Among the books in Smithson’s library, there was also 
Harold Blum’s Time's Arrow and Evolution  (1951), an attempt to argue that thermodynamics and 
biological evolution are not mutually exclusive, but that, in fact, even living systems obey the law of 
entropy. As for Prigogine, so for Blum “order” and “organization” can randomly arise en route to 
entropic disorder. Cf. Harold F. Blum, Time's Arrow and Evolution  [1951], 3rd edition (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1968).
90 “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” Afterimage 4  (Autumn 1972), 44-77. 71 cited.
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Entropy, here, is actually what for Frampton disproves “progress”: we do not 
progress because we are subject to “more and more” entropy. As we have seen, and 
for Frampton too, entropy is a question of degree, a measure; and one that is 
perceived to go on growing until a bursting point. As such, it can designate both this 
final state itself -  whether a cosmic or a more localized “death” -  and the 
incremental path to it, whose pace, indeed, may vary. It could be “infinitesimal,”97 as 
in the phenomena of geological erosion that attracted Smithson; more rapid, as in the 
burning to ashes of the photographs in Frampton’s nostalgia (1971); or, even, 
sudden and violent, as in the explosion in Zabriskie Point. So, whilst there cannot be 
progress, there is, however, still process. In both Smithson’s and Frampton’s 
understanding, entropy entails change, but only change that travels in the direction of 
destruction, of pulverization, of things turning “to dust”: a “system,” as Smithson put 
it, “deteriorates and starts to break apart and there’s no way that you can really piece 
it back together again.”92
After all, this was a time in which -  as entropy expanded from the realm of 
“energy” to that of “information” -  “energy” itself came often to be coupled with the 
word “nuclear.” So, in Ueclisse, Antonioni had evoked nuclear energy’s potential 
for destruction as “the” constant - yet somewhat intangible -  threat of the cold war. 
The newspaper headlines reading “The Atomic Age” and “Peace Is Weak” in the 
concluding sequence are rather direct evocations of it -  and, with hindsight, have 
even been seen as premonitory of the mood of the Cuban missile crisis, which the 
making of the film preceded by a few months. Yet, a subtler sense of “looming, 
unidentifiable catastrophe” impregnates the film as a whole.93 And in fact, from the 
very start, the modernist tower visible from the window of Riccardo’s flat (in
91 Smithson, “Entropy and the New Monuments,” 13.
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Rome’s EUR district), is uncannily reminiscent of a mushroom-shaped cloud.94 
Meanwhile, however, the actual devastating effects of nuclear weapons could be 
physically seen -  not only, of course, in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
but, also, in the series of atomic-bomb tests carried out throughout those decades. 
And certainly the spectre of nuclear devastation, firmly rooted in the “collective 
imaginary” of the time, may partly be behind the irreparable pulverization both 
Frampton and Smithson evoke (Smithson specifically drew on the bomb-stricken 
landscape of Ballard’s “The Terminal Beach” for one of his essays).95 This sense of 
irrevocable disintegration is dramatically and violently rendered in Zabriskie Point's 
final scene, not only -  or not so much -  in the magnitude of the explosion itself but 
also, in fact, in its insistent return. For it is precisely through its cinematic repetition 
that the irreversibility of the explosion becomes manifest: the instant of destruction 
can be repeated many times but not “undone.” If anything, in fact, it is further 
magnified by being re-presented each time from slightly different angles.
If Zabriskie Point's blast summarizes entropy’s destructive potential, it also, 
at the same time, shows it to be a universal “leveller,” as it is in Ballard’s “The 
Voices of Time,” where entropic dissipation is the “signature” that makes things 
equal (in difference), and as it functions for Frampton and Smithson. The explosion 
“sends” a riot of disparate objects in a slow-motion flight into the sky. Books, com 
flakes, clothes, roast chickens, flowers: all chaotically come to share the same space. 
While on the one hand the objects themselves might have escaped (if temporarily) 
the literal levelling of “dust,” their disorderly crowding of the sky also suggests a
92Smithson, “Entropy Made V isible,” 301.
93 Ron Peck, “Chance Encounters,” Sight and Sound (December 1994), 61.
94 For a Lacanian reading o f this tower, see: Angelo Restivo, The Cinema o f  Economic M iracles: 
Visuality and Modernization in the Italian A rt Film (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), esp. 117- 
118.
95 See footnote 66.
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less literal kind of flight and of equalization: a flight from categories, a dissolution of 
hierarchies, a breaking through ranks. Certainly, at an obvious level, this blast is 
resonant, if not symbolic, of the students’ and Civil Rights protests of the late 1960s, 
whose riots at a Californian university campus actually start the film, and provide the 
initial incident out of which the plot develops. Yet, more subtly perhaps, it was 
precisely this effect that Mekas had already appreciated in the entropic scenarios of 
Antonioni’s “trilogy,” by the end of which, as he wrote:
people stare into each other and their surroundings, and the surroundings and 
the objects stare back at them, with a cold, unmerciful eye. Man and objects 
have become equals -  it is a terrifying state for man, but that’s where he is.96
And indeed, for Smithson, one of the fundamental operations of entropy was 
precisely this de-hierarchization, for in an entropic condition “all the classifications 
would lose their grids.”97 Irreversible and, at some level, “unidirectional” by 
definition, entropic disintegration would seem to eat up all traces of this very process 
in its own stride, leaving only a paradoxically chaotic uniformity, in which any 
boundary is abolished, and the very basis for identifying sense -  as “direction” and 
even, possibly, “meaning” -  is erased. Smithson’s understanding of entropy in these 
terms resonates with Calvino’s humorous account of the origin and development of 
the universe in twelve short tales in his Cosmicomics (1965), which in fact Smithson 
had in his library. For in Calvino’s view, the “logic of cybernetics applied to the 
history of the universe” reveals -  and, in this respect, as we have seen, Wiener 
himself would have agreed -  its gradual degeneration into meaningless chaos.
96 Mekas, Movie Journal, 76. The entry is entitled: “December 13, 1962: Antonioni and L ’ec lis se”
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Eventually, Calvino writes, “events come flowing down without interruption, like 
cement being poured.. .a doughy mass of events without form or direction, which 
surrounds, submerges, crushes all reasoning.”98
But this “doughy mass without form or direction” Calvino describes is, in the 
end, not very different from the “shapeless nebula,” “cold and dark” and without 
“any reference points” from whichs the universe itself sprang in the first place.99 
Similarly, rather than evolution minus idealism, entropy is actually, in Smithson’s 
view, more like an “evolution in reverse.”100 And so it is for Frampton. Because, in 
proposing entropy as “the gist of the dust to dust business,” Frampton is not so much 
talking of a turning to dust of things, as of a return to it. Not just a “non-progressive” 
evolution, a process of pulverization by which things are levelled and rendered 
equal, entropy comes to seem like more of an involution, a regression to a former 
state reminiscent of the Freudian death drive. Entropy, the very embodiment of 
irreversibility and unrepeatability, is here also somewhat circular. But rather than 
negating irreversibility, this circularity -  like that of the film loop -  enmeshes with it 
and confirms it, for it is understood to be the very product of temporal accumulation. 
Strangely then, entropy is indeed perhaps a bit like a loop, where beginning and 
ending, a “sense of extreme past and future,” meet and become intertwined, if not 
even indistinguishable -  as in “The Sand-Box Monument” of Passaic, which 
Smithson also calls “The Desert”; or, indeed, as in the desert itself.101
97 Smithson, “ ...The Earth, Subject to Cataclysm, Is a Cruel Master,” 256.
98 Italo Calvino, Cosmicomics [1965] (London: Picador, 1993), 93. There is perhaps an echo, here, 
with Smithson’s Asphalt Rundown (1969). This, the first o f a series o f works referred to as “flow s,” or 
“pours,” consisted in realising a load o f asphalt from a truck at the top o f a hill in an abandoned gravel 
quarry outside Rome.
"C alvino, Cosmicomics, 19.
100 Smithson, “Entropy and the New Monuments,” 15.
245
Desert
But where is the horizon-line? Odd enough, this vast circling sea does not always 
know a horizon; it sometimes reaches up and blends into the sky without any point of 
demarcation.
John C. Van Dyke, The Desert102
.. .the tire tracks in the sand, the old arastra by the gold mine’s mouth, the grove 
where the station used to be, the shiny power pylons marching over the horizon, the 
old windmill in the canyon and the new telephone repeater on the peak, the Indian 
pictograph and the anti-war graffiti...
Peter Reyner Banham, Scenes in American Deserta103
Smithson, Holt, and Van Dyke
For Smithson, the desert is the archetypal entropic space: the place of time and its 
irreversibility. Yet, his account (and physical pursuit) of the desert as the extreme 
embodiment of this condition, as the site of temporal accumulation and 
irreversibility as such, is deeply informed by -  if not, indeed, largely dependent on -  
notions of circularity, roundness, gyration. As we shall see, he is not alone in 
thinking about the desert and time in these terms; in seeing the desert, that is, as a 
sort of “looping” space -  and, as such, also intrinsically “cinematic” -  which,
101 Ibid.
102 John C. Van Dyke, The Desert: Further Studies in Natural Appearances [1901] (Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 55-56.
103 Peter Reyner Banham, Scenes in American D eserta  (London: Thames and Hudson, 1982), 199.
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paradoxically, can communicate the idea of time’s irrevocability through a sense of 
circularity. Antonioni’s own search for the desert, I will argue, also hinges on this. 
And in fact, Smithson’s “desert” itself is, arguably, in part mediated through 
Antonioni’s -  in particular that of Red Desert.
Explaining the genesis of his monumental earthwork Spiral Jetty (1970; ill. 
20, p. 348), a fifteen-foot-wide coil of earth and boulders extending for over fifteen 
hundred feet into the Great Salt Lake, Utah, this is how Smithson remembers his first 
encounter with the Great Basin Desert.104 (A desert “more terrible than any desert in 
North America except possibly Death Valley. [...] Even the Mormons could do little 
with it,” as Wallace Stegner wrote.105) Smithson and his wife Nancy Holt -  herself a 
land-art pioneer who will, in fact, use the Great Basin Desert as the location for one 
of her earthworks, Sun Tunnels (1973-1976) -  have been driving west from New 
York. At one point, Smithson recounts, “the valley spread into an uncanny 
immensity unlike the other landscapes we had seen.”106 “Hills,” he continues,
took on the appearance of melting solids, and glowed under amber light. We 
followed roads that glided away into dead ends. Sandy slopes turned into 
viscous masses of perception. [...] As I looked at the site, it reverberated out 
to the horizons only to suggest an immobile cyclone while flickering light 
made the entire landscape appear to quake. A dormant earthquake spread into 
the fluttering stillness, into a spinning sensation without movement. This site
104 Disappeared under water in the early 1970s, Spiral Jetty has re-emerged in 2002. Cooke and Kelly, 
Robert Smithson: Spiral Jetty, contains a portfolio o f photographs of the site taken in the past three 
years. Smithson’s earthwork is becoming an increasingly popular destination; in fact, so popular that 
the DIA Art Foundation in New York, in charge o f the site’s conservation, needs now to think of 
ways o f avoiding its being looted away by tourists taking a part o f it home as “souvenir.” See: James 
Trainor, “This Is Your Land,” Frieze 88 (January-February 2005), 94-97.
105 Wallace Stegner, Mormon Country [1942] (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1981), 44.
106 Robert Smithson, “The Spiral Jetty” [1972], in The Collected Writings, 145.
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was a rotary that enclosed itself in an immense roundness. From that gyrating 
space emerged the possibility of the Spiral Jetty. No ideas, no concepts, no 
systems, no structures, no abstractions could hold themselves together in the 
actuality of that evidence. My dialectics of site and nonsite whirled into an 
indeterminate state, where solid and liquid lost themselves in each other. It 
was as if the mainland oscillated with waves and pulsations, and the lake 
remained rock still. The shore of the lake became the edge of the sun, a 
boiling curve, an explosion rising into fiery prominence. Matter collapsing 
into the lake mirrored in the shape of a spiral. No sense wondering about 
classifications and categories, there were none.107
“The site was a rotary that enclosed itself in an immense roundness,” a “gyrating 
space,” a “spiral.”108 Described as both circular and circling, round and rotating, 
coiled and coiling, it is the very nature of this desert site, in Smithson’s account, to 
produce -  if not, even, to impose -  the idea and the shape of his yet unrealized work. 
These attributes of the desert, meanwhile, are also inherently cinematic. “A film is a 
spiral made up of frames,” Smithson writes later on in the essay, crisply drawing an 
equivalence between his two Spiral Jetty -  earthwork and film.109 And indeed this 
idea of the film being an “analogue” of the sculpture, as Elizabeth Childs pointed 
out, is made explicit in the film’s final sequence, in which spirals of film dangling 
off reels surround a photograph of Smithson’s jetty on the wall.110 If the sculpture is 
a spiral in the desert that redoubles the spiral of the desert as such, this attribute
107 Ibid., 145-146. -
108 The Oxford English Dictionary defines rotary (adjective and noun) as “something acting by 
rotation (rotary drill, rotary pump).” So, with this word, Smithson is also alluding to the remains of 
oil-extraction structures visible on the site, abandoned after unsuccessful attempts spanning several 
decades, which he has mentioned earlier in the text.
109 Smithson, “The Spiral Jetty,” 148.
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echoed from one to the other is also intrinsically cinematic. For Smithson in fact, the 
desert “belongs” to cinema. As the extended quotation above shows, and as George 
Baker recently noted, Rozel Point in the Great Salt Lake is lyrically described in 
terms of the “cinema-ized” site the artist had already outlined in “A Tour of the 
Monuments of Passaic.” “A physical site,” Baker explains “taken over by the 
condition of the cinematic.”111 More than merely looking cinematic, for Smithson the 
landscape is a sort of giant projector. Not just bathed in “flickering light,” the place 
itself is actually a “rotary” -  but a rotary whose oxymoronic combination of 
“fluttering stillness,” and “spinning [...] without movement” echoes the paradox at 
the heart of cinema itself.
In her description of Sun Tunnels (ill. 21, p. 349), Holt -  if less overtly than 
Smithson -  draws out a similar analogy between the desert site chosen for the work, 
the work itself, and cinema. Here, again, it is the “roundness” and “gyration” of the 
desert which seem to suggest the concept and form of the installation. The four 
tunnels, arranged in the shape of an X, as if radiating from a central circular “void,” 
echo and blend with the encircling “emptiness” of the site.112 Furthermore, Holt 
points out, this is a place “only ten miles” away from “one of the areas in the world 
where you can actually see the curvature of the earth.”113 And in fact, the work levers 
on this enhanced “visibility” of both the earth’s curvature and its rotation that the 
“empty” vastness of the desert affords. The tunnels are oriented to the summer and
110 Childs, “Robert Smithson and Film: The Spiral Jetty Reconsidered,” 77.
111 Baker, “The Cinema Model,” 95. “Noon-day sunshine,” Smithson wrote in “A Tour o f the 
Monuments of Passaic,” “cinema-ized the site, turning the bridge and the river into an overexposed 
picture ,” 70 (italics in original). Reynolds also discusses Smithson’s “cinema-ized site” in Robert 
Smithson: Learning from  New Jersey and Elsewhere, 103 and 223.
112 The desert’s “emptiness” is, o f course, relative. Whilst the topography o f the Salt Lake area is 
certainly flat, bare, and desolate, one cannot say that there is “nothing” -  or indeed, no human activity 
-  there at all. Historically, much o f the American desert has been host to military, or military-related 
operations and the Salt Lake area is no exception.
249
winter solstices. Whereas during those periods the sun shines straight into the holes 
(ill. 22, p. 350), throughout the rest of the year, and from day to night, the light, 
entering the tunnels at varying angles, “casts a changing pattern of pointed ellipses 
and circles of light.”114 This effect is both amplified and modified by a number of 
smaller holes that have been opened along the solid structure of the tunnels 
themselves. “There are times,” Holt explains, “when the sun is directly over a hole 
and a perfect circle is cast.” On these occasions, inside the pipes the effect is that 
“day is turned into night, and an inversion of the sky takes place: stars are cast down 
to earth, spots of warmth in cool tunnels.”115 This inversion is in turn “reverted” by 
“looking up through the holes on a bright night.” With stars and moon framed within 
their diameters, it “is like seeing the circles of light during the day, only 
inverted.5,116At an obvious level, Sun Tunnels is certainly “about” the solar year, and 
the desert as a privileged site from which to observe and become aware of “the sun 
rising and setting, keeping the time of the earth.”117 Yet, more subtly, Holt’s work is 
also “about” the desert itself, whose own rotating circularity it replicates and 
embodies. For the game of inversion between earth and sky Holt insists on in 
relation to Sun Tunnels is cognate with the illusions that the desert as such 
engenders, whereby “the earth, reflected upside down in the heat,” comes full circle 
with the sky. At her chosen site in particular “the mirages are extraordinary,” she 
enthuses: “you can see whole mountains hovering” upside down in the air.118
113 Nancy Holt, “Sun Tunnels,” Artforum  15 (April 1977), 32-37. 34 cited, my emphasis. Lucy 
Lippard discusses Sun Tunnels in Overlay: Contemporary Art and Prehistory  (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1983), 106-107.
114 Ibid., 32.
115 Ibid., 36.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid., 37.
118 Ibid., 34.
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Meanwhile, the thought of these inverted images the desert “projects” onto 
the sky strikes us as being deeply cinematic. And so is, too, the “chiastic” mimicking 
of this effect that the casting of lights and shadows through the tunnels’ various 
holes produces on their internal surfaces. “Real-time filmic spaces” (in which “points 
of light slide imperceptibly around the inner surface as the sun travels from horizon 
to horizon”), is how James Trainor saw the tunnels’ “dark interiors” on a recent visit. 
With the holes “creat[ing] something like a pin-hole camera,” Sun Tunnels is 
described as at once a film -  unfolding in the arc of the day -  and a place a bit like a 
cinema -  a cosy “oasis of focus” in the “vastness” of the desert, dark but for the 
projector-like beams of light filtering through the pipes.119And so it is this “real-time 
filmic space” that Sun Tunnels (1978), Holt’s celluloid film of her earthwork, 
replicates in synthesis. Sped up through time-lapse photography, the film takes us 
through a day’s cycle in less than half an hour, just as the spaciousness of the desert 
site comes to be “enclosed” within its circumscribed “spiral made up of frames” (to 
use Smithson’s definition of film as such).120 Reflected -  if not also, in fact, re­
produced -  in the concrete tunnels, the circular and revolving space of the desert 
finds further reverberation in the forms and dynamics of the cinematic.121
Through their emphasis on illusions and reflections, their metaphors of 
roundness and circularity, and of a movement at once rotatory and elliptical -  or 
even spiral -  both Smithson and Holt present the desert as a space in which
119 James Trainor, “A Place in the Sun,” Frieze 77 (September 2003), 56-57. 57.
120 Smithson, “The Spiral Jetty,” 148. Nancy Holt herself has stressed the “cinematic quality” o f her 
work in general. For example, talking of her wrought iron structures -  such as Inside/Outside (1980), 
and Annual Ring (1980/81), she has said that “they spin.” “That’s one of the strongest aspects o f that 
Washington piece [Inside/Outside]. Two roads come together there and, whey you drive or walk by, 
the work spins optically because o f the bars going round. It sets up a kind o f cinematic quality; it’s 
like you’re seeing frames o f the landscape go by.” Micky Donnelly, “Nancy Holt Interviewed,”
Circa: Contemporary Art Journal 11 (July/August 1983), 4-10. 8 cited.
121 Given their remoteness, o f course, both Spiral Jetty (which furthermore, as mentioned, has only 
recently become visible again) and Sun Tunnels are mostly known precisely through their 
photographic and cinematic representations.
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distinctions collapse, opposites merge. As for Holt sky and earth chase and merge 
into each other, so for Smithson, as we have seen, “the shore of the lake” becomes 
“the edge of the sun,” and solid and liquid become confused as the mainland appears 
to oscillate as if rippled by waves whilst “the lake remain[s] rock still.”122
Their recourse to these figures echoes Van Dyke’s description in the epigraph 
at the beginning of this section. For, in fact, in Van Dyke’s account too, the “vast 
circling sea” of the desert sometimes even cancels out the horizon-line itself, 
“reaching] up and blend[ing] into the sky without any point of demarcation.”123A 
librarian and art historian, Van Dyke had set off for the American deserts in 1898. 
Starting from Colorado, and travelling alone -  by train, on a pony, on foot -  he re- 
emerged approximately two and a half years later. Largely written “on the road,” and 
published in 1901, The Desert is not so much a memoir of this journey, as a lyrical 
account of the landscapes encountered. Reprinted until the 1920s, this small volume 
then went out of print for a few decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, when 
ecological movements “rediscovered” the desert, it became something of a cult text, 
and has since gone through various republications.124
Van Dyke’s and Smithson’s -  or even Holt’s -  aesthetic outlook, and their 
motive for pursuing the desert, may be widely different, if not even antithetical. As 
Alessandra Ponte has suggested, whilst for Van Dyke the desert was a 
quintessentially optical domain, indeed, “the house of light and colour”(as he himself 
put it, “the desert air is practically colored air”125), for Smithson it was rather the
122 Smithson, “The Spiral Jetty,” 146.
123 Van Dyke, The D esert, 55-56.
124 For biographical notes on Van Dyke, see Peter W ild’s introduction to ibid. See also Richard 
Sheton, “Introduction,” in John C. Van Dyke, The D esert [1901] (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith 
Inc., 1980). For a discussion o f Van Dyke and his book, see also Banham, Scenes in America Deserta, 
155ff; and Alessandra Ponte, “The House o f Light and Entropy: Inhabiting the American Desert,” 
Assemblage 30 (August 1996), 12-31.
125 Van Dyke, The Desert, 87.
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place of entropy.126 Yet, these differences notwithstanding, all three describe the 
desert as a space of ambiguity and ambivalence, a place where boundaries are erased 
and difference is paradoxically both eliminated and preserved.
For Van Dyke, in the desert sand is a veil that spreads over everything:
The shifting sands! Slowly they move, wave upon wave, drift upon drift; but 
by day and by night they gather, gather, gather. They overwhelm, they bury, 
they destroy, and then a spirit of restlessness seizes them and they move off 
elsewhere, swirl upon swirl, line upon line, in serpentine windings that enfold 
some new growth of fill in some new valley in the waste.127
On the one hand, this veil of sand, relentlessly and indiscriminately covering 
anything and everything, may make of the desert a space of temporal and spatial 
repetition. In Frank Norris’s McTeague, a novel whose story culminates in Death 
Valley -  and, published in 1899, actually contemporary with Van Dyke’s own 
journey -  the desert is indeed described in such terms: as an “infinite” spread “laid 
[...] out like an immeasurable scroll unrolled from horizon to horizon.”128 Yet, for 
Van Dyke, this does not mean that the desert is just sameness, everywhere and 
always. On the contrary, the desert is articulated both spatially and temporally, only 
not in the terms one may usually expect. Precisely because there is nothing “to hold 
the sands in place,” “the surface of the desert is far from being a permanent affair,” 
everything is always “shifting,” being “overwhelmfedj,” “buri[ed],” “destroyfed].”129 
And indeed, the entirety of his book is dedicated to analysing, distinguishing and
126 Ponte, “The House of Light and Entropy,” 21.
127 Van Dyke, The Desert, 28.
128 Frank Norris, McTeague [1899] (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 425.
129 Van Dyke, The Desert, 28-29.
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drawing out nuances within this apparent sameness. In fact, even in McTeague, the 
“horrible monotony” of the desert is also, at the same time, a state of extreme 
disorder, a “chaotic desolation.”130
Of course, we may think back, here, to the condition of maximum disorder 
the increasingly uniform greyness of the sand represents in Smithson’s theoretical 
experiment, spurred by the “model desert” of Passaic’s sandbox.131 And, for 
Smithson, the actual desert is a similarly oxymoronic space, monotonous yet random 
and chaotic. At a point in his essay on the Spiral Jetty, Smithson draws an accurate 
list of what can be seen from each and every point of the compass from its centre:
North -Mud, salt crystals, rocks, water 
North by East -  Mud, salt crystals, rocks, water 
Northeast by North -  Mud, salt crystals, rocks, water 
Northeast by East -  Mud, salt crystals, rocks, water 
East by North -  Mud, salt crystals, rocks, water 
East -  Mud, salt crystals, rocks, water 
East by South -  Mud, salt crystals, rocks, water132
And so on. Especially when seen from above, redoubled by the surrounding lake, 
which functions as “a vast thermal mirror,” this disordered uniformity is 
“dizzying.”133 As wherever one turns “mud, salt crystals, rocks, water,” is all that can 
be observed, in this “rippling stillness” even the sense of direction falters.134 Whilst 
using spatial co-ordinates, Smithson’s list at the same time undermines them:
130 Norris, McTeague, 425 and 439.
131 Smithson, “A Tour of the Monuments o f Passaic, New Jersey,” 74.
132 Smithson, “The Spiral Jetty,” 149.
133 Ibid., 148 and 149.
“[f]rom the centre of the Spiral Jetty” they become somewhat meaningless, 
impossible to discern, useless.135 Holt, too, drew on the directionlessness of the 
desert. Before discovering the Great Basin Desert, Holt had been fascinated by the 
desolate wilderness in southern New Jersey called Pine Barrens, which, as she said, 
in a way “begins to approach that kind of Western spaciousness.”136 And in 1975 she 
made a film of it, Pine Barrens. Here, Holt tracks the vastness of that landscape with 
her handheld camera, but without ever offering a panoramic view. As she walks, 
what we see is either the expanse of sand (and sometimes trees) in front of her, when 
the camera points forward, or below, as she tilts it to the ground just ahead of her 
feet. Thus, the restricted visual scope of the film, that withholds an “establishing” 
shot, or any kind of co-ordinate through which to construct and orient ourselves in 
the space being depicted, at some level incarnates the very directionlessness of the 
desert it reproduces. Moreover, this quality of the space is being praised by the 
voices of the local people that can be heard off-screen. They explain why they prefer 
Pine Barrens to the city, how they like walking in its emptiness, where, as one of 
them says, there is “no direction whatsoever.”
The “directionlessness” of the desert is temporal as well as spatial. Yet, the 
desert’s lack, or erasure, of temporal directionality, is not seen to be incompatible 
with the fact that, at the same time, the desert itself is, par excellence, the space that 
displays time. As Holt herself puts it,
“Time” is not just a mental concept or a mathematical abstraction in the
desert. The rocks in the distance are ageless; they have been deposited in
134 Ibid., 149.
135 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
136 Holt, “Sun Tunnels,” 34.
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layers over hundreds of thousands of years. “Time” takes on a physical 
presence.137
Certainly, to see the desert as spatialized time, and as the embodiment of 
irreversibility, is a common enough view. Writing in 1859 about the Colorado Sage 
Plain, the geologist J.S. Newberry noted that “the mind is awestruck in 
contemplation of the magnitude of the element of time” presented by “these 
stupendous monuments of erosion.”138 More recently, Jean Baudrillard described 
Death Valley as “a geological epic”: “everything the earth has ever been, all the 
inhuman forms it has been through, gathered together in a single anthologizing 
vision.”139 The desert is “a matchless spectacle” of time -  or indeed, of “the depth of 
time,” presented to us “in synthesis, in a miraculously abridged version.”140 Precisely 
because of this visualization of time, the desert, for Baudrillard too, is essentially 
“cinematic” -  in fact, he points out, it was thus long before actual cinema “came on 
the scene.”141 But whilst Baudrillard seems to emphasize the idea of an ordered, 
chronological display (a miraculous abridgement), for Smithson and Van Dyke and, 
partly, for Holt, the way in which the desert exhibits time is far from being orderly, 
or chronological. For them, in fact, it is precisely the desert’s lack of spatial co­
ordinates, its state of chaotic uniformity, which manifests time, but without -  or, in 
fact, “after” -  the arrow. Like the “model desert” adduced by Smithson to 
demonstrate entropy, the real desert displays time in its irreversibility by, 
paradoxically, embodying the clouding over, if not the disintegration, of the very 
directionality subtending this process. Overtly, for Smithson, time in the desert is
137 Holt, “Sun Tunnels,” 34.
138 Quoted by Reyner Banham, Scenes in America Deserta, 137.
139 Jean Baudrillard, America [1986], trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 1988), 69 and 68.
140 Ibid., 69-70.
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indeed time as seen from the apex, if not the end, of entropy -  a condition in which, 
as we have seen, “all classifications would lose their grids.”142
Van Dyke does not mention entropy. Yet, whereas for him the desert is the 
very incarnation of the time of the earth, this manifests itself as havoc. For whilst 
“all strata and all geological ages” are revealed in its “many kinds of splintered and 
twisted rocks,” these very strata and ages are all muddled up, “blown into discord” 
by the action of volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, water and wind.143 Similarly, for 
Smithson, “the strata of the Earth” the desert exposes are “a jumbled museum.”144 
But it is not only geological time that the desert at once displays and jumbles, 
making it both a “physical presence” (as Holt puts it) and “directionless.” For, in 
fact, the desert exhibits and confounds human time too. Towards the beginning of his 
book, Van Dyke describes coming upon the ruins of what might once have been a 
fort. Yet, dating these remains is arduous. “A geologist,” Van Dyke muses, might 
think them “an illustration of the Stone Age,” “an iconoclast,” might argue they are 
“merely a Mexican corral built to hide stolen horses,” whilst “a plain person of the 
southwest” would probably see them as “an old Indian camp.”145 Since the materials 
the builders used are those of the desert itself, now further transformed and eroded 
by its winds and sands, Van Dyke concludes that there is, in fact, no sure way to tell. 
Thus, he suggests, in the desert “[t]he man of the Stone Age exists to-day with 
contemporary civilized man. Possibly he always did.”146 So, for Van Dyke, the desert 
obfuscates or even, indeed, “undoes” human chronology, seemingly making cave 
and contemporary man at once adjacent and indistinguishable.
141 Ibid., 69.
142 Smithson, “ ...The Earth, Subject to Cataclysms, Is a Cruel Master,” 256.
143 Van Dyke, The Desert, 37.
144 Robert Smithson, “A Sedimentation o f the Mind: Earth Projects” [1968], in The Collected  
Writings, 106.
145 Van Dyke, The Desert, 11.
The extreme proximity of temporally-distant eras, the touching -  if not the 
fusion -  of past and present that Van Dyke reads in the topography of the desert, is 
echoed in both Holt’s and Smithson’s accounts. Whilst Holt may not mention the 
“disorder” of geological layers, she describes the area surrounding the site chosen for 
her Sun Tunnels as a hotchpotch of human epochs. “Old trails, crystal caves, disused 
turquoise, copper, and tungsten mines, old oil wells and windmills, hidden springs, 
and ancient caves,” she writes, all confusedly blended together, “coated with 
centuries of charcoal and grease,” or “filled [...] with residue -  mostly dirt, bones, 
and artefacts.”147 Smithson’s gaze is more oxymoronic. To his eyes, the muddled 
contiguity of pasts and presents engenders not simply a fusion, but a reversal. Thus, 
by the Great Salt Lake, he is “transported [...] into a world of modern prehistory,” in 
which it is the present that comes to look like an extreme past.148 It is, that is, “the 
trapped fragments of junk and waste” caught in the vast “expanse of salt flats,” “two 
dilapidated shacks,” “a tired group of oil rigs,” and “pumps coated with black 
stickiness rust[ing] in the corrosive salt air” to look prehistoric. At once discernible 
and “lost in those expansive deposits of sand and mud,” they look like the imaginary 
“products of a Devonian industry,” or “the machines of the Upper Carboniferous 
Period.”149
This idea of a space of temporal confusion and overturn is recurrent in 
Smithson. On another occasion, for example, he had similarly defined some slate 
quarries in Pennsylvania as a place in which “the present fell forward and backward 
into a tumult.”150 Though not a recognized “desert,” these Pennsylvanian quarries are 
nevertheless described by Smithson in the same terms (an “ocean of slate,” “a
146 Ibid.
147 Holt, “Sun Tunnels,” 34.
148 Smithson, “The Spiral Jetty,” 146.
149 Ibid., 145-146.
petrified sea” that seems “to swarm around one”) he employs for the more canonical 
American deserts, such as, indeed, the Salt Lake area.151 Holt, as we have seen, does 
the same with New Jersey’s Pine Barrens. What is, or what makes a desert is far 
from straightforward, as Banham has observed: in fact, rather than having the 
definition of desert, he argues, “all deserts are desert by deflniton.”152 Both Banham 
and Smithson would agree that the desert is not so much an incontrovertible physical 
entity as a malleable conceptual reality. For his part, Banham ultimately sees the 
desert as an often equivocal “value judgement [...] of, and about, people.” 153 In fact, 
whilst deserts are typically thought of as people-less places, the opposite is true: 
from industrial and military plants to tourism -  including indeed land-artists and 
their “fans,” about whom Banham is somewhat sceptical -  American deserts, at 
least, are thoroughly inhabited. For Smithson, on the other hand, “the desert is less 
‘nature’ than a concept [...] that swallows up boundaries,” including, of course, 
those that, so to speak, keep time.154 As before and after converge on the same plane, 
“traces of an end or a beginning” may become undecipherable, if not even 
disappear.155 As such, Smithson’s desert corresponds to Calvino’s universe in the 
Cosmicomics\ a “space” to which, conversely, Calvino sometimes assigns the 
topography of the desert itself: “with crevasses and dunes,” “winding canyon[s],” 
“cactus’s thorns,” and a “void” as “stony as the bed of a dried-up stream”.156 Here, 
“past and future” are “vague terms,” and it is hard to “make much distinction
150 Smithson, “A Sedimentation o f the Mind: The Earth Projects,” 110.
151 Ibid., 110-111.
152 Banham, Scenes in American Deserta, 204.
153 Ibid., 205.
154 Smithson, “A Sedimentation o f the Mind,” 109. Ina Blom makes a similar point in relation to the 
concept o f entropy for Fluxus, in “Boredom and Oblivion,” 70.
155 Ibid., 111. Describing his “Non-Site” o f the Pennsylvania quarry mentioned above, Smithson 
characterizes it as “a fragment o f a greater fragmentation [...where] there are no traces o f an end or a 
beginning.” Cf. Ponte’s discussion in “The House o f Light and Entropy.”
156Calvino, Cosmicomics, 122.
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between them,” since “what might have been before” is “confounded with the 
future.”157
Just as the desert is a bit like the cinema -  cinematic long before cinema 
itself, as it is for Baudrillard, or a place of “gyration,” reflections and illusions, as it 
is for Smithson and Holt -  so cinema is a bit like the desert. For cinema, too, is a 
“jumbled museum”: a space where temporal “disconnections” and “fragments” 
converge, “a chaos of ‘takes,’” as Smithson put it a propos his own film Spiral Jetty, 
“trapped in [...] a stream of viscosities.”158 The hotchpotch of, and ambiguity 
between, different times characteristic of the desert is also, of course, a quality of 
cinema par excellence, where continuous temporalities are dismembered and re­
arranged in a different order, and epochs historically remote from each other may 
come to be spliced, if not fused, together.159 Both Smithson’s Spiral Jetty and Holt’s 
Sun Tunnels films relie on this power of editing to re-organize and “jumble” time. 
Where Holt condenses a day into half an hour through time-lapse photography, 
Smithson’s film stages a continuous movement forward and backward in time, as the 
film oscillates between evoking prehistory and “documenting” the recent past of 
making the jetty: “The moviola becomes a ‘time machine’ that transforms trucks into 
dinosaurs.”160 But if the shots of the road leading to Rozel Point- where images of 
stretches ahead of the truck are alternated with images of stretches behind it -  allude 
to the film’s hopping back and forth in time, they also replicate what is already a 
cinematic quality of the desert as such. For in Smithson’s view the desert itself has 
an equivalent power, being able, as we have seen, to turn contemporary oil rigs and
157 Ibid., 120.
158 Smithson, “ The Spiral Jetty,” 150. Cf. Michael Ned Holte, “Shooting the Archeozoic,” Frieze 88 
(January/February 2005), 78-80, a reading o f the film  Spiral Jetty as a “time machine.”
159 Cf. Eva Schmidt, “Et in Utah Ego: Robert Smithson’s ‘entropologic’ cinema,” in Robert Smithson: 
Zeichnungen aus dem Nachlass/Drawings from  the Estate (Munster: Landschaftsverband Westfalen- 
Lippe Westfalisches Landmuseum fiir Kunst und Kulturgeschichte, 1989), 53.
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pumps into prehistoric “machinery.” The “disparate elements,” “unlikely places and 
things,” “stuck” together in the Spiral Jetty film “recapitulate” the desert site itself, 
in which distant times converge and merge.161 Therefore, indeed, the relationship 
between cinema and desert emerges as one of deep analogy, or homology.
The “gyration” they share may function as an index of the passage of time, 
whereby the irreversibility of time is conveyed through the “accumulation” of 
repetition, circularity, cyclicality. So, the revolutions of film in the projector may be 
in some way equivalent to the revolutions of the earth the “emptiness” of the desert 
makes visible, and that -  for instance -  Sun Tunnels at once echoes and brings into 
relief. But even as they mark time’s unfolding, the “gyrations” of both cinema and 
the desert challenge the idea of time’s “course,” engendering a space of temporal 
ambivalence. It was this sense of a looping space, of temporal a-directionality and 
ambiguity, that attracted Antonioni to the desert, both as a geographical entity and as 
a mental, or indeed, a cinematic “chronotope.”162
Antonioni, and Smithson
Interviewed after the release of The Passenger (1975), which begins and ends in the 
North African desert, Antonioni explains the choice of that location as “a need to 
escape [...] from the historical context” in which he and the characters lived -  “that
160 Smithson, “The Spiral Jetty,” 150.
161 Ibid., 151.
162 Cf. Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of “chronotope” in “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the 
Novel” [1937-38], in The D ialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl 
Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1981). Drawing on Einstein’s 
Theory of Relativity, Bakhtin coins the term “chronotope” to indicate “the intrinsic connectedness of 
temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature.” “In the literary artistic 
chronotope,” he continues, “spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, 
concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space 
becomes charged and responsive to the movement o f time, plot and history. This intersection o f axes 
and fusion of indicators characterizes the artistic chronotope” (84).
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is, the urban, civil, and civilized context.”163 In this account, the desert would seem 
to be temporally ambiguous because outside of human history and civilization -  a 
place of primordial timelessness. This romanticized picture, however, is not borne 
out by the film itself. For there, in fact, the desert is a very “busy” place: a place in 
which one encounters “civilization,” and in which “history” happens (namely, here, 
arms trafficking, guerrilla, civil war). And so, Antonioni’s physical pursuit of the 
desert, and the cinematic image of it he constructs, are much less naive and far more 
complex than this throwaway comment suggests.
It is indeed after The Passenger, that, noting the recurrence of the desert in 
Antonioni’s films, Pascal Bonitzer commented on Antonioni’s “obsession” with it.164 
In his view, Red Desert, Zabriskie Point, The Passenger -  films in which the desert 
is explicitly a theme, if not a place — are part of what he sees as Antonioni’s 
“project” since Uavventura: “the empty, the de-peopled shot.”165 Thus, for Bonitzer, 
“desert” in Antonioni designates emptiness, “the void,” that which, as in Ueclisse, 
leads to “the eclipse of the face, the obliteration of the characters.”166 However, there 
is always someone in Antonioni’s deserts. Where one may say that in any case there 
would always at least be the camera framing the desert as a “view,” more often than 
not there are actually people in them -  be these the urban desert of Ueclisse or the 
“real” ones of Death Valley or North Africa.167 So, whilst the protagonists might 
have disappeared from the urban landscape of Ueclisse's last sequence, anonymous 
city dwellers still populate the scene -  and the camera seems indeed “attracted” by
163 Alberto Ongaro, “Una ricerca nel profondo” [interview with Antonioni, 1975], in Antonioni, Fare 
un film  e p er  me vivefe, 307.
164 Pascal Bonitzer, “Desir desert (Profession reporter)," Cahiers du cinema 262/263 (January 1976), 
96-98. 96 cited.
165 Pascal Bonitzer, Le Champ aveugle: Essais sur le cinema (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), 88.
166 Ibid.
167 For a discussion of this point see: Edward Dimendberg, “Beyond Cinema: Space, Time, and 
Entropy in Zabriskie Point," Paragrana  7  (1998), 241-249. 245 cited.
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their everyday activities. Not only, in Zabriskie Point, is the Californian desert the 
stage of Daria’s and Mark’s brief romance, but in the famous (and for the time 
scandalous) love-in sequence, Death Valley becomes a rather crowded place, as a 
myriad of other couples appears dotted here and there on the sandy dunes. Given this 
crowding, could it be that the desert, in Antonioni’s films, is not quite -  or not just -  
a sign of emptiness, absence, “void”?
Throughout the 1960s, the lack of “dramatic line” -  as he called it -  became 
a constant of Antonioni’s films (as indeed, of course, of those of a number of his 
contemporaries).168 In this respect, Red Deserfs “return” of the end to the beginning
-  as, both diegetically and visually, the film’s finale strongly echoes its opening -  
makes apparent his tendency not only to do away with “dramatic line” but in fact, 
also, to replace it with a sort of loop. If Red Desert is surely the immediately 
remarkable example, from II grido (The Cry, 1957) onwards almost all of 
Antonioni’s films have a looping structure -  whether narratively, visually, or indeed 
both.
Bookended at each side by a scene at the village refinery tower where he 
works, Aldo’s picaresque journey in II grido, is both a “loop” and a “traditional” -  if 
not, in fact, an “archetypal” -  story. While the end dovetails with, and mimics, its 
beginning, there is still a clearly perceptible “dramatic line” in its plot. Since Aldo 
doesn’t simply return atop the tower to carry on working as before, but throws 
himself from it, the end maintains the conventional attributes of a “closure.” By 
contrast, “closure” is much more diluted, much less “conclusive,” in The Passenger
-  despite the fact that, with the added twist of a change of identity, the film is in 
some way an intercontinental version of Aldo’s more modest peregrinations around
the Po Valley. For, amongst other things, whilst II grido ends with Aldo’s death, The 
Passenger carries on after Locke’s murder, the camera resuming its observation of 
life in -  or in the villages at the edges of -  the desert, with which the film started. 
Films like Uavventura and Ueclisse similarly have a circularity without closure. 
Rather than echoing the initial narrative situation, the concluding situation is actually 
equivalent to it: one film opens and closes with a couple trying to piece together their 
relationship, the other with the end of a love affair. In this context, the fact that by 
the end of the film one of the characters in the couples has actually changed matters 
little: in fact, this enhances, rather than undermines, the sense of circularity. Indeed, 
in an article on Blow up (another looping story, in which, visually too, the end -  with 
the return of the group of mimes -  strongly echoes the beginning), Marsha Kinder 
took this “interchangeability” of Antonioni’s characters as a further proof of this. In 
her view, the true “protagonist” of Antonioni’s films is not so much the specific 
content of people’s stories as, rather, their almost inescapable formal circularity.169
Antonioni himself seemingly corroborated this insight when he thus justified 
his propensity:
Today stories are what they are, they may have neither beginning nor end, be 
without key scene, without dramatic curve, without catharsis. They may be 
made of shreds, of fragments [...] like the life we lead.170
Made in 1965, and thus between Red Desert and Blow up, this statement suggests 
that the striking “return” of these films’ ends to their beginnings is, for Antonioni,
168 Pierre Billard, “L’idea mi viene attraverso le immagini” [1965], in Antonioni, Fare un film  e per  
m evivere, 129-130.
169 Marsha Kinder, “Antonioni in Transit” [1967], in Huss, Focus on Blow-up, 86.
170 Billard, “L’idea mi viene attraverso le immagini,” 129-30.
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somewhat analogous to having “neither beginning nor end” -  like, indeed, the 
seemingly infinite plane of the desert itself.
Could it not be then, that for Antonioni too, the desert is -  physically, 
conceptually, cinematically -  a space o/time; and, more precisely, a space in which 
beginning and end become contiguous, confused, if not ‘Yused”? The question 
Antonioni’s deserts insistently elicit is whether they designate a pre- or a post­
human time. And the only answer to this seems to be that -  short of providing the 
resolution to this doubt -  they incarnate the very question, the very ambiguity.
Let us take the American desert of Zabriskie Point. Historically, many of the 
vast expanses of the American desert have been in the hands of the military, or host 
to military-related operations. The forbidding nature of their environment, and their 
remoteness, has made them an ideal place for this type of industriousness. Whilst 
from the centre of Spiral Jetty Smithson could see only “mud, salt crystals, rocks, 
water,” and, similarly, Holt appreciated the emptiness of her relatively nearby site, 
this does not mean that there was actually “nothing,” or nothing else, going on in that 
most inhospitable desert. Indeed, within a sixty-miles radius from Spiral Jetty and 
Sun Tunnels one finds, among other things: the airstrip from where Enola Gay took 
off en route to Hiroshima; the Thiokol Propulsion plant -  a rocket-delivery factory 
active since the Cold War; the Tooele Army Depot, allegedly the world’s largest 
storage of chemical and biological weapons.171 Similarly, Zabriskie Point's more 
spectacular Californian deserts (which, of course, cinema itself has partly rendered 
iconic, contributing to making them popular tourist destinations) are adjacent to the
171 Trainor points this out in “A Place in the Sun,” 56-57.
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famous Nevada Test Site, where controlled nuclear explosions were carried out -  
and largely publicized -  throughout the postwar period.172
So, indeed, Zabriskie Point's spectacular bang could evoke “the Bomb” with 
very concrete and immediate connotations -  for an American audience at least. In 
fact, only a few years before Antonioni’s film, the Swiss artist Jean Tinguely had 
exploited the same ideological and geographical associations for his Study for the 
End of the World, No. 2 (1962). This consisted of a choreographed explosion, in the 
Nevada desert, of an intricate but primitive machine built by Tinguely himself with 
the most disparate “found” objects, metal scraps, junk and wires. By comparison 
with Antonioni’s grand set-up and state-of-the-art technology, Study for the End of 
the World, in spite of the apocalyptic title, was a rather low-tech and DIY affair. Not 
only the machine, a fragile and precarious assemblage of oddities, but also the 
bombs were home-made by Tinguely himself; he even lit some of the dynamite 
during the blast. Broadcast on NBC television was, however, a constitutive part of 
the event: so that the work, particularly redolent of symbolisms at that specific 
historic conjuncture, attracted world-wide press attention.173
172 In a recent article on 1960s American nuclear testing programmes, Alesssandra Ponte shows how 
the literature produced at the time to defend their usefulness tended to sentimentalize and 
“aestheticize” them, drawing on the beauty -  if not, indeed, the sublime qualities -  o f the explosions 
themselves. See: Alessandra Ponte, “Desert Testing,” Lotus International 114: D eserts/Deserti 
(2002), 56-89. Among others, she mentions The Effects o f  Nuclear Weapons, a report by the US 
Department of Defence. This, first published in 1950 as The Effects o f  Atomic Weapons, went through 
various updates in the following decades -  revised editions appeared in 1957, 1962 ,1964  and 1977. 
Aimed to the lay public, the publication, as one o f the editors puts it, “should permit the general 
reader to obtain a good understanding o f the various topics without having to cope with the more 
technical details.” In fact, in addition to fairly basic explanations, it does so with quite a lot o f 
photographs, showing both a range of explosions (including underwater and underground ones) and 
their effects on buildiftgs and infrastructure. Whilst some o f these latter images are o f Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, most refer to the tests on residential structures carried out at the Nevada Test Site in 1953 
and 1955, and systematically show the “before” followed by the “after.” See: Samuel Glasstone and 
Philip J. Dolan, eds., The Effects o f  Nuclear Weapons, 3rd edition (Washington: United States 
Department o f Defense and the Energy Research and Development Administration, 1977).
173 For a detailed and compelling discussion o f Tinguely’s A Study fo r  the End o f  the Work, see Lee, 
Chronophobia, 84-153, on whose account I rely.
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Given Antonioni’s declared indifference to notions of beginning and end, the 
desert of Zabriskie Point could therefore also be the space left by the explosion at the 
end of the film itself. It may designate futurity rather than -  or in fact, indeed, as 
well as -  pastness and primordiality. As well as a “chronotope” nearly ten-million- 
year old, Zabriskie Point's desert could be the cipher of a very “new” time, or a time 
yet to come. But is Zabriskie Point's ending just an allegory of impending 
catastrophe, its desert as such just a symbol of nuclear devastation -  a “day after” 
scenario? And, similarly, is the dystopian world of Red Desert -  with its layer of 
greasy slime covering earth and water, the fumes, the jarring yet washed-out colours, 
the looming giant skeletons of industrial infrastructure -  just a memento of 
ecological cataclysm?
The worn-out and tired look of Red Desert's futuristic present -  as the child’s 
robot, the aseptic spaceship-like hotel, the giant pylons “to listen to the stars” suggest 
-  chimes with Smithson’s journey to the “future [...] ‘out of date’” of Passaic.174 The 
derelict industrial landscape around Passaic is for Smithson a “zero panorama,” 
containing “ruins in reverse, that is -  all the construction that would eventually be 
built.” Contrary to “the ‘romantic ruin,”’ here “buildings don’t/a// into ruin after 
they are built but rather rise into ruin before they are built.”175 That the dereliction 
Smithson encounters in his -  as he calls it -  “suburban Odyssey” may have an 
affinity with the world of Red Desert is not that surprising.176 For both Antonioni and 
Smithson are evoking the aftermath of modernity’s shocks; that moment which in a 
slightly different context, as we have seen, Patrice Petro defined as “aftershock.” 
Similarly to “afterimage,” as Petro suggests, the idea of aftershock still retains an 
element of shock, of dazzlement -  like, indeed, “the noon-day sunshine” that
174 Smithson, “A Tour o f the Monuments o f Passaic,” 73.
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“cinema-izes” Passaic, or the whiteness of the fog that momentarily blinds 
Giuliana.177 Like Smithson’s Passaic, the reality of Red Desert is industrial and 
already /?as/-industrial, if not indeed, like a Ballardian scenario, post -human -  a 
reality in which the frail and confused Giuliana seems at once a survivor from the 
past, and an inhabitant of a “backward looking future.”178 Yet, interestingly, the wild, 
unliveable and un-industrializable site of Spiral Jetty (where, as Smithson points out, 
hopes to install a petrol-extraction plant, repeatedly curbed by “nature,” were finally 
abandoned) is evocative of Red Desert too. The red of its algae-coloured waters, the 
mud and rocks of the jetty itself resonate strongly with the red-stained waters and 
putrid mud of Red Deserfs polluted swamps.
These echoes between Smithson’s “A Tour of the Monuments of Passaic,” 
Spiral Jetty and Red Desert re-enhance the confusion and ambiguity of times -  
geological, human -  embodied by the desert as such. It is indeed possible that 
Smithson himself actually did have Antonioni’s film in mind when he wrote his 
“travelogue,”179 or when he made the jetty. A keen and eclectic cinema-goer -  who 
liked experimental and European auteur films as well as sci-fi B-movies -  it is 
actually almost inconceivable that Smithson should not have seen Red Desert, given, 
besides, the esteem in which Antonioni was held by the New York “avant-garde” of 
the time.180 And if Smithson did see it, Spiral Jetty becomes emblematic of how his
175 Ibid., 72.
176 Ibid.
177 Patrice Petro “After Shock/ Between Boredom and History,” in Patrice Petro, ed., Fugitive Images: 
From Photography to Video (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 265 (I discuss this in 
Chapter 2). Smithson, “A Tour o f the Monuments of Passaic,” 70.
178 Smithson, “Entropy and the New Monuments,” 15.
179 Childs proposed this term for “A Tour o f the Monuments o f Passaic,” in “Robert Smithson and 
Film,” 72.
180 For Smithson’s “cinephilia” see, among others: Uroskie, “La Jetee en Spirale: Robert Smithson’s 
stratigraphic Cinema,” Baker, “The Cinema Model,” and Childs, “Robert Smithson and Film: The 
Spiral Jetty Reconsidered,” in addition to Smithson’s own “A Cinematic Atopia.” Mekas’s columns 
for The Village Voice are a clear indicator o f  Antonioni’s popularity. So, for example, whilst, unlike 
Antonioni’s previous films, Zabriskie Point ended up a financial and critical failure, Mekas notes that
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reading of Red Desert goes against the grain of the references to a modernist 
pictorial model with which the film has often been aligned, and which Antonioni’s 
own allusions to Rothko and Pollock partly corroborated.181 Like Mekas with La 
notte, and Kozloff with Blow up, Spiral Jetty would show that Smithson read Red 
Desert for its entropic drive. Indeed, Spiral Jetty can show us this now, even if 
Smithson himself had not seen the film, or was unaware of the way in which his 
work evokes it. With Red Desert in mind, the “natural” deserts of Spiral Jetty and 
Zabriskie Point, and the “industrial” ones of Passaic and Red Desert itself, become 
very similar, in a way.
Moreover, the apocalyptic scenarios of Red Desert or Passaic may not even 
look like “The End.” At the end of The Desert, Van Dyke asked: “Is then this great 
expand of sand and rock the beginning of the end?”182 Conversely, could it be that 
for Antonioni and Smithson the desert is a way of positing the idea of “The End” as, 
if not an entirely new beginning, then -  at least -  a moment of rupture which is also 
a moment of continuation,I Whilst not quite the fresh start, the radical renewal, the 
“Zero Point” that Mekas’s enthusiastic review attributed to Zabriskie Point, 
Smithson’s and Antonioni’s desert may at least indicate prolongation, or persistence. 
The space of the desert, that is, may suggest the possibility of continuation after the 
shocks of the twentieth century, and after the breaking down of time “into many 
times.”183 An entropic space in which ends and beginnings are confused and thus 
made indifferent and equivalent, the desert may be seen to function as a levelling and
he had to stand through the screening because the seats were sold out. He not only personally liked 
the film, as we have seen, but he “defended” it twice in his “Movie Journal.” See: Mekas, Movie 
Journal, 371-373 (entry for 12 February in addition to the aforementioned one for 19 February 1970).
181 On this see, among others: Chatman, Antonioni: or, The Surface o f  the World; Dalle Vacche, 
“Michelangelo Antonioni’s Red Desert. Painting as Ventriloquism and Colour as Movement, ” in 
Cinema and Painting: How A r tis  Used in Film  (London: Athlone Press, 1996); Sam Rohdie, 
Antonioni (London: BFI, 1990).
182 Van Dyke, The Desert, 231.
183 Smithson, “Entropy and the New Monuments,” 11.
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“democratizing” concept vis a vis time, or times -  just like the cinema that the desert 
embodies and embeds within itself. And as by the cinema as such, time is at once 
expanded and relativized by (to return to Smithson’s expression) the “cinema-ized” 
space of the desert. Yet, as human time is dwarfed by geology and its “centrality” is 
eroded by entropy, this de-hierachization and levelling, though a radical challenge to 
its position, are not necessarily a way of positing its “end,” or the end of the subject 
as the “seat” of time. Rather, in a project that is at once “modern” and “postmodern,” 
they may constitute a way of re-thinking subjectivity and temporality, and of inviting 
the subject to re-think itself in its relation to time.
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Conclusion
In 2001, Rodney Graham made Softcore: More Solo Music for the Sex Scene,
Zabriskie Point. As the title suggests, the work is inspired by Antonioni’s film and, 
more precisely, by the extended love-in sequence in Death Valley. Here, Daria and 
Mark, having started to make love in the sand and playfully cover themselves with 
dust, are soon “joined” by an ever multiplying number of people likewise engaged. At 
the time of Zabriskie Point's original release, in 1970, this scene proved no less 
explosive than the actual explosion in the concluding sequence, contributing to make 
the film, as Graham puts it (and as noted above), “the bomb that almost sunk 
Michelangelo Antonioni’s film career.” 1 Just as the finale of destruction generated 
furore for its supposed indictment of American consumerism, the explosiveness of the 
“sex scene” derived from its apparent celebration of the “countercultre” and the hippie 
generation, rather than its -  albeit daring -  shots of full nudity.2 For Softcore, Graham 
took seven minutes of this sequence and copied the same fragment for as many times 
as are needed (about fifteen) to reproduce the exact overall duration of Antonioni’s 
film, 108 minutes. Reversed from left to right, this was then projected on a screen 
placed in the gallery, behind which Graham sat (able to see the images the “right” 
way around) improvising music on his guitar. And while the accompaniment was his 
own, this set up intentionally parroted that followed by Jerry Garcia of the Grateful 
Dead, whose music provided the soundtrack in Antonioni’s original. For, as Graham
1 Rodney Graham, “Softcore: More Solo Guitar Music fo r  the Sex Scene, Zabriskie Point,” artist’s 
notes for live performance on 8 March 2001, part o f  Rodney Graham, solo exhibition, 9 March to 7 
April 2001, at Galerie Micheline Zzwajcer, Belgium. Website: 
http://www.gms.be/graham exhibition 2001.html. accessed 3 March 2004.
2 For contemporary reviews see, among others, the anthology collected in Michelangelo Antonioni, 
Zabriskie Point (Bologna: Cappelli, 1970).
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himself recounts, Garcia, invited to provide a score for the scene, “noodled on the 
guitar for several hours, while repeatedly viewing a looped version of [the] footage” 
as an inspirational prompt.3 A remastered version of the music with the looped 
sequence was then released on a limited-edition digital video, and Softcore, initially a 
live performance, now also exists and circulates in this form.
There are many ways in which Graham’s appropriation of Zabriskie Point 
exemplifies the relation between Antonioni and experimental cinema considered in 
this thesis. A complex instance of that “borrowing” and “repurposing” between works 
in different media, and media as such, that Bolter and Grusin term “remediation,” 
Softcore brings Zabriskie Point into the present.4 Antonioni’s biggest flop -  and, by 
extension, the now obsolescent analogue technology with which it was made -  are 
“resuscitated,” so to speak, with digital technology. Furthermore, Zabriskie Point is 
thus recuperated for a mode of reception (in the art gallery) different from the one to 
which it was originally destined.5 If this translation points to the appeal Antonioni still 
holds for the contemporary visual arts, then it also encapsulates the affinities his 
cinema shared from the start with a cinematic culture alternative to that of the 
“feature” film as commonly understood. Drawing on -  as well as, indeed, literally 
made of -  the language and material of both Antonioni’s and experimental cinema, 
Softcore stands as a sort of embodiment of the intertwining between the two practices 
my argument addresses. Its synthesis of the two for the contemporary art gallery, in 
turn, points to how the cross-pollination between arts and media that flourished in the 
1960s is both embedded in and generative of today’s visual culture.
3 Graham, “So/icore.”
4 Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New M edia  (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1999), 45. For more on “remediation,” see Chapter 2 above.
5 In fact, Graham’s recuperation o f  Zabriskie Point is representative o f  a more widespread 
“renaissance” Zabriskie Point has recently begun to enjoy with critics and artists alike. Amongst others, 
it is the subject o f  a forthcoming essay by Matthew Gandy, “The Cinematic Void: The Representation
But even more crucially, Graham’s layered remediation of Zabriskie Point 
throws into focus the question of time and time’s mediation via the cinematic that is 
central to my thesis. For, even as it remediates analogue cinema into digital cinema 
(and the dark movie-house auditorium into the dimly-lit white cube), Softcore 
confirms the crucial role of cinema as a medium for “apprehending” time -  a medium, 
that is, for articulating and thinking time -  highlighted throughout the preceding 
chapters. Indeed, it is in great part by drawing attention to how cinema not only 
transforms but is also transformed by other media and technologies that Softcore 
crystallizes the centrality of the cinematic in the apprehension of time. Though 
centred on the remediation of cinema itself, Graham’s piece also refers us back to how 
other media -  such as photography and sound recording, my foci in Chapters 2 and 3 
respectively -  are remediated by or within cinema, transforming both in the process.
In this respect, the metamorphosis of cinema that Softcore plays out recalls Hollis 
Frampton’s comments on the radical plasticity of cinema -  and his conviction that it is 
precisely this radical plasticity which cinema shares with time, thus making cinema a 
privileged medium of time.6
On the one hand then, Graham’s remediation of cinema already embodies and 
displays time in and of itself. Just like the “cine-repetitions,” as Raymond Bellour 
once called them, that make up cinema as a technology, an illusion and a culture, this 
too is a kind of repetition whose constitutive elements of “difference” are the very 
markers of time.7 (Enticingly here, what makes and marks the difference with 
Antonioni’s original -  and thus designates the passing of time -  is not only Graham’s
o f  Desert Space in Antonioni’s Zabriskie P o in ty  in Martin Lefebvre, ed., The Cinematic Landscape 
(London: Routledge, in press); and it inspired Angela Bulloch’s art installation Z-Point (2001).
6 See: Simon Field, “Interview with Hollis Frampton,” Afterimage 4  (Autumn 1972), 44-77, esp. 73, 
and above, Introduction.
7 Raymond Bellour, “Cine-Repetitions,” trans. Kari Hanet, Screen 20 (Summer 1979), 65-72, and 
above, Chapter 4.
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copying of the “sex scene” in a different and “new” medium for a different and “new” 
context, but also the fact that he obstinately repeats it again and again.) On the other 
hand, with repetition -  and indeed, more precisely, the various kinds of repetition 
which make up his remediation of Zabriskie Poin t- Graham also recapitulates many 
of the ways in which both Antonioni and experimental cinema articulated and 
“thought” time through the cinematic.
Thus, Graham’s relentless representation of the same clip of Zabriskie Point 
bears in important respects on the question of the “cut” considered in Chapter 1. For 
Graham’s strategy here is also one of cutting: both “out” of Zabriskie Point and “into” 
Softcore, each echoing the ways in which in the course of the 1960s the cut came to 
be seen as a “positive” operation -  if not, indeed, itself a segment or a thing. The cut 
acquired visibility within the fabric of the film: an elision or interruption of time 
remaining as a positive imprint on the screen and becoming, even, a durational 
segment in its own right. We have seen how this relates to questions of time and 
subjectivity -  in particular, their perceived inextricability and mutual discontinuity.
To filmmakers in many respects as diverse as Frampton, Antonioni and Alain 
Resnais, the cut was precisely that which could articulate this inextricability and this 
discontinuity and, besides, at some level make present and possibly visible the 
“ruptures” or “negatives” of time as well. But, as I argue throughout the thesis, 
cinema makes time as much as it represents it. Thus, while cinema’s cuts could -  and, 
as shown, were -  seen to reproduce a model of the mind as temporally discontinuous, 
they also, in fact, produced a model for it. Similarly, more than just a means to 
incarnate the cut in time as such -  the moment when time is “suspended,” given over 
to its negative “other,” as in the fantasy scene in Red Desert (1964) -  cinema actively 
figures and configures it. Much of this is self-consciously at stake in Graham’s work,
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Softcore in particular. For here it is precisely not only a cut of  time (a segment) but a 
cut in time that gets repeated again and again: Daria and Mark’s drug-induced 
fantasy/mirage in the desert, certainly one of the most exquisitely cinematic moments 
in Antonioni’s film.
Paradoxically, however, its repetition for over fifteen times (15.4 to be 
precise), so as to make Softcore match Zabriskie Point's length to the minute, also at 
some level dilutes -  if not, indeed, temporally dilates -  its cinematic qualities. And in 
so much as, through reiteration, Softcore renders Zabriskie Point's notorious sex 
scene “uncinematic,” it recalls the attributes of stillness and slowness, and the related 
question of boredom, discussed in Chapter 2. For the Belgian kinetic artist Pol Bury, 
slowness consisted of an oscillation between “the immobile and mobility” by which
o
time is “dilated,” made long. In Chapter 2 ,1 considered how it is precisely this 
paradoxical binary of stillness and movement -  of stillness in movement -  that the 
remediation of photography within cinema effects. The remediation of the still within 
the moving image that, as we saw, is characteristic of the cinema of the 1960s and 
1970s in manifold ways, changes both, producing a blend of photographic and 
unphotographic, cinematic and uncinematic. And whilst this is indicative of the 
period’s intensive inquiry into the origin, nature and structure of cinema itself, it is 
also, I argued, linked to the contemporary pursuit of boredom and its thematization as, 
specifically, a problem of time. For the oxymoron of the still in the film (or even, as in 
Andy Warhol’s “Screen Tests,” of a “still” film) at once echoes and shapes boredom, 
where time is apparently caught in a similar tension of stasis and motion, experienced 
as something that fails to pass, passing nevertheless. By contrast with the moving 
stillness of photography in cinema, in Softcore it is the movement of cinema as such
8 Pol Bury, “Time Dilated” [1964], in Dore Ashton, Pol Bury (Paris: Maeght Editeur, 1970), 107.
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that is somewhat stationary: endlessly, it just seems to retrace its own steps. And this 
“static” quality of Softcore’s moving imagery is as if redoubled by the monotonous 
drone Graham -  parroting Garcia -  produced for it.
Consideration of the music in both Softcore and Zabriskie Point leads us on to 
sound, the topic of Chapter 3. Sounds, durational by definition, take time. If, in this 
respect, they function as a demonstration of time and its passing, then they also 
further temporalize the image when joined to it. Thus, Antonioni’s attention to 
“soundscape” -  attention undoubtedly encouraged by the development of magnetic 
tape technology in the course of the 1950s and 1960s -  contributes to embed and map 
time into the visual. This is so even if, or in fact precisely because, the sounds he 
focuses on are those of ordinariness and everydayness, when time itself seems “dead,” 
or a drag. The extent to which sound further embeds and adds layers of time to the 
image is thrown into relief by the mise-en-abyme (indeed, the “remediation”) of sound 
recording technology itself in film. For, here, chronologically disjointed moments are 
made to co-exist “audio-visually.” The hiatus between the instance of recording and 
its playback is poignantly on display: at once a temporal depth and a gap in time that, 
in a slightly different context, Gilles Deleuze has defined as a “cut” inside, as opposed 
to outside, of the cinematic image.9 Meanwhile, this “cut” between aural and visual so 
self-reflexively flaunted in a film such as The Passenger (1975) is both evoked and, in 
a way, “erased” in Softcore. Called into play by the delayed addition of a “new” 
soundtrack to “old” footage, the extent to which Graham’s “noodling” resembles 
Garcia’s own also brings the “new” music back to the “old.”
The repetitiousness of Graham’s “noodling” -  also a sort of “loop” back into 
the original work -  shows us how Softcore rekindles the patterns of repetition and
9 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time Image [1985], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1989), esp. 241-261.
reduplication already at the heart of Zabriskie Point's sex scene itself. For Graham’s 
obsessive looping emphasizes the way in which repetition is at once displayed and 
played with in the original, where -  to Garcia’s droning music -  Daria and Mark are 
redoubled by a myriad other couples replicating their already repetitive actions. And 
where this “distils” and recalls the repetitions structuring Antonioni’s cinema more 
widely, it also points to how these repetitions as such, in turn, relate to the avant-garde 
of the time and its enquiries into the nature of the cinematic. Thus, in Chapter 4, we 
have seen how the scene of the final explosion, for instance, quotes the device of the 
“loop” signature of many experimental films in the period. In particular, I have 
discussed how for both Antonioni and experimental filmmakers the intrinsic 
reproducibility and repeatability of the cinematic became a tool for exploring time and 
its intrinsic unrepeatability. Cinema, that is, functioned as something that 
demonstrated temporal accumulation, irreversibility and entropy precisely via 
repetition, circularity and looping. And it is in this respect that the desert, not only for 
artists such as Robert Smithson and Nancy Holt, but also for Antonioni himself, came 
to stand as an analogue of cinema -  and, indeed, as intrinsically cinematic: a space for 
“seeing” and “thinking” time. In fact, Softcore's focus on the desert and, furthermore, 
its repetition and “looping” of  the desert, also help to crystallize this latter’s deep 
affinity with the cinema. Its attributes of repetition and difference, circularity and 
linearity, immobility and mobility, reflection and mirage are in many respects 
homologous with those of cinema. And this homology, in turn, points to how cinema 
has percolated into modes of perceiving and thinking -  modes of perceiving and 
thinking time in particular.
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Filmography
Feature films, shorts and documentaries
Antonioni, Michelangelo, Gente del Po (The People of the Po River, Italy, 1942- 
43/1947).
Antonioni, Michelangelo, Nettezza Urbana (N.U., Italy, 1948).
Antonioni, Michelangelo, L ’amorosa menzogna (.Loving Lie, Italy, 1949).
Antonioni, Michelangelo, Cronaca di un amore (Story of a Love Affair!Chronicle of a 
Love, Italy, 1950).
Antonioni, Michelangelo, Le amiche (The Girlfriends, Italy, 1955).
Antonioni, Michelangelo, II grido (The Cry, Italy/USA, 1957).
Antonioni, Michelangelo, L’avventura (Italy/France, 1960).
Antonioni, Michelangelo, La notte (Italy/France, 1961).
Antonioni, Michelangelo, Ueclisse (Italy/France, 1962).
Antonioni, Michelangelo, II deserto rosso (Red Desert, Italy/France, 1964).
Antonioni, Michelangelo, Blow-up (UK/Italy, 1966).
Antonioni, Michelangelo, Zabriskie Point (USA, 1970).
Antonioni, Michelangelo, The Passenger (Professione.’Reporter, USA, 1975). 
Antonioni, Michelangelo, The Mystery of Oberwald (Italy/West Germany, 1981, 
videotape film-for television broadcast).
Bergman, Ingmar, Persona (Sweden, 1966).
Coppola, Francis Ford, The Conversation (USA, 1974).
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Duras, Marguerite, India Song (France, 1975).
Egoyan, Atom, Krapp’s Last Tape (Ireland, 2000, for television broadcast). 
Fellini, Federico, La dolce vita (Italy/France, 1960).
Fellini, Federico, Lo sceicco bianco (The White Sheik, Italy, 1952).
Hill, George Roy, Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (USA, 1969).
Hitchcock, Alfred, The Birds (USA, 1963).
Kubrick, Stanley, 2001: A Space Odyssey (UK/USA, 1968).
Lai, Sandro, Michelangelo Antonioni: lo sguardo che ha cambiato il cinema 
{Michelangelo Antonioni: The Eye that Changed Cinema, Italy, 2001). 
Labarthe, S. Andre, La Derniere Sequence de Profession Reporter {The Last 
Sequence of The Passenger, France, 1974).
Lumiere, Louis, UArroseur arrose (France, 1895, silent).
Malick, Terrence, Badlands (USA, 1973).
Resnais, Alain, Nuit et Brouillard {Night and Fog, France, 1955).
Resnais, Alain, L’Annee derniere a Marienbad {Last Year at Marienbad, France, 
1961).
Pakula Alan, The Parallax View (USA, 1974).
Powell, Michael Peeping Tom (UK, 1960).
Tovoli, Luciano, Antonioni visto da Antonioni (Italy, 1978).
Vertov, Dziga, Man with a Movie Camera (Soviet Union, 1929, silent).
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Experimental Films and Videos:
Beydler, Gary, Pasadena Freeway Stills (USA, 1974, 16 mm, colour, silent, 6 mins).
Conrad, Tony, The Flicker (USA, 1965, 16mm, b&w, sound on tape, 30 mins).
Fisher, Morgan, Production Stills (USA, 1970, 16mm, b&w, sound, 11 mins).
Fisher, Morgan, The Director and His Actor Look at Footage Showing Preparations 
for an Unmade Film (2) (USA, 1968, 16mm, colour, sound, 15 mins).
Frampton, Hollis, Process Red (USA, 1966, 16mm, colour, silent, 3 Vi mins).
Frampton, Hollis, Heterodyne (USA, 1967, 16mm, colour, silent, 7 mins).
Frampton, Hollis, Maxwell's Demon (USA, 1968, 16 mm, colour, sound, 4 mins).
Frampton, Hollis, Zorns Lemma (USA, 1970, 16 mm, colour, sound, 60 mins).
Frampton, Hollis, nostalgia (USA, 1971, 16 mm, b&w, sound, 36 mins).
Higgins, Dick, Invocation of Canyons and Boulders for Stan Brakhage (USA, 1963, 
16 mm, colour, sound, 1 min).
Holt, Nancy, Pine Barrens (USA, 1975, 16 mm, colour, sound, 31 mins).
Holt, Nancy, Sun Tunnels (USA, 1978, 16 mm, colour, sound, 26 1/2 mins).
Jacobs, Ken, Tom Tom the Piper’s Son (USA, 1969, 16 mm, b&w and colour, silent, 
115 mins).
Landow, George (now known as Owen Land) Film in Which There Appear, Sprocket 
Holes, Edge Lettering, Dirt Particles, Etc. (USA, 1965/66, 16 mm, colour, 
silent, 5 mins).
Landow, George (now known as Owen Land) Remedial Reading Comprehension 
(USA, 1970, 16 mm, colour, sound, 5 mins).
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Landow, George (now known as George Lando), Bardo Follies or Diploteratology 
(USA, 1967, 16 mm, colour, silent, 20 mins). [Versions of different length 
exist]
Le Grice, Malcolm, Little Dog for Roger (UK, 1967, 16 mm, b&w, sound, 13 mins). 
Le Grice, Malcolm, Berlin Horse (UK, 1970, 16 mm, colour, sound, 8 mins, 
single or double screen).
Le Grice, Malcolm, After Lumiere (UK, 1974, 16 mm, colour, sound, 16 mins).
Marker, Chris, La Jetee (France, 1962, 16 mm, b&w, sound, 29 mins).
Nauman, Bruce, Walking in an Exaggerated Manner Around the Perimeter of a 
Square (USA, 1967, 16 mm, b&w, silent, 10 mins).
Nauman, Bruce, Playing a Note on the Violin While I Walk Around the Studio (USA, 
1967/68, 16 mm, b&w, sound, 10 mins).
Nauman, Bruce, Pulling Mouth (USA, 1969, 16 mm, b&w, silent, 8 mins).
Ono, Yoko, Eye Blink (USA, 1966, in Fluxfilm Program [1966/70], 16 mm, colour 
and b&w, silent, 40 mins).
Paik, Nam June, Zen for Film (USA, 1964, 16 mm, approx 23 1/2 mins of film leader).
Rainer, Yvonne, Lives of Performers (USA, 1972, 16 mm, b&w, sound, 90 mins).
Rosier, Martha Semiotics of the Kitchen (USA, 1975, video, 6 mins).
Sharits, Paul, Ray Gun Virus (USA, 1966, 16 mm, colour, sound, 14 mins).
Sharits, Paul, Shutter Interface (USA, 1975, 16 mm, colour, sound, 23 1/2 mins, 
double screen).
Smithson, Robert, Spiral Jetty (USA, 1970, 16 mm, colour, sound, 34 1/2 mins).
Snow, Michael, Wavelength (Canada, 1967, 16 mm, colour, sound, 45 mins).
Snow, Michael, Back and Forth (Canada, 1969, 16 mm, colour, sound, 52 mins).
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Snow Michael, One Second in Montreal (Canada, 1969, 16 mm, b&w, silent, 18fps, 
25 mins).
Warhol, Andy, Sleep (USA, 1963, 16 mm, b&w, silent, 321 mins, 16fps).
Warhol, Andy, Empire (USA, 1964, 16 mm, b&w, silent, 485 mins).
Warhol, Andy, 13 Most Beautiful Boys (USA, 1964, 16 mm, b&w, silent, approx. 40 
mins, 18fps).
Warhol, Andy, 13 Most Beautiful Women (USA, 1964, 16 mm, b&w, silent, aprrox. 
40 mins, 18fps).
Wieland, Joyce and Frampton, Hollis, A andB in Ontario (Canada, 1967/84, 16mm, 
b&w, sound, 16 mins).
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111. 17: Marguerite Duras, India Song, 1975. Source: British Film Institute.
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111. 22: Nancy Holt, Sun Tunnels, The Great Basin Desert, Northwestern Utah, 1973- 
76, interior detail. Photo: Nancy Holt.
